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“China doesn’t matter very much. It’s not very important. It’s never going to be powerful.”   
- George Kennan, 1949 
 
“Every time during the last half-century or more that the sleeping Chinese dragon flicked his 
tail, there were American China watchers anxiously sure it was coming awake.”  
- Harold Isaacs, 1958 
 
“At any given time the ‘truth’ about China is in our heads, a notoriously unsafe repository for 
so valuable a commodity.”  
- John Fairbank, 1976. 
 
“Our fashion is to have the enemy of the year. China is big, it’s large on the map, it’s yellow, 
so there is an under-the-surface racist element, and it fits very nicely an obsessive state of 
mind.”   
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, 1997 
 
“This new focus reflects a fundamental truth – the United States has been, and always will be 
a Pacific power”.  
- Barack Obama, 2012 
 
“We can't continue to allow China to rape our country”.  
- Donald Trump, 2016 
 
 
  
 iv 
  
 v 
Acknowledgements 
 
Despite the occasional trial, no thesis is a journey completed alone. 
With many great thanks to friends and colleagues: Ariel, Maria, Paul, Gemma, Lily, Matt, 
Cahir, Chris, Stefan, Russell, Xander, Mide and Pete. 
I benefitted from a number of conversations at various conferences and workshops over the 
years and I am grateful to the time people gave to me and my ideas. I would like to extend my 
thanks to the organisers and participants of the 2013 Gregynog summer school. I would also 
like to thank the organisers and participants at the Oslo PRIO research methods workshop in 
2014, in particular Mark Salter for his energy, kindness and inspiration. Many thanks as well 
to the staff at the National Committee on US-China Relations in New York City for kindly 
hosting me during the early winter months of 2014. This was an eye opening experience that 
had a profound effect on the direction this thesis took and I will always be thankful for that. 
During my time in New York I was fortunate enough to be invited to participate in one of Lily 
Ling’s graduate courses and not only did this stimulate a whole world of new ideas my work 
benefitted substantially from our conversations. 
Many thanks go as well to the Staff of the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress 
during the summer of 2015 for making my stay a welcoming, productive and fun experience.   
I also extend my gratitude to the ESRC for making this whole enterprise financially possible.  
A number of staff in my department at Newcastle were also kind enough to lend me their time 
and share their wisdom when I came knocking. Special mentions go to Kyle Grayson, Matt 
Davies, Jemima Repo and the guardians in the GPS office. 
Thanks must also go to all the members of Hartmut Behr’s Supervision Colloquium from 
2013-2017 for conversations, provocations and motivation.  
Where would I be with out the patience, guidance, counselling, motivation, laughter, honesty 
and friendship of my supervisors, Hartmut Behr and Michael Barr. Thank you for motivating 
me until the end. 
Shout out to Erik, Phill and Chantal for putting up with all the struggles over the years.  
The thanks I owe to my dad, Simon Coulson, for the past few years and more, go beyond 
what words here will capture. For now, thank you. 
The memory of my mum has been my main motivation for the longest time and that has 
proven true here. Thank you. 
And of course my infinite gratitude goes to Shaadeh and Rex for everything till now and what 
is still to come.  
 vi 
  
 vii 
Abstract 
This thesis analyses US presidential discourses of China from 1844 to 2016. Provoked by the 
contemporary trope of the ‘rise of China’ and Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to the Asia Pacific, I 
demonstrate how specific US discourses of China have emerged over time to condition how 
the US thinks about and acts towards China. Through an interdisciplinary analytical 
framework, motivated by a poststructural ethos, appreciative of the contributions of political 
economy and inspired by the methodological approach of Michel Foucault, I conduct an 
intertextual discourse analysis and genealogical critique of US Presidential discourses on 
China.  
By focusing on ‘official’ sources, predominantly the speeches and statements of US 
Presidents, I analyse US discourses of China from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the 
end of Barack Obama’s Presidency in 2016. Through this genealogical discourse analysis I 
argue that three logics, of identity, capital, and geopolitics, emerge over time and are 
predominant in shaping US foreign policy towards China. I do not take these as pre-existing 
assumptions but inductively conceptualise them through a hermeneutic engagement with the 
history of US Presidential discourses regarding China. These logics function to frame, 
organise and limit what is politically possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US 
foreign policy towards China.  
The logic of capital addresses the need for US capital to reproduce itself by expanding 
internationally. The logic of geopolitics functions primarily as the organising principles for 
the logic of capital and US foreign relations specifically in relation to China. The logic of 
identity functions as a conditioning limit on the logics of capital and geopolitics. From this, I 
conclude that US anxiety over the ‘rise of China’ is a manifestation of historic US 
conceptions of its identity, its geopolitical imagining of the Asia-Pacific, and the perceived 
imperatives of contemporary capitalism.  
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I Thinking About US Presidential Discourses of China 
 
Part I of this thesis sets out the problem this research addresses and the analytical approach it 
adopts. Chapter 1 introduces the focus of this research through the initial context of Barack 
Obama’s pivot to Asia and outlines the argument revolving around the presence of three 
logics – identity, capital, and geopolitics- in US presidential discourses towards China. 
Chapter 2 outlines the existing literature on US foreign policy towards China to situate my 
argument and indicate how this research reacts and contributes to further analysis. Chapter 3 
presents my analytical framework beginning with the major arguments regarding the logics of 
identity, capital, and geopolitics and then setting out the methodology of a genealogical 
discourse analysis that underpins this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 – US Foreign Policy and China 
1.1 China in the US Imagination  
During the 2012 Super Bowl, a campaign advert released by a Republican candidate for the 
House of Representatives featured a Chinese woman mocking the US in broken English. She 
declared: “You borrow more and more from us. Your economy get very weak. Ours get very 
good. We take your jobs”.1 The ad, though heavily criticised, was not unusual. In the 2010 US 
mid-term elections, nearly 30 candidates ran pieces referring to China as a threat to US 
interests.2  In a 2012 Republican debate on National Security, one candidate, Rick Perry, 
declared that “Communist China is destined for the ash heap of history because they are not a 
country of virtues”.3 China ‘bashing’ during US political campaign season though, was not 
necessarily a new phenomenon.4 More recently in May 2016, then Republican candidate for 
the Presidency, and now US President, Donald Trump when making the case for protecting 
US jobs remarked, somewhat crudely, “we can't continue to allow China to rape our 
country”.5  The last few years have seen the increasing prevalence of China in US political 
discourse and foreign policy. How the US thinks about China though, has a history, and that 
history can help illuminate how the US thinks today. 
Writing in 1976, the renowned historian of US-China relations, John Fairbank captured these 
dynamics where he argued how “at any given time the ‘truth’ about China is in our heads, a 
notoriously unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity”.6 Tinged with irony, this remark 
suggests that the ‘truth’ of what China is or is not, is at once an intangible and tangible 
“commodity” inhabiting the imagination. Harold Isaacs understood this claim when he 
observed that “every time during the last half-century or more that the sleeping Chinese 
                                                
1 Rachel Weiner, ‘Pete Hoekstra’s China ad provokes accusations of racism’, The Washington Post 
(http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/pete-hoekstras-china-ad-provokes-accusations-of-
racism/2012/02/06/gIQAPD6buQ_blog.html 15 February 2012). 
2 David Chen, ‘China Emerges as a Scapegoat in Campaign Ads’, The New York Times 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/us/politics/10outsource.html?pagewanted=all 5 February 2012). 
3 ‘Part IV: 21:30-22:00, CNN National Security Debate’, CNN 
(http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1111/22/se.05.html 14 March 2013). 
4 Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘China Bashing: A US political tradition’, Reuters (http://blogs.reuters.com/great-
debate/2012/10/11/china-bashing-a-political-tradition/, 10 February 2015). 
5 Jeremy Diamond, ‘Trump: 'We can't continue to allow China to rape our country', CNN 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/01/politics/donald-trump-china-rape/, 24 October 2016); David Autor, David 
Dorn and Gordon Hanson, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labour Market Effects of Import competition in the 
United States’, American Economic Review 103(2013): 2121-2168; Claire Miller, ‘The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is 
Not China. It’s Automation’, The New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/upshot/the-long-term-
jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html, 24 October 2016). 
6 John Fairbank, China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1976): xiv. 
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dragon flicked his tail, there were American China watchers anxiously sure it was coming 
awake”.7  James Baker reflected these observations in 1991 when as US Secretary of State, he 
observed that US views of China had “oscillated between extremes of fascination and 
confrontation”, and alluded to the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in 1949 as a 
sign that US attempts to remake China in its image was now a “conversion that failed”. 8 Not 
long after this one the of the first explicit references to the ‘rise of China’ appeared in print in 
William Overholt’s 1994 book The Rise of China: How Economic Reform is Creating a New 
Superpower.9 This was soon followed by a trend of sensationalist texts, ranging in degrees of 
orientalism, which argued conflict with China was deliberately undermining the US and 
conflict was imminent or necessary.10 More recent texts consider the historical parallel of the 
breakout of World War or suggest that China has a secret strategy to replace the US as the 
global superpower.11 
Contemporary US-China relations have also been depicted by a number of popular culture 
artefacts that constitute the broader US imagination as the intersubjective background within 
which political practices take place.12 In a stage play called Chimerica, which examines the 
changing fortunes of the US and China, a character expresses concern about China’s foreign 
policy, “you know how much they’ve expanded their military? How much of Africa they’ve 
got in their shopping carts?...they seem pretty intent on putting every factory in Ohio out of 
                                                
7 Harold Isaacs, Scratches on our Minds (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1980): 209. 
8 James A. Baker III, ‘America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community’, Foreign Affairs 70 
(1991): 15. 
9 William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). For his more recent take 
on the issue see William Overholt, Asia, America, and The Transformation of Geopolitics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
10 Bill Gertz, The China Threat How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington DC: Regnery 
Publishing, 2000); Richard Bernstein, and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1998); Constantine Menges, China The Gathering Threat (Tennessee: Nelson Current, 2005); Ethan 
Gutmann, Losing the New China (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004); Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim 
The Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese (London: Bantam Press, 1995); Reed Hunt, In China’s Shadow 
The Crisis of American Entrepreneurship (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Steven Mosher, China’s 
Plan to Dominate Asia and The World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); Craig Simons, The Devouring 
Dragon (New York: St. Martins Press, 2013); Eamon Fingleton, In the Jaws of the Dragon (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2007); Christopher Coker, The Improbable War (London: Hurst & Company, 2015); Daniel 
Burstein and Arne de Keijzer, Big Dragon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); Richard Bush and Michael 
O’Hanlon, A War Like No Other The Truth about China’s Challenge to America (New Jersey: John Wiley & 
Sons,2007); Peter Kiernan, Becoming China’s Bitch and Nine More Catastrophes We must Avoid Right Now 
(Tennessee: Turner Publishing, 2012); Ted Galen Carpenter, America’s Coming War With China (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Robert Haddick, Fire on the Water China, America, and he future of the Pacific 
(Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014). 
11 Richard Rosencrance and Steven Miller (eds), The Next Great War? The Roots of World War I and the Risk of 
U.S. China Conflict (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2015); Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon 
China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2015). 
12 Patrick Hayden, ‘Systemic evil and the international political imagination’, International Politics 51 (2014): 
426. 
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business”.13 More prominently China has also featured as part of a major political plotline in 
the second season of House of Cards in 2014, where it was depicted as infiltrating the US 
political process.14 This takes concurrently with  a growing body of fictional texts whose plot 
centres on potential US-China conflicts including the 1995 science fiction novel China 
Mountain Zhang where the US is a defeated satellite state of China’s and most recently Ghost 
Fleet which imagines a naval conflict in the Pacific and claims to be based on real world 
trends.15  At the very least, China has become increasingly prominent in the broader political 
imagination of the US. 
James Mann has reflected on the major narrative tropes that have dominated US media 
coverage of China since the 1950s. He observed how “in the 1950s, the coverage in the 
United States was of Chinese as disciplined automatons. In the 1980s, it was “China goes 
capitalist”. In the early 1990s, it was “crackdown in China”. Now it’s “China Rising” (and 
“China gets rich”).16 These tropes reflect some of the popular and dominant narratives of 
China in the US imagination that at times would filter through into official political rhetoric. 
More recently there is an emerging body of memoirs and books from former government 
officials how to deal with China.17 There have also been more varying theoretical attempts to 
understand what China’s ‘rise’ means for the US and how the US should respond18, what it 
                                                
13 Lucy Kirkwood, Chimerica (London: Nick Hern Books, 2013): 81. Gregory Lee, Chinas Unlimited Making 
the Imaginaries of China and Chineseness (Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003). 
14 ‘House of Cards Episode List’, IMDB (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1856010/episodes?season=2 , 10 January 
2017);  
15 Maureen McHugh, China Mountain Zhang (Great Britain: Orbit, 1995); Tom Clancy, SSN (London: 
HarperCollins, 1996); Tom Clancy, The Bear and The Dragon (London: Penguin, 2001); Tom Clancy, Threat 
Vector (London: Penguin, 2012); John Updike, Toward the End of Time (London: Penguin, 2006); Philip 
Nowlan, Armageddon- 2419 AD & The Airlords of Han (USA: Verneysbooks, 2013); Peter Singer and August 
Cole, Ghost Fleet (New York: Mariner Books, 2016); Peter Tasker, Dragon Dance (New York: Kodansha 
International, 2002); Chuck DeVore and Steven Mosher, China Attacks (Silkworm, 2013); 
16 ‘CDT Bookshelp: Interview with James Mann’, China Digital Times (http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/02/cdt-
bookshelf-interview-with-james-mann/ 1 June 2014). 
17 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise (Washington DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2012); Henry Paulson Jr., 
Dealing with China (Great Britain: Headline, 2015); Kurt Campbell, The Pivot The future of American Statecraft 
in Asia (New York: Twelve, 2016). For a recollection of the Nixon era normalization with China, John 
Holdridge, Crossing The Divide (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 
18 David Kang, China Rising (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Michael Brown, Owen Cote Jr., 
Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds), The Rise of China (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000); Robert 
Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security 
Studies 15(2006): 355-395; June Dreyer, ‘US-China Relations: engagement or talking past each other’, Journal 
of Contemporary China 17(2008): 591-609; Thomas Wilkins, ‘The new ‘Pacific Century’ and the rise of China” 
an international relations perspective’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 64(2010): 381-405; Rosemary 
Foot and Andrew Walter, China, The United States, and Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011); Nina Hachigian (ed.), Debating China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); G. John Ikenberry, 
Wang Jisi, and Zhu Feng (eds), America, China, and the Struggle for World Order (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015); Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu (eds), Managing the China Challenge (Oxon: Routledge, 
2009); Stephen Fruhling, Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2014); James Steinberg and Michael Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve U.S.0China 
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might mean more broadly for global politics19, as well as a burst of ‘think tank’ reports on 
how to manage US-China relations.20 Richard Heydarian’s Asia’s New Battlefield is the most 
engaging of these that explores how “Washington’s imperial ‘pivot’, China’s aggressive 
moves and Japan’s opportunistic moves add up to a volatile brew”.21 The potential for general 
geopolitical crises as well as challenges to US primacy in Asia has also become a prominent 
concern for orthodox IR scholarship.22 What is clear from this variety of sources is that the 
topic of China has become increasingly salient across the varied sites that constitute US 
politics. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Relations in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Bill Hayton, The South 
China Sea The Struggle for Power In Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Lyle Goldstein Meeting 
China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2015). 
19 Ming Li, The Rise of China and The Demise of the Capitalist World-Economy (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 2008); Paul Bowles and Baotai Wang, ‘The rocky road ahead: China, the US and the future of the dollar’, 
Review of International Political Economy 15 (2008): 335-353; Mark Beeson, ‘Comment: Trading Places? 
China, the United States and the evolution of the international political economy’, Review of International 
Political Economy 16 (2009): 729-741; Gerard Strange, ‘China’s Post-Listian Rise: Beyond Radical 
Globalisation Theory and he Political Economy of Neoliberal Hegemony’, New Political Economy 16 (2011): 
539-559; Mattias Vermeiren and Sacha Dierckx, ‘Challenging Global Neoliberalism? The global political 
economy of China’s capital controls’, Third World Quarterly 33 (2012): 1647-1688; Ho-fung Hung, ‘Rise of 
China and the global accumulation crisis’, Review of International Political Economy 15 (2008): 149-179; 
William Callahan, ‘Forum: The Rise of China – How to understand China: the dangers of being a rising power’, 
Review of International Studies 31(2005): 701-714. 
20 Paul Stares, Scott Snyder, Joshua Kurlantzick, Daniel Markey and Evan Feigenbaum, ‘Managing Instability 
on China’s Periphery, March 2011’, Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-
pacific/managing-instability-chinas-periphery/p25838, 26 March 2016); Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisu, 
‘Addressing US—China Strategic Distrust, March 2012’, Brookings 
(https://www.brookings.edu/research/addressing-u-s-china-strategic-distrust/ ; 26 March 2016); Robert 
Blackwell and Ashley Tellis, ‘Revising US Grand strategy Toward China, March 2015’, Council on Foreign 
Relations (http://www.cfr.org/china/revising-us-grand-strategy-toward-china/p36371, 26 March 2016); Kevin 
Rudd, ‘US-China 21: The future of US-China Relations Under Xi Jinping, April 2015’, Belfer Center 
(http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf , 25 
March 2016).  
21 Richard Heydarian, Asia’s New Battlefield (London: Zed Books, 2015): xii. 
22 Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Primacy or World Order?’, International Security 38(2013): 153-175; Avery Goldstein, 
‘First Tings First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations’, International Security 
37(2013): 49-89; Evan Montgomery, ‘contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise and the Future of 
U.S. Power Projection’, International Security 38(2014): 115-149; Ja Choong and Todd Hall, ‘The Lessons of 
1914 for East Asia Today: Missing the Trees for the Forest’, International Security 39(2014): 7-43; Yiwei 
Wang, ‘Rethinking the South China Sea Issue: A Perspective of Sino-U.S. Relations’, Pacific Focus 21(2006): 
105-135; Jonathan Kirshner, ‘The tragedy of offensive realism: classical realism and the rise of China, European 
Journal of International Relations 18(2012): 53-75; Michel Beckley, ‘China’s Century? Why America’s Edge 
will Endure’, International Security 36(2011): 41-78; Thomas Christensen, ‘fostering Stability or Creating a 
Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia’, International Security 31(2006): 81-126; 
Thomas Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert Kelly, ‘The 
‘pivot’ and its problems: American foreign policy in Northeast Asia’, The Pacific Review 27 (2014): 479-503; 
Christopher Le Miere, ‘America’s Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension’, Survival 54 (2012): 81-94; Matteo 
Dian, ‘The Pivot to Asia, Air-Sea Battle and contested commons in the Asia Pacific region’, Pacific Review 28 
(2015): 237-257; Amitai Etzioni, Avoiding War with China: Two Nations, One World (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia, 2017). 
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The increasing salience of China in US politics has not arisen from nowhere. Gideon 
Rachman described the post 2008 world as “the age of anxiety” as opposed to, age of 
optimism from 1991-2008, where “a shrinking economy and a rising China have changed the 
way America thinks about the world”.23 This sense of US insecurity is similar to what Richard 
Hofstadter called “the paranoid style” in US politics, a kind of broad crisis in the national 
consciousness which lead to humanitarian or aggressive actions.24 With this sense of anxiety 
in mind Barack Obama made the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, TPP, a large multi-
state free trade agreement a cornerstone of his policy in the Pacific where one of it’s main 
goals was to isolate China in the region. Obama’s signature foreign policy development has 
been his much advertised and much maligned ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance to Asia. In the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crisis, economic anxiety about the US’s place in the world, especially in 
comparison to China has become not only campaign fodder in US elections, but a general 
concern in US politics.25  Some were prompted to ask if the American century was over, 
while others reflected on the economic interdependence of the US and Chinese economies.26  
How the US imagined China came into stark view when in 2014 China launched an initiative 
to formulate what would become the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a more regionally 
focused development bank, modelled on the International Monetary Fund. Although China 
explicitly stated it was not to be a competitor to existing global institutions, it raised questions 
about the construction of power and international order in East Asia.27 The US, in unusual 
bluster stated that it would not participate and encouraged its traditional Western allies to also 
refrain.28 In 2015 Britain became the first Western state to apply for membership and was 
soon followed by Germany, Australia, and a number of others much to the chagrin of the US. 
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The US response and its lack of effect on the willingness of its allies to join the bank lead to 
the question of what this incident reveals about how the US thinks about China. 
The contrasting depictions above exemplify the complexities and ambiguities of US-Sino 
relations. For Americans, China is neither a friend nor an enemy: it is, rather, a ‘frenemy’.29 It 
seems to be simultaneously a partner, an ally, an adversary, and an enemy. Generally 
understood along a spectrum of either being ‘on the rise’ as a potential threat or an 
opportunity for peaceful cooperation, the tangled interdependence between the two, combined 
with China’s perceived challenge to US military ‘pre-eminence’ signify the unstable yet vital 
role this relationship has on contemporary international politics.30  If this is the case, as I 
would argue here, then it is worth investigating the history of how the US has thought about 
China by way of contextualising the present. 
In an early articulation of what is now commonly referred to as critical geopolitics Gerard 
Toal and John Agnew argued that “to designate a place is not simply to define a location or 
setting [but] to open up a field of possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, 
subjects and appropriate foreign policy responses”. 31 ‘China’ has in this reading, become a 
signifier and a trigger, for a broad, varied and contradictory spread of ideas, passions, beliefs, 
fears, emotions and arguments.  China though, as it is appears in US presidential discourses, 
also invokes what I call logics as a way of the US making sense of what to think and how to 
act towards China. The ‘rise of China’, as a discursive trope exemplifies what John Agnew 
has termed “making the strange familiar”.32 This familiarising of China occurs through what 
can be understood as geopolitical imaginations. These are a form of aesthetic engagement 
with politics, recognising the difference between the form of representation and the ‘real’ 
object it seeks to represent.33 As Roland Bleiker states, “representation is always an act of 
power”.34  As an act of power then, a representation is entirely subjective, contingent on a 
variety of contextual particularities. This makes clear that particular representations are taken 
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34 Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic turn in International Political Theory’, 515. 
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as accurate and ‘real’ portrayals of that which they represent. What is particular, contextual 
and contingent becomes obvious, universal and fixed. For instance, the notions that China is 
on the rise and this implies that China is a threat or an opportunity appear as truisms 
desperately indeed of critique.  
The geopolitical imaginations evident in how the ‘the rise of China’ functions in US 
presidential discourse exerts something akin to the disciplinary power described by Michel 
Foucault where discipline “functions to the extent that it isolates a space”, it “concentrates, 
focuses and encloses...by definition discipline regulates everything. Discipline allows nothing 
to escape”.35  Obama’s declaration, for instance, that “the currents of history...move 
decidedly, decisively, in a single direction” is an attempt to subsume the potentials of world 
politics a US-centric teleological vision.36  The argument I make here is that these geopolitical 
imaginations evident in US presidential discourses are conditioned by the three logics of 
identity, capital, and geopolitics. I derive the framing of ‘geopolitical imagination’ from 
Edward Said’s use of “imaginative geographies” in his Orientalism as an arbitrary, yet 
“universal practice of designating in one’s mind a familiar space which is ‘ours’ and an 
unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which is ‘theirs’”.37 Derek Gregory expanded on this notion to 
describe them as “fabrications” that combined the “fictionalised” and the “real”.38 We can say 
then that ‘true’ knowledge about the world is “a function of learned judgement” that 
determines what constitutes a legitimate political understanding of another state, a perception 
Said describes as “only a fictional reality”.39 What is important is not whether these 
imaginations are ‘the’ truth or not, but that these imaginations have consequences for what is 
deemed politically possible and necessary. How China is presented, constructed and imagined 
in US presidential discourses does not indicate some kind of truth as to what China really ‘is’ 
or ‘is’ not, but how the US understands and thinks about China. And here I argue this is 
constituted by the three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics.  
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Obama’s remarks represent the enclosure of US geopolitical imaginations into a singular 
hegemonic understanding of how the world should be organised, where China can only and 
should follow the US prescribed path, itself premised on a series of historical myths, or as 
Agnew determines, “the discursive process of domesticating the exotic”.40 This process of 
“making the strange familiar”, and sense of ‘knowing’ the ‘Other’ as Zhang Longxi 
articulates, “begins with interpretive givens, the epistemes or fundamental codes of a cultural 
system, but as the hermeneutic process evolves, those givens will be challenged and 
revised”.41 The “familiarity” in how the US thinks about China and how this has been 
rendered in the secondary literature is indeed of continuing reassessment.  This is precisely 
what I intend to achieve with the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics. They are intended 
to constitute an analytical framework to make sense of US presidential discourse towards 
China and this thesis is about demonstrating simultaneously how I derived them and how they 
can be used. 
There are historical precedents of states becoming ‘problems’ in US foreign policy in one way 
or another, for instance, Cuba under Fidel Castro, Iran following the 1979 revolution, the 
USSR for much of the 20th century and then Japan in the late 1980s. Japan is one of the most 
significant with regards to this research as much of the literature regarding its threat to the US 
is relatively interchangeable with the recent growth of ‘China threat’ publications.42  Richard 
Leaver for instance wondered if at the end of the 1980s we were witnessing a shift form “pax 
Americana to pax Nipponica”.43 Toal explored how Japan was used in US discourses 
regarding the ‘New World Order’ and the perception of Japan as an existential economic 
threat, similar in many ways to how China is characterised today in US politics.44 What we 
can say is that the ‘problem’ of China then, has become increasingly salient in US politics 
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over the last decade and how the US thinks about and acts towards China is a concern this 
thesis attempts to address. 
The question emerges though, given, the immense quantity, breadth and calibre of academic 
and popular analysis on the US and China, as will be indicated throughout the rest of this 
introduction and in chapter two, why add another one? 
With this in mind it becomes possible and necessary to consider what I call the logics of 
identity, capital, and geopolitics and how they produce and depend on particular imaginative 
renderings of China, as a site to exert practices of US identity, as a space for capital 
investment or potential consumers for US exporters, or a potential geopolitical threat to 
economic prosperity in Asia. 
1.2 The Logics of US Presidential Discourses of China 
This thesis analyses how China has been understood in US foreign policy from the mid 19th 
century up until the end of the Obama Presidency in 2017.  To do so, I present a genealogical 
discourse analysis of how China features in official US presidential discourse form 1844 to 
2016.. The significance of conducting this genealogy is to contextualize the present within its 
historical conditions.  I argue that when it comes to thinking about China the US has done so 
through three major frameworks, which have emerged historically. I call these the logics of 
identity, capital, and geopolitics.  These logics essentially represent and function as the 
discursive conditions of possibility for US foreign policy towards China while also attempting 
to capture why the US acts in the way it does. They are at times, contradictory, contrarian and 
complimentary, at other times one takes precedence over the two and rarely do they overlap in 
perfect coherence.  Their analytical significance is that they do not simply emerge from the 
present, nor do they exist as some kind of transcendental national interest. They form the 
intellectual horizons within which US foreign policy towards China takes place. These three 
logics explain the parameters in which China has come to be ‘known’ in US foreign policy 
and are evident in the foreign policies of Presidents from John Tyler up to Barack Obama. 
In this thesis I am making an empirically informed argument that has required the engagement 
with a broad, heterodox body of literature. It is my intention that this research speaks to 
questions of ‘how possible’ and ‘why’ when it comes to US presidential discourse of China, 
rather addressing one or the other. Where these logics emerge from and their relationship to 
domestic and transnational social forces is beyond the remit of this thesis, as I am focused on 
how they are discernable and how they function in relation to US foreign policy towards 
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China. What I will say is that I acknowledge that the social and potentially domestic origins 
of these logics is worthy of further study, as is their comparison across other case studies, for 
example US foreign policy towards Iran, Russia or Britain 
I make no general conclusions of how these logics may or may not function towards some 
universalized theory of foreign policy or international relations. It is a central understanding 
of mine that this kind of universalisation is not strictly possible even if potentially desirable as 
one might succumb to the potential reductionism or parsimonius theorising or analysis. I do 
see them though, as potentially useful starting concepts to spur  further investigation, in terms 
of the domestic or international relations of power, and whether they may be discernable in 
other situations. If genealogy is to be understood as Foucault intended and Colin Koopman 
has so masterfully captured, then it is about the analysis of particular context bound cases – 
with the potential to develop broader analytical concepts like biopolitics or disciplinary 
power.45 For the argument here, I have determined these three logics best capture how US 
foreign policy towards China has been conceptualised in US presidential discourses. The 
logics I describe inform US foreign policy, give it its overall sense of ‘rationality’ and 
constitute the parameters and criteria for what constitutes this rationality. The logics in this 
light inform what can be considered as legitimate choice but they do not determine a 
particular choice. They function as the discursive spectrum in which agency operates. 
The scope of my research covers ‘official’ sources, predominantly the speeches and 
statements from US Presidents from the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of the 
Barack Obama Presidency.This includes discourses engaging with the 1844 Treaty of 
Wangxia and the 1882 Exclusion Act. I  move on through the open door policies of Willaim 
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt to William Taft’s dollar diplomacy and the later 
discourses of Woodrow Wilsons. Following this I analyse the discourses of, Franklin 
Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson as China 
went from being considered ally to to an enemy. I examine the rapprochement under Richard 
Nixon and its continuation through the Presidencies of, Jimmy Carter’s and Ronald Reagan. I 
then examine the more recent discourses of China in the George H.W. Bush, William Clinton 
and George W. Bush Presidencies. Finally I examine Barack Obama’s discourses of China. 
Taking into account the long temporal focus of my thesis my research narrows in on official 
US government discourses. This is not to say other sources are of less value or irrelevant, the 
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contrary has been insightfully explored elsewhere46, but given the contraints of time and space 
and the agenda setting importance of US presidential disocurses this was the most appropriate 
material to begin with when addressing my overall concern of US foreign policy towards 
China. 
1.3 Research Trajectory  
At this stage, a brief outline of how this research agenda emerged in response to some of the 
initial dilemmas with my original focus is worth recounting to grasp the some of the rationale 
to cover such an extensive time frame. This initial digression is intended to make transparent 
the larger ‘messy’ process of research.  
This thesis began initially as a discourse analysis of US foreign policy towards China after 
1989 using the Tiananmen Square protests and subsequent Communist party response as a cut 
off point for examining the role identity narratives play in US foreign policy. Upon further 
reflection though, the limits of this type of analysis became more evident and increasingly 
problematic. The role that identity, the self/other nexus, and poststructural arguments about 
foreign policy being a reflection of these dynamics is well established in the literature, even if 
deemed insignificant by orthodox IR scholars focusing on security and geopolitics.47 The 
questions emerges then, of what would a study of this kind can add to the debate, or in more 
cynical terms, would it provide anything beyond an interesting but analytically weak set of 
categories of different discourses of ‘Chinas’ in US foreign policy. The subsequent scope of 
this thesis has expanded through back through history, and through seemingly irreconcilable 
theoretical paradigms.  
The limits of my initial approach became more acute in two ways. Firstly, I could articulate 
the different categories of discourse used to describe China including a serial abuser of human 
rights, a state that needed to learn how to be a responsible stakeholder in international politics 
or a competitor to US interests in Asia and globally. I could also explain how these were 
juxtaposed to lofty visions of a mature, responsible US self. These discursive tropes though, 
relied on particular historical interpretations that functioned as ideological givens in US 
foreign policy. In a way, these discourses reflected a historical common sense about the role 
of the US in world politics and how it related to China. The significance of conducting a 
genealogy addresses this by generating effective and appropriate analytical concepts within a 
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particular problematisation.  This is where my argument emerges from, that three logics are 
discernable in US presidential discourse as they condition US foreign policy towards China. It 
is my intention that these logics contribute an original contribution to the analysis of US 
foreign policy towards China that can be expanded on in further research.   
The second issue is to do with the scope of my analytical focus. Identity is an important 
feature of US foreign policy and Presidents often articulate their foreign policy visions 
through appeals to some sort of US identity, but this did not feel like an approach that 
comprehensively grasps the varied aspects of US foreign policy towards China specifically, 
and foreign policy more broadly.48 Since the 1990s the constructivist and more critically 
orientated strands of IR, led by scholars like Alenander Wendt, Ted hopf, David Campbell 
and Lene Hansen to name a few, have demonstrated the role identity plays in shaping foreign 
policy choices, and the performative role that foreign policy plays in constituting those very 
identities.  Yet, this line of argument appeared to exclude the role that capitalism plays in US-
China relations. In the short term, US concern with regards to China was amplified in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.49 Now, there is an abundant and rich literature on the 
economic significance of China in US foreign policy but this was rarely partnered with 
arguments centred on identity. If identity and capitalism are important features of US foreign 
policy then another axis of limitations to emerge came from the importance that geopolitics, 
in its classical sense regarding inter-state rivalry and strategic goals of national interests 
featured in US foreign policy.  
Identity, following my research’s expansion in a longer historical focus became too narrow a 
framework to understand US foreign policy towards China because capitalism and the 
prerogatives of capital were of much more explicit concern previously, for instance during the 
Presidencies of Teddy Roosevelt and William Taft in particular. In the 2011 Obama ‘pivot’ to 
Asia, it was evident, that identity, geopolitics and capital were core features in US foreign 
policy though it remained unclear how to best capture these dynamics. What became apparent 
is that neorealist arguments, for all their limitations and unexplained assumptions50, with 
regard to state practices of pursuing hegemony and acting in the ‘national interest’ provide 
some insight into US considerations of the geopolitical rivalries, tensions and relationships in 
                                                
48 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Politic and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998); Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies 
Quarterly 35(1991): 211-239. 
49 Hugo Meijer (ed.), Origins and Evolution of the US Rebalance Toward Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015). 
50 Richard Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization 38(1984): 225-286. 
 23 
East Asia. Neorealism alone though, offers insufficient explanation of the broader spectrum of 
US foreign policy towards China or why for instance China has sometimes been considered 
an ally, during the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek for instance, and other times, an enemy, 
like during Mao’s leadership in the 1950s. 
My research then was orientated around  the specific problem of China in the US imagination 
and I made use of the necessary theoretical considerations to engage with it. I maintained my 
focus on US presidential discourses, as an expansion of this, although in many ways 
desirable, would prove too overwhelming for a study of this kind. Though I would emphasise 
that a study that incorporates a broader range of sources of US discourses of China following 
my methodological approach would be highly desirable. Oliver Turner for instance provides 
an excellent long-term overview of what he terms ‘American Images’ of China in official and 
popular contexts.51 One of the limitations of this study though, excellent as it is, is how it 
excludes the role of what I see as the logic of capital in shaping US foreign policy. Bruce 
Cummings signalled a promising direction when he set out to generate a theoretically and 
historically informed approach to the problem of contemporary US-East Asian relations in 
response to what he saw as historical works compromised by an “epistemology of progress”, 
where international politics was on a teleological path to increasing interconnection via the 
promises of liberal democracy and free markets.52 Cummings though, took a broad approach 
focusing on US relations with countries other than China like Japan and South Korea as well 
as issues in civil society, but importantly focused his critique on what he called “American 
liberalism”, which I understand here as an overarching political rationality that the logics I 
describe might inform.53 
This thesis is not intended to be a comprehensive account of US foreign policy and China as 
this has been done effectively many times before.54 This thesis is also not about providing a 
revisionist history of US foreign policy towards China and is concerned with developing a 
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novel analytical framework with which to approach contemporary US discourses of China. 
My research in this regard is indebted to these works for providing an entry point into the 
history of US-China relations.  There are also many authoritative studies that engage either 
US-China relations either through constructivist approaches regarding the imagining of China 
in US foreign policy during specific periods, or emphasise the significance of China for 
various constructions of US identity. 55 These texts constitute a body of literature that this 
thesis will hopefully speak to.  
There are a number of other important studies that have examined issues ranging across the 
following: the role of the US congress56 in influencing China policy, George W. Bush’s 
approach to China and Asia57, the role of emotions in US-China relations58, the role of interest 
groups in US policy towards China59, the changing security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific60, 
the origins of the island disputes in East Asia61, US policy towards Taiwan62, or debates 
regarding potential hegemonic transition in Asia63. This thesis is an attempt to add to the 
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broad array of existing literature on US foreign policy and China but with an exclusive64 
focus on official presidential sources. At times I mention how other sources of discourse 
influenced official rhetoric and revealed the broader landscape of China in the US 
imagination. But this is not the major focus of my thesis even if it is occasionally important to 
indicate.  
The analysis I present and the analytical logics I derive from my genealogical engagement 
address how China came to be a problem in US foreign policy and how this conditions the 
way the US perceives its imperatives and potential ‘solutions’. In one sense, what becomes 
apparent in the genealogy I present is how China was perceived as the solution to another 
problem, the on-going crises in US capitalism dating back to at least the 1890 recession65, and 
the potential regional hegemony of Japan, a concern dating back to the 19th century as well. 
China would not emerge as a problem in its own right for the US until the Communist victory 
in the Chinese civil war in 1949. Although I indicate these features where relevant they 
remain secondary to my concern of demonstrating the presences of the logics of identity, 
capital and geopolitics in US presidential discourses of China.  
1.4 Chapter Outline 
In Chapter 2 I will outline how my thesis relates to the existing literature on US foreign policy 
towards China. In Chapter 3 I establish my analytical framework focusing on how I 
conceptualise my argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics; the 
genealogical approach I adopt; the method of discourse analysis which complements this and 
the manner in which I read US presidential discourses.   
Chapters 4 to 9 contain the main substantive elements of this thesis where I present my 
genealogical analysis of US presidential discourse of China from 1844 until 2016. Chapter 10 
will draw this analysis together and reflect on the limitations of this thesis and consider some 
of the promising questions emerging from the arguments presented here. 
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Chapter 2 – Approaches to US Foreign Policy and China 
2.1 Introduction 
The approach this thesis adopts falls within the broad tent of critical theory, described by 
Robert Cox as a theoretical disposition that “does not take institutions and social and power 
relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and 
how and whether they might be in the process of changing. … Critical theory is directed to 
the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts”.66 Cox contrasts 
this to problem-solving theory, an approach that “takes the world as it finds it, with the 
prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as 
the given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to make these 
relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble”.67 
In this light, the investigation will adopt an understanding suggested by Campbell that US 
foreign policy is a political practice central to the “constitution, production, and maintenance” 
of US political identity and its discursive constructions of ‘others’ such as the Chinese.68 
Consequently, how China is characterised in US discourses is a “practice of interpretation”, 
contingent on how the US understands itself and its role towards China, and vice versa.69 
Arthur Waldron calls for a more open process of thinking China is needed, one that 
necessitates in depth historical knowledge, imagination and the ability to think beyond 
existing philosophical and geopolitical imaginations.70 My concern in the rest of the thesis 
takes a step back from this important concern to establish the specific logics that inform US 
presidential discourses towards China. 
This chapter will briefly demonstrate how this thesis organises the extensive literature on US 
China relations in the context of my theoretical inclinations and argument regarding the three 
logics of identity, capital and geopolitics in US presidential discourses towards China. I begin 
with the body of literature that has inspired my approach and that I wish to associate this 
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research with. This includes work that can be loosely categorised as critical in Cox’s sense. I 
then summarise the debate between what should be overall considered as problem solving 
approaches including the texts that argue China is a threat to the US or global interests and the 
corresponding literature that sees China as an opportunity for the US to take advantage of. 
Following this I outline the general historical surveys of US China relations before 
considering some of the historical texts that focus on more specific periods. 
2.2 Critical Approaches to China in the US Imagination  
In chapter 1 I indicated some of the critical literature that this thesis attempts to engage with 
and contribute too. In this section I will briefly extend this outline to indicate the broad areas 
of scholarship I have been influenced by. Despite the prevalence of sources emphasising a 
potential China threat an increasing number of critical approaches have emerged that 
interrogate how and why China has come to be constituted as threat, is geopolitically 
imagined and how these imaginings and renderings are related to capitalism more broadly.71  
This includes Chengxin Pan, Daniel Vukovich, Michael Barr and Lily Ling who formed the 
approximate literary landscape for my theoretical entryway into US foreign policy and China 
by interrogating how China features in the US imagination.72 In a general sense, Zhang 
Longxi has asked,  “what could be a better sign of the Other than a fictionalized space of 
China? What [could] furnish the West with a better reservoir for its dreams, fantasies and 
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utopias?”.73 China is in this regard the exemplar space to be filled by US imaginations. Barr 
has engaged with how “the West’s own past, hopes and fears shape the way it thinks about 
and engages with China and how the West expresses its own moral confusion and cultural 
divide through a fear of China”.74 
Vukovich analyses the integral relationship between capitalism and orientalism to critique 
how knowledge about China has been produced in the West through a colonial discourse 
analysis.75 Vukovich argues that the Western understanding of China has progressed from one 
of “essential difference” to one the inevitable process of “becoming-the-same”.76 This 
“sameness” though is still structured by “a hierarchical difference” and confers a sense of 
positional superiority on the West.77  Vukovich argues that the “rise of China and its economy 
must have effects on intellectual production”, and this is reflected in the literature referece in 
the preceding chapter and the following section.78 Vukovich’s declaration that “it should no 
longer be possible to speak of orientalism and China without also speaking of capitalism and 
the enduring presence of the Cold War” contributed to my concern with the logic of capital in 
US discourses of China.79 Put plainly, Vukovich states that “it is no accident that the 
orientalist logic of sameness dovetails with capital’s own logic of a homogenising, abstract 
sameness”.80 Vukovich argues that China’s transformation by capitalism and the increasing 
global flows-including of authorised knowledge producers- between it and the West are the 
necessary background and conditions of possibility for sinological-orientalism in its current 
form”.81 For Vukovich, there is general consensus that the West’s understanding of China has 
been constituted on an economic basis, though he argues that the consequences are yet to be 
adequately investigated.  
Ming Dong Gu has also adapted Said’s understanding of orientalism specifically in reference 
to Western knowledge productions of China through his conception of “Sinologism”.82 For 
Gu, not all knowledge production regarding China demonstrates such traits described by 
                                                
73 Zhang Longxi, Mighty Opposites: From Dichotomies to Differences in the Comparative Study of China 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1998): 21-22. 
74 Barr, Who’s Afraid of China?, 7. 
75 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 7-8. 
76 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 1. 
77 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 3. 
78 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 142. 
79 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 21. 
80 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 5. 
81 Vukovich, China and Orientalism, 143. 
82 Ming Dong Gu, Sinologism: An alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism (London: Routledge, 
forthcoming). 
 29 
Vukovich as orientalist, dominative and contingent on “Cold War-era sinology”, or the 
prevalence of binary Cold War frames of reference.83  Gu defines sinologism as “an implicit 
system of ideas, notions, theories, approaches, and paradigms first conceived and employed 
by the West in the encounter with China to deal with all things Chinese”.84 Sinologism then 
“is both a system of knowledge and a practical theory of knowledge production” where the 
former covers the complex phenomena in Western based China studies and the latter 
describes the way the West is engaged in generating knowledge about China.85 William 
Callahan for example, has investigated the manner in which various ‘China threat’ theories 
simply assume this as self-evident, where as discussion on China constitutes a “practice of 
interpretation”, and the notion of threat is what should be problematized not assumed.86 
Chengxin Pan has critiqued the manner in which many US scholars, when debating what 
China is or is not, consider that “China is ultimately a knowable object”.87 He sets out to 
question the underlying ontological epistemological commitments in the “mainstream IR 
community”, contending that how these thinkers and many policy makers see themselves as 
“disinterested observers”, or problem solvers in Cox’s formulation as I classify them here.88  
Pan claims that in fact their claims are “not value-free, objective descriptions of an 
independent, pre-existing Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of 
normative, meaning-giving practice” that legitimises US foreign policy. Pan expands on these 
criticisms in an extensive critique of how China is rendered across of a variety of sources 
arguing that the threat and opportunity narratives, that I detail in the following section, 
emanate form the same basis of colonial desire.89 Pan and Vukovich served as some of the 
major inspirational provocations that guided the initial steps of this thesis and I hope that their 
concerns are reflected throughout my analysis. 
Turner, as mentioned previously, argues that a “key purpose of depicting China as a threat has 
been to protect the components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) 
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deemed most fundamental to its being”.90 He adopts a scope similar to the one adopted here 
where he outlines his contribution as along the lines that “no volume has yet been designed to 
explore American images of China and their significance to US China policy across the full 
history of their relations”.91 He does though, focus on a broader array of sources including 
official, media, art and literature. Turner traces how four identity constructions of China as 
“Idealised, Opportunity, Uncivilised and Threatening” emerged in the US during the 19th 
century and then returned in varying ways through the history of US-China relations to shape 
how the US thought about China and itself.92  Turner aims to address what he sees an 
imbalance in the analysis of China that focuses more on the material then the ideational and 
argues that these images of China have been fundamental to “formulation, enactment and 
justification” of US China policy.93 Turner’s approach constitutes what can be described as an 
archaeological approach in the Foucauldian sense that will be described in chapter 3. His text 
ultimately provided an excellent initial framework to thinking about US foreign policy 
towards China but as this thesis will demonstrate, identity, or as I understand it the logic of 
identity is only part of the analysis. 
Recently there has been steady stream of other studies that take a broadly critical approach to 
the US foreign policy towards China, their relations in general and the effect this might have 
on Asia. John Agnew has critiqued the linear narrative embedded in Western geopolitics and 
its construction of “China’s rise”94, Eric Blanchard has demonstrated the role that metaphors 
played in early US-China relations95, Jonna Nyman has looked at the securitisation of energy 
by US elite actors during the failed bid of the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation for 
US company Unocal in 200596, Jarrod Hayes has examined how the role of threat 
construction in US relations with India and China97, Kean Lim has examined the tension 
between state centric geopolitical concerns and transnational geo-economic formations in US-
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China relations concerning Taiwan98, Cotton Seiler has explored how the US media  imagines 
the future potential of Chinese automobility as reflective of the same dynamics in the US99, 
Jan Hanska deploys the 2013 film Pacific Rim as a interpretive tool for examining Obama’s 
‘pivot’ to Asia100, Pan has more recently looked at how the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is manufactured as 
a “super-region” to buttress anxiety about China’s rise101 and Turner has examined Obama’s 
Asia policy through a critical geopolitical and postcolonial lens focusing on the significance 
of identity.102 
In a similar manner to my approach here a number of other texts engage with how the US has 
imagined the Pacific spatially and explored the implications of how this imagining related to 
US practices and what this signified about the US itself.103 There are also more culturally 
focused texts concerned with how China has been encountered in Western history more 
broadly.104 For instance Bruce Cummings argues we should erase the domestic-international 
line when considering how the US expanded first Westward across the continent and then into 
East Asia as a way of conceptualising how US power today is conditioned much more by its 
relations with East Asia than Europe.105 Teemu Ruskola has considered how a form of legal 
Orientalism towards China was visible in US law and traced how this contributed to the 
constitution of a legal modernity and a legal exceptionalism as the basis of US foreign 
policies in the 20th century.106 Although comparatively small compared to the body of 
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literature concerned with addressing the  “China Threat”, these texts constitute the 
approximate theoretical milieu within which my thesis is related to. 
As should be clear, critical approaches that analyse US foreign policy towards China and US-
China relations in general are an increasingly extensive body of literature. The thesis intends 
to add to this by incorporating some of their insights regarding the role of images, capitalism 
and the role of the imagination when conducting genealogical discourse analysis of US 
presidential discourses of China. 
2.3 The Problem-Solving Approaches: China as Threat or Opportunity 
This thesis began initially as a response to the overwhelming production of texts that 
approached China as a problem to be addressed by US foreign policy. The majority of these 
texts adopted a line of argument indicating that China was a threat to US interests and 
hegemony either regionally or globally. Closely related to this trend was the genre that 
considered China as an opportunity and promoted cooperation between the US and China. It 
is in this genealogy, so to speak, that it is worthwhile engaging more substantially with this 
genre of political analysis. 
A number of events contribute to this narrative, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Communism in Eastern Europe, the events at Tiananmen Square, George H.W. Bush’s 
declarations of a New World Order, and the collapse of Japan’s economy and subsequently its 
perceived threat to the US. This is not an exhaustive list but relevant to the emergence of what 
can be described as the ‘China threat’ literature whose central motif is “the inevitable enmity 
with China” and subsequent US decline or endurance.107 This literature tends to constitute a 
narrow neorealist approach to politics, which when subjected to critique appears more as 
reactionary nationalism than implied ‘objective’ analysis. 
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This dynamic finds its popular articulation in a genre of China threat literature which includes 
books such as Robert Kaplan’s Asia Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of A Stable 
Pacific, Geoff Dyer’s The Contest of the Century: The New Era of Competition and Aaron 
Friedberg’s A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in 
Asia.108 This literature reproduces a zero-sum logic where space exists objectively as 
something to master and dominate rather than a material descriptor that is given meaning 
through socially constructed discourses. From this it follows that the China threat literature 
understands China as an objective threat rather than a subjectively interpreted entity. In one 
more hyperbolic formulation, a group of authors declared, “Asia is not a theatre at 
peace…suspicions rooted in rivalry and nationalism run deep. The continent harbours every 
traditional and non-traditional challenge of our age”.109  China, unspoken of in this 
formulation was central to those suspicions and rivalries. 
John Mearsheimer is emblematic of the threat-orientated analysis evident when he asked, “can 
China rise peacefully? My answer is no”.110 He argues that “America is likely to behave 
towards China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the cold war”, a 
policy approach he deemed necessary to contain China.111 Mearsheimer encapsulates the 
neorealist propensity to displace observation and context with ‘theory’. Daniel Vukovich 
describes this process as a form of “economism” where an argument tends towards abstraction 
as “the proper arena of truth”.112  He has also updated his ‘canonical’ text on offensive 
realism, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, to include a new chapter that incorporates 
these thoughts where his argument briefly stated is that “China and the United States are 
destined to be adversaries if China’s power grows”.113 Through a reductionist reading of US 
international history, Mearsheimer comments “I expect China to act the way the United States 
has acted over its long history”, exemplifying Vukovich’s argument that China is deemed a 
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seamless fit for a reductionist theory.114 From this perspective there is no need to interrogate 
the broader aspects of China and how the US relates to it as this is deemed secondary to the 
obvious nature of China’s ‘threat’. 
Chengxin Pan notes that objectifying China as a ‘threat’ “has much to do with the particular 
mode of U.S. self-imagination”, one characterised as utopia achieved, or in Hegelian inspired 
notions of the “End of History”.115 This universalising imagination can only behave in an 
imperial manner when it encounters something alien to its formulations, an inside/outside 
dynamic to borrow from Rob Walker, where these imaginations can be read as “historically 
specific understanding[s] of the character and location of political life in general”.116 
Particularly representative of this outlook is Robert Kaplan’s 2010 publication Monsoon: the 
Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Kaplan’s views are worth analysing due to 
his position in the US policy establishment.117  Adopting a particular American-centric 
perspective in relation to the Indian Ocean he presumes a pre-political state of enmity where 
difference is constituted as conflict and any potential state on ‘the rise’ is to be contained. 
Kaplan describes the current era as one of a “fading empire alongside rising powers, benign 
and unbenign” where, should the US’s engagement with world lessen, there would be 
devastating consequences for humanity and the preservation of a balance of power among 
China and other rising powers like India and Japan.118 He interprets China’s growing 
significance in the Indian Ocean as suspicious due to its dual-use civilian-military facilities 
and goes on to assert that US ability to comprehend this will determine its own destiny “and 
that of the West as a whole”.119 This vision, this imaginative imperative that the Western 
order is at risk in the Indian Ocean due to China’s ‘rise’, reveals a privileging of the 
particularity described by Walker as a universalising framework for understanding world 
politics. This encloses the future within strict confinements of ‘legitimate’ behaviour and 
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prevents adequate interpretation of existing conditions in world politics. Here, this manifests 
itself through a ‘rising’ China attempting to articulate, enact and legitimate its increasing 
political role and a hegemonic Western, if not principally US discourse, of pre-eminence in 
world politics. This enmity-driven discourse over China’s political existence often leads to 
reflexive referencing to military technology as solutions to differences of political 
understanding.120 
W. Wertheim, writing in 1954, decisively captured an underlying assumption that remains 
prevalent regarding contemporary fetish for ‘the Rise of China’ discourse in contemporary US 
imaginations:  
The temporary hegemony of western European civilisation has distorted our view of the past and 
made our interest one-sided. Because the world had been dominated by the West for a hundred 
twenty years...the West came to consider itself as the focus of world history and the measure of all 
things.121 
This process of confining discourse to particular assumptions is described by Herbert Marcuse 
as “the closing of the universe of discourse”, where such a “closed language does not 
demonstrate and explain- it communicates decision, dictum, command”.122 Marcuse’s 
argument is relevant here as it captures the how the threat literature exist within its own 
particular discursive framework whilst taking this particularity to be universal. So China 
being a threat is logical conclusion of the discursive parameters that the threat literature 
operates within. The threat literature most importantly, does not interrogate how it is China 
comes to be understood as a threat or not, or how the practices of US foreign policy become 
meaningful through discourses and other social practices. 
The smaller body of opportunity inclined authors often locate China within the narrow 
confinement of a ‘liberal world order’ of possibilities and potentialities are evident in the US 
discourse surrounding China’s ‘rise’. Even in this line of argument, the opportunity they 
described relies on the need to ‘do’ something about China. The major premise of these 
arguments when they do differ from the more threat orientated approaches is that this is an 
opportunity for the liberal order to demonstrate its credentials by peacefully incorporating 
China in to it. For example John Ikenberry claims that the major task of the current liberal 
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international order “is to make it so expansive and so institutionalised that China has no 
choice but to become a full-fledged member of it”.123 Order though, implied the ‘order’ 
imposed by Ikenberry’s liberal system. Bruce Gilley has commented more optimistically, that 
“China’s embrace of democracy will be one of the defining moments of modern political 
history”.124 Other authors that adopt an opportunity-orientated approach include Hugh White, 
Thomas Christensen and Donald Gross.125 Stephen Roach develops the most nuanced of these 
approaches arguing that there is now a state of economic co-dependency between the US and 
China and only cooperation can safely manage this relationship.126 China is less an 
opportunity in Roach’s assessment than a necessity.   
2.4 US-China Surveys 
The most useful survey based texts used to guide this thesis have been by Warren Cohen, 
Michael Schaller, Chi Wang and Gordon Chang.127 Their work helped guide my focus as well 
as provide invaluable context to how the US had interacted with China more broadly over the 
time period I engage with. I should emphasise that this thesis is not attempt to develop a new 
narrative or offer some kind of revisionist history of US-China relations, but an attempt to 
derive a more precise analytical framework for approaching the history and present of US 
foreign policy to China via analysis of presidential discourses. 
Michael Oksenberg and Robert Oxnams’ Dragon and Eagle: United States –China Relations 
Past and Future and David Shambaugh’s Tangled Titans: The United States and China both 
capture the complicated and popular imaginations of US-China relations.128 More importantly 
for my focus there is a history of literature engaging with the role that image and perception 
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perform in the political relationship between the US and China.129 These deal explicitly with 
how China is perceived and how the various images of China impact on policy. They do not 
however engage with more explicit debates regarding the logics of geopolitics or capital but 
are useful reference points for understanding contemporary perceptions. There are also a 
number of other excellent historical surveys by the likes of Harry Harding130, John 
Fairbank131, David Lampton132, Rosemary Foot133, Robert Sutter134. The body of literature in 
this regard is the most extensive with regard to the US and China, of which many contributed 
to the background knowledge of my analysis and in this in this vein they are worth citing 
here.135 
While these texts provide excellent points of reference and context, they are not intended to 
offer significant analytical insight into why the US thought or behaved in a particular way. 
Now, this is by no means an argument that these texts are irrelevant or any less useful, 
without my research would have been substantially more adrift than it was at times, but I 
attempt a form of analysis and argument that they do not. 
2.5 Historically Specific Texts 
Many authors have focused on specific periods to establish what happened in a narrative 
sense and these have proved an invaluable context to developing my argument and 
considering the events US presidents would refer to. There has been a recent boom in broad 
assessments of US-China relations in the 21st century and how the US should respond and has 
responded to a ‘rising’ China.136 There have been a number of important and insightful texts 
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on issues surrounding Chinese immigration into the US during the 19th century the subsequent 
manner in which popular resentment towards these immigrants fed into official narratives and 
actions into the 20th century.137 Some have focused on engaging with the historical ‘origins’ 
of the US encounter with China.138 And there are a number of texts that present broad 
histories of the US in Asia.139 These texts are generally historical in orientation and none 
adopt a genealogical approach or discourse analysis. 
I will also indicate in the brief introductions to my genealogy chapters 4 through 9 the more 
specific texts that cover particular presidencies but it is useful to indicate here how some of 
these more general texts constitute the larger ecosystem in which my analysis takes place.140 I 
am not particularly concerned with indicating which of these sources are in most agreement 
with the argument I present mainly because the nature of what I am attempting to do is 
substantially different to what these more historical accounts are intended to do. I would like 
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to reinforce though how the argument and analysis I make had benefitted greatly from the 
existing accounts of US-China relations by way of contextualising the speeches that I analyse. 
2.6 Beyond the US and China 
I do not explicitly address the broader literature on US foreign policy though it is worth 
briefly indicating that a number of sources outline the broader context to understanding US 
foreign policy towards China. For example, Perry Anderson has majestically considered the 
relationship between the geopolitical thought of US grand strategists and the practices of US 
foreign policy to chart the way US imperial practices are intertwined with its role as the 
guarantor of capital.141Although not explicitly as a discourse analysis but with a similar goal 
in mind, Joseph Siracusa and Aiden Warren have traced the development of US national 
security doctrines from Washington to Obama and William Walker III does so in a similar 
vein to determine the core values contributing to a sense of exceptionalism in US foreign 
policy.142 Joan Hoff detects a Faustian tone at the heart of US foreign policy from Wilson to 
George W. Bush, where it considers itself a moral force for good in the world despite the 
harms that this engenders when practiced, which is not to dissimilar from the arguments made 
by Peter Gowan on how US business elites and foreign policy thinkers attempted to ensure 
US global dominance.143  
Frank Ninkovich makes the argument that early 20th century US Presidents constructed 
foreign policy on the basis of civilizational values, as a discursive precursor to ideas about 
modernization.144 Walter McDougall traces a similar tension between the US as a superior 
moral entity and its more ‘crusader’ like urges.145 There are important arguments made 
regarding the economic basis of American empire and how this has affected the global 
capitalism.146 Similar to my approach although from a distinctly different theoretical 
background, Wesley Widmaier has attempted a more general analysis on how US presidents 
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have constructed crises from Woodrow Wilson to Barack Obama. He demonstrates in 
genealogical fashion, even if he does not do so in those terms, how crises were constructed in 
ways that led to foreign overreach which were then followed by more limited counter 
commitments.147  
There is a broader body of literature on US foreign policy specifically which can be 
categorised in similar fashion as I have here with US-China texts. These include critical 
texts148 which consider the role of ideas and narratives in US foreign policy, problem-solving 
approaches149 which tend to adopt neorealist approaches to developing some notion of grand 
strategy, general historical surveys150 which present a broad narrative of US foreign policy, 
historically specific analyses151 which focus on particular time periods Presidencies and 
approaches concerned explicitly with economic dynamics152. This is not to say that all of 
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these can be categorised as one or the other but is a useful means for summarising some of the 
literature on US foreign policy more broadly that were nonetheless relevant to developing the 
argument I present here. 
The literature that examines US foreign policy towards Japan especially towards the end of 
the 1980s was also at times remarkably similar in its variety and analytical focus to the 
literature on the US and China. 153 This is notable as some of the Chine threat literature has 
direct links to the Japan threat literature of the 1980s.154 Significantly, the arguments made by 
the likes of Toal and David Campbell with regards to US foreign policy and Japan are similar 
to the critical texts on the US and China indicated in section 2.2.155 
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I have attempted to briefly outline the major categories of literature relevant to this thesis that 
address US foreign policy towards China or US-China relations more broadly. This is to draw 
attention to the broader aspects of US foreign policy worth keeping in mind throughout my 
genealogy. What should be significant is that despite the quantity and quality of this body 
there remains the space for an analysis that takes a genealogical approach to US presidential 
discourses of China.  
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Chapter 3 – Analytical Framework: Logics, Genealogy, and Discourse 
Analysis 
3.1 Introduction 
Edward Said argued that the role of the intellectual is “by the very virtue of this vocation, an 
opponent of consensus and orthodoxy…so the role of the intellectual is not to consolidate 
authority, but to understand, interpret, and question it”.156 Although Said saw the intellectual 
as someone outside of the academy, his thoughts are relevant to what this thesis attempts to 
disrupt in considering US Presidential discourses of China. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, my approach falls within the broad umbrella of critical theory, an approach “stands 
back from the existing order of things to question how that order came into being, how it may 
be changing, and how that change may be influence or channelled”.157 Following Cox’s 
remarks that “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” and “all theories have a 
perspective” than it is imperative, if one is going to challenge consensus and orthodoxy to 
make my approach and purpose as transparent as possible. 158 Steve Smith reflects this line of 
reasoning arguing that “there is no view from nowhere, no secure, isolated academic refuge, 
away from power…all knowledge is partial”.159 If all academic activity takes place in the 
context of power then theory and practice as Smith indicates, are constitutive and so it is 
imperative to make clear the analytical basis of the argument I will present here.160 Before 
doing so, I will set out a brief reflection on the importance of analysing US Presidential 
discourses. 
While trying to clarify who should be considered an official voice of US foreign policy, 
President Clinton once remarked that:  
“in dealing with the United States, unless there is some clear signal to the contrary, you should 
assume that a statement by the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defence, the Secretary of the Treasury, the National Security Adviser, the Trade Ambassador, the 
people in our direct line of authority—they represent our policy”.161 
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Clinton was making the point that statements by the US president or other senior 
administration officials represented US policy. This might seem an obvious point but is worth 
drawing attention to when outlining the importance and value of dealing with presidential 
statements and discourse. These remarks were similar to a statement by Donald Rumsfeld’s, 
George W. Bush’s first Secretary of Defence when he outlined the centrality of the President 
in US foreign policy. Rumsfeld declared in response to a question about the ambiguity of US 
foreign policy in Asia that “there isn’t any ambiguity about our strategy. Our strategy is 
published. It’s written. It’s put out by the White House, not the Department of Defence. The 
President signs it, and it exists”.162 Rumsfeld’s assertion captures how the President 
essentially authorises US foreign policy and this underlines the focus of this thesis on 
Presidential discourses. The Presidential discourses I analyse then, are made up of the words, 
described Jennifer Milliken and David Sylvan, which “were the world of the officials who 
uttered them, and those words helped create the world in which millions of people of other 
people lived, suffered, or died”.163  The point they were making is that words matter. And in 
analysing US foreign policy towards China, the words of the US President matter for what 
they reveal about their conception of the world, and in this case China. 
More specifically in relation to US presidents and China, Michael Riccards, in an excellent 
account of how the US presidency has been the fundamental influence in US policy towards 
China, has demonstrated that “to a remarkable extent, American policy toward the most 
populous nation on earth was extensively dictated, managed, and implemented by American 
Presidents and their secretaries of state”.164 Riccards had earlier established how the 
presidency refracts through its own prism American society more broadly.165 To be clear, I do 
not subscribe the great man theory of history that Riccards also warns against, but I do 
maintain that US presidential discourses are important to account for, especially with regards 
to China, though they are by no means the only source worth engaging with. In more precise 
terms Gerard Toal and John Agnew have described the US president as “the chief bricoleur of 
American political life, a combination of storyteller and tribal shaman”.166 
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In light of these observations this chapter has 2 main purposes. Firstly, it will set out the 
analytical argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as they 
appear and function within US presidential discourses of China.  The second is to outline how 
genealogy, discourse analysis and symptomatic reading can be seen as a complimentary set of 
interpretive tools to analyse US presidential discourses. To do so I will first outline an 
understanding of Michel Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches 
complemented by the interpretation of Foucault’s work by Colin Koopman. I turn to 
Koopman as he has been the most effective interlocutor for understanding Foucault’s work 
and his methodological practices. This is significant as Koopman argues that the point of a 
genealogy is to demonstrate how certain problems emerged over time and establish analytical 
concepts that can contribute to understanding the problem at hand.167 I will then describe how 
a method of discourse analysis compliments my genealogical approach focusing on the 
prescriptions of Lene Hansen, before a brief outline of how a hermeneutic practice of 
symptomatic reading enables me to derive the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics from 
the presidential discourses I analyse.168 These 4 sections are intended to demonstrate how I 
interpreted the sources present from Chapters 4 to 9.  To be clear here, the genealogical 
chapters have a dual purpose, to present the body of evidence from where I derived the three 
logics from and demonstrate how the logics conditioned US foreign policy towards China as 
presented in US presidential discourses over time.  
What should become apparent is the broad theoretical basis this thesis takes to analysing US 
presidential discourses of China. A varied, complex, and at times seemingly contradictory 
body of literature has influenced the basis and arguments of this thesis, some of which was 
outlined in the preceding chapter. This includes approaches ranging from constructivist and 
poststructural IR theory169, postcolonial approaches170, arguments emerging from the broad 
areas of critical geopolitics171, Marxist approaches to political economy172 and the Wisconsin 
School of history led by William Appleman Williams173.  
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The theoretical literature where this work is primarily situated is extensive, rich and diverse 
including focus on topics as varied as foreign policy and discourse analysis174; Swedish 
foreign policy in the Thirty Years War175; the relationship between security, identity and 
drugs in Canada176; discursive critiques of IR theory177; Tibet in the Western imagination178; 
the colonial politics of representation in North-South relations179; how danger and security 
can be understood as culturally produced180; US interventions in Latin American181; the role 
of the US military in Hawaii182; how identities and various social mobilisations are occurring 
across territorial boundaries183; European identity formation and its Easter ‘others’184; post-
war German reconstruction and the concept of the West185, the discourse of terrorism in US 
politics186; discourse of civilisation and barbarism187; Russian foreign policy and identity188; 
identity and geopolitics in Europe189; dialogical approaches to international relations and 
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identity190; and the general relationship between identity and international relations191. This is 
also includes more specific texts that address US foreign policy through a method of 
discourse analysis, that engage the concepts of identity, or the imagination.192  
Significantly, as I engaged with the texts of US presidential speeches it became clear that 
identity was merely one aspect of US foreign policy towards China. As my genealogy will 
demonstrate, it would become clear that I would need some way to conceptualise and analyse 
how the dynamics of identity construction amongst other factors as articulated by 
poststructuralists interacted with the perceptions of economic imperatives and geopolitical 
considerations within US foreign policy towards China. With this in mind, the research 
became more and more problem orientated and driven. My initial approach had been to 
explore how US identity constructions shaped its policy towards China focusing on the post 
1989 world, with the political repression in Tiananmen as a starting point. This would have 
involved a broader discourse analysis of US foreign policy towards China including other 
official government sources like the State and Defence Departments as well as taking into 
account Congressional discourses. 
The initial expansion of my research came with the insight that US identity narratives 
concerning China invoke the much longer history of the US-China encounter, the notion that 
the US is a Pacific power for instance and this entitled and enabled it to taking a more 
prominent role in the politics of the Asia Pacific. As the scope of my research extended 
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further back historically, it became necessary to narrow the focus down to Presidential 
discourses to account for issues of space. This also explains the addition of genealogy to my 
initial method of a discourse analysis. I also felt, that a discourse analysis of US foreign 
policy towards China in a recent time period would appear too descriptive and lack useful 
analysis. Intuitively, after examining the discourses of this period I felt there was something 
more worthwhile at stake. My encounter with the William Taft’s Presidency and their explicit 
concern with finding outlets for surplus US capital raised a concern accurately captured by 
Mark Laffey when he observed that “leaving out capital and Marx skews analysis of 
historicity and defangs analysis of world politics”.193 Yet, this left me with a new conundrum 
of how to reconcile the theoretical divisons and tensions between a variety of theoretical 
approaches with seemingly divergent ontological and epistemological commitments. My 
analysis and theoretical approach is drawn from an eclectic body of theory including 
poststructuralism, postcolonialism, Marxism and critical theory more generally. 
What became apparent was how the US need to reproduce its identity, find foreign markets 
and outlets for its surplus capital and commodities and account for its geopolitical 
commitments to allies were all fundamental features in its foreign policy towards China. I 
came to see my research as being specifically problem orientated – how to account for US 
foreign policy towards China in US Presidential discourse considering the significance of 
these at times contradictory and contrarian concerns. More generally, my approach builds on 
Foucault’s description of critique where he has observed how critique “is not a matter of 
saying things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of 
assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought that 
practices we accept rest”.194 I combine this ethos with the critical perspective as outlined by 
Cox where critical theories attempt to register how changes in the existing order of things are 
changing and how and where they those changes should be influenced.195  Critique in this 
sense is less ambivalent than Foucault articulates it above. This thesis intends to demonstrate 
the modes of thought, and their guiding imperatives in the form of the logics, that condition 
US foreign policy towards China as present in US presidential discourses. 
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I do not explicitly argue for how US foreign policy should be changed or adjusted but one of 
the implications of articulating these three logics in US presidential discourses of China is that 
they indicate what needs to be taken into account if one is going to consider what it is that 
needs to be changed. It would not be a matter of calling for a reassessment of the US’s 
identity, geopolitical concerns, or economic structure but more of challenging at least, the 
concerns and imperatives of all three logics if one were to desire more substantial change. 
Koopman has made the argument that “critique in its most general sense is a procedure for 
explicating the conceptual conditions that make experiences, thoughts and activities 
possible”.196 The logics I describe can be considered as the conceptual conditions that contain 
assumptions found in, though not solely located, presidential discourses towards China. To 
accomplish this it is necessary to outline the multifaceted nature of my argument concerning 
identity, capital, and geopolitics. 
To clarify my intentions and aims, it is useful to explain what it is I am not attempting to do. 
This is not intended to be an empirical study of specific sites of discourse or policy. Exploring 
how policy is framed and its consequences does help inform how US identity and its 
constructions of ‘China’ are established. Although I take the US to be understood as a series 
of discourses regarding the self and other, I only intend to explore the official presidential 
conceptions it circulates in its foreign policy towards China as rendered through US 
presidential discourses. This is not a desire to judge China’s, the US’s or the West’s 
perception of what constitutes legitimate behaviour in world politics, but an exploration of 
how the US frames China within its foreign policy. Analysing US discourses of China can 
include many more sources beyond that of official policy, however I limit myself here to this 
spectrum for the purposes of space and analytical depth.197 There exists an array of literature 
exploring how the US media and other aspects of popular culture imagine China but any 
engagement with that material goes beyond my concern here.198  
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This also accounts for why I do not engage significantly with discourses regarding the ‘yellow 
peril’ or ‘loss of China’ narratives, as these were not found in US presidential sources. This is 
not to say they were not important features in the US imagination of China or in domestic 
political debates in the US, they clearly were, but they go beyond the scope of this thesis.199 
As David Campbell has demonstrated how US identity has emerged constitutively over time 
in the US’s multiple encounters with numerous ‘others’ beyond China, I do not claim that US 
identity emerged through solely through its encounter with China. I am thus interested in how 
US identity as it was deployed towards and then increasingly through the latter parts of the 
20th century constitutively constituted with and against its imaginations of China. 
My thesis attempts, through a genealogical discourse analysis to determine how the US thinks 
about China and offer an analytical framework for how to make sense of this. As reflected in 
chapter 2, my thesis speaks with, through and against a number of key arguments from 
Vukovich, regarding the significance of knowledge about China being produced under 
conditions of capitalism200, Turner, regarding the significance of US images of China in 
impacting how it acts towards China201, Ling, and the significance of how China both in a 
material sense discursive sense contributes the US sense of itself202, Hayes, and the 
significance of China as a “non-democratic other” in the process of threat construction in US 
imaginations of China203, Pan, regarding the colonial basis of the threat and opportunity 
narratives in US discourses of China204, and Barr, who considers the “failures” of the Western 
imagination when it comes to imagining China and what China’s rise means for the world205. 
To repeat I do not attempt to synthesise the arguments and theoretical claims of the different 
theoretical approaches to international politics, US foreign policy and political economy, but 
make use of the broad spectrum of analytical insight to understand how China has been 
imagined in US presidential discourses. My argument regarding the three logics of identity, 
capital and geopolitics discernable in US presidential discourse, is the conclusion of this 
process.  
I will now turn to describing in more detail how I conceptualise these logics, before 
explaining the 3 main features of my analytical framework. 
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3.2 The Logics of Identity, Capital, and Geopolitics  
Hillary Clinton, speaking in March 2012 at the US Institute of Peace in Washington D.C., 
described how “the link between power and responsibility is built into the logic of global 
politics. As countries become more powerful, their stake in the success of the international 
system naturally rises, because they have more to lose when that system fails”.206 “The 
international system is not static. Rules and institutions designed for an earlier age may not be 
suited to today”.207 A few years later on June 4th, 2016 in Singapore at a conference on 
security, Ash Carter, US Secretary of Defence, also invoked the notion of a logic of US 
foreign policy. He described how “US engagement in the Asia-Pacific is in America’s 
interests…America’s commitment to the region – and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in 
particular- is not transient. It is enduring. And that’s because the logic of, and the need for, 
and the value of American engagement in the Asia Pacific is irrefutable. And it is proven over 
decades”. 208 Now, Clinton and Carter were not US Presidents, and nor is their use of logic 
identical to mine, but they do indicate the notion that US foreign policy contains or operates 
in regards to certain logics.  
In brief, I argue that these logics function to frame, organise and limit what is politically 
possible and subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. The 
logic of capital addresses the need for the US to secure its economic basis through the 
reproduction and profitability of capital by expanding internationally. The logic of geopolitics 
primarily functions as the organising principles for the logic of capital although it also exerts 
contrasting political imperatives in how the US thinks about political stability in relation to 
China. The logic of identity functions as a conditioning limit on the logics of capital and 
geopolitics as well as compelling the imperative to reproduce the US conception of itself. By 
this I mean that the logic of identity both enables and limits certain understandings and 
application of the other two logics. In this section I will unpack what it is I mean by the logics 
of identity, capital and geopolitics. 
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To begin, I make  use of the concept of logic as distinct  from other terms like reason, 
judgement and rationality. They can and are at times used interchangeably in political 
discourse, however I find it useful to consider the specificity of why I use logic as the basis of 
my analysis. This also allows me to demonstrate some of the important limits to my research, 
as well as foreshadow some of the further research that is implied by many of my claims. It is 
also worth noting here that these logics I describe do not just give rise to or determine a 
particular policy, but those policies and their articulation reproduce those very logics. The 
relationship then, between logics and policy as I discern them here, is constitutive rather than 
simply causal. The discourses of China I discuss in this thesis then reflect particular logics 
while also giving substance to those very logics. The invocation of a particular logics at a 
particular time is dependent on a variety of other determining factors, most notably the 
various agencies involved with US foreign policy making and the other contextual or 
structural factors at the time. This type of detail though is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
even if it is a point worth indicating. 
Fundamentally I argue that the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics in US presidential 
discourses of China function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and 
subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. Before expanding 
on this though I will first engage with some of the ways ‘logic’ has been deployed as an 
analytical device in existing literature on international politics. 
Doug Stokes has described “dual logics” as visible in US energy security and US practices of 
empire more broadly.209 G. John Ikenberry discussed two logics of order, one with liberal 
characteristics and another organised imperial characteristics, as the choice the US faced in its 
“unipolar” moment after the end of The Cold War.210  Edward Rhodes211 detected an imperial 
logic in George W. Bush’s foreign policy and Franz Schurman wrote about the “logic of 
world power” where he looked at the origins, currents and contradictions in world politics 
where the “chief thrust of American imperialism” was control and “the chief thrust of 
international capitalism is and has to be profit”.212 John Hobson and J. Sharman attempt to 
trace the social logics related to identity formation that govern the reproduction of hierarchical 
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formations in international politics.213 David McCourt, most usefully has drawn attention to 
“everyday logic in world politics” which constitute “context-dependent practical 
imperatives”, frustratingly though this only occurs in the abstract and lacks expanded 
engagement in his text.214  Edward Luttwak spoke of a logic of strategy which imposed 
imperatives on US leaders when it came to China, though unlike my understanding he saw 
this as deterministic and universal.215 Where I see the logics present in US presidential 
discourse of China I describe them as particular to the example at hand.  More usefully, 
though distinct to my approach Vincent Pouliot, influence Pierre Bourdieu, has outlined a 
logic of practicality when making the case for a practice turn in international relations 
theorising.216 Pouliot makes the case for deploying a logic of practicality as ontological prior 
to other logics of social action, namely the logics of consequences, appropriateness and 
arguing, so that one can explore the constitutive relationship between agency and structure.217 
None of these authors except for Pouliot offer significant or theoretical engagement with what 
logic meant in their case other than the implication it was a set of ideas that influences 
reasoning, or some kind of social process. 
Robert Heilbroner offers a similar, yet significantly distinct application of ‘logic’ to the one 
used in this thesis. Heilbroner’s argument concerns the logic of social formations that “refers 
to the movements of and changes in the ‘life processes’ and institutional configurations of a 
society”.218 However, he understood this logic as generating certain political trajectories that 
we could identify in a causal relationship to particular outcomes and other processes.219 He 
draws close to how I understand the logic of capital functioning in US presidential discourses 
of China but I do not make the case for causality and place emphasis on how the logics are 
only evident in particular discourses, even if they themselves are contingently and 
discursively constituted.  I am not articulating a logic of capital as something that exists 
independent of US presidents as a systemic imperative, but as a set of constructed imperatives 
and conditions evident in how US presidents construct US interests towards China that takes 
place within the broader economic, political and social context. 
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Gerard Toal and Agnew detect a “distinctive cultural logic” in US geopolitical reasoning. In 
this reasoning they argue that representations of the US as a place are “pervasively 
mythological” in orientation, a tension between the expressions of US uniqueness and its 
belief in the universalisation of its principles and a tendency to draw a distinct line between 
the self an the other.220 The first two aspects they describe correspond to what I have observed 
as the logic of geopolitics in US discourse on China and the third corresponds more precisely 
to what I describe as the logic of identity.  Walter Mignolo has described what he sees as a 
more general logic of coloniality, which contains an imperial epistemology, as constitutive of 
Western modernity.221 In specific terms this logic of coloniality describes the 
“implementation of capitalist appropriation of land, exploitation of labour and accumulation 
of wealth in fewer and fewer hands”.222 What I take from Mignolo in this case is the manner 
in which a particular logic and my case three logics, contain and delimit knowledge 
production of, and practices towards China. 
My conceptualisation of the logics present within US presidential discourse builds on David 
Harvey’s arguments in The New Imperialism. Harvey argues that two logics of power 
constitute contemporary US imperial practices.223 Drawing on Giovanni Arrighi’s conception 
of a “territorial” and “capitalist” logic of power, Harvey outlines how they exist in a 
dialectical relationship, inherently distinct from one another yet intertwined, and to analyse 
US imperial practices, “one must not lapse into either a solely political or predominantly 
economic mode of analysis”.224  The logic of territory for Harvey was a distinctively political 
project where actors assumed power through the command of territory and mobilisation of its 
resources for various ends.225 It emphasised the political, diplomatic, and military strategies 
invoked and used by the state. The capitalist logic is similar but the command over capital 
takes primacy, where economic power flows across and through continuous space evident in 
the daily practices of production, trade, commerce and other flows.226 The relationship Harvey 
was trying to trace was that between the politics of state and empire on the one hand and the 
movements of capital accumulation. Harvey describes the “general thrust of any capitalistic 
logic of power is not that territories should be held back form capitalist development, but that 
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they should be continuously opened up”.227 Harvey used these logics to outline how “the 
political and military containment of China would be …essential to the maintenance of US 
global hegemony” in light of increasing Chinese assertiveness in Asia.228 US foreign policy in 
a broad sense then is a result of the interplay between these two distinct logics  
As useful as Harvey’s conception of his two logics have been, I diverge significantly from his 
understanding, not least because he does not definitively set out what he means by logic. 229 
Bob Jessop also criticises his attempt to integrate the territorial logic into his analysis and 
relying on the over determinate logic of capital to order his argument.230 What I take from 
Harvey though is the notion that US foreign policy might contain certain logical prescriptions 
and imperatives that compel certain types of practices and action. I am not trying to capture a 
geopolitics of capitalism as Harvey does effectively elsewhere231 but demonstrate how within 
US presidential discourses on China it is possible to discern three distinct logics. 
Building on Harvey from an approach he describes as a “radical geopolitics”, Julien Mercille 
has articulated what he sees as a geopolitical and a geoeconomic logic to interpret political 
events.232 Mercille attempts to incorporate the concerns of political economy in his approach 
to geopolitics to account for the “why” of policy with regards to US foreign policy with 
regards to Iran in the late 2000s and the Iraq War in 2003.233 In a paper with Alun Jones, they 
describe the geopolitical logic as capturing the US “need to maintain international credibility, 
a symbolic process whereby US officials of statecraft signal to others that challenges to US 
hegemony will be resisted” and the geoeconomic logic through Harvey’s “spatial fix” which 
they describe here as the expansion of capitalist activities to resolve “the tendential over-
accumulation of capital and labour power that threatens the devaluation of capital”.234 
Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith also attempted to articulate a geoeconomic logic to capture 
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how geopolitical forms had been recalibrated by market logics.235  This conception of logic 
significantly influenced the conception of logic deployed in this thesis although I also take 
into account the logic of identity where the US needs to perpetually reproduce its identity 
through practice and that this logic limits the manner in which the logics of capital and of 
geopolitics can solely condition US foreign policy towards China.  
In another case of using the notion of logic to understand US foreign policy, Brian Massumi 
has described the existence of a US strategy of pre-emption after 9/11 as an “operative logic 
of power”.  By operative logic he means a logic “that combines an ontology with an 
epistemology in such a way to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency that's is not in the 
sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible 
sweeps them up in its own dynamic”.236  Massumi describes an operative logic as having no 
set boundaries and “a potent shape shifting capacity” to take into account how problems 
change.237 I take from Massumi this understanding that logics have a self-propelling tendency 
within them and are dynamic, in the sense that their focus and propositions change over time 
depending on how material circumstances, the influence of other actors, how the US 
prioritises its immediate interests.  
Jason Glynos and David Howarth offer the most useful discussion of logics for the purpose of 
this thesis.238 Situated in poststructuralist theory, they develop their notion in opposition to 
causal laws, causal mechanisms and contextualised self-interpretations.239 They understand 
‘logics’ in three distinct senses. The first focuses on theory construction and explanation, the 
second as referring to a particular approach or ‘style of reasoning’ and a third in a “more 
substantive sense to constitute the basic unit of explanation of [their] approach”.240 It is this 
third sense in which I make use of the concept of logics as the basic unit of explanation of US 
presidential discourses of China. Glynos and Howarth take as their principal objects of 
investigation the “practices or regimes of practices, where [their] aim is to critically explain 
their transformation, stabilization, and maintenance”.241 In general, their conception of logic 
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“refers to the purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a practice or regime 
possible and intelligible”, which translate to case I analyse here with US foreign policy 
towards China as capturing what are the possibilities, limits and necessities for how the US 
thinks about China as rendered in US presidential discourses of China.242  
As they put it, the logic of a practice aims “not just to describe or characterise it, but also to 
capture the various conditions that make that practice ‘work’ or ‘tick’”.243 Overall, “the logic 
of a practice comprises the rules or grammar of the practice as well as the conditions which 
make the practice both possible and vulnerable”.244 Howarth has since affirmed that what they 
meant by logic was “designed to capture the point, rules, and ontological preconditions of a 
policy, practice, or regime”.245 The logics articulated then were not to be understood as 
independent of the specific historical context and empirical circumstances in which they were 
rooted.246 This is similar to the argument Koopman makes about Foucault, discussed in the 
following section, that one should be cautious about transposing analytical concepts derived 
from specific local analyses in to other substantially different contexts.247 
Logics, then are an explanatory concept where their function “in social scientific analysis is 
not only to make social processes more intelligible, but in the process of describing and 
explaining it should also furnish the possibility of a critical engagement with practices and 
processes under investigation”.248 Critical here essentially means contingent, arbitrary, 
revisable and contestable. To put this more succinctly, things could be otherwise but it is 
necessary to know why things are the way they are now.. This conception of logic allows me 
to critically explain US presidential discourses of China by identifying and outlining the 
major logics within them. I identify particular statements or arguments as comprising or 
indicating one logic or another by whether or not they refer to issues relating to identity, the 
geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific or invoking economic concerns.  
Essentially, logics as I use them, give a particular order to reason. Logics constitute what can 
be considered reasonable. They provide the limits and organising principles for what can be 
thought, even if those very logics emerges out of those thoughts. With this in mind I do not 
attempt to locate the origins of these logics, though I would emphasise that would be a 
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worthwhile project. The logics I discuss function as the discursive conditions of possibility for 
a particular rationality or practice. Wendy Brown describes how Foucault’s genealogy was a 
method for asking “what are the logics of power that have produced this condition and within 
which we operate?”249 I do not claim that these logics, explain history or historical change, 
but are visible in how the US thinks about China. Reason adjudicates between logics and 
allows for judgements to be made about what China is or is not or what should or should not 
be done about China.  The combination of logic informed reason and judgement amount to 
what can be described as rationalities, in a way that one might understand neo-conservatism, 
liberalism or in Foucault’s case, governmentality. Brown writes for instance that “political 
rationalities are orders of reason, not systems of rule” and genealogy is capable of exposing 
their contingent nature.250  The logics I derive form genealogy then allow me to describe the 
processes that constitute what one author has called traditions of US foreign policy. 
Walter Mead has raised the question of whether the US “foreign policy system had a logic of 
its own, a different logic from the one that governed the foreign policy of the traditional great 
powers of Europe”.251 In an attempt to capture this ‘logic’ he described four traditions of US 
foreign policy. They were, a Hamiltonian regard for close relationship between national 
government and big business, a Wilsonian sense of moral obligation to spread US values, a 
Jeffersonian sense of hawkish isolationism, protective of the US and what he describes as a 
“large populist school” of Jacksonian beliefs that the US should prioritise “the physical 
security and the economic well-being of the American people”.252 Significantly, Mead 
appears to undervalue the effects of the US existing in a capitalist world system and some of 
the geopolitical consequences of previous US foreign policy practices on its present 
behaviour. It is as though the US exists in a vacuum where the international context does not 
exert any substantial influence on the foreign policy process or discourse beyond notions of a 
dangerous world or a civilising mission. What I mean by this is US foreign policy towards 
China for instance, exist within the historic legacy of previous encounters and the broader 
international context which can and do lead to new dynamics and imperatives within the 
logics I describe.  
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 There can be multiple contrarian logics that inform a judgement about practice or a particular 
rationality as the impact of each is determined or reasoned by a broader array of factors. So 
where as the logics I discuss manifest themselves in different ways depending on the 
interpretation of material conditions and other social forces, a political rationality operates at a 
more general level. There may be an overarching rationality to describe US foreign policy 
although that would go beyond the scope of this thesis. My thesis then can be seen as a first 
step to deducing broader political rationalities in US foreign policy, but it would be premature 
to such a broad claim based on the relatively narrow scope of my focus on US foreign policy 
towards China.  
I deduce what these logics entail from the US presidential discourses that I analyse, and 
through a genealogy I can determine which logics were prominent in US reasoning and when 
changes occurred. The reasons for why one logic was more dominant than another though, 
requires an approach more in line with historical sociology to examine a more comprehensive 
set of factors, both domestic and international. I do, where possible indicate how the US 
justified its policy towards China in terms of the broader political context though this captures 
only a partial understanding of US foreign policy decisions as I do not focus in detail on 
domestic factors like congressional politics or other social or international forces.  
The major point regarding how I develop my argument regarding these logics is that they are 
what Jennifer Milliken has described as “grounded theory”. This means that “rather than 
selectively choosing data according to a priori theoretical categories” one “formulates the 
theory from the data by developing provisional categorisations via empirical study and 
abstracting, comparing on the basis of new data, whether these categories fit and, if necessary 
reformulating these categories so that they are empirically valid”.253 In this light, I determined 
the logics after having engaged with the source material even if I had an inclination from 
early engagement with the post 1989 US discourses of China that I would need a way to 
conceptualise how the US imagined China in terms of issues pertaining to identity, capitalism 
and geopolitics. The hope is that they might be useful analytical concepts for further research 
or refinement, but for now my focus is on demonstrating their existence via a discourse 
analysis of US presidential sources. 
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I use logics to capture how the US frames the conditions of possibility for its foreign policy 
towards China. I characterize the core features of these conditions as it relates to China as 
being structured through the logics identity, capital and geopolitics. They emerge out of 
existing ideas and responses to historical events. They are not necessarily linear in their 
development, and there is no teleological value in my critique, even if some of the logics 
themselves contain teleological premises. I do not argue that they become more refined as 
time goes on but recognise that their character and emphasis do change and reflect adaptations 
to on going events. Often particular political statements speak to and reflect more than one 
logic at the same time and at times the logics operate in concert with one another, while at 
others in tension, with no conclusive closure or synthesis. 
Additionally, while structuring her discourse analysis, Roxanne Doty outlines three concepts, 
thought of as textual mechanisms, of presupposition, predication and subject positioning. 
Presuppositions describes forms of background knowledge to be true, predication involves the 
linking of certain qualities to particular subjects through the use of adverbs and adjectives and 
subject positioning captures how the relationships established between various subjects and 
objects comes about.254 Doty uses these as a way to make discourses intelligible and describe 
their particular function. The logics I describe in my genealogy function to do all three by 
drawing on and implying a certain body of background knowledge about the US, its 
relationship to China, and China itself to be true. The logics also link certain qualities to the 
US and China and construct a particular kind of relationship between the US and China as 
rendered in US presidential discourses. They do this by reflecting, and bringing into being the 
varying meanings of China in US presidential discourse. When a president makes a statement 
or remark about China, they are simultaneously reflecting a particular logic or multiple logics, 
and re-establishing the very pertinence of that logic. Although I frame the qualities of these 
logics in terms of framing, organising and limiting how the US thinks of and acts towards 
China, Doty’s concepts contributed to understanding how these logics functioned. 
Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein have suggested adopting analytical eclecticism as an 
approach to world politics. This eclecticism was about “making intellectually and practically 
useful connections among clusters of analysis that are substantively related but normally 
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formulated in separate paradigms”.255  Sil and Katzenstein defined as eclectic “any approach 
that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements- concepts, logics, 
mechanisms, and interpretations- of theories or narratives that have been developed with 
separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both 
scholarly and practical significance”.256 This would enable researchers to “take on problems 
as they are understood and experience by political actors, without excessively simplifying 
such problems simply to fit the scholarly conventions or theoretical boundaries established by 
any one tradition”.257 It can be considered a way or approaching a complex problem in a way 
that makes that complexity intelligible without attempting to reduce this complexity to one 
theoretical paradigm or theory. Sil and Katzenstein also indicate that analytical eclecticism 
should not be taken to mean, “anything goes”, nor should it be considered “theoretical 
synthesis” nor as simply mixing methods.258 It should be a “flexible approach that needs to be 
tailored to a given problem”.259  The basis for analytical eclecticism depends on the 
“multiplicity of connections between different mechanisms and logics normally analysed in 
isolation in separate research traditions”. 260 
Taking Sil and Katzensteins’ arguments into consideration, this thesis is not about reconciling 
the debates between poststructuralists, Marxists, and postcolonial approaches or reconciling 
the space between neorealist and post-positivist approaches to IR. If that could be done, or if 
that were desirable, that is mostly certainly not a task of mine here. This thesis remains much 
more modest as I aim to demonstrate the presence of the three logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics in US presidential discourses regarding China. Yes, my approach remains 
committed to exploring discourse, rather than ideology, I understand the logic of identity, 
based on my empirical analysis, to operate on the lines observed by the likes of Hansen, 
Connolly and Campbell261, where identity is constituted, not necessarily always, through 
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difference. This takes the form of how a ‘self’ can only distinguish itself from other entities 
through performances of difference, of which foreign policy is the signature feature of this for 
states. Campbell for instance, adopts a “logic of interpretation” as the medium through he can 
describe a “logic of identity and the dispositions and orientations it encourages in diverse 
times and places”.262 Fundamentally for Campbell, “identity is an inescapable dimension of 
being and as “identity is constituted in relation to difference”, “difference is constituted in 
relation to identity”.263 This sense of identity though, is inherently unstable and in need of 
perpetual performative reconstitution, which in terms of the state takes place through the 
differentiation practices of foreign policy.264 
The logic of geopolitics contains much of the reasoning about state behaviour under 
conditions of international anarchy as described by neorealists.265 They do tend to act in their 
own ‘self-interest’ though what that self-interest is, how states understand that, and the 
relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ concerns is often more complicated then 
neorealists would have us believe.266  The logic of geopolitics also captures how the US’s 
understanding of how space is to be produced, organised, governed and then acted upon 
according to expectations of how a state should behave, arguments that have been detailed by 
scholars of critical geopolitics.267 The logic of geopolitics as analyse it pertains to both of 
these issues, the manner in which the US understands geopolitical ‘realities’ and imperatives, 
and the manner in which this has effects of producing certain types of spaces. 
The logic of capital is reflected in the work of David Harvey on the manner in which the 
contradictions of capitalism lead to what he calls the “spatio-temporal fix”, a solution to over-
accumulation within a given territorial system. This over-accumulation leads to surpluses of 
labour and capital where two solutions are possible, either the temporal displacement of 
capital through long-term investment projects or social expenditures such as higher education 
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funding or the spatial displacement of capital by opening up new markets, production 
capacities and labour possibilities elsewhere.268 In the second spatial fix, the forces of capital 
move across boundaries into new spaces or markets in other states, in an attempt to alleviate 
the surplus and maintain higher levels of profitability.269  Harvey outlines the manner in in 
which a combination of the two spatial and temporal fixes produces a particular kind of 
response to capitalist crises through “temporal deferral and geographical expansion”.270 
Harvey outlines some of these practices as consisting of “the production of space, the 
organisation of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper 
resource complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the 
penetration of pre-existing social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional 
arrangements”.271 China in this case came to represent a potential solution to domestic and 
international crises of capitalist accumulation as experience by the US. As important as this 
argument is, especially in regards to US foreign policy practices and as evident in US 
presidential discourses, my analysis indicates how this phenomenon encounters the other 
imperatives of the other logics of identity and geopolitics.  
I am not here saying that neorealists, critical IR scholars and Marxist based approaches should 
be reconciled into some unifying theory of foreign policy. But, that each approach offer 
important, yet partial understandings when it comes to interpreting US foreign policy towards 
China. I do not here elaborate on how the more modest task of attempting to locate 
overlapping points of analysis, but my genealogy indicates that we should do more than settle 
for mutually exclusive interpretations. I make this case based on my empirical analysis of US 
presidential discourses where concerns regarding self-interest, identity, capital and broader 
geopolitical considerations all feature in regards to the US foreign policy towards China. In 
terms of the actual process, I simply found that US presidents invoke issues pertaining to 
identity, capital, and geopolitics when considering China and it would be academically 
suspect to suggest one concern, expressed here though the concept of logics adequately 
captured the complex and interwoven concerns in US presidential discourses of China. There 
is no convenient or parsimonious statement to capture the spectrum of US interest with 
regards to China either historically or in the present. What I attempt to do here is make a 
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complex set of concerns more intelligible without reducing their complexity to a simplicity 
which is not present. 
What my logics try to do then is make sense of the arguments in US presidential discourses in 
light of what we already ‘know’ across multiple theoretical perspectives. A disconcerting 
thought is that these varied theoretical approaches and the conclusions they make will remain 
permanently irreconcilable and unable to grasp the complexity of US foreign policy in a 
manner that does not oversimplify or overemphasise particular aspects. This genealogically 
orientated research is in this regard, an attempt to make the complexity of US discourses of 
China not more simply, but more intelligible. And fundamentally the logics I articulate not 
only capture how the US thinks about China, but they function to produce China as the very 
problem they attempt to resolve. What I mean by this is that China is not some ‘problem’ out 
there in the world needing to be solved, but that the notion of China as a ‘problem’ that can 
and needs to be solved is contingent on the very discourses which portray it as a problem in 
the first place. And it is in this manner that I expand on Foucault’s comments on critique 
above to imply that it is on the terrain of these logics that US foreign policy should be 
challenged if one has in mind reducing the tension between the US and China. 
These considerations also reflect the arguments of John Law regarding methodological mess. 
Law considers that “if much of reality is ephemeral and elusive, then we cannot expect single 
answers, if the world is complex and messy, then at least some of the time we’re going to 
have to give up on simplicities”.272 To Laws, the world is “a set of possibly discoverable 
processes”, that can exceed our capacity to know it, though we can be sure that “everything is 
constructed in a specific historical context and there can be no escape form history”, hence the 
necessity of genealogy in this case.273 It is also worth clarifying here, that these logics are not 
meant to be totalising, all encompassing frameworks that explain all of US foreign policy in 
general, nor specifically towards China. My argument is that they are present, predominant 
and irreducible in US Presidential discourses. This is in recognition of Gerard Toal’s critique 
of what he calls postmodern geopolitics as approaches that “tend to smooth out the messy 
historicity and complex spatiality of geopolitical discourses and practices, attributing a deep 
logic and underlying coherence to these that may not necessarily have”.274 The mess that Toal 
is referring to here I take to mean the particular reasons for why these logics emerged, and 
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why they are rendered and deployed in their specific manner through each Presidency. Any 
attempt to explore the specific historical, political, and cultural context of any particular 
decision making or policy regarding China would have to do adopt a different theoretical 
approach.275 
The specific manifestations of this nexus are most certainly related to transient perceptions of 
state capability, class interests and antagonisms, other global circumstances, the sway of 
congressional and domestic politics as well as personal preference of state officials. However, 
I do not explore these issues in as much depth as would be required as my main aim has been 
to articulate and demonstrate the existence of these logics in US foreign policy through 
presidential rhetoric.  I am aware that this thesis appears to adopt a state centric conception of 
international politics, though I readily admit that the relationship between the US and China is 
constituted by a constellation of multiple actors across multiple forums where the state is but 
one of many actors. However, in the interests of time, personal ability and analytical focus, I 
limit my focus to presidential rhetoric as this best captures how the US state thinks about and 
acts towards China. I am not articulating the internal relations of the three logics as they relate 
to each other. When it comes to foreign policy they function in a particular manner. They 
exert a force that simultaneously produces meaning and yet limits what can be thought and 
done. I am not attempting an explanation of how identity broadly features in the US, nor how 
capitalism in general functions in the US, or every aspect of geopolitics the US participates in 
but how specific instances of these, in the form of particular logics are visible in US 
presidential discourse of China.  
3.3 Genealogy 
Michel Foucault remarked, in his essay ‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, that “genealogy is 
gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary”, reflecting the laborious task of piecing together 
analysis from a broad body of source materials.276  More pointedly he remarked that 
“knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting”.277 Knowledge, and the 
inquiries that produce knowledge are about intervening in the world. Foucault describes how 
“to do criticism is to make harder, those acts which are now too easy”.278 In this sense, it has 
become too easy to limit debate to whether China is a threat, without considering the 
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assumptions embedded in this line of questioning even in the spaces where there is a more 
considered approach to what China and its growing economic power might mean for the US. 
In this section though, I will outline my engagement with Foucault’s arguments on genealogy 
through Colin Koopman’s engagement with Foucault. 
Colin Koopman argues that the point of conducting a genealogy is “to use history to show the 
way in which certain practices have structured some of the core problematics which a given 
period of thought, most notably our own modernity, must face”.279   Foucault indicated that 
genealogy is generally more concerned with “local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate 
knowledges against the claim of a unitary body of theory” which would order those in the 
name of some arbitrary and truth.280  Although it may seem strange to approach US 
presidential discourses as an example of disqualified or illegitimate knowledge, as 
demonstrated in chapter 2 a genealogical analysis of them remains missing from the extensive 
literature on US-China relations. What I am interested in here is the more meticulous task of 
documenting how the US presidents have come to imagine China rather than form normative 
judgements on whether China is a threat or not. The analytical concepts of the three logics I 
develop through my genealogy are intended to contribute to the debates over the US and 
China today by situating the present in the context of the past. 
Genealogical analysis is premised on problematising ideas and practices that are taken for 
granted and the demonstrating the assumptions that guide these practices. There have been a 
number of effective genealogies in IR investigating subjects as diverse as finance281, 
diplomacy282, territory283, US exceptionalism284, racial identities285, US imaginative 
geographies286 and sovereignty287. This thesis aims at documenting the logics of US foreign 
policy discourses towards China as a way of establishing analytical tools to interrogate US 
foreign policy to China more broadly. Combining discourse analysis with genealogy is a 
response to the charge, and something that I found, that a discourse analysis on its own tends 
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towards the ahistorical. This is not necessarily a problem though in the case of this research it 
became clear that solely a discourse analysis of the more recent period of US discourses of 
China would be of limited analytical value as it became clear through my initial engagement 
Obama’s discourses of China that US residents exist within, build upon and constantly refer 
back to more historical discourses.  
In a recent summary, archaeology has been described as working “to unearth historically 
contingent truths through their archival traces” and “genealogy is the immanent, historical and 
critical exploration of power relations and their constitutive effects”.288 Foucault described the 
two in the following manner: 
“‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 
‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of these descriptions of these local 
discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play”.289 
The logics I describe as present in US presidential discourses of China then are an attempt to 
make sense of the “local discursivities” where US presidents refer to China. The 
archaeological work then is here, the invisible practice of determining what was said and 
when, and the genealogical is represented by my rendering of the logics of identity, capital, 
and geopolitics. 
The understanding and deployment of genealogy is diverse, and there is not necessarily a 
‘correct’ way of engaging with an issue genealogically. One’s understanding of genealogy 
may very well be determined by the problem or issue one wishes to address.  In one concerted 
engagement with how to think about and deploy genealogy, Srdjan Vucetic outlines how it is 
“primarily a method/methodology for historicising social items” and is a “distinctive 
historical, interpretive research tool suited for the making of epistemologically varied truth-
claims”.290  Vucetic argues that “effective genealogies are those that focus on a ‘problem’- a 
social phenomenon that appears (seems, feels) normal or true (commonplace, natural, 
intuitive) and then turns it into a question” of how the problem came about.291 On the other 
hand, Seantel Anais has described genealogy as a “methodological process concerned with 
telling the story of how a set of discursive and non-discursive practices come into being and 
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interact to form a set of political, economic, moral, cultural, and social institutions which 
define the limits of acceptable speaking, knowing, and acting”.292 In Koopman’s words 
though, genealogy is “an initiating rather than concluding phase of thought” and it “seeks out 
the limits that condition our possibilities for being, acting, and thinking in the present”.293 A 
genealogy is thus intended to yield particular analytical concepts to be applied through other 
methods to the task at hand. In this regard, my argument regarding the logics of US 
presidential discourse towards China begins the process of analysing US foreign policy 
towards China more broadly, rather than generating some kind of conclusive statement. 
Koopman describes Foucault as a “critical empiricist insofar as his best legacy involved the 
patient use of empirical analytics as a check against the speculative use of abstract 
conceptualisation”.294 This is underpinned by Koopman’s excellent distinction between 
Foucault’s analytics and his concepts. For Koopman analytics are understood as “the broadly 
methodological constraints that Foucault brought to bear upon his inquiries” like archaeology 
or genealogy and concepts “specify the formulations through which Foucault made sense of 
the objects of his inquiry”.295 Koopman also defines categories as “the lenses through which 
inquiry takes place”.296 So in the case of this research on US presidential discourses on China, 
discourse is the category through which my research takes place, genealogy and discourse 
analysis are the analytics, or method, I deploy, and the logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics are the concepts I describe and develop.297 It is worth mentioning that my 
description of analytical concepts is distinct from how Koopman uses the term analytics to 
describe Foucault’s “high-order methodological constraints” archaeology or genealogy.298 
Koopman distinguishes these from concepts like discipline or biopower whereas I describe 
the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as analytical concepts for how they contribute 
specifically to the analysis presented here. 
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Despite the prevalence of Foucault in the study of IR299 Jan Selby has argued convincingly 
that theorists should be aware of the difficulties of how to translate Foucault, “primarily a 
historian/theorist of the domestic realm of liberal capitalist societies, into the international or 
global arena, into a realm which, while no doubt a social and historical construct, has certain 
quite specific, enduring and irreducible qualities”.300 Selby also cautions against limited 
readings of Foucault’s analytical arguments, the tendency to read Foucault only in a 
poststructuralist framing, and the misappropriation of selective resources. Taking these 
warnings into account I do not attempt to use Foucault’s specific and substantive arguments 
about biopolitics or disciplinary power to analyse US foreign policy, but I am more interested 
in his methodological approach to analyse the discourses and practices of US foreign policy. 
Although Selby argues that the more useful applications of Foucault occur when engaging 
with the “historically shifting relations between knowledge, practices, institutions, and 
subjectification”, I consider my genealogy as a starting point for the broader analysis of US 
foreign policy practices towards China.301  In this sense, my use of Foucault’s method to 
generate the analytical concepts of the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics should be 
useful if, in future study, one were to expand the scope of discourses beyond that of the 
presidential.  
To more appropriately grasp what is meant by genealogy, it is necessary to consider 
Foucault’s own philosophical development. Genealogy as a methodological approach evolves 
out of and in response to the limits of archaeology as Foucault saw them, but as Koopman 
argues, an archaeology is a prerequisite to conducting a genealogy. 302 I will briefly explain 
the basis of Foucault’s archaeological approach and how it is relevant to how he understands 
genealogy but also why archaeology and genealogy are inherently part of his overall intention 
of critique.303  Foucault's archaeology provides a framework for discerning how certain rules 
regarding US discourses of China function, and genealogy offers a method for understanding 
how these rules come to constitute the logics I describe. It is not that the content and 
understands of the logics remain static throughout the time period I cover but that they refer to 
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a certain set of concerns where their content and relevance is contingently dependent on a 
variety of other social and political factors that I go beyond my analysis here. 
 
For Foucault an archaeological investigation was intended to understand how objects were 
regulated by certain discursive rules. Foucault indicated that archaeology was intended to 
study objects without referencing an essential “foundation of things, but by relating them to 
the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a discourses and this constitute the 
conditions of their historical appearance”.304 He continued stating this was “to write a history 
of discursive objects that does not plunge them into the common depth of a primal soil, but 
deploys the nexus of regularities that govern their dispersion.”305 Foucault was here interested 
in establishing the ‘rules’ for what could and could not be said and these contributed to the 
understanding of a particular object. In many ways this was essentially descriptive in nature, 
and similar to the type of project I initially envisioned on post 1989 US discourses of China. 
Foucault offered a more succinct explanation in an interview describing archaeology as “the 
description of the record” by which he meant “all the rules at a given period for and for a 
definite society defined the limits and forms of”, “expressibility”, “conservation”, “memory”, 
“reactiviation”, and “appropriation”.306  What this means in a practical sense is I had to first 
engage with the source material and describe what US presidents had said about China and 
then establish how these discourses related to each other. Archaeology it can be said is the 
preceding work that documents what was said and the limits of what was said to enable a 
genealogical analysis to take place. 
Koopman makes the case that Foucault did not move from one methodological approach to 
the other but expanded on archaeology by complementing it with a genealogy which had 
more of a focus on the nexus between power and knowledge where one always implemented 
the other.307 Koopman describes this as the view that “power and knowledge are neither 
reducible to nor identical with one another, and yet neither are the two ever wholly 
separable”.308 Foucault identified clearly how “studying their relation was precisely [his] 
problem” and he never intended to develop a theory of power or of knowledge but was 
                                                
304 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge trans.by A. M. Sheridan Smith (Oxon: Routledge, 2002): 
52-53. 
305 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 52-53. 
306 Michel Foucault, ‘History, Discourse, Discontinuity’ in Sylvere Lotringer (ed.), Foucault Live Collected 
Interviews, 1961-1984 (New York: Semiotext(E), 1996):39-40. 
307 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 37. 
308 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 37. 
 71 
concerned with how they function in particular practices, institutions and discourses. 309 
Foucault would describe genealogy in the following terms: 
“Let us give the term genealogy to the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which 
allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge 
tactically today…It is not therefore via an empiricism that the genealogical project unfolds, now 
even via a positivism in the ordinary sense of that term. What it really does is to entertain the 
claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims 
of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true 
knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects”.310 
More precisely, genealogy “opposes itself to the search for origins…the image of primordial 
truth”. 311 It is “not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that [things] have no essence 
or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms”.312 I am in this 
light not interested in articulating the origins of the logics themselves or claiming that there is 
some kind of transcendental essence to US foreign policy. The question though, of where 
these logics do emerge from and how they come to constitute US political thinking towards 
China is most definitely worth engaging in. 
Foucault would elsewhere describe the relationship between archaeology and genealogy in the 
following manner: 
“If we were to characterize it in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the appropriate 
methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, 
on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were 
thus released would be brought into play”.313 
If archaeology was intended to describe the rules governing what could and could not be said 
or thought, then genealogy would offer the tools to analyse how the discursive rules changed 
by providing concepts with which to make sense of that change. Koopman makes the case 
that it is through the “master key” of problematisation that we understand the relationship 
between archaeology and genealogy. Foucault again in this light described the two as follows: 
“It was a matter of analysing, not behaviours, or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies’, but the 
problematisations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought- and the practices on 
the basis of which these problematisations are formed. The archaeological dimension of the 
analysis made it possible to examine the forms themselves; its genealogical dimension enabled me 
to analyse their formation out of the practices and modifications undergone by the latter”.314 
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This allowed Foucault to develop a form of inquiry tat would enable help to define and 
articulate the problematisations that are the conditions of possibility for the present state of 
things.315 The research presented here then is orientated towards identifying useful analytical 
concepts for studying US foreign policy to China more broadly without engaging in detail 
how US conceptions of China have changed over time. This follows Koopman’s reading of 
Foucault where genealogy can help generate new analytical concepts that might then 
contribute to analysing in more specificity why particular discursive rules and norms changed. 
Through a genealogy I offer a reading organised around the three logics of identity, capital, 
and geopolitics that traces how China has been discursively rendered in US presidential 
discourses and how present US discourses of China are intimately bound up with ‘historical’ 
narratives. A genealogy then in Colin Koopman’s words involves a “practice of critique in the 
form of historical problematisation of the present”.316 Koopman’s main argument is that 
Foucault is concerned with problematising how the power-knowledge nexus works, not what 
power or knowledge necessarily are.317 Conducting a genealogy then is about articulating 
“strange singularities by fashioning concepts that make visible linkages, assemblages, and 
networks, particularly with an eye to their overall coherence”.318 Rather than deploying the 
terminology of an assemblage, or a dispositif that Foucault uses in his later works, I develop 
the analytical concepts of the logic of identity, capital, and geopolitics through a genealogical 
analysis pertinent to the particular context of US presidential discourses and China. If  US 
presidential discourses of China are understood in a broad sense as being ‘coherent’, despite 
some of the tensions that I will go into demonstrate, than that coherence is determined by the 
three analytical logics I describe.   
Koopman’s underlying premise is that Foucault must be read through a Kantian, rather than 
Nietzsche or Heidegger, and that Foucault internally transformed a Kantian transcendental 
plane to an immanent historical one. Koopman argues that “whereas Kant undertook a 
transcendental critique of the various employments of our reason, Foucault undertook a 
historical critique of the various deployments of our thought”.319 Foucault’s critique “should 
be understood as investigations of the conditions of possibility of the practices whose critique 
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they perform”.320 This is important to note as Koopman categorises the genealogy of Bernard 
Williams and Friedrich Nietzsche as being conducted in the name of vindicating a particular 
truth and subverting a particular norm or tradition respectively. What distinguishes Foucault 
from Kant in this regard, and aligns Foucault more with the notion of critical theory described 
by Cox is his interest in an “inquiry that provokes us to transform ourselves into being 
otherwise”.321 The advantage of a Foucauldian genealogy is how it “shows the precise ways in 
which our knowledges, powers, and ethics have contingently formed”.322  
The primary goal of a genealogy then is an “explication and conceptualisation of a complex 
set of practices that have contingently coalesced”.323 Koopman also indicates that genealogies 
should be understood as an “initiating, rather than concluding, phase of thought”, where it is 
not concerned with judgement but “bings into focus the problems to which further critical 
work must develop responses”.324 With this in mind, I do not intend the logics of identity, 
capital and geopolitics to be universal or transferable concepts to other contexts, though they 
should be useful when assessing the broader issues, and broader sources of discourses of US 
foreign policy towards China. This is something that Koopman warned about when he 
distinguishes between Foucault's concepts and his analytics and laments at times, how 
Foucault’s historically derived concepts and categories are unfortunately universalised.325 The 
logics are also, despite being the most prominent, not the only logics present in US discourse 
of China. But I maintain that they are fundamental when analysing US presidential discourses 
of China.  
3.4 Discourse Analysis  
Iver Neumann explains discourse analysis can be a way of “specifying the bandwidth of 
possible outcomes” in political practice or it can demonstrate the preconditions for a specific 
outcome indicating concurrently that it might have been different.326 To Ole Waever 
“discourses organise knowledge systematically, and thus delimit what can be said and what 
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not”.327  Discourses in Waever’s approach “are made up of statements, and what makes for 
the unity and coherence of a discourse is simply the regularities exhibited by the relations 
between different statements”.328 Can Mutlu and Mark Salter argue that  “language is 
political, social, and cultural” and “discourse analysis is the rigorous study of writing, speech, 
and other communicative events in order to understand these political, social, and cultural 
dynamics”.329 For Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillip “language is a ‘machine’ that 
generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world”. 330 Jack Holland describes how 
“discourses occur where language becomes relatively stable, producing meaning in a 
comparatively systematic way”.331 It is through the production of meaning through language 
that the logics I describe are apparent in US presidential discourses. 
Roxanne Doty usefully describes discourse as “a structured, relational totality” that 
“delineates the terms of intelligibility whereby a particular ‘reality’ can be known and acted 
upon”.332 Doty in this light describes how discourse analysis “can reveal the necessary but not 
sufficient conditions of various practices”.333 Martin Mueller distinguishes between narratives 
and discourse where narratives are “assembled through texts” and associated with the 
representations of events whereas “discourse is always more than the text, reflecting 
contextual, supra-subjective meaning structures that are not exclusively expressed by textual 
means”.334 Jennifer Milliken outlines how there are three major commitments to 
understanding discourse; they are structures of signification, they are productive of the things 
they define, and there is a relationship between the meanings produced by discourses and the 
practices that they implement.335  
Lene Hansen remarks that foreign policy debates are “about the definition of what is 
objectively at stake”.336 The articulation of a ‘security threat’ or ‘national interest’ is not an 
exercise in non-discursive or objective observation but embodies the use of a discourse of 
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what one thing ‘is’ or ‘isn’t’. For Hansen security discourses in particular imply a dual 
political dynamic, “they invest those enacting security policies with the legitimate power to 
undertake decisive and otherwise exceptional actions, but they also construct those actors with 
a particular responsibility for doing so”.337 Discourse analysis then is a method concerned 
with re-politicising seemingly objective statements and in Foucault’s terms, problematising 
the taken for granted. 
For Foucault in his archaeological writings, discourses are the “practices that systematically 
form the objects of which we speak”.338 They are more than just a series of signs and 
signifiers, irreducible to language and speech. His genealogical writings expand to examine 
the impact of social practices on discursive patterns that enable the production and 
understanding of objects and statements.339 David Howarth elaborates on this, taking 
discourse “to refer to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of 
subjects and object”.340 Howarth understands discourse analysis through the work of Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, where it is about determining “the historically specific rules and 
conventions that structure production of meaning in a particular social context”.341 As I use 
discourse analysis here I do not mean it as the study of ‘pure’ meanings within a particular 
text but as the more expansive understanding that includes the manner in which discourse 
reproduces meanings within a broader set of social practices.  
Hansen describes discourse as “framings of meanings and lenses of interpretation” as opposed 
to objective eternal truths.342 Discourses then constitute patterns of meaning and sense 
making, existing in a constitutive relationship with the objects and things that they help 
describe. This is to say that US imaginations regarding China respond to as well as shape how 
China is imagined. Policy discourses and discourses of identity as outlined by Hansen are 
subsequently conceptualised as ontologically related, inherent in the constitution of one 
another. As Hansen makes clear, this conception of discourse is concerned with the 
constitution of material facts and the structures that support them.343  
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 I follow Hansen’s work in a number of ways. I adopt similar ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, where I am ontologically concerned with the language used in discourses of 
China in US presidential statements, and adopted a non-casual epistemology where these 
discourses are constitutively related to US foreign policy practices towards China.344  My 
concern then is explicitly not what China essentially is or is not but with how the US comes to 
understand what China is. The ontological status of ‘China’ is thus beyond the scope of my 
analysis even if that status itself is similarly contingent and arbitrary. Hansen describes how 
“an intertextual understanding of foreign policy argues that texts build their arguments and 
authority through references to other texts: by making direct quotes or adopting key concepts 
and catchphrases”.345 This intertextuality forms the underpinning assumption of the 
relationship between the different speeches and documents I analyse, even though they are 
drawn from an extensive time period.  Most usefully Hansen outlines how to design a 
discourse analysis focusing on the number of ‘selves’ analysed, the intertextual source base, 
the number of events and the temporal perspective considered.346 For my purposes I focus on 
a single ‘self’ embodied by the US president, I rely on official discourses and focus on 
multiple events over a substantial period of time. 
The President for instance, circulates many dominant imaginaries of and for the US political 
entity.347 The importance of historically contextualising China within US discourses is 
signified by Hansen’s observation that “the meaning of security is tied to historically specific 
forms of political community” where identity practices are a performance of a particular 
imagination.348 This requires an understanding of the manner in which the ‘self’ is regarded in 
relation towards the ‘other’ and the forming of identity through difference, or as Hansen and 
others formulate, that identity is constitutively related to foreign policy and security practices. 
349 This process captures how the logic of identity functions as I describe in US presidential 
discourses towards China. I maintain though, that despite the centrality of identity in 
Hansen’s analysis it is not merely through the logic of identity that US presidential discourses 
imagine China and construct US foreign policy towards and China.  
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In a practical sense, I focused my analysis on US presidential sources taken from the 
American Presidency Project, which is a digital archive hosted by the University of California 
in Santa Barbara.350 The archive contains over 123,000 individual sources relating to US 
Presidents from George Washington up until the current President Donald Trump. It includes 
State of the Union addresses, major speeches, executive orders, some interviews, press office 
statements, news conferences, some government reports and other documents related to the 
US presidency. I searched the archive for all documents containing the word China in a 
presidential source, not including documents from the press office. There were 5887 relevant 
documents from George Washington up until the end of Barack Obama’s second term in 
January 2017. Although my genealogy is focused on the years from 1844 to 2016 it was 
useful to establish what US presidents before 1844 had to say about China and although they 
provide some useful context in the following chapter they do not represent the major 
analytical focus of this thesis. From the 5887 I concluded that 403 contained meaningful 
statements regarding US policy towards China and they form the basis of my analysis. By 
meaningful here I was looking for statements that reflected some kind of judgement and 
opinion rather than factual accounts of events. The main sources I used are listed at the 
beginning of the bibliography, and although I do not quote everyone individually they 
remained important for contextualising and understanding the ones that I do include. I have 
also at times engaged with key texts from outside this archive, predominantly including the 
major statements of senior government officials, based on their intertextual significance in 
articulating the logics of US foreign policies towards China.  
Luis Lobo-Guerrero describes approaching an archive as a site of interrogation, rather than a 
store of knowledge, thus, understanding the archive is a space where “imaginaries are 
negotiated”.351 It is in this narrow sense that I understand the US imagination in this thesis. 
The presidential discourses I analyse constitute the US imagination of itself, China and the 
US relationship to China. I recognise though that the US imagination exists more broadly in a 
variety of different sources, mediums and discourses beyond official presidential statements. 
3.5 A Note on Reading 
In his later reading of Karl Marx’s Capital, Louis Althusser articulates a form of hermeneutic 
exploration he calls “symptomatic reading” to “discern in the apparent continuity of the 
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discourse, the lacunae, blanks and failures of rigour”.352 It is an intuitive exploration of the 
unsaid and the silences that arise from a text, a form of reading in-between the lines, that takes 
into account the broader discourse within which a particular text or imagination is 
constructed. Through these silences, Althusser contended it was possible to locate “an answer 
to which does not correspond to any question posed (emphasis in original)”, where the text is 
symptomatic of a broader schema of thought, absent from the text.353 This form of reading is 
intended to reveal the absences within, and yet outside a text. It is this “conceptual emptiness” 
beneath the presence of a word that Althusser describes as a symptom where his reading is a 
process of “making manifest what is latent”.354   This makes it clear that although US 
presidents do not invoke a particular logic in their statements regarding China, despite the rare 
occurrences I have noted, they do appear to invoke a particular set of perceived interests, 
understandings and priorities. I am not seeking to unveil a hidden meaning within US 
presidential discourses, but articulate the logics that they appear to invoke. 
Complementary to Althusser’s symptomatic reading is Foucault’s remark that “we must not 
imagine that the world turns toward us a legible face which we would only decipher” to 
understand the significance of imaginations.355 My reading of US presidential discourse of 
China is intended to locate the perceptions of imperatives and logics within US foreign policy 
towards China, yes these are socially constituted and contingent discourses but as the texts I 
analyse testify, they function and exert an influence over US foreign policy towards China. 
Reading then, is a brand of intellectual habitus that necessitates a continual process of 
reflectivity with regards to the texts I choose to analyse and the concepts I adopt in doing so. I 
have stated explicitly here that I adopt and build on a variety of analytical concepts and 
theoretical framings from a heterodox body of authors with deliberate scepticism towards 
some kind of tidy disciplinary boundary.  
Reading and writing, in this regard, is always a form of constructing meaning as a 
constitutive bond between author and reader. Not only can this be said for myself in my 
reading of texts, but for the manner in which the US ‘reads’ China. How US presidents 
articulate these perceptions can be said to be symptoms of the logics that I describe. The 
interpretation of the various physical absences in the texts is similar to Jacques Derrida’s 
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notion of différance and his framing of deconstruction. Différance refers to the “movement 
that consists in deferring by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour, 
postponement, reserving”.356 What can be said for now is that the absences Althusser intended 
to discern with his form of reading are perpetually deferred, initially in their absence and 
thereafter in the constant negotiations over their meaning. In his descriptions of genealogy as 
a method, Michael Shapiro posits that established meaning is “one possible emergence from 
an interpretive agonistics” where the “genealogical imagination construes all systems of 
intelligibility”.357 The broader networks of discourse that shape intelligibility can be discerned 
through a hybrid of Althusser’s symptomatic reading that accounts for absent but invoked 
assumptions, in my case logics, and a genealogical reading that accounts for the absent 
legacies of earlier thought. 
Reading is not so much a process of simply inferring apparent meaning, but a negotiation 
between the ‘said’ and the ‘unsaid’, the present and the absent. It is a process of adjusting 
one’s hearing to the loud silences that circulate various texts and practices. The ‘said’ and the 
‘unsaid’ are thus mutually implicated in a text or any other formulation of meaning.  F. M. 
Cornford in his The Unwritten Philosophy observed that often philosophic discussion “rested 
on tacit assumptions, which were enshrined in the ambiguities of language”.358 He borrows 
from William James when he asserts how “the most potentest of all our premises is never 
mentioned”.359 The logics I describe then, are never mentioned explicitly, yet are regularly 
invoked and conditioned through the discourses that I analyse. Reading then is a process of 
sense making and sense breaking. This is not to say that assumptions of various kinds are 
universally shared but that in the case of US imaginations, universally presumed, a point I 
shall return to later. What is vital though is to display a certain degree of scepticism and 
curiosity especially in regards to the unsaid, unwritten, and unacknowledged.360  
Symptomatic reading is then, aimed at exploring what is unsaid as much as what is said in US 
presidential discourses of China. For the texts I analyse do not explicitly name a particular 
logic but they do invoke a series of ideas, imperatives, and concerns that I determine can be 
described as particular logic. I am not looking for some deeper hidden truth of what the US is 
nor am I trying to make the case for a comprehensive and parsimonious theory of US foreign 
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policy. In this regard it is helpful to understand symptomatic reading as a process of inductive 
reasoning where I begin by engaging a body of source material rather than a stated hypothesis 
regarding US foreign policy and China. The combination of a genealogy and discourse 
analysis as set out here are intended to produce new analytical concepts to understand US 
foreign policy towards China, the outcome of which are the logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics. This is not to say that any prior theorising was or is unnecessary, as I have 
remarked previously that I began the process expecting to identify the importance of identity 
in US foreign policy towards China, but it has been empirically and theoretically necessary to 
engage more openly with US presidential discourses of China. The result of which is my 
argument regarding the primary presence of three logics in US presidential discourse of 
China. It is also important to reiterate that my goal here is not to work from an inductive 
analysis to a deductive one where I start to build a more general theory of US foreign policy 
premised on these three logics but that I merely want to identity their presence in US 
presidential discourses and explain how it is they function in regards to China.361  
Rita Felski captures this nicely in her observation that “political linkages and effects are not 
immanent, hidden in the convoluted folds of texts, but derive from connections and 
mediations that must be tracked down and described”.362 Felski also describes 
poststructuralist critique, which I no doubt am engaged in, as a “second-level hermeneutics –a 
method of reading that looks beyond the individual text to decipher larger structures of 
cultural production”, where the logics I describe contribute and are part of these structures.363 
Yes the US can emphasise its values, or the search for new markets, or concerns about 
political stability in the Asia-Pacific, but what these statements ‘mean’, is that there are 
particular conceptions of logical practice and thought being deployed and invoked in how 
China is represented in US presidential discourses. I am open to the possibility and indeed 
potential ‘logic’ of the logics I describe being consistent with broader US foreign policy 
expectations, beliefs and potential logics but my goal here is more focused. 
In short, symptomatic reading explains how I determine from the source material I engaged 
with, through a genealogical discourse analysis, the three logics of identity, capital, and 
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geopolitics as evident in US presidential discourses of China. The statements I analyse are in 
this regard symptomatic of these broader logics I discern.  
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II A Genealogy of US Presidential Discourses of China 
 
Part two of this thesis is comprised of 6 substantive genealogical chapters and a conclusion. 
This section presents my genealogical analysis of US presidential discourses of China from 
the 1844 Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of Barack Obama’s presidency in 2016. I outline 
the prevalence, constitution and function of the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics as 
they are apparent in these discourses. These chapters are not intended to be an exhaustive 
historical account of US-China relations but an analysis of US presidential discourses of 
China and how they reveal, articulate and reflect the three logics of practice. The chapters 
have a dual purpose: to present the material basis from where I derived the three logics of 
practice from and demonstrate how those logics functioned in US presidential discourses of 
China. 
Chapter 4 covers the period from the John Tyler’s Presidency and the Treaty of Wangxia in 
1844 until the end of Grover Cleveland’s second term in 1897. Chapter 5 covers the 
Presidencies of William McKinley to Woodrow Wilson. Chapter 6 presents analysis from 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Presidency to Lyndon Johnson’s. Chapter 7 covers the Presidencies of 
Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. Chapter 8 covers the Presidencies of 
George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Chapter 9 returns to the initial origins 
of my research where I analyse Barack Obama’s discourses of China. Finally in chapter 10 I 
summarise my main arguments while elaborating on the notion that the research presented 
here best serves as the initial analysis of a broader research agenda into US foreign policy 
towards China. 
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Chapter 4 – 1844-1897: Early Encounters with China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the period from 1844 and the Treaty of Wangxia up until the end of 
Grover Cleveland’s second term in 1897.364 I begin with a brief section on some earlier 
discourses of US presidents with regards to China but this is not the main focus of the chapter. 
I examine discourses from the presidencies of John Tyler, James Polk, Ulysses S. Grant, 
Chester Arthur and Grover Cleveland. This period begins with the US securing commercial 
access to Chinese ports on the back of the British military victory in the first Opium War from 
1839-1842 which lead to a gradual increase in trade through the rest of the century.365 During 
the 1850s and onwards the US started to see a rise in Chinese immigration, predominantly 
labours who were coming to work on the West coast. This was coupled with growing hostility 
and racism culminating in the passage of the Chinese Exclusions Acts in 1882 that banned all 
Chinese immigration.366 
What I demonstrate is the early prominence of the logic of capital in US presidential 
discourses towards China. This provides the predominant organising principle for US thinking 
towards China up until the end of the 19th century when more explicit geopolitical interests 
start to form, reflecting the growing recognition that the imperatives of the logic of capital 
required some kind of organisation of the US geopolitical presence in Asia. 
4.2 Early Encounters 
One of the first substantial Presidential remarks on China occurred in the first annual message 
to Congress on December 6th 1825 by John Quincy Adams. He emphasised the liberal 
character of US trade where it was “the policy of the United States in their commercial 
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intercourse with other nations has always been of the most liberal character”.367 Adams 
reflected on the necessity of maintaining a strong navy to protect US seafaring commerce as 
“the constant maintenance of a small squadron in the Mediterranean is a necessary substitute 
for the humiliating alternative of paying tribute for the security of our commerce in that 
sea…similar motives have rendered expedient the keeping of a like force on the coasts of Peru 
and Chile on the Pacific”.368  This relationship between geopolitical concerns and economic 
interest reflects the early close relationship between the logic of capital and the logic 
geopolitics. Trade with allies required sufficient policing of the seas to protect US economic 
activity. A point further emphasised by Adams when went he remarked that “an unsettled 
coast of many degrees of latitude forming part of our own territory and a flourishing 
commerce and fishery extending to the islands of the Pacific and to China still require that the 
protecting power of the Union should be displayed under its flag as well as upon the ocean as 
upon the land”. 369 Adams was reflecting on the case for a US naval presence in the Pacific to 
defend its territory and its trade with countries like China indicating how the logic of 
geopolitics here was contingent on the primary importance of the logic of capital. 
Soon after Adams, Andrew Jackson described the growing commercial relations between the 
US and China in his third annual message to Congress on December 6th 1831. Jackson 
described how “to China and the East Indies our commerce continues in its usual extent, and 
with increased facilities which the credit and capital of our merchants afford by substituting 
bills for payments in specie.”370 Echoing the concerns of Adams he observed how “Chile and 
Peru seem to be still threatened with civil commotions, and until they shall be settled 
disorders may naturally be apprehended, requiring the constant presence of a naval force in 
the Pacific Ocean to protect our fisheries and guard our commerce”.371 Jackson had elaborated 
further on how the US needed a Pacific naval presence to protect US commerce against 
political disturbances in regional countries. This reflects the early geopolitical concerns with 
regards to the Pacific and how this would affect US commerce. If the logic of capital 
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necessitated the existence and expansion of trade, then the logic of geopolitics began to 
emerge as a way to secure US international commerce. 
Martin van Buren also echoed these sentiments in his second annual message to Congress 
December 3rd 1838. Buren remarked described how “the unsettled state of a portion of South 
America renders it indispensable that our commerce should receive protection in that quarter; 
the vast and increasing interests embarked in the trade of the Indian and China seas, in the 
whale fisheries of the Pacific Ocean, and in the Gulf of Mexico require equal attention to their 
safety”.372  This reflected the dual concerns regarding South American politics and US 
commerce in Asia. Buren also noted how “the rapid increase and wide expansion of our 
commerce, which is every day seeking new avenues of profitable adventure” implied “the 
absolute necessity of a naval force for its protection precisely in the degree of its extension”. 
In a comment directed at the need for increased congressional funding for the navy Buren 
emphasised how “the anticipation of its future triumphs whenever opportunity presents itself, 
which we may rightfully indulge from the experience of the past all seem to point to the Navy 
as a most efficient arm of our national defence and a proper object of legislative 
encouragement.”373 The significance of the US navy then was rendered through the logic of 
capital with a focus on securing US commerce as well as a a more minor concern where the 
navy reflected through the logic of identity, a source of social prestige.  
Buren signified a notable shift in his understanding of the scope of the US navy in his fourth 
annual message to Congress on December 5th 1840. He described how “the Navy…has been 
usefully and honourably employed in the protection of our commerce and citizens in the 
Mediterranean, the Pacific, on the coast of Brazil, and in the Gulf of Mexico”.374 Reflecting 
the increasing commercial ties between US merchants and China, Buren’s comments reflected 
the close relationship between the expanding tendency of the logic of capital, and its 
corresponding considerations described by a logic of geopolitics. He also described how “a 
small squadron, consisting of the frigate Constellation and the sloop of war Boston, under 
Commodore Kearney, is now on its way to the China and Indian seas for the purpose of 
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attending to our interests in that quarter”.375 What this begins to indicate is that geopolitical 
concerns were closely related to the imperatives of a logic of capital. Although in this early 
stage in US imaginations of China, the logic of geopolitics was restricted to the securing of 
US commerce in the spaces it was expanding into, US policy towards China specifically, and 
more generally would come to be the securing and administration of that very space. 
These initial references to China reflect a concern more specifically with expanding 
commerce rather than any meaningful considerations of China’s domestic politics. These 
early US imaginations then suggest US foreign policy towards China was motivated by a 
logic of capital as the relatively new US state sought out the necessary commercial contacts to 
guarantee its survival.376 What is apparent though is the intimate connection between 
economic interests and geopolitical consideration of how to secure the Pacific for safe trade. 
4.3 First Contact: The Treaty of Wangxia and the Speculative Promise of the China 
Market  
The first official contacts between the US and China occurred during the Presidency of John 
Tyler. Taking advantage of British military successes during the first Opium War, Tyler 
dispatched a diplomatic mission to China to secure equal access rights to Chinese ports. The 
First Opium War should be understood as the early conditions of possibility for contemporary 
US imaginations of China where economic access was a priority. If, as the following chapter 
will argue, the early 20th century saw strong US interest in the “myth of the China market”, 
these myths began to take shape in the very initial encounters between the US and China. The 
notion though, that this market across the Pacific would not become apparent until the end of 
the century. 
In a special message to Congress on December 30 1842 John Tyler described the British 
military successes in China where “events of considerable importance have recently 
transpired in China. The military operations carried on against that Empire by the English 
Government have been terminated by a treaty, according to the terms of which four important 
ports hitherto shut against foreign commerce are to be open to British merchants, Amoy, 
FooChooFoo, Ningpo, and Chinghai”.377 Tyler here understands the significance of the 
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British imperial war to be the access to four ports, significant as until then foreign trade had 
been limited to Canton. Tyler continues expressing concern about the potential for the US to 
gain equal access, “it can not but be interesting to the mercantile interest of the United States, 
whose intercourse with China at the single port of Canton has already become so 
considerable, to ascertain whether these other ports now open to British commerce are to 
remain shut, nevertheless, against the commerce of the United States”.378 His conclusion is 
that “the treaty between the Chinese Government and the British commissioner provides 
neither for the admission nor the exclusion of the ships of other nations. It would seem, 
therefore, that it remains with every other nation having commercial intercourse with China to 
seek to make proper arrangements for itself with the Government of that Empire in this 
respect”.379 In this light, Tyler’s immediate concerns for China were constituted through the 
logic capital whereby the US desires similar economic access to the British.  
Notable here, is the absence of US concerns for the integrity of the Chinese empire, or any 
reference to US values and their corresponding logic of identity. Tyler does though comment 
on how these “events appear likely to break down and soften this spirit of non-intercourse and 
to bring China ere long into the relations which usually subsist between civilized states”.380 
China here is positioned as outside the civilized world order which the US inhabits. Tyler 
articulates the general otherness of China when he observes how “the peculiarities of the 
Chinese Government and the Chinese character are well known”. He goes on to consider the 
“peculiarities” of how “an Empire supposed to contain 300,000,000 subjects, fertile in various 
rich products of the earth, not without the knowledge of letters and of many arts, and with 
large and expensive accommodations for internal intercourse and traffic, has for ages sought 
to exclude the visits of strangers and foreigners from its dominions, and has assumed for itself 
a superiority over all other nations”.381 In this early formulation of China representing another 
example of the difference authors like Campbell and Connolly describe as necessary to the 
reproduction of meaningful stable identities reflects a partial influence of the exclusionary 
aspects of the logic of identity.  
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Tyler speculates on how recent US “experience proves that the productions of western nations 
find a market to some extent among the Chinese; that that market, so far as respects the 
productions of the United States, although it has considerably varied in successive seasons, 
has on the whole more than doubled within the last ten years”.382 For Tyler, “it can hardly be 
doubted that the opening of several new and important ports connected with parts of the 
Empire heretofore seldom visited by Europeans or Americans would exercise a favourable 
influence upon the demand for such productions”. The China market then appears as a 
potentially desirable opportunity for US production. Tyler uses these conclusions to request 
Congressional appropriation for a permanent commission in China. He makes the case that 
“the commercial interests of the United States connected with China require at the present 
moment a degree of attention and vigilance…for the compensation of a commissioner to 
reside in China to exercise a watchful care over the concerns of American citizens and for the 
protection of their persons and property.”383 This mission was undertaken by Caleb Cushing 
who would return two years later with the Treaty of Wangxia that conferred on the US the 
same commercial rights the British had taken by force.384 This marks the beginning of official 
US concern with China and which primarily characterised by the logic of capital where it was 
extended commercial relations that the US was interested in. A more minor concern reflected 
the entwinement of the logics of geopolitics and identity with the US’s desire to assist in the 
‘civilising’ of China. 
Next year, in his third	annual message to Congress in 1843 Tyler articulated an expansionist 
message in the context of US territorial expansion across the continent where “under the 
influence of our free system of government new republics are destined to spring up at no 
distant day on the shores of the Pacific similar in policy and in feeling to those existing on this 
side of the Rocky Mountains, and giving a wider and more extensive spread to the principles 
of civil and religious liberty”.385 This is significant as in later decades the US would come to 
see this expansion as not necessarily stopping on these Pacific shores, but logically extending 
across the ocean into Asia. For Tyler this was the promise of the civilized world and US “ 
national greatness”.	He describes triumphantly how “the tide of population continues 
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unbrokenly to flow into the new States and Territories, where a refuge is found not only for 
our native born fellow citizens, but for emigrants from all parts of the civilized world, who 
come among us to partake of the blessings of our free institutions and to aid by their labour to 
swell the current of our wealth and power”.386 This is indicative of the emerging logic of 
geopolitics and identity as entwined where the US would logically expand spatially as a 
natural process of civilization. Although here this is limited to the North American continent, 
this represents the beginnings of what would become a more international approach.	
In January 1845 Tyler described the success of Cushing’s mission where “the 
accomplishment so far of the great objects for which it was appointed, and in placing our 
relations with China on a new footing eminently favourable to the commerce and other 
interests of the United States”.387 Tyler also implied that US concern with establishing 
amicable relations with China was speculative towards the potential they held. He argued to 
Congress that “in view of the magnitude and importance of our national concerns, actual and 
prospective, in China, I submit to the consideration of Congress the expediency of providing 
for the preservation and cultivation of the subsisting relations of amity between the United 
States and the Chinese Government, either by means of a permanent minister or 
commissioner with diplomatic functions.”388 China then, was not just important in the present, 
but existed as a speculative prospect to US commercial interests. 
While James Polk is known more for his annexation of Texas and war with Mexico, he 
contributed significantly to US presidential discourses of China. In his third annual message 
to Congress on December 7th 1847 he envisioned how “the Bay of San Francisco and other 
harbors along the Californian coast would afford shelter for our Navy, for our numerous 
whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific Ocean, and would in a short 
period become the marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China and other 
countries of the East”.389 Polk articulated a more explicit concern with the potential of the 
China trade for US interests. With regards to his comments on the Californian coast, Polk saw 
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domestic prosperity as intimately linked to international commerce. The logic of capital in 
this light encompassed the domestic imperatives behind international expansion.  
Extolling Congress over the details of the laws of extraterritoriality of US citizens in China, 
Polk commented on the need for laws and tribunals to manage these legal aspects. Noting 
how, “under our treaty with that power American citizens are withdrawn from the jurisdiction, 
whether civil or criminal, of the Chinese Government and placed under that of our public 
functionaries in that country”, Polk captured one of the specific manifestations of 
exceptionalism in the US imagination.390  
Polk described how “crimes may be committed with impunity and debts may be contracted 
without any means to enforce their payment. Inconveniences have already resulted from the 
omission of Congress to legislate upon the subject, and still greater are apprehended”. Here 
Polk reveals the international tensions by the apparent absence of the law for US citizens in 
China.  Polk was concerned with how tensions “might disturb, if not destroy, our friendly 
relations with that Empire, and cause an interruption of our valuable commerce”.391 China’s 
significance then was rendered through the logic of capital. 
In a special message on July 6th 1848 to Congress Polk drew attention to the potential for a 
US empire based on its continental expansion and how this held promise for increasing 
commercial relations across the Pacific. He remarked how: 
“New Mexico and Upper California have been ceded by Mexico to the United States, and now 
constitute a part of our country. Embracing nearly ten degrees of latitude, lying adjacent to the 
Oregon Territory, and extending from the Pacific Ocean to the Rio Grande, a mean distance of 
nearly 1,000 miles, it would be difficult to estimate the value of these possessions to the United 
States. They constitute of themselves a country large enough for a great empire, and their 
acquisition is second only in importance to that of Louisiana in 1803... The possession of the ports 
of San Diego and Monterey and the Bay of San Francisco will enable the United States to 
command the already valuable and rapidly increasing commerce of the Pacific”.392 
Continental expansion for Polk was creating the conditions for the US to “command…the 
rapidly increasing commerce of the Pacific”. Apparent here is the extension of securing US 
trade across the Pacific to commanding and ordering Pacific commerce. Polk saw the 
acquisition of new Western territories as bringing the US “into immediate proximity with the 
west coast of America, from Cape Horn to the Russian possessions north of Oregon, with the 
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islands of the Pacific Ocean, and by a direct voyage in steamers we will be in less than thirty 
days of Canton and other ports of China”.393 This was significant for Polk as he declared that 
“in this vast region, whose rich resources are soon to be developed by American energy and 
enterprise, great must be the augmentation of our commerce, and with it new and profitable 
demands for mechanic labour in all its branches and new and valuable markets for our 
manufactures and agricultural products”.394 The continental expansion of the US then was 
seen as closely related to the success and expansion of trade across the Pacific. Present here 
was the close relationship between the logics of capitals and geopolitics in the US 
conceptualisation of its geopolitical and economic need for physical expansion. 
In his fourth annual message in 1848 Polk continued to define the virtues of San Francisco in 
terms of the potential to increase commercial activity with China. He declared that by  
“embracing the only safe and commodious harbours on that coast for many hundred miles…it 
is scarcely possible to estimate its wealth until it shall be brought under the government of our 
laws and its resources fully developed”.395 The West coast of the US held promise not only in 
its domestic sources of wealth but, Polk demanded that “from its position it must command 
the rich commerce of China, of Asia, of the islands of the Pacific, of western Mexico, of 
Central America, the South American States, and of the Russian possessions bordering on that 
ocean”. This would in Polk’s projections, lead to “a great emporium…on the Californian 
coast which may be destined to rival in importance New Orleans itself. The depot of the vast 
commerce which must exist on the Pacific will probably be at some point on the Bay of San 
Francisco, and will occupy the same relation to the whole western coast of that ocean as New 
Orleans does to the valley of the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico”.396 This great emporium 
that Polk envisioned would be made possible by increased commercial ties across the Pacific. 
In a sense, the successful expansion of the continental US created the conditions for improved 
Commercial relations with Asia, while those commercial relations would also create the 
conditions for a more successful and wealthy West coast of the US.  
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In one of his few mentions of China in public during his fourth annual message to Congress in 
1864, Abraham Lincoln drew attention to the how China was increasingly accepting 
“conventional laws” of international relations. Lincoln described the need for increased US 
consular presences amidst the on-going Taiping “rebellion which has so long been flagrant in 
China has at last been suppressed, with the cooperating good offices of this Government and 
of the other Western commercial States. The judicial consular establishment…will need 
legislative revision to adapt it to the extension of our commerce and to the more intimate 
intercourse which has been instituted with the Government and people of that vast Empire”.397 
Lincoln referred to the positive prospect of how “China seems to be accepting with hearty 
good will the conventional laws which regulate commercial and social intercourse among the 
Western nations”.398 These conventional laws were by all means Western norms and customs 
for international relations. This constitutes an early interpretation of China accepting the 
requirements for participating in a Western based international system.  
By no means a source of regular study in US-China relations, Ulysses S. Grant made a 
number of important discursive elaborations in US imaginations of China and itself. In his 
first annual message December 6th 1869 he reflected on the potential of the US where “the 
vast resources of the nation, both developed and undeveloped, ought to make our credit the 
best on earth”.399 Making the case for the anti-colonial nature of US interests he declared that 
“the United States have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her 
colonial possessions on this continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other 
European powers will find their interest in terminating those relations and establishing their 
present dependencies as independent powers members of the family of nations. These 
dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to 
another”.400 More forcefully, he described how “when the present relation of colonies ceases, 
they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self control in 
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the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers”.401 This anti-
colonial stance reflects an important dynamic in the logic of geopolitics where the US is 
concerned with the management of international politics but conditioned by the anti-colonial 
principles within the logic of identity.  
Grant drew special attention to the US’s Pacific trading partners when he declared, “our 
neighbours south of us and China and Japan, should receive our special attention. It will be 
the endeavour of the Administration to cultivate such relations with all these nations as to 
entitle us to their confidence and make it their interest, as well as ours, to establish better 
commercial relations”.402 The framing of these relations again, emphasised the logic of capital 
for improved commerce. Grant described the diplomatic activities of Anson Burlingame, a US 
representative in China who had since taken up a position as a representative for China in the 
US and how they were going to contribute to a more “enlightened policy” towards China.403 
He described how “through the agency of a more enlightened policy than that heretofore 
pursued toward China, largely due to the sagacity and efforts of one of our own distinguished 
citizens, the world is about to commence largely increased relations with that populous and 
hitherto exclusive nation”. Grant was describing the 1868 treaty between the US and China, 
which granted China greater trade access to the US, acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over 
its territory, and was designed to foster increased Chinese immigration to the US.404 
Grant celebrated US initiative in granting China a relatively equal treaty as opposed to the 
imposition of unequal demands in the First and Second Opium War treaties. He described the 
treaty in a positive light: 
“as the United States have been the initiators in this new policy, so they should be the most earnest 
in showing their good faith in making it a success. In this connection I advise such legislation as 
will forever preclude the enslavement of the Chinese upon our soil under the name of coolies, and 
also prevent American vessels from engaging in the transportation of coolies to any country 
tolerating the system. I also recommend that the mission to China be raised to one of the first 
class”.405 
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For Grant, the US was obliged to honour the integrity of the treaty and that the US was at the 
forefront of international cooperation with the Chinese empire. There was little to suggest any 
potential anxiety that Chinese immigration would later cause. 
In his second annual message to Congress on December 5th 1870 Grant described an 
important dynamic in the logic of capital where domestic economic crises were to find their 
solution in international commercial expansion. He lamented that “our depressed commerce is 
a subject to which I called your special attention at the last session, and suggested that we will 
in the future have to look more to the countries south of us, and to China and Japan, for its 
revival”. In this sense, what would become the 20th century problem of China, found its 
origins in the domestic problems of US capitalism. Grant was also frustrated by the lack of 
US merchant ships as “the fact exists that the carrying is done almost entirely in foreign 
bottoms, and while this state of affairs exists we can not control our due share of the 
commerce of the world; that between the Pacific States and China and Japan is about all the 
carrying trade now conducted in American vessels”.406 As long as this was the case, the US 
was at the mercy of others when it came to international trade. 
Grant echoed many of these themes in his third annual message to Congress in December 
1871 where he was now frustrated by the lack of capable US translators in China. He 
described how “our representatives in Japan and China have to depend for interpreters and 
translators upon natives of those countries who know our language imperfectly, or procure for 
the occasion the services of employees in foreign business houses or the interpreters to other 
foreign ministers”.407 The importance of improved diplomatic relations with China and Japan 
was “in retaining the good opinion of those peoples, and to secure to the United States its 
share of the commerce destined to flow between those nations and the balance of the 
commercial world”.408 Again, the speculative prospects increased commercial activity 
between the US and China was a constitutive feature of the logic of capital. 
Grant drew attention to the potential conflict between China and Japan in the early 1870s on 
the basis that it might harm US commercial interests and would stunt the civilising of these 
Asian states. Grant described this in his sixth annual to Congress in December 1874: 
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“During the past year the fear of hostilities between China and Japan, growing out of the landing of 
an armed force upon the island of Formosa by the latter, has occasioned uneasiness. It is earnestly 
hoped, however, that the difficulties arising from this cause will be adjusted, and that the advance 
of civilization in these Empires may not be retarded by a state of war.”409  
War and conflict then, are an impediment to US hopes for the civilizing of the region. An 
early example of US consternation over the islands of the Asia-Pacific, Grant emphasized 
how US “representatives in those countries have been instructed to impress upon the 
Governments of China and Japan the firm intention of this country to maintain strict neutrality 
in the event of hostilities”.410 The US was more concerned with geopolitical stability for the 
sake of maintaining profitable commercial ties and the expansion of civilization into the 
region. The logics of geopolitics, identity and capital are all visible in these concerns.  
In comparison to the lack of explicit concern about Chinese immigration Grant indicated his 
frustration over the increasing immigration of Chinese women. He articulated concern over 
how “the great proportion of the Chinese immigrants who come to our shores do not come 
voluntarily, to make their homes with us and their labour productive of general prosperity, but 
come under contracts with headmen, who own them almost absolutely”.411 This concern was 
heightened as “in a worse form does this apply to Chinese women. Hardly a perceptible 
percentage of them perform any honourable labour, but they are brought for shameful 
purposes, to the disgrace of the communities where settled and to the great demoralization of 
the youth of those localities”. Grant here is referring to the importation of Chinese women to 
function as se workers for the growing number of Chinese men working on the West coast of 
the US. He also articulated his openness to support legislation addressing this by declaring, “if 
this evil practice can be legislated against, it will be my pleasure as well as duty to enforce 
any regulation to secure so desirable an end”.412 This was echoed in his next annual message 
where he described the “evil [of] the importation of Chinese women, but few of whom are 
brought to our shores to pursue honourable or useful occupations”.413 Grant’s statements 
captured the growing tensions between the logics of capital and identity as the increasing 
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effect of domestic economic crises needed to be addressed through solutions in international 
commercial expansion. 
In a more general sense in his seventh annual message in 1875 Grant addressed the political 
maturation of the US when he remarked “as we are now about to enter upon our second 
centennial commenting our manhood as a nation it is well to look back upon the past and 
study what will be best to preserve and advance our future greatness”.414 For Grant this 
entailed recalling how “from the fall of Adam for his transgression to the present day no 
nation has ever been free from threatened danger to its prosperity and happiness. We should 
look to the dangers threatening us, and remedy them so far as lies in our power”.415 The US 
was like any other state in the sense that Grant saw a permanent state of insecurity as the 
permanent existential condition of existence. This sense of insecurity, or a general anxiety 
about the future was for Grant an inherent aspect of the logic of identity. There was always 
some kind of potential threat to US security, and Grant’s articulations of the dishonourable 
activities of emigrant populations of Chinese women captured the material and ontological 
varieties of this insecurity.  
4.4 The Chinese Exclusion Act and US Identity  
Anxiety over Chinese immigration came to political culmination in the 1880s. Chester Arthur 
in his first annual message to Congress in December 1881 described the “demoralizing and 
destructive traffic” of Chinese immigration.416 Arthur commended the Chinese government 
for accepting potential changes in “prompt and friendly spirit” to existing treaty statutes 
regarding immigration.417 He also described US relations with Japan in a very positive 
manner. Describing the on-going conversion of Japan he described how “the intimacy 
between our own country and Japan, the most advanced of the Eastern nations, continues to 
be cordial. I am advised that the Emperor contemplates the establishment of full constitutional 
government, and that he has already summoned a parliamentary congress for the purpose of 
effecting the change”.418 For Arthur this was “a remarkable step toward complete assimilation 
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with the Western system [which] can not fail to bring Japan into closer and more beneficial 
relationship with ourselves as the chief Pacific power”.419 Although he was describing 
conditions in Japan, This reflected Arthur’s general hopes for political conditions in Asia 
more broadly. In effect here, was US desire to see the assimilation of Asian states into the 
Western system via the conversation of those states by Western ‘standards of civilization’, a 
process articulated in detail by Gerrit Gong.420 
In his 1882 message to Congress describing his veto over a bill to ban all Chinese 
immigration Arthur captured the tension between domestic political concerns and 
international commercial interests. He state how “a nation is justified in repudiating its treaty 
obligations only when they are in conflict with great paramount interests…	The present treaty 
relations between that power and the United States spring from an antagonism which arose 
between our paramount domestic interests and our previous relations”.421 This international-
domestic tension was to in effect become ever-present in US policies towards China and will 
be highlighted again in chapter 9 with Barack Obama’s trade initiatives in the Asia-Pacific. 
Arthur described how “the treaty commonly known as the Burlingame treaty conferred upon 
Chinese subjects the right of voluntary emigration to the United States for the purposes of 
curiosity or trade or as permanent residents, and was in all respects reciprocal as to citizens of 
the United States in China”. It was designed to give “the voluntary emigrant coming to the 
United States the right to travel there or to reside there, with all the privileges, immunities, or 
exemptions enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation”.422  
He was now aware though that the increasing domestic tensions over this encounter was 
beginning to undermine domestic political stability in the West coast states. Arthur accepted 
the need for modifying the 1880 Treaty affirming immigration rights when he conceded that 
“I think it may fairly be accepted as an expression of the opinion of Congress that the coming 
of such labourers to the United States or their residence here affects our interests and 
endangers good order throughout the country. On this point I should feel it my duty to accept 
the views of Congress”.423 He did though maintain his position that the provision of the act 
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suspending immigration for 20 years was “a breach of our national faith, and being unable to 
bring myself in harmony with the views of Congress on this vital point the honour of the 
country constrains me to return the act with this objection to its passage”.424 Thus, for Arthur, 
the logic of identity exerted some influence on his decision-making. 
Arthur described how the acquisition of California created the conditions for more promising 
commercial relations with China. He explained how “our intercourse with China is of recent 
date. Our first treaty with that power is not yet forty years old. It is only since we acquired 
California and established a great seat of commerce on the Pacific that we may be said to have 
broken down the barriers which fenced in that ancient Monarchy”.425 Arthur noted how 
Chinese immigration had been beneficial for the US, as Chinese labour had contributed to US 
prosperity. Describing the 1868 Treaty as a natural progression of the US encounter with 
China he declared, “no one can say that the country has not profited by their work. They were 
largely instrumental in constructing the railways which connect the Atlantic with the 
Pacific”.426 The contribution of Chinese bodies then has been critical to the development of 
the Western US, “the States of the Pacific Slope are full of evidences of their industry. 
Enterprises profitable alike to the capitalist and to the labourer of Caucasian origin would 
have lain dormant but for them”.427 China had contributed to the material construction of the 
US and, as implied by Arthur, US capital would have been worse off without this 
engagement. What is essentially encountered here, is the tension between the logic of capital 
which necessitated an influx of cheap labour for the production and reproduction of US 
capitalism on its Western states and the logic of identity as practiced by everyday Americans 
in those states. 
Arthur continued, by arguing that “experience has shown that the trade of the East is the key 
to national wealth and influence. The opening of China to the commerce of the whole world 
has benefited no section of it more than the States of our own Pacific Slope”.428 Specifically, 
“the State of California, and its great maritime port especially, have reaped enormous 
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advantages from this source. … San Francisco has before it an incalculable future if our 
friendly and amicable relations with Asia remain undisturbed”.429 Arthur’s protestations at the 
action of the US Congress emphasised the logic of capital as he feared that the “policy which 
we now propose to adopt must have a direct tendency to repel Oriental nations from us and to 
drive their trade and commerce into more friendly lands”.430 Foreshadowing contemporary 
debates about protectionism in the face of Asian competition Arthur suggested that “it may be 
that the great and paramount interest of protecting our labour from Asiatic competition may 
justify us in a permanent adoption of this policy” while warning that it would be “wiser in the 
first place to make a shorter experiment, with a view hereafter of maintaining permanently 
only such features as time and experience may commend”.431 For Arthur it was evident that 
commercial relations with China, and Chinese workers were necessary to the social 
reproduction of US life on its West coast. In this line of reasoning the logic of capital 
provided the material basis with which the logic of identity would concurrently justify and 
perpetuate from.  
In another prelude to contemporary debates about the role of US capital Arthur warned, in 
1883, that “the transference to China of American capital for the employment there of 
Chinese labour would in effect inaugurate a competition for the control of markets now 
supplied by our home industries”.432 Although it was becoming apparent in Arthur’s words 
that US capital needed an outlet but also a source of cheaper labour to reproduce itself, this 
would undermine the need for US capital to secure domestic US industries. 
In a special message to Congress on December 10th 1884 Arthur celebrated the emerging 
empire on the western US coast. He stated how “within a generation the western coast has 
developed into an empire, with a large and rapidly growing population, with vast, but partially 
developed, resources”.433 He was calling for a canal to be dug through the American isthmus 
so that US “vessels and productions will enter upon the world's competitive field with a 
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decided advantage, of which they will avail themselves”.434 A major interest in doing so is 
that a shorter route to the Pacific would “give to the manufacturers on the Atlantic seaboard 
economical access to the cities of China, thus breaking down the barrier which separates the 
principal manufacturing centres of the United States from the markets of the vast population 
of Asia, and placing the Eastern States of the Union for all purposes of trade midway between 
Europe and Asia”.435 The speculative potential of the China market within the logic of capital, 
was an increasingly important factor in US presidential discourse. 
4.5 Cleveland, Domestic Tensions and US Commercial Interests   
During his first term, Grover Cleveland affirmed the continuity of US-China relations but 
indicated that domestic tensions were proving “beyond the power of the Executive to remedy, 
and calling for judicial determination”.436 Although he claimed “the harmony of our relations 
with China is fully sustained…the condition of the Chinese question in the Western States and 
Territories is, despite this restrictive legislation, far from being satisfactory”. He was alluding 
to an 1885 incident in Wyoming known as the Rocks Spring massacre where 28 Chinese 
labourers were killed by White miners in a labour dispute. Cleveland voiced concern that 
“there [was] apprehension lest the bitterness of feeling against the Mongolian race on the 
Pacific Slope may find vent in similar lawless demonstrations. All the power of this 
Government should be exerted to maintain the amplest good faith toward China in the 
treatment of these men, and the inflexible sternness of the law in bringing the wrongdoers to 
justice should be insisted upon”.437 In his first annual message to Congress in December 1885 
he claimed “every effort has been made by this Government to prevent these violent 
outbreaks and to aid the representatives of China in their investigation of these outrages; and 
it is but just to say that they are traceable to the lawlessness of men not citizens of the United 
States engaged in competition with Chinese labourers”.438 
In one of the clearest statements by a US president of the role of race in these domestic cases 
of violence Cleveland stated that “race prejudice is the chief factor in originating these 
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disturbances, and it exists in a large part of our domain, jeopardizing our domestic peace and 
the good relationship we strive to maintain with China”.439 Cleveland here reveals the direct 
relationship between domestic and foreign issues. The logic of identity as it was functioning 
in a domestic sense, had the potential to undermine the international aspects of the logic of 
capital for as has already been clear, US interest in China was primarily motivated by 
commercial concerns. 
Cleveland referred to the incidents in Wyoming again in a special message to Congress on 
March 1st 1886. Reflecting on the domestic tensions he stated, “the oppression of Chinese 
subjects by their rivals in the competition for labour does not differ in violence and illegality 
from that applied to other classes of native or alien labour. All are equally under the 
protection of law and equally entitled to enjoy the benefits of assured public order”.440 What 
this reveals is the domestic tensions over labour as Chinese labourers were paid less than their 
white counterparts.  
Later in his presidency, Cleveland concluded that the racial tensions that governed the 
encounter between US citizens and immigrant Chinese labourers rendered the “experiment” a 
failure. He observed in 1888 that “the experiment of blending the social habits and mutual 
race idiosyncrasies of the Chinese labouring classes with those of the great body of the people 
of the United States has been proved by the experience of twenty years, and ever since the 
Burlingame treaty of 1868, to be in every sense unwise, impolitic, and injurious to both 
nations”.441 The logic of identity where the self is constitutively constructed against and 
through the other, had ultimately proved uncompromisingly exclusionary. Cleveland 
concluded that “with the lapse of time the necessity for its abandonment has grown in force, 
until those having in charge the Government of the respective countries have resolved to 
modify and sufficiently abrogate all those features of prior conventional arrangements which 
permitted the coming of Chinese labourers to the United States”.442 
The racial divisions reflected what Cleveland described as “the inoperative and inefficient 
condition of the treaty and law has produced deep seated and increasing discontent among the 
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people of the United States, and especially with those resident on the Pacific Coast”. This led 
Cleveland to the position where he had “to answer the earnest popular demand for the 
absolute exclusion of Chinese labourers having objects and purposes unlike our own and 
wholly disconnected with American citizenship”.443 The Chinese then, as they were 
encountered in the US, were understood to be distinctly un-American to the point where their 
general exclusion was deemed the only possible political position. This was on of the rare 
instances where race was explicitly articulated in US presidential discourse as a feature of the 
logic of identity whereby the Chinese were understood as a distinct and inferior racial other to 
the US labourer.  
In his second term, Cleveland spoke more specifically about the US’s relations with China 
itself. Reflecting the concern of his predecessors when it came to conflicts in Asia, he 
observed during his second term in 1894 that “although the war between China and Japan 
endangers no policy of the United States, it deserves our gravest consideration by reason of its 
disturbance of our growing commercial interests in the two countries and the increased 
dangers which may result to our citizens domiciled or sojourning in the interior of China”.444 
Priority was against reserved for US commercial concerns. This reflected a somewhat passive 
geopolitical consideration in terms of US commercial interests. He described an anxiety over 
any disruption to commercial interests in the region. Cleveland declared that the US was 
“deploring the destructive war between the two most powerful of the eastern nations and 
anxious that our commercial interests in those countries may be preserved and that the safety 
of our citizens there shall not be jeopardized”. Cleveland though also offered US assistance in 
the resolution of the Sino-Japanese war stating that he “would not hesitate to heed any 
intimation that our friendly aid for the honourable termination of hostilities would be 
acceptable to both belligerents”.445 
In 1895 following the end of the Sino-Japanese war Cleveland again gave expression to US 
anxiety, but this time over China’s domestic political context. He was frustrated at how the 
conflict had “developed a domestic condition in the Chinese Empire which has caused much 
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anxiety and called for prompt and careful attention”.446 He could not decide though whether it 
was the war itself or what he saw ad “the aversion of the Chinese population to all foreign 
ways and undertakings” that had led to an outbreak of what Cleveland saw as “the old 
fanatical spirit against foreigners, which, unchecked by the local authorities, if not actually 
connived at by them, have culminated in mob attacks on foreign missionary stations, causing 
much destruction of property and attended with personal injuries as well as loss of life”.447 He 
made sure to emphasise the non-colonial interests of US foreign policy when dealing with 
China at this time, stating “that we desire only the liberty and protection of our own citizens 
and redress for any wrongs they may have suffered, and that we have no ulterior designs or 
objects, political or otherwise”. He hoped that “China will not forget either our kindly service 
to her citizens during her late war nor the further fact that, while furnishing all the facilities at 
our command to further the negotiation of a peace between her and Japan, we sought no 
advantages and interposed no counsel”.448 For Cleveland the US was not interested in 
territorial acquisitions in the Pacific but merely the security of US commercial interests. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated the prominence of the logic of capital in early US presidential 
discourses regarding China. This was the prime conditioning feature of how the US imagined 
China. As the century goes on the emerging features of what I call a logic of geopolitics and a 
logic of identity begin to form. The speculative potential of the China market within the logic 
of capital, was an increasingly important factor in US presidential discourse. Cleveland 
marked the rare instance where race was explicitly articulated as a feature of the logic of 
identity when considering the distinctions between Chinese and US labourers.  This period 
marks the early formations of the three logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics in US 
presidential discourses. I do not analyse where they emerged or the domestic conditions that 
might have influenced them but that would make for productive further analysis in light of the 
arguments present here. 
The following chapter turns to focus on US presidential discourses of China from 1898 to 
1922. 
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Chapter 5 – 1898-1922: The Open Door Notes and Dollar Diplomacy 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the discourses from the presidencies of William McKinley449, Theodore 
Roosevelt450, William Taft451 and Woodrow Wilson452.  What starts to become apparent 
during this period is how China comes to be perceived as a solution to domestic economic 
problems while also becoming more of a geopolitical concern regarding how the US 
understands the nature of its role in Asia. The period covers the events of the international 
response to the Boxer rebellion in China from November 1899 to September 1901, the Open 
Door Notes453 proposed by US Secretary of State John Hay in response to creeping territorial 
claims by the world’s imperial powers, Taft’s ‘Dollar Diplomacy’454, through to the aftermath 
of WWI and Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to negotiate the return of Shandong province to 
China.455  
In a statement akin to how I understand the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics Taft 
made reference to the “logical modern corollaries of the undisputed and traditional 
fundamentals of the foreign policy of the United States”(emphasis added) when trying to 
justify his approach to US foreign policy.456 Taft is of significant value in this genealogy 
despite one view that describes his presidency in the following manner, “no wars, no major 
crises, no enduring doctrines, only the deriding label of ‘dollar diplomacy’ remains of what 
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Taft and his secretary of state Philander Knox, tried to do”.457 What this chapter demonstrates 
is that despite the increasing importance of the logic of geopolitics and identity, the logic of 
capital remained primary in US presidential discourses of China. 
5.2 McKinley, the Open Door Notes and Access to China 
William McKinley expressed concern for US access to Chinese empire in his second annual 
message to Congress in 1898. The US, for McKinley had “not been an indifferent spectator of 
the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire, whereby portions of its maritime 
provinces are passing under the control of various European powers”.458 Although implying 
US concern for Chinese sovereignty, McKinley’s main concern was “the prospect that the 
vast commerce which the energy of our citizens and the necessity of our staple productions 
for Chinese uses has built up in those regions may not be prejudiced through any exclusive 
treatment by the new occupants has obviated the need of our country becoming an actor in the 
scene”.459 McKinley located the US right to be involved in China in the US’s geographic 
position and commercial interests. He stated that “our position among nations, having a large 
Pacific coast and a constantly expanding direct trade with the farther Orient, gives us the 
equitable claim to consideration and friendly treatment in this regard”.460 The lack of genuine 
concern for Chinese territorial sovereignty was revealed in his remarks that “the territories of 
Kiaochow, of Weihaiwei, and of Port Arthur and Talienwan, leased to Germany, Great 
Britain, and Russia, respectively, for terms of years, will, it is announced, be open to 
international commerce during such alien occupation”. 461 US concern here was motivated 
primarily by the logic of capital where commercial access was prioritised.   
McKinley would also recommend that Congress allocate funds to a study on “the commercial 
and industrial conditions in the Chinese Empire and report as to the opportunities for and 
obstacles to the enlargement of markets in China for the raw products and manufactures of the 
United States”. The opportunities that a potential China market held were in McKinley’s 
                                                
457 Lewis Gould, The William Howard Taft Presidency (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2009): 79. 
458 William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539. 
459 William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539. 
460 William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539. 
461 William McKinley: "Second Annual Message," December 5, 1898. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29539. 
 106 
words potentially of  “timeliness merit”.462 McKinley was also concerned about any  “revival 
of the old sentiment of opposition and prejudice to alien people which pervades certain of the 
Chinese provinces. As in the case of the attacks upon our citizens in Szechuen and at Kutien 
in 1895”. To enable a rapid response to any potential unrest McKinley made clear that US 
“war ships have been stationed at Tientsin for more ready observation of the disorders which 
have invaded even the Chinese capital, so as to be in a position to act should need arise”.463 
This reflects a desire to maintain general stability and order for the continuation of US 
commercial expansion. Again, the logic of geopolitics was configured along lines determined 
by the logic of capital. 
In his third annual message to Congress on December 5th 1899, McKinley assured Congress 
that “the interests of our citizens in that vast Empire have not been neglected during the past 
year”.464 More importantly for McKinley, “American capital has sought and found various 
opportunities of competing to carry out the internal improvements which the Imperial 
Government is wisely encouraging, and to develop the natural resources of the Empire”.465  
US relations with China were beneficial as US “trade with China has continued to grow, and 
our commercial rights under existing treaties have been everywhere maintained during the 
past year, as they will be in the future”.466 Looking ahead McKinley was hopeful when 
describing how “the extension of the area open to international foreign settlement at Shanghai 
and the opening of the ports of Nanking, Tsingtao (Kiao chao), and Talienwan to foreign trade 
and settlement will doubtless afford American enterprise additional facilities and new 
fields”.467 The partial colonisation of China was for McKinley relevant for the economic 
expansion it offered, an issue to be mediated through the logic of identity. 
Recalling his request the previous year for Congress to fund a study of potential commercial 
expansion in China, McKinley renewed the “recommendation, as the importance of the 
subject has steadily grown since it was first submitted to you, and no time should be lost in 
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studying for ourselves the resources of this great field for American trade and enterprise”.468 
Summarising the general policy of his administration, McKinley clarified that “markets are 
being sought and opened up for surplus farm and factory products in Europe and in Asia”.469 
This is one of the first explicit references to the US need to find outlets for its domestic 
economic surpluses. This was to constitute one of the central elements of the logic of capital, 
the need for expansion to ensure social reproduction. And this imperative was to be a key 
feature in US foreign policy towards China. 
When accepting the Republican nomination for re-election on July 12 1900, McKinley 
celebrated how the US had “happily ended the European alliance in Samoa, securing to 
ourselves one of the most valuable harbours in the Pacific Ocean, while the open door in 
China gives to us fair and equal competition in the vast trade of the Orient”.470 The territorial 
expansion into the Pacific, was valuable for its economic potential, rather than any inherent 
value in acquiring territory. As mentioned previously, although the notion of a “vast” market 
was more potential than actuality, it functioned as a discursive trope of US geopolitical 
interest in China and Asia more broadly. In describing the on-going Boxer rebellion in China, 
McKinley drew upon the US logic of identity by where its civilised qualities compelled its 
concern for the welfare of China, even if this appeared as secondary to US commercial 
interests as guaranteed by various treaties.471 McKinley extolled how the US had “the ultimate 
object of the peace and welfare of China, the safeguarding of all our treaty rights, and the 
maintenance of those principles of impartial intercourse to which the civilized world is 
pledged”.472 For McKinley, the US interest in securing the reproduction of US capital, was 
understood to constitute “impartial intercourse”, rather than the political consideration it was. 
McKinley located the causes of the rebellion in racial terms, where insubordination was as an 
inherent and flawed feature of the Chinese. He claimed that” the recent troubles in China 
spring from the anti-foreign agitation which for the past three years has gained strength in the 
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northern provinces. Their origin lies deep in the character of the Chinese races and in the 
traditions of their Government”. China’s relative isolation, from McKinley’s perspective, was 
ending as events like “the Taiping rebellion and the opening of Chinese ports to foreign trade 
and settlement disturbed alike the homogeneity and the seclusion of China”.473 The 
advancement of “foreign activity made itself felt in all quarters, not alone on the coast, but 
along the great river arteries and in the remoter districts, carrying new ideas and introducing 
new associations among a primitive people which had pursued for centuries a national policy 
of isolation”.474 Like Cleveland before him, McKinley saw the Chinese through the logic of 
identity, where they were the primitive others to the civilised colonial powers, specifically the 
US. 
McKinley celebrated the early technological advancements of the 20th century where “the 
telegraph and the railway [were] spreading over their land, the steamers plying on their 
waterways, the merchant and the missionary penetrating year by year farther to the interior”. 
This encroachment McKinley argued, “became to the Chinese mind types of an alien 
invasion, changing the course of their national life and fraught with vague forebodings of 
disaster to their beliefs and their self control”.475 This Chinese antipathy to Western practices 
was emblematic in McKinley’s reasoning of the Chinese aversion to the civilised world. He 
observed that “all the resources of foreign diplomacy, backed by moral demonstrations of the 
physical force of fleets and arms, have been needed to secure due respect for the treaty rights 
of foreigners and to obtain satisfaction from the responsible authorities for the sporadic 
outrages upon the persons and property of unoffending sojourners”.476 The Chinese appeared 
belligerent and disrespectful of the “impartial” aspects of Western policy. It was though “the 
imminence of peril to our own diversified interests in the Empire, as well as to those of all the 
other treaty governments” that motivated US interest in China the most. 477 
In his fourth annual message to Congress on December 3rd 1900, McKinley made explicit 
reference to what would come to be known as the Open Door Notes. He called for “united 
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action of the powers at Peking to promote the administrative reforms so greatly needed for 
strengthening the Imperial Government and maintaining the integrity of China, in which we 
believed the whole western world to be alike concerned”.478 The notes, circulated by his 
Secretary of State John Hay, called for mutual respect of China’s territorial integrity, while 
maintaining various spheres of influence of the colonial powers. The notes reflected an 
appreciation of the limit of US power at the time and the intensions of the US to maintain 
equal access to Chinese commerce. Hay spoke of how this lead him to distribute “to the 
several powers occupying territory and maintaining spheres of influence in China the circular 
proposals of 1899, inviting from them declarations of their intentions and views as to the 
desirability of the adoption of measures insuring the benefits of equality of treatment of all 
foreign trade throughout China”.479 Geopolitical order, understood here, as the maintenance of 
Chinese territorial cohesion, was necessary to facilitate US economic interest. McKinley 
described the success of the notes as reflecting how “the various powers interested in the 
untrammelled development of commerce and industry in the Chinese Empire as a source of 
vast benefit to the whole commercial world”.480 Again the logic of capital was prioritised as it 
has necessary implications for the logic of geopolitics.  
McKinley summarised US policy as determined “to seek a solution which may bring about 
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, 
protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard 
for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese 
Empire”.481 What is apparent from this declaration is the overriding importance of 
maintaining uninhibited economic access to China. It is worth recalling that this project is not 
concerned with establishing the veracity of the China market for US interests, but the 
discursive construction of what China means for the US through analysing its foreign policy 
discourses. McKinley made the self serving suggestion that China compensate foreign powers 
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for maintaining its territorial cohesion by neo-colonial means and that this could be done most 
effectively “by the opening of China to the equal commerce of all the world”.482 
In his second inaugural address on March 4th 1901 McKinley spoke more emphatically about 
the need for economic expansion as a solution to apparent overproduction. McKinley spoke of 
how US “ diversified productions…are increasing in such unprecedented volume as to 
admonish us of the necessity of still further enlarging our foreign markets by broader 
commercial relations”.483  This is not a revisionist claim, as historians like Williams and 
LaFeber have long ago established the significance of economic outlets in US expansion.484 
McKinley saw a solution in establishing “reciprocal trade arrangements with other nations 
should in liberal spirit be carefully cultivated and promoted”.485 In this light he reflected on 
“the part which the United States bore so honourably in the thrilling scenes in China, while 
new to American life, has been in harmony with its true spirit and best traditions, and in 
dealing with the results its policy will be that of moderation and fairness”.486 The US 
contribution to maintaining Chinese territorial integrity reflected one of the early cases of the 
US intervening militarily outside the American continent. McKinley saw this as a reflection 
of US “spirit and best traditions” implying it was compatible with how the US saw itself 
through the logic of identity.  
In his last address before his assassination, McKinley again spoke of the need to increase 
exports and find suitable foreign outlets for surplus produce. Speaking Buffalo, New York on 
September 5th 1901, he described how US “industrial enterprises which have grown to such 
great proportions affect the homes and occupations of the people and the welfare of the 
country”. The impacts on everyday life in the US aside, McKinley was more concerned with 
how US “capacity to produce has developed so enormously and our products have so 
multiplied that the problem of more markets requires our urgent and immediate attention”.487 
The solution was for McKinley was achieved through the negotiation of “sensible trade 
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arrangements which will not interrupt our home production we shall extend the outlets for our 
increasing surplus. A system which provides a mutual exchange of commodities, a mutual 
exchange is manifestly essential to the continued and healthful growth of our export trade”.488 
A vision not to distinct from Barack Obama’s justifications for the Tran-Pacific Partnership as 
chapter 9 will explain. 
In his most explicit reference statements on the issue, McKinley declared, “what we produce 
beyond our domestic consumption must have a vent abroad”.489 Foreign markets were then a 
solution to domestic crises of capitalism. The China myth as described by Thomas 
McCormick or understood here as discourses of China within the US imagination considered 
China as a solution to domestic economic issues.490 As this thesis will eventually demonstrate, 
China itself was to become a problem in its own right, rather than a solution to a prior crisis. 
McKinley continued, demanding that “the excess must be relieved through a foreign outlet 
and we should sell everywhere we can, and buy wherever the buying will enlarge our sales 
and productions, and thereby make a greater demand for home labour…The expansion of our 
trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of 
good will and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals”.491 US presidential discourses of 
China then, were still primarily constituted through the logic of capital even if this was 
facilitated and conditioned by the logics of identity and geopolitics. 
5.3 Theodore Roosevelt, the World, and Japan 
Inheriting the Presidency from McKinley in September 1901, Theodore Roosevelt built on his 
concerns regarding the need for foreign markets. In his first annual message to congress on 
December 3rd 1901, Roosevelt envisioned business and commercial concerns as an enterprise 
to dominate. He elaborated on “business concerns which have the largest means at their 
disposal and are managed by the ablest men are naturally those which take the lead in the 
strife for commercial supremacy among the nations of the world”.492 With this commercial 
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supremacy in mind Roosevelt outlined how “America has only just begun to assume that 
commanding position in the international business world which we believe will more and 
more be hers”. This sense of entitlement to commercial supremacy, or hegemony as is more 
commonly understood meant it was “the utmost importance that this position be not 
jeopardised, especially at a time when the overflowing abundance of our own natural 
resources and the skill, business energy, and mechanical aptitude of our people make foreign 
markets essential”.493 Again, this reference to foreign markets, perceived as integral to the 
growth of US power, was sought out in the name of the economic security of the US. 
Roosevelt though envisioned the necessary deployment of US military power in “wars with 
barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples”. He described how “over the entire world, of recent 
years, wars between the great civilized powers have become less and less frequent” and that it 
was these “wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples…being merely a most regrettable 
but necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of 
mankind”.494 This police duty took, when seen alongside the following claim, the “we have 
not the slightest desire to secure any territory at the expense of any of our neighbours” 
indicated Roosevelt’s position that the US would work to secure the geopolitical stability of 
regions inhabited by barbarous peoples.495 Roosevelt here reflected the anti-colonial 
administrative urges within the logic of geopolitics. He also invoked the logic of identity 
when phrasing US interest in terms of “the welfare of mankind”. 
Roosevelt saw the improvement and expansion of the US navy as vital to US prestige and the 
conduct of foreign policy. He declared how “no one point of our policy, foreign or domestic, 
is more important than this to the honour and material welfare, and above all to the peace, of 
our nation in the future. Whether we desire it or not, we must henceforth recognize that we 
have international duties no less than international rights”.496 Most importantly for Roosevelt 
was the need to secure US commerce, “unless our commerce is always to be carried in foreign 
bottoms, we must have war craft to protect it”.497 This reflected arguments made previously 
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by Buren as discussed in the previous chapter, though Roosevelt differed as his statements 
began to reflect the on-going entanglement of the imperatives of the three logics. 
The construction of a more powerful navy was for Roosevelt a matter that linked concerns 
about economic security with a conception of its ‘place’ in international politics. He saw the 
issue in the following terms: 
“The American people must either build and maintain an adequate navy or else make up their 
minds definitely to accept a secondary position in international affairs, not merely in political, but 
in commercial, matters. It has been well said that there is no surer way of courting national disaster 
than to be "opulent, aggressive, and unarmed”.498 
This reflected how the logics of capital and identity were rendered in geopolitical terms where 
the space of commercial interaction and international ‘affairs’ needed to be secured. 
Roosevelt was to emphasise this point again in his second annual message to Congress in 
1902 when he declared that “there should be no halt in the work of building up the Navy…we 
have deliberately made our own certain foreign policies which demand the possession of a 
first class navy”.499 Roosevelt’s desire for and presumption of US pre-eminence is evident in 
his speculation about US desires for a commercially secure peace. He postulated that 
“probably no other great nation in the world is so anxious for peace as we are. There is not a 
single civilized power which has anything whatever to fear from aggressiveness on our part. 
All we want is peace”.500 The US desire for peace was premised on the mutual recognition of 
rights aimed “to insure fair treatment to us commercially, and to guarantee the safety of the 
American people”.501 Here Roosevelt reflected all three of the logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics as he set out his priorities for US foreign policy. 
For the most part, Roosevelt extended his predecessors interests in China. He described how 
“owing to the rapid growth of our power and our interests on the Pacific, whatever happens in 
China must be of the keenest national concern to us”.502 In this way, the logic of capital 
shaping US commercial interests in China was beginning to necessitate an increasing concern 
with the regions geopolitical stability. Roosevelt commented positively on the settlements 
                                                
498 Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542. 
499 Theodore Roosevelt: "Second Annual Message," December 2, 1902. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29543. 
500 Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542. 
501 Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542. 
502 Theodore Roosevelt: "First Annual Message," December 3, 1901. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29542. 
 114 
with the Chinese over the Boxer rebellion. 503 Roosevelt described the colonial style 
“provisions made for insuring the future safety of the foreign representatives in [Beijing] by 
setting aside for their exclusive use a quarter of the city which the powers can make 
defensible and in which they can if necessary maintain permanent military guards”.504 Most 
significantly for Roosevelt and US interest was that “under the provisions of the joint note of 
December, 1900, China has agreed to revise the treaties of commerce and navigation and to 
take such other steps for the purpose of facilitating foreign trade as the foreign powers may 
decide to be needed”.505 China was now at the explicit behest of the colonial powers. 
Roosevelt portrayed US actions in the most positive of lights where the US “government has 
unswervingly advocated moderation, and has materially aided in bringing about an adjustment 
which tends to enhance the welfare of China and to lead to a more beneficial intercourse 
between the Empire and the modern world”. 506 Roosevelt here understood US military 
intervention as being undertaken to encourage further Chinese interaction with the 
international system. This colonial style compulsion was framed by Roosevelt’s continuation 
of McKinley’s Open Door policies. Roosevelt declared that “we advocate the "open door" 
with all that it implies; not merely the procurement of enlarged commercial opportunities on 
the coasts, but access to the interior by the waterways with which China has been so 
extraordinarily favoured”. This captured the increasing commercial expansion of the US into 
Chinese territory. It becomes increasingly apparent that a logic of capital, requiring increased 
US access to foreign markets, was fostering the need for a more refined logic of geopolitics, 
for as political geographers have demonstrated, politics, as do commercial activities, occur in 
particular spaces that have been meaningful constituted by political considerations. For all the 
concern about China’s territorial integrity, China’s territorial sovereignty was of secondary 
concern to the logic of capital and US economic interests.  
The attempt to incorporate China into the colonial structures of the international system 
should be seen as the start what can essentially be understood as a 20th century US project. 
Roosevelt summarised the essence of the Open Door policy when he commented that “only 
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by bringing the people of China into peaceful and friendly community of trade with all the 
peoples of the earth can the work now auspiciously begun be carried to fruition”. The priority 
was mutual economic access or rather the desire for “parity of treatment, under the 
conventions, throughout the Empire for our trade and our citizens with those of all other 
powers”.507 Roosevelt saw the incorporation of China into the civilised world as a necessary 
act for the general welfare of the world. To him declining examples of warfare between 
“civilised powers” was increasingly a normal condition, and he understood intervention in 
China as an example where “wars with uncivilized powers are largely mere matters of 
international police duty, essential for, the welfare of the world”.508 Roosevelt here would 
foreshadow arguments made most prominently by Obama to China’s importance in 
contributing to the maintainence of the international order. 
Speaking in San Francisco at a mechanics pavilion on May 13th 1903, Roosevelt elaborated 
on his expansionist beliefs. He remarked “before I came to the Pacific Slope I was an 
expansionist, and after having been here I fail to understand how any man convinced of his 
country's greatness and glad that his country should challenge with proud confidence its 
mighty future, can be anything but an expansionist”.509 Expansion was for Roosevelt, a 
rational effect of the logic of identity, where the US was seen as a great country and this 
necessarily meant it should expand its territory and ideas. This was a vision that found similar 
conclusions from the logics of geopolitics and capital. Roosevelt emphasised how “in the 
century that is opening, the commerce and the command of the Pacific will be factors of 
incalculable moment in the world's history”.510 US commercial interest in China, and its 
perceived necessity within the logic of capital led the US to understand “the commerce and 
the command of the Pacific” as vital to its material, economic and ontological security. 
Roosevelt’s interest in China was also conditioned by his more positive interpretation of 
Japan. For him, “Japan, shaking off the lethargy of centuries, has taken her rank among 
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civilized, modern powers”.511 Japan was seen favourably as it had adopted Western norms and 
discarded its non-Western “lethargy”. This was juxtaposed immediately to his more dour 
consideration of China. He observed how “European nations have seated themselves along the 
eastern coast of Asia, while China by her misfortunes has given us an object lesson in the 
utter folly of attempting to exist as a nation at all, if at the same time both rich and 
defenceless”.512 To Roosevelt, China’s on-going political issues were the result of its own 
decisions rather than the colonial policies of the European powers Roosevelt referred to.  
In a rhetorical flourish predating contemporary axioms of US interest in the Pacific, Roosevelt 
declared that “our own mighty republic has stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and now 
in California, Oregon, and Washington, in Alaska, Hawaii and the Philippines, holds an extent 
of coast line which makes it of necessity a power of the first class in the Pacific”. The US, by 
its mere geographic existence was in this reasoning a power with the right to seek out its 
interests in Asia. Worth mentioning here is Roosevelt’s inclusion of the Philippines in his 
understanding of the US republic. For all intensive purposes the US had become an empire 
after it 1898 victory over Spain, even if most Presidential rhetoric adopted an anti-colonial 
stance.513 This geographical expansion began to develop the logic of geopolitics in a more 
distinct manner to the logic of capital. The US’s geopolitical position as it was constructed, 
started to dictate US interest, even if this expansion into Asia had initially been motivated by 
the logic of capital. Roosevelt continued, declaring that “the extension in the area of our 
domain has been immense, the extension in the area of our influence even greater. America's 
geographical position on the Pacific is such as to insure our peaceful domination of its waters 
in the future if only we grasp with sufficient resolution the advantages of that position”.514 
Roosevelt established the discursive norm that perceived the nature of the US’s geographical 
position, as legitimising its interest and activities in Asia. His reference to “peaceful 
domination” of the Pacific, created the discursive conditions for what is more regular referred 
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to as US hegemony. At the time of Roosevelt though, this was more of an aspiration than 
anything more substantive. 
Tangential to US interest in China, although indicative of the general US attitude was policy 
towards the Philippines.515 Roosevelt described how “the inevitable march of events gave us 
the control of the Philippine Islands at a time so opportune that it may without irreverence be 
called Providential”, inferring that the colonial expansion of the US had a sense of natural 
progression to it.516 This was combined with a masculine rendering of political perception 
where “unless we show ourselves weak, unless we show ourselves degenerate sons of the 
sires from whose loins we sprang, we must go on with the work we have undertaken”. Now 
that the US had a colonial possession, it had to act accordingly to demonstrate strength. 
Although Roosevelt made it clear that he had “hope that this work will ever be of a peaceful 
character”, the necessity of appearing strong led to the inconsistent claim that  “we infinitely 
desire peace, and the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war”.517 
Roosevelt’s romanticised rendering of colonial expansion was captured by the following 
remarks, “for our proper place is with the great expanding peoples, with the peoples that dare 
to be great, that accept with confidence a place of leadership in the world…for much of our 
expansion must go through the Golden Gate”. Roosevelt here was invoking a sense of identity 
to be found in US expansion. This idea of being great, and holding some kind of leadership in 
the world was constitutively a component of the logic of identity. This presumption, found 
geopolitical expression in his following remark directed at the audience in San Francisco: 
“And inevitably you who are seated by the Pacific must take the lead in and must profit by the 
growth of American influence along the coasts and among the islands of that mighty ocean, where 
East and West finally become one”.518 
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Roosevelt here, invoked the promise of unification of East and West via commercial 
interaction, even if this would more fundamentally turn out to be the attempted 
homogenisation of the East though Western capitalist powers.  
In his third annual message to Congress, on December 7th 1903, Roosevelt described the 
activity of the executive branch as focusing on “strengthening our domestic and foreign 
markets, in perfecting our transportation facilities, in building up our merchant marine, in 
preventing the entrance of undesirable immigrants, in improving commercial and industrial 
conditions, and in bringing together on common ground those necessary partners in industrial 
progress - capital and labour”.519 These activities were designed to function in concert for the 
benefits of US economic security. Promisingly for Roosevelt, “commerce between the nations 
is steadily growing in volume, and the tendency of the times is toward closer trade relations”. 
In this sense the logic of capital, as manifested in desire for expanding areas of trade took on a 
sense of inevitability. Despite this Roosevelt warned that “constant watchfulness is needed to 
secure to Americans the chance to participate to the best advantage in foreign trade”.520 In this 
light, the logic of capital remained vital to US conceptions of  its foreign policy priorities. 
One of the potentially fruitful areas of foreign trade was again, China. Roosevelt celebrated 
how “the signing of a new commercial treaty with China, which took place at Shanghai on the 
8th of October, is a cause for satisfaction. This act, the result of long discussion and 
negotiation, places our commercial relations with the great Oriental Empire on a more 
satisfactory footing than they have ever heretofore enjoyed”. The agreement was most notable 
as it contained “an important extension of our commerce by increased facility of access to 
Chinese ports, and for the relief of trade by the removal of some of the obstacles which have 
embarrassed it in the past”.521 This marked a success for the logic of capital and this success 
had promising potential for further expansion. 
Roosevelt saw how the new treaty as “an indispensable condition for the advance and 
development of our commerce in Manchuria, China…opened to foreign commerce the cities 
of Mukden, the capital of the province of Manchuria, and Antung, an important port on the 
Yalu River, on the road to Korea. The full measure of development which our commerce may 
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rightfully expect can hardly be looked for until the settlement of the present abnormal state of 
things in the Empire; but the foundation for such development has at last been laid”.522 The 
significance of China emphasised through the logic of capital was for the US as much about 
the future as the present. 
The US also started to develop significant geopolitical concerns in Asia. Roosevelt remarked 
how the construction of a naval base in the Philippines was a necessary interest to secure US 
trade and economic activity.  He declared, “the establishment of a naval base in the 
Philippines ought not to be longer postponed. Such a base is desirable in time of peace; in 
time of war it would be indispensable, and its lack would be ruinous. Without it our fleet 
would be helpless”.523 US colonial expansion was thus motivated by the logic of capital and 
its concern for secure economic trade in Asia. The acquisition of territory was justified on the 
basis of management and administration of regional and international trade, rather than for the 
mere sake of physical expansion.   
It is worth reflecting on the contrast between the US approach to China and the Philippines. 
Roosevelt described the Philippines in more regular colonial terms where “at present they are 
utterly incapable of existing in independence at all or of building up a civilization of their 
own. I firmly believe that we can help them to rise higher and higher in the scale of 
civilization and of capacity for self-government”.524 US interest in the Philippines was as 
much to do with a sense of civilised responsibility as it was securing geopolitical station in 
Asia. Roosevelt acknowledged how “in the development of our interests in the Pacific Ocean 
and along its coasts, the Philippines have played and will play an important part; and that our 
interests have been served in more than one way by the possession of the islands”. This was 
qualified by his remark that the “chief reason for continuing to hold them must be that we 
ought in good faith to try to do our share of the world's work, and this particular piece of work 
has been imposed upon us by the results of the war with Spain”. The US was now confronted 
with the administrative issues of colonialism, a point also recognised by Roosevelt when he 
stated “the problem presented to us in the Philippine Islands is akin to, but not exactly like, 
the problems presented to the other great civilized powers which have possessions in the 
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Orient”.525 US interest in Asia was now justified through the logic of capital, of geopolitics 
and of identity.  
Roosevelt explicitly mentioned the significance of continuity in foreign policy between US 
Presidents in his fourth annual message to Congress in 1904.  He described that “the growing 
importance of the Orient as a field for American exports drew from my predecessor, President 
McKinley”.526 McKinley can been seen then as important for opening the door, so to speak, to 
increased US interest in Asia. Roosevelt drew on and expanded McKinley’s request for a “a 
commission to study the industrial and commercial conditions in the Chinese Empire and to 
report as to the opportunities for and the obstacles to the enlargement of markets in China for 
the raw products and manufactures of the United States”.527 The administrative aspects of 
capitalism were of significance to Roosevelt as he emphasised “the importance of securing 
proper information and data with a view to the enlargement of our trade with Asia is 
undiminished”. This could be done for example by “a place for permanent display of 
American products in some prominent trade centre of that Empire, under Government control 
and management, as an effective means of advancing our export trade therein”.528 The logic 
of capital as rendered by Roosevelt then compelled the management and administration of 
geopolitics. 
In a candid reflection on the US interest in securing a “peace of justice… which comes when 
each nation is not merely safeguarded in its own rights, but scrupulously recognizes and 
performs its duty toward others”, Roosevelt revealed the importance of the logic of identity in 
US foreign policy. Significantly, “if there is conflict between the two [peace and a policy of 
righteousness], then our fealty is due first to the cause of righteousness”. 529 Cynically, this 
can be read as utilising the cause of righteousness to legitimise violence in the name of 
morality. This is relevant here as Roosevelt also invoked a conditional understanding of state 
sovereignty as a legitimate cause for US military intervention abroad. Intervention would be 
“the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do 
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justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign 
aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations”. Roosevelt declared it “a 
mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to 
maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such 
independence can not be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it”.530 
Roosevelt here was invoking a global application of the Monroe Doctrine where US military 
power could be deployed for righteous means, whatever that may entail. 
The previous point is significant as Roosevelt then recounted that “in asserting the Monroe 
Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama, 
and in endeavouring to circumscribe the theatre of war in the Far East, and to secure the open 
door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at 
large”.531 US intervention in the boxer rebellion in China, was recast as being justified by the 
Monroe doctrine, and as an act of global interest, even if it was more common to hear US 
policy towards China justified through the logic of capital and the necessary attention to 
potential foreign markets. Roosevelt thus, reiterated his call for a stronger navy as justified 
though US interest in Asia. He emphasised how the US “have undertaken to secure for 
ourselves our just share in the trade of the Orient”.532 Through the logic of capital, access to 
Chinese markets was now a matter of justice, not just economic necessity.  
The discourse of a moral and civilised identity ran more generally through aspects of 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy beliefs. He mused, foreshadowing later goals of Woodrow Wilson 
and Franklin Roosevelt that a US “aim should be from time to time to take such steps as may 
be possible toward creating something like an organization of the civilized nations, because as 
the world becomes more highly organized the need for navies and armies will diminish”.533 
US foreign policy towards China then can be seen a matter of administrative common sense. 
This is not to say he was preoccupied with some kind of teleology regarding the convergence 
of international relations in international institutions, but that the US saw international 
relations as an administrative issue. As Roosevelt remarked, this was about “organisation” 
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where civilised states could manage all aspects of international politics. This attitude, was 
combined with the more dubious declaration that: 
“Not only there is not now, but there never has been, any other nation in the world so wholly free 
from the evils of militarism as is ours…Never at any time in our history has this Nation suffered 
from militarism or been in the remotest danger of suffering from militarism”.534 
To Roosevelt, the US military was to be used in technical interventions to restore political 
order in the name of stable commercial conditions and as described earlier, the “general 
welfare” of the world. The US in this reasoning was more concerned with the administration 
of closer ‘civilised’ ties, than any attempt to remake the world in its image.  
In his fifth annual message to Congress on December 5th 1905, Roosevelt reflected in detail 
on the issue of Chinese immigration. He relayed orthodox US concerns about Chinese 
immigration “the entire Chinese coolie class, that is, the class of Chinese labourers, skilled 
and unskilled, legitimately come under the head of undesirable immigrants to this country, 
because of their numbers, the low wages for which they work, and their low standard of 
living”.535 It was thus, “not only is it to the interest of this country to keep them out, but the 
Chinese authorities do not desire that they should be admitted”.536 Despite this, Roosevelt 
conceded that “in the effort to carry out the policy of excluding Chinese labourers, Chinese 
coolies, grave injustice and wrong have been done by this Nation to the people of China, and 
therefore ultimately to this Nation itself”. Roosevelt was attempting to distinguish between 
desirable and undesirable immigrants where “Chinese students, business and professional 
men of all kinds not only merchants, but bankers, doctors, manufacturers, professors, 
travellers, and the like should be encouraged to come here, and treated on precisely the same 
footing that we treat students, business men, travellers, and the like of other nations”.537 This 
reveals the tensions between the economic imperatives of the logic of capital and the 
prejudices embedded within the logic of identity during this period.  
Roosevelt was motivated the potential economic disturbances due to and organised Chinese 
boycott of US products. In accepting the prejudicial basis of the Chinese exclusion acts he 
announced, “we cannot expect to receive equity unless we do equity. We cannot ask the 
                                                
534 Theodore Roosevelt: "Seventh Annual Message," December 3, 1907. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29548. 
535 Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546. 
536 Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546. 
537 Theodore Roosevelt: "Fifth Annual Message," December 5, 1905. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29546. 
 123 
Chinese to do to us what we are unwilling to do to them”.538 Roosevelt observed that “much 
trouble has come during the past summer from the organized boycott against American goods 
which has been started in China” where “the main factor in producing this boycott has been 
the resentment felt by the students and business people of China, by all the Chinese leaders, 
against the harshness of our law toward educated Chinamen of the professional and business 
classes”.539 The reciprocity Roosevelt alluded to then, was motivated not by a moral sense of 
justice and the logic of identity, but by a threat to US economic interests and the logic of 
capital.  
In his seventh annual message to congress on December 3rd 1907, Roosevelt spoke explicitly 
about US interest in incorporating China into the international system. He announced, “this 
Nation should help in every practicable way in the education of the Chinese people, so that 
the vast and populous Empire of China may gradually adapt itself to modern conditions”.540 
China was to be introduced into the civilised international system by “promoting the coming 
of Chinese students to this country and making it attractive to them to take courses at our 
universities and higher educational institutions”.541 This strand of thinking is similar to the 
interest and concerns of US missionaries in China.542 It also reflected one of the more 
common colonial tropes that the colonised needed to be “educated” if they were to join the 
ranks of civilisation. This had the constitutive effect of not only constructing the Chinese as 
uneducated and uncivilised, but also juxtaposing them to a civilised and educated US. 
In special message to Congress on April 14th 1908, Roosevelt repeated his claim that “we are 
not a military nation. Our army is so small as to present an almost absurd contrast to our size, 
and is properly treated as little more than a nucleus for organization in case of serious war”.543 
The issue now though was captured by the following remark that the US was “a rich Nation, 
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and undefended wealth invites aggression”.544 Roosevelt drew a comparison between this 
peaceful yet rich US and an unstable and weak China. Although China desired peace 
Roosevelt remarked how “for centuries China has refused to provide military forces and has 
treated the career of the soldier as inferior in honour and regard to the career of the merchant 
or of the man of letters”. To Roosevelt, China’s lack of military preparedness had been 
detrimental to its international standing, “there never has been so large an empire which for so 
long a time has so resolutely proceeded on the theory of doing away with what is called 
‘militarism’…all the advanced reformers and farsighted patriots in the Chinese Empire are at 
present seeking - I may add, with our hearty good will-for a radical and far reaching reform in 
internal affairs”.545 Roosevelt reiterated here, through the logics of geopolitics and identity, 
the US aim to see a reformed China incorporated into the ‘civilised’ international system. 
China’s domestic weaknesses to Roosevelt had created the conditions for its potential 
“absolute dismemberment”. He observed how “in external affairs the policy has resulted in 
various other nations now holding large portions of Chinese territory, while there is a very 
acute fear in China lest the Empire, because of its defencelessness, be exposed to absolute 
dismemberment”. This was one of the clearest public statements from Roosevelt, invoking the 
logic of geopolitics, concerning the interest maintained by the US in the territorial integrity of 
China. 
His reflection on China’s international predicament was used by Roosevelt to justify US 
military build-up with the emphasis on legitimate security concerns rather than a 
preoccupation with militarism. Other states were “able to help [China] only in a small 
measure, because no nation can help any other unless that other can help itself”.546 He implied 
that the Chinese been lazy in their lack of preparedness for international politics and he is 
worth considering at length here: 
“it is idle to assume, and from the standpoint of national interest and honour it is mischievous folly 
for any statesman to assume, that this world has yet reached the stage, or has come within 
measurable distance of the stage, when a proud nation, jealous of its honour and conscious of its 
great mission in the world, can be content to rely for peace upon the forbearance of other powers. It 
would be equally foolish to rely upon each of them possessing at all times and under all 
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circumstances and provocations an altruistic regard for the rights of others…They are blind to what 
has happened in China”.547 
For Roosevelt, the world could not yet be fully trusted. Roosevelt used these concerns to 
justify the construction of a stronger naval force. As he remarked, “the United States can hope 
for a permanent career of peace on only one condition, and that is, on condition of building 
and maintaining a first class navy”.548 Although he had previously described the world as 
becoming increasingly more civilised Roosevelt also made the case that “Great Britain has 
been saved by its fleet from the necessity of facing one of the two alternatives of submission 
to conquest by a foreign power or of itself becoming a great military power”.549 In some 
ways, this reflects the arguments of defensive neo-realists that a state should accrue enough 
material capability to deter foreign aggression, though I am more interested in here how 
Roosevelt used China to justify an expansive military build-up as well as to juxtapose a weak 
and idle to China to a more enlightened and militarily prepared US. 
The more commonly recognised colonial trope of China as uncivilized was a minor theme in 
Roosevelt’s eighth annual message to Congress in 1908. He described how “the lesson of 
deforestation in China is a lesson which mankind should have learned many times already 
from what has occurred in other places”.550 He continued, “this ruthless destruction of the 
forests in northern China has brought about, or has aided in bringing about, desolation…short 
sighted man, whether barbaric, semi-civilized, or what he mistakenly regards as fully 
civilized, when he has destroyed the forests, has rendered certain the ultimate destruction of 
the land itself. In northern China the mountains are now such as are shown by the 
accompanying photographs, absolutely barren peaks”.551 China’s environmental ignorance 
was evidence, through the logic of identity of its ‘uncivilised’ nature.  
Most of his references to China had invoked the logic of capital this thesis describes; yet it 
was evident that this was not the only guiding influence in US foreign policy. Roosevelt also 
declared that US “foreign policy is based on the theory that right must be done between 
nations precisely as between individuals, and in our actions for the last ten years we have in 
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this matter proven our faith by our deeds”.552  Not only did Roosevelt invoke the moral 
influence in US foreign policy, he was also equating the behaviour of individuals with the 
behaviour of the state. He stated further that the US had “behaved, and are behaving, towards 
other nations as in private life an honourable man would behave towards his fellows”.553 US 
foreign policy towards China under Roosevelt then, had been motivated by the need for 
access to foreign markets, concordant geopolitical and colonial concerns about US standing in 
Asia, and a sense of moral honour. This captures the main argument of this thesis that to 
reduce US imaginations of China as being motivated by a singular narrative as only partially 
accurate.   
The basis of US interest in China was captured by an article Roosevelt wrote while still 
President entitled “The Awakening of China”, for a periodical called The Outlook, published 
on November 28th 1908. His central claim was that at this moment “China is awakening” and 
this called to the US’s “Christian obligations to this great awakening people across the 
sea”.554 For Roosevelt, this was “one of the great events of our age” where “the remedy for 
the ‘yellow peril’, whatever that may be, is not the repression of life but the cultivation and 
direction of life”.555 In Roosevelt’s view, it was necessary for the US to shape the future of 
China to prevent any future conflict. Foreshadowing contemporary discourses on the ‘rise of 
China’ Roosevelt saw this moment as the “time for the West to implant its ideals in the 
Orient, in such a fashion as to minimize the chance of a dreadful future clash between two 
radically different and hostile civilisations; if we wait until tomorrow, we may find that we 
have waited too long”.556 The possibility that difference between China and the West might 
lead to conflict was to be mediated by the increasing Westernisation of China and its politics. 
This reflects the arguments made by Vukovich about the homogenising tendencies of 
capitalism as practiced by the US.557 Rather than the perpetuation of difference, Western and 
US policy here was about making China more similar to the West, an overall process that 
occurred through the deployment of the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics.  
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5.4 Strictly Business: Taft and Dollar Diplomacy  
I begin this section with a brief diversion from analysing the public statements of US 
Presidents to some more complimentary sources that nevertheless are vital to understanding 
Taft’s foreign policy towards China. In the broader scope of this thesis, Taft’s formulations 
are seen as possessing an effervescent presence in US discourses of China.  
Speaking in Shanghai in 1907 while serving as Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Taft declared 
made clear that “for our present purpose the attitude of the United States toward China must 
be regarded not alone as a country interested in the trade of China, but also as a Power owning 
territory in China’s immediate neighbourhood”.558 This sentiment was echoed later by 
Philander Knox when Secretary of State under Taft when he remarked “so long as the U.S. 
holds the Philippines…the domination of China by other nations to our exclusion would be 
fraught with danger, and it is unthinkable that this country should be squeezed out of any 
combination [of powers] exercising an influence in Peking”.559 Existing geopolitical 
configurations as Taft saw them, compelled the US to behave in a particular manner. This is 
precisely what I mean when I argue for the presence of a logic of geopolitics. The ownership 
of territory, in Taft’s words, endowed the US with a certain set of expectations if it was to 
remain credible and maintain access to Chinese markets. 
Taft would also invoke the logic of identity when justifying US foreign policy in East Asia. 
During a speech campaigning for President in Ohio on September 19th 1908, Taft presented a 
defence of US policy in the Philippines and Asia more broadly. When describing US 
treatment of the Philippines Taft declared, “our recognition of the rights of the people there, 
our attempt to teach them practical self-government, our exaltation of the individual, have had 
an excellent effect throughout the Orient. It is felt in China…we are pioneers in spreading 
Western civilisation in the East”.560 This sense of a civilising mission represented the logic of 
identity in US foreign policies toward China. 
During his Presidency, in a personal conversation with Prince Chun of China on the 15th of 
July 1909, Taft made clear that he had “an intense personal interest in making the use of 
American capital in the development of China an instrument for the promotion of the welfare 
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of China…and the preservation of her territorial integrity”.561 Later that year in November, 
Taft emphasized again to the Chinese that “I want to make it known to your government that 
it can trust us implicitly, for we do not want any of your territory. We only want your 
trade”.562  US interest in China was conditioned by the logic of capital though as Taft’s 
previous statements made clear, this was complimented by a logic of geopolitics, a logic not 
just capturing how the US thought about international prestige and legitimacy, but as a 
rendering of how space is discursively produced in international politics, in particular in 
relation to how the US conceived of Asia as a natural area of US interest based on its location 
across the Pacific. 
In his first annual message to Congress on December 7th 1909, Taft reiterated the now 
common US refrain that “in the Far East this Government preserves unchanged its policy of 
supporting the principle of equality of opportunity and scrupulous respect for the integrity of 
the Chinese Empire, to which policy are pledged the interested Powers of both East and 
West”.563 Taft though was taking a more proactive approach to the Open Door in China. One 
of his signature policies was a railroad loan which “represented a practical and real 
application of the open door policy through cooperation with China by interested Power” 
where “the Administration deemed American participation to be of great national interest”.564 
This was significant as Taft saw participation in an international consortium as a case where 
“opportunity should not be lost” and was pleased that “the indispensable instrumentality 
presented itself when a group of American bankers, of international reputation and great 
resources, agreed at once to share in the loan upon precisely such terms as this Government 
should approve”.565  For Taft it was “gratifying that Americans will thus take their share in 
this extension of these great highways of trade, and to believe that such activities will give a 
real impetus to our commerce and will prove a practical corollary to our historic policy in the 
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Far East”.566 Taft was invoking the logic of capital by drawing on the historic US concern 
with access to the Chinese economy as a potential market for domestic US surpluses. 
During his second annual message to Congress on December 6th 1910, Taft dwelled on how 
“the centre of interest in Far Eastern affairs during the past year has again been China”.567 
Championing US participation in the Hukuang Loan railway loan, he described the settlement 
of the loan as “one of exact equality between America, Great Britain, France, and Germany in 
respect to financing the loan and supplying materials for the proposed railways and their 
future branches”.568 This was an example of the Open Door policy in practice, equal 
participation of Western states in the Chinese economy. As Taft was to state, “the application 
of the principle underlying the policy of the United States in regard to the Hukuang Loan, 
viz., that of the internationalization of the foreign interest in such of the railways of China as 
may be financed by foreign countries”. Taft had been eager to secure the US access to the 
construction of railways in China and saw it as part of a broader “proposal for 
internationalization and commercial neutralization of all the railways of Manchuria”.569 
Difficulties in getting the Russian and Japanese governments to agree to US participation in 
the loans, as they were to lose out on monopolies, this was an example of the logic of capital 
and of geopolitics in operation. 
Taft made this abundantly clear when he declared “the policy of this Government in these 
matters has been directed by a desire to make the use of American capital in the development 
of China an instrument in the promotion of China's welfare and material prosperity without 
prejudice to her legitimate rights as an independent political power”.570 US capital then would 
now start to have a dual purpose, it would seek foreign outlets to relieve domestic surpluses, 
but it would also be used to help ‘develop’ China. He described the railway loan as being of 
“the greatest importance to the commercial interests of the United States and the civilized 
world at large”.571 Taft also notes with positivity how it was “a matter of interest to 
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Americans to note the success which is attending the efforts of China to establish gradually a 
system of representative government”.572 The logic of identity, where the US saw itself as a 
self proclaimed exemplar of democratic governance was invoked to suggest that the US 
should set about promoting political reform and development in China. The logic of identity 
in this sense compelled the US to produce a certain kind of China in its own image. 
The central organising principle of Taft’s foreign policy was conditioned by the logic of 
capital. He stated clearly that:  
“our foreign trade merits the best support of the Government and the most earnest endeavour of our 
manufacturers and merchants, who, if they do not already in all cases need a foreign market, are 
certain soon to become dependent on it. Therefore, now is the time to secure a strong position in 
this field”.573 
Taft was explicitly trying to combine the policies of US foreign policy with the interests of 
private capital in the US. This was part of what has now come be to known as ‘Dollar 
Diplomacy’, at the time a derisory label attached to Taft’s disposition in using US diplomacy 
to benefit private US based capital.574 
In his third annual message to Congress in December 1911, Taft recalled the US’s role in 
trying to ensure China’s political stability while gaining further access to its markets. In 
attempts to help the Chinese reform their currency Taft described how “this was originally to 
be solely an American enterprise” but “the American Government, consistently with its desire 
to secure a sympathetic and practical cooperation of the great powers toward maintaining the 
principle of equality of opportunity and the administrative integrity of China, urged the 
Chinese Government to admit to participation in the currency loan the associates of the 
American group in the Hukuang loan”.575 Taft was determined to maintain the premises of the 
Open Door policy in China while also ensuring Chinese political stability. This was merely 
the start of a longer term objective as Taft observed that “while of immense importance in 
itself, the reform contemplated in making this loan is but preliminary to other and more 
comprehensive fiscal reforms which will be of incalculable benefit to China and foreign 
interests alike, since they will strengthen the Chinese Empire and promote the rapid 
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development of international trade”.576 Securing US access to the Chinese market and 
fostering political stability were seen as complimentary enterprises. The logics of capital and 
of geopolitics then were closely related then even if at times they did not always function in 
concert. 
Reflecting on the civil in China, Taft saw it as “especially important at the present, when the 
ancient Chinese Empire is shaken by civil war incidental to its awakening to the many 
influences and activities of modernization, are the cooperative policy of good understanding 
which has been fostered by the international projects referred to above and the general 
sympathy of view among all the Powers interested in the Far East”.  Taft saw it as plausible to 
distinguish the activities of foreign powers in China from the collapse of the imperial system 
and the emergence of a Chinese Republic. He described how “while safeguarding the interests 
of our nationals, this Government is using its best efforts in continuance of its traditional 
policy of sympathy and friendship toward the Chinese Empire and its people, with the 
confident hope for their economic and administrative development”.577 Taft revealed a 
somewhat ambivalent concern to China’s political conditions where economic and 
administrative development were prioritised with the primary concern minimal disruption to 
the US’s economic interests.  
In one of the rare invocations of ‘logic’ to describe US foreign policy by a US President 
during his fourth annual message to Congress in 1912, Taft made clear his “desire to touch 
upon some of the essentials to the safe management of the foreign relations of the United 
States and to endeavour, also, to define clearly certain concrete policies which are the logical 
modern corollaries of the undisputed and traditional fundamentals of the foreign policy of the 
United States”(emphasis added).578 Taft here is articulating how US policies were informed 
by and conditioned by, logical corollaries of “traditional fundamentals”. Although this is not 
precisely the conceptualisation I adopt in my argument regarding the three logics of US 
foreign policy towards China, Taft makes clear that policies emerge out of certain conditions 
that are structured and informed by particular logics of US concerns. Missing from Taft’s 
remarks though, is the awareness that these policies also constitutively constitute those very 
logics, or in Taft’s words “traditional fundamentals”, rather than these fundamentals simply 
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giving rise to these policies.  The traditional fundamentals Taft’s refer to do not exist 
independent of particular US interests and concerns even if Taft appears to implicitly 
understand them as transcendental truisms. I find it more useful to understand these traditional 
fundamentals as being comprised of particular logics of interpretation, concern and 
disposition that produce certain imperatives and actions as more desirable, if not necessary to 
the reproduction of themselves and the US way of life.  In this sense, it is not just that these 
logics I describe give rise to policy, but those policies and their articulation reproduce those 
very logics. The relationship then between logics and policy as I discern them here is 
constitutive rather than simply causal.  
Taft’s general approach to foreign policy saw “diplomacy a hand maid of commercial 
intercourse and peace”.579 US foreign policy practices then were about the joint pursuit of 
foreign markets and the political stability to facilitate “commercial intercourse”. Taft 
declared, “the diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas 
of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for 
bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealistic humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of 
sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims”. Essentially he is making the 
case that his foreign policy sought to unite the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics into a 
coherent framework with the emphasis on US economic interests. This is especially pertinent 
in the following remark that  “it [was] an effort frankly directed to the increase of American 
trade upon the axiomatic principle that the Government of the United States shall extend all 
proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise abroad”.580 Here he 
makes it clear that the logic of capital, the imperative for US capital to reproduce and secure 
itself though its extension into foreign markets as the primary guiding principle of US foreign 
policy. Taft draws no distinction between diplomatic initiatives and commercial interests; he 
observes that “because modern diplomacy is commercial, there has been a disposition in some 
quarters to attribute to it none but materialistic aims. How strikingly erroneous is such an 
impression may be seen from a study of the results by which the diplomacy of the United 
States can be judged”.581 Alluded to here is the conviction that US foreign policy has been 
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about more than just economic gain, though considering some of his remarks one should be 
forgiven for seeing it so. 
Taft turned to US foreign policy towards China to exemplify his arguments. Recognising the 
continuity in US foreign policy back to McKinley he described how “in China the policy of 
encouraging financial investment to enable that country to help itself has had the result of 
giving new life and practical application to the open door policy”.582 In a summation of his 
administration’s policy, but also loosely capturing US interest in China over the first half of 
the 20th century he declared: 
“The consistent purpose of the present administration has been to encourage the use of American 
capital in the development of China by the promotion of those essential reforms to which China is 
pledged by treaties with the United States and other powers.”(Emphasis added)583  
Taft also made apparent how it was a general concern of missing out to other foreign powers 
in China that the US was so determined to be involved in the railways deals, “the 
hypothecation to foreign bankers in connection with certain industrial enterprises, such as the 
Hukuang railways…led the Department of State early in the administration to demand for 
American citizens participation in such enterprises, in order that the United States might have 
equal rights and an equal voice” in the economic reforms taking place in China.584 Qualifying 
this declaration though were the remarks of his Secretary of State Philander Knox who in a 
speech in Ohio in December 1910 made it clear that “when we support the ‘open door’ in 
China, that is not so-called ‘dollar diplomacy’, but the recognition of a high moral duty”.585 
Knox here was invoking the effects of the logic of identity in US foreign policy. 
In one of the few remarks on the on-going revolutionary turmoil in China, he was sympathetic 
but not explicitly interventionist. He described “the natural sympathy of the American people 
with the assumption of republican principles by the Chinese people”, but refrained from any 
further public statements of support. He had made his general foreign policy approach clear 
when he remarked, “if this government is really to preserve to the American people that free 
opportunity in foreign markets which will soon be indispensable to our prosperity, even 
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greater efforts must be made”.586  He was more concerned with the economic security of the 
US than intervening for the sake of political goals. He warned that for the US government to 
not assist with the interests of US capital, private and public that “the American merchant, 
manufacturer and exporter will find many a field in which American trade should logically 
predominate pre-empted through the more energetic efforts of other governments and 
commercial relations”.587 Trade and the logic of capital were seen as a zero sum game, to 
adopt modern parlance, where the US should remain pre-eminent at the expense of other 
states.  
Taft proved a pivotal moment of clarification and coherency in US foreign policy towards 
China. His expansion on the Open Door policy initiated by John Hay under McKinley was 
accurately captured by the tagline Dollar Diplomacy. Taft attempted to streamline the three 
logics of US foreign policy towards China claiming to be acting in the interests of capital, 
geopolitics and identity or as he remarked, “legitimate commercial aims”, “strategy” and 
“humanitarian sentiments”. What is worth mentioning and reflecting on briefly, is a remark in 
an undated Knox memo found in his papers. It captures the power relations embedded in the 
creditor-debtor relation, though its limited provenance explains my limited usage of it here. 
Knox writes that “the borrower is the servant of the lender, we propose in all cases to claim 
the right to proportional representation in the influence which attaches to the holding of the 
credits of the Chinese government”.588 The US then saw dollar diplomacy and its utilisation 
of capital as a form of control and domination over countries like China. Was this neo-
colonialism? Colonialism without the conquering of territory? These are important questions 
to flag here, even if their answers require other forms of analysis and inquiry to the one 
outlined here. It is my hope though that my arguments would contribute to addressing these 
other lines of questioning. In prescient form, the application of US capital and its 
corresponding logics was the original governing logic of US imperial practices. The US in 
this sense was more concerned with establishing the conditions for continued economic 
expansion and prosperity and the acquisition of territory would be to merely further these 
concerns. 
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5.5 Woodrow Wilson and the Logic of Identity  
Although Wilson was President for eight years including during World War I, my analysis 
focuses on the later years of his Presidency. This was notable for how he prioritised the logic 
of geopolitics as he sought a solution to the issues regarding the province of Shandong in 
Eastern China as it was claimed by the Japanese via treaty agreement with the British, despite 
having been Chinese territory before German occupation in. First though, Wilson’s rendering 
of the logic of capital is worth recognising. 
 Speaking in Indiana on September 4th 1919. Wilson emphasised the economic power of the 
US. He remarked to the audience: “I want you to realize that this war was won not only by the 
armies of the world. It was won by economic means as well. Without the economic means the 
war would have been much longer continued. What happened was that Germany was shut off 
from the economic resources of the rest of the globe and she could not stand it”.589 Embedded 
in this was the logic of capital where state power depended participation in a global system of 
finance and exchange. Just as the extension of US capital was used by Taft to attempt to shape 
conditions in China, Wilson inverted the logic whereby “a nation that is boycotted is a nation 
that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there 
will be no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation 
boycotted, but it brings a pressure upon that nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation 
could resist”.590 Through the logic of capital, access to the international system was necessary 
for the domestic reproduction of political life. 
Turning to the issue of Shandong, Wilson spent considerable time on a speaking tour around 
the US using the issue to build up popular support for US entry into the League of Nations. 
He describes the complexity of issue well: 
“When we came to the settlement of the Shantung matter with regard to China, we found that Great 
Britain and France were under explicit treaty obligation to Japan that she should get exactly what 
she got in the treaty with Germany, and the most that the United states could do was to urge upon 
Japan the promise, which she gave, that she would not take advantage of those portions of the 
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treaty but would return to the Republic of China, without qualification, the sovereignty which 
Germany had enjoyed in Shantung Province”. 591 
Although the US had wanted the province returned to Chinese sovereignty, the limits of US 
international authority were revealed when it could do nothing to prevent the Japanese treaty 
with the French and the British. Wilson lamented that the US could not ask the Japanese, 
British and French to break their secret agreement because “this war had been fought in part 
because of the refusal to observe the fidelity which is involved in a promise, because of the 
failure to regard the sacredness of treaties”.592 
Wilson made it clear in a speech in Missouri on September 5th 1919, that the US had been 
excluded from the secret negotiations, further accentuating the limited authority possessed by 
the US. He remarked that “it was very embarrassing, my fellow citizens, when you thought 
you were approaching an ideal solution of a particular question to find that some of your 
principal colleagues had given the whole thing away”. Wilson pointed out that  “as everybody 
now knows, in order to make it more certain that Japan would come into the war and so assist 
to clear the Pacific of the German fleets, had promised that any rights that Germany had in 
China should, in the case of the victory of the Allies, pass to Japan”.593 The US concern with 
Chinese territorial integrity remained an important aspect of US concern for China. Wilson 
emphasised later that he did “not like that settlement any better than you do…In order to 
induce Japan to cooperate in the war and clear the Pacific of the German power England, and 
subsequently France, bound themselves without any qualification to see to it that Japan got 
anything in China that Germany had”.594 This reflected an indication that the logic of 
geopolitics, and the requisite respect for territorial integrity was an influential part of Wilson’s 
reasoning, even if the logic of geopolitics until now had mostly featured more explicitly as a 
corollary to the logic of capital. 
At a speaking event in Iowa on September 6th 1919, Wilson bluntly made the case that US 
isolation, continental expansion aside, was over due to the international conditions of politics. 
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He stated “the isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose to go into the 
politics of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of our 
power we have become a determining factor in the history of mankind, and after you had 
become a determining factor you can not remain isolated, whether you want to or not”.595 The 
material conditions produced by US economic expansion established a new set of discursive 
conditions of possibility for US interaction with the world. The logic of capital appeared to 
dictate how the US perceived its ‘place’ in international politics. Wilson saw this process in 
somewhat teleological if not prophetic terms claiming that this “isolation ended by the 
processes of history, not by the processes of our independent choice, and the processes of 
history merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our Republic”.596 He 
prescribed a degree of inevitability about it. This reveals the successful naturalisation and 
depoliticising of political decisions and consequences as natural and preordained occurrences. 
This explains how the logics I describe are rarely articulated in such overt terms as expressed 
by Taft in the previous section. 
In a speech in Nebraska on September 8th 1919, Wilson expressed his determination to use the 
arbitration clauses within the League of Nations to resolve the Shantung issue. International 
politics was to be mediated by legal and administrative procedures. His ultimate girl was that 
“Japan promises and we guarantee that the territorial integrity and political independence of 
China will be respected and preserved. That is the way to serve China. That is the only 
possible way in the circumstances to serve China”.597 Implicitly here, is an expression of the 
logic of identity where the US is concerned for international norms and standards of self-
determination.  
In Montana September 3 days later, Wilson used the Chinese issue to make the case that a 
form of global inter-connectedness was inevitable. He argued how “it [was] not only we, my 
fellow citizens, who are caught in all the implications of the affairs of the world; everybody is 
caught in it now, and it is right that anything that affects the world should be made 
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everybody's business”.598 He made this in the context of his concern for China where he 
invoked a narrative of helplessness commenting that “I do not know when any nation that 
could not take care of itself, as unfortunately China can not, ever had such a humane 
advantage accorded it before”.599 Wilson understood this increasing “connectedness” through 
the logic of capital, even if his concern here was the specific geopolitical issue facing China. 
On September 17th 1919, at luncheon in California, Wilson expressed an altruistic basis of US 
concern for China when he remarked in reference to the other colonial empires that “nowhere 
will they countenance a disregard for the territorial integrity or the political independence of 
that great helpless people, lying there hitherto as an object of prey in the great Orient. It is the 
first time in the history of the world that anything has been done for China”.600 Adopting a 
more explicit turn of phrase later that day at an event in San Francisco Wilson asked, “why 
should not the Chinaman hate the foreigner? The foreigner has always taken from him 
everything that he could get... Other civilized nations had done the same thing to China”.601 
This question raised Wilson’s major concern with the US’s recent approach to China. He was 
critical of Hay and McKinley for focusing on commercial relations alone in their articulation 
of the Open Door Policy. He had also been critical of Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy even if he later 
adopted similar rhetoric on the use of US foreign policy.602 
Wilson criticised Hay and McKinley in relation to their acceptance of German occupation of 
Shandong as “they did not even protest against this compulsory granting to Germany of the 
best part of a rich Province of a helpless country, but only stipulated that the Germans should 
keep it open to the trade of the United States”.603 He was frustrated by the pair’s moral 
inaction where “they did not make the least effort to save the rights of China; they only tried 
to save the commercial advantages of the United States… there was not a single attempt made 
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by the Government of the United States to do anything except to keep those regions open to 
our traders.”.604 Wilson here expressed frustration with the centrality that the logic of capital 
had played in US foreign policy form McKinley until now, implying it lacked a sense of 
reciprocity.  
This point on reciprocity was made clear when Wilson spoke in Los Angeles on September 
20th 1919, where he continued his criticism of Hay and McKinley. To Wilson, “they only 
insisted that the door should not be shut in any of these regions [in China] against the trade of 
the United States. You have heard of Mr Hay's policy of the open door. That was his policy of 
the open door—not the open door to the rights of China, but the open door to the goods of 
America”.605 Wilson expressed what was to become a more prominent resonance within the 
logic of US identity. This was a concern, in public at least, for fairness and morality when it 
came to US dealings with China specifically, and the world more generally. The arguments 
made by Wilson here are similar in nature to those by my Richard Nixon as discussed in 
section 7.2. 
Despite his frustration with the overly economic focus of US foreign policy until now, Wilson 
continued to link the logic capital, geopolitics and identity in his declaration that the US was 
now “tied into the rest of the world by kinship, by sympathy, by interest in every great 
enterprise of human affairs. The United States has become the economic centre of the world, 
the ' financial centre”.606 This was part of his determination to make the case for the US 
joining the League of Nations appear as legal recognition of a defacto state of global 
interconnectedness. He charged that “It is impossible for the United States to be isolated, it is 
impossible for the United States to play a lone hand, because it has gone partners with all the 
rest of the world with regard to every great interest that it is connected with”. In a challenge to 
isolationist he asked “What are you going to do? Give up your foreign markets? Give up your 
influence in the affairs of other nations and arm yourselves to the teeth and double your taxes 
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and be ready to spring instead of ready to cooperate?”.607 The proclamation that the US was 
the economic centre of the world was built on the understanding that this was now something 
the US needed to continue to reproduce its way of life. This acknowledgement, of the 
necessity of foreign markets and the international system to the security of the US was to 
become a lasting truism in US foreign policy, especially in relation to China following the 
Chinese economic reforms after the death of Mao Zedong.608  
Wilson observed how US “economic engagements run everywhere, into every part of the 
globe. Our assistance is essential to the establishment of normal conditions throughout the 
world”.609 To Wilson, the US was now the essential stabiliser or international politics. In it 
most extreme he considered the US, a necessary component in international stability. This 
sense of centrality expressed a more inflated sense of self within the logic of identity. Wilson 
continued, “our advice is constantly sought. Our standards of labour are being extended to all 
parts of the world just so fast as they can be extended. America is the breeding centre for all 
the ideas that are now going to fecundate the great future”, the US as the life source of 
international politics. In the context of US foreign policy accounting for its expansion across 
the North American continent, regular interventions abroad and war making fecundity from 
Vietnam through to Iraq, this appeared, in the kindest sense, a disingenuous metaphor. The 
homogenising tendencies Vukovich described in relation to a capitalist system was now 
embedded within all three logics of US foreign policy towards China, and in some sense 
generally.610 Wilson ended this parable with the refrain “you can no more separate yourselves 
from the rest of the world than you can take all the tender roots of a great tree out of the earth 
and expect the tree to live”.611 The Shandong question for Wilson then, was a matter of US 
identity and sense of justice where the logic of identity was more influential than the logic of 
capital.  
Wilson’s occasional disdain for the primacy of the logic of capital in US foreign policy is 
captured by the following statement, where for him, the logic of identity supersedes the logic 
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of capital. He proclaimed “the only immortal thing about America is her conscience. America 
is not going to be immortal because she has immense wealth. Other great nations had 
immense wealth and went down in decay and disgrace, because they had nothing else”. If the 
logic of capital is to dominate un-qualified, it would lead to domestic ruin. Thus in Wilson’s 
vision, “America is great because of the ideas she has conceived. America is great because of 
the purposes she has set herself to achieve”.612  Implicit here is the nexus between identity and 
practice as accounted for by David Campbell in Writing Security, where US identity is 
constitutively related to foreign policy practices as a way of re-establishing and affirming that 
particular sense of identity.613 This is exemplary of how the logic of identity was prioritised 
by Wilson when approaching the logics of capital and geopolitics. 
Returning to the issue of China, speaking in Nevada on September 22nd 1919, Wilson set out a 
vision where  “China lay rich and undeveloped and the rest of the world was covetous and it 
had made bargains with China, generally to China's disadvantage, which enabled the world to 
go in and exploit her riches”.614 The sense of exploitation spoke to the moral concerns within 
the logic of identity.615 Wilson compounded his criticisms of Hay and McKinley stating that 
“they took no interest, I mean so far as what they did was concerned, in the liberties and rights 
of China. They were interested only in the rights of the merchants of the United States”.616 
Although he did not say it, Wilson implied a sense of moral bankruptcy to the US’s 
ambivalence about China’s sovereignty. If anything, the distinction tacitly made by McKinley 
of the separation between sovereignty and territorial integrity, lacked a moral integrity that a 
logic of identity could now provide. The US was ‘great’ to Wilson because of its ideas and 
sense of self, not because of its economic prowess in its search for foreign markets. 
In Wyoming on September 24th 1919, Wilson captured his frustration with the colonial states 
and his sympathy with China. He bluntly stated, “you know that China has been the common 
prey of the great European powers…Nation after nation has demanded rights, semi-sovereign 
                                                
612 Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Shrine Auditorium in Los Angeles, California," September 20, 
1919. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117393. 
613 Campbell, Writing Security. 
614 Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Reno Auditorium in Reno, Nevada," September 22, 1919. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117396. 
615 Although not a major focus of mine one might also detect a highly sexualised language here used to construct 
China as a feminine, vulnerable and exploited. 
616 Woodrow Wilson: "Address at the Reno Auditorium in Reno, Nevada," September 22, 1919. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117396. 
 142 
rights, and concessions with regard to mines and railways and every other resource that China 
could put at their disposition”.617 To Wilson then the logic of capital compelled by 
geopolitical concerns about credibility and competition, were hollow and self-defeating 
without a mediating logic of identity. Wilson was frustrated with how “China has never been 
able to say "No"—a great learned, patient, diligent people, numbering hundreds of millions; 
has had no organized force with which to resist, and has yielded again and again and again to 
unjust demands”.618 Wilson constituted a realignment in the operative primacy of the logics of 
capital, geopolitics and identity. He did not abandon economic or geopolitical concerns, but 
mediated them through a concern with how the US should behave as a just and moral state, 
with clear prescriptions of justice. 
Finally, indicating his concerns with the logic of capital in a domestic sense, Wilson set forth 
a warning, that merits parity with that of Eisenhower’s caution with regards to the military-
industrial-complex. In his seventh annual message to Congress on December 2nd 1919, 
Wilson cautioned that: 
“The great unrest throughout the world, out of which has emerged a demand for an immediate 
consideration of the difficulties between capital and labour, bids us put our own house in order. 
Frankly, there can be no permanent and lasting settlements between capital and labour which do 
not recognize the fundamental concepts for which labour has been struggling through the years… 
Labour must not be longer treated as a commodity. It must be regarded as the activity of human 
beings, possessed of deep yearnings and desires”.619 
Wilson was no Marxist. But his concerns about the logic of capital were not only present in 
his thinking about US foreign policy, but his domestic thought too. The uninhibited logic of 
capital called for expansion, regardless of consequences. And Wilson’s reflections on the 
relations between capital and labour, reflected his international concerns about a US foreign 
policy governed in the name of capital alone. In this sense, in reaction to the historical 
primacy of the logic of capital, the logics of identity and eventually geopolitics, were 
deployed and positioned by Wilson as contrarian to the logic of capital, exerting a constraint 
on its imperatives for endless expansion and reproduction. This tension was to play out in US 
foreign policy towards China right up until and through Barack Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia.    
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5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated how the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics begin to 
operate in a form of contrarian tension in US presidential discourses of China. China comes to 
be perceived as a solution to domestic economic crises and the notion that as a potential 
market it could satisfy US economic needs. McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft especially, and Wilson 
despite the prevalence of the logic of identity in his speeches all prioritised the logic of capital 
to varying degrees. Taft’s formulations of what would become dollar diplomacy became one 
of the fundamental principles of the logic of capital. The US need and search for foreign 
markets though necessitated the continued prominence of the logic of capital in shaping the 
logic of geopolitics as evidenced by McKinley’s concern for the territorial integrity of China 
in the worry that the US might miss out on securing commercial access to the other imperial 
powers. 
The next chapter moves considerably forward to the Franklin Roosevelt presidency during 
WWII. I pass over the presidencies of Calvin Coolidge, Warren Harding and Herbert Hoover 
for varying reasons but mostly regarding the issue of discernable discourses on China. This is 
despite the on-going political turbulence in China resulting in conflict between the emerging 
Nationalist and Communist factions.620 A secondary consideration was also one of space and 
the frustrating fact that I could not cover everything in this thesis. Due to the lack of explicit 
literature focusing on US foreign policy towards China during the 1920s this either suggests 
there is not much to analyse, or that there is a potential area for further scholarship.  
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Chapter 6 – 1941-1968: From Allies to Alienation and Back Again 
6.1 Introduction 
The largest chapter in the thesis, this chapter covers the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt621, 
Harry Truman622, Dwight Eisenhower623, John Kennedy624 and Lyndon Johnson625 following 
the general arc of China going from a key all to an estranged enemy.  It was necessary to 
cover this period as it reflected a boomerang like trajectory of US relations form China going 
from admirable ally to estranged enemy and the beginnings of a potential reconciliation 
forming under Johnson. Broadly there was significant debate over how the US should 
understand China, indeed there was some debate about whether to ally with the Communists 
over the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war626, during Roosevelt’s presidency but this gave 
way to a more hostile attitude following his death. Truman’s presidency witnessed the 
emergence of two China’s essentially in the People’s Republic of China on the mainland and 
the Republic of China627 on Formosa, now Taiwan. 628 Truman had maintained some of the 
hope Roosevelt displayed but this was overcome by the Communist victory in 1949. 
Eisenhower was fundamentally hostile to China and during this time, his discourse on China 
very much invoked the logic of identity. Kennedy would articulate clearly the manner in 
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which the imperatives of the logic of identity, the spreading of democracy for one, would 
create the best conditions for the logic of capital to function. Under Johnson, the US would 
come to consider reconciliation with China though this would not come to fruition until the 
Nixon presidency. 
What this chapter demonstrates is the emerging primacy of the logic of geopolitics in US 
presidential discourse in this period. The logic of capital remained significant though as the 
US sought to outline how capital expansion should be organised under the Cold War 
conditions of superpower rivalry. This period covers WWII, the Communist victory in the 
Chinese civil war in 1949, the Korean War in the early 1950s and the breakout of the US 
phase of he Vietnam War in the 1960s.629 
6.2 FDR, War and the Hope for a Democratic China 
Roosevelt’s discourse on China was characterised by hope. Hope of what China might 
become. To Roosevelt, this was not so much a question of might, but one of should. He hoped 
that China would come to be a powerful democratic ally in Asia and he made it clear that the 
US would do what would need to assist in this. In his 1941 address at annual dinner of White 
House Correspondents’ Association he declared that China “expresses the magnificent will of 
millions of plain people to resist the dismemberment of their historic Nation. China, through 
the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-Shek, asks our help. America has said that China shall have 
our help”.630 Roosevelt used this as an example to illustrate his broader point that the US “is 
going to be what our people have proclaimed it must be—the arsenal of democracy. Our 
country is going to play its full part”.631 Roosevelt returned to this idea in his report to 
Congress on the Lend-Lease Act on June 10th 1941. He stated that “beginning with the 
outbreak of the war the American public began to realize that it was in our own national 
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interest and security to help Britain, China and other democratic nations”.632 By expanding on 
the premise that the US would promote democratic institutions and practices, Roosevelt’s 
comments here essentially constitute the militarisation of the logic of identity.  
Speaking to the International Labour Organization on November 6th 1941, Roosevelt reflected 
on US support for China and others. He reflected on the inability of the US to “grasp the full 
extent of the sacrifices that the people of China are making in their struggle for freedom from 
aggression…the epic stand of Britain, of China and of Russia receives the full support of the 
free people of the Americas”.633 Comments such as these were indicative of Roosevelt’s 
attempts to establish US support and sympathy through the logic of identity to make it easier 
for the US to enter WWII even if his reasons for doing so were more complex.634  
In Asia more specifically Roosevelt emphasised, during a press conference on November 28th 
1941, how “our one desire has been peace in the Pacific, and the taking of no steps to alter the 
prospects of peace, which of course has meant nonaggression. It really boils down to that”.635 
The significance of the US desire for peace was not so much an end in itself as Roosevelt 
would elaborate. He remarked how “talking along the line of general peace for the Pacific, 
based on a settlement of the war between China and Japan the restoration of peace there, plus 
a permanent arrangement for nonaggression in the Pacific” was aimed at “the restoration of 
normal economic relations, access to raw materials”.636 Although Roosevelt framed the 
overall goal of US foreign policy as being motivated by the logic of identity, in relation to 
Asia, it became clear that the logic of capital still featured significantly. This concern was also 
mediated through the logic of geopolitics when Roosevelt remarked on US concern regarding  
“the possible extension of control by aggression into the whole of the Pacific area. And we 
are thinking about what it would mean to this country if that policy were to be used against us 
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in the whole Pacific area”.637 US interest in China was discussed through the emphasis of the 
logic of geopolitics. 
Roosevelt again invoked the logic of geopolitics in a press conference a few days later on 
December 2nd 1941, when he wanted to make “it perfectly clear that the objective which we 
were seeking meant the taking of no additional territory by anybody in the Pacific area”.638 It 
was not entirely apparent if this meant a return to the status quo before Japanese territorial 
aggression in the 1930s or a defence of the current status quo, nevertheless it was clear that 
the US was imagining Asia through the logic of geopolitics. Significantly for my purposes, 
Roosevelt indicated a general lack of interest in expanding US territory in the Asia-Pacific.  
The emphasis on the resumption of commercial relations was evident in Roosevelt’s appeal to 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito to avoid war in the Pacific made on December 6th 1941. Roosevelt 
again articulated the link between peace and commerce stating that “We have hoped for a 
termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of 
the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples 
could exist side by side without fear of invasion…and that all peoples would resume 
commerce without discrimination against or in favour of any Nation”.639 This is not to say 
that peace was not desirable in its own right, but that Roosevelt regularly deployed the US 
desire for peace as a condition for successful commerce in the region. 
On December 15th 1941, Roosevelt spoke at length to Congress on the history of relations 
between the United States and Japan and more generally about US interest in Asia. Roosevelt 
reconstructed a narrative of US interest in Asia outlining how “a little over a hundred years 
ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It 
was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships. Ten years later Caleb 
Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China”.640 
This was an attempt to justify contemporary US interest in Asia though its historical 
encounter. Turning to Japan Roosevelt continued, “in 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on 
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Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept 
itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those 
early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her 
transition stage”.641 Significant here is the subtle exclusion of the unbalanced power relations 
from Roosevelt’s narrative as there is no mention of US economic concerns initiating its 
desire to profit off of British colonial practices in China or militaristic nature of US excursion 
into Japan as I have indicated earlier in Chapter 4. 
Turning to the end of the 19th century, Roosevelt focused on China, positioning the US as the 
lead defender of Chinese territorial integrity. He remarked, “at that time there was going on in 
China what has been called the ‘scramble for concessions’. There was even talk about a 
possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was 
laid down”.642 Building on the notion of US altruism, while making it apparent that this was 
motivated by the logic of capital, Roosevelt continued, “in 1900, the American Government 
declared that its policy was to ‘seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and 
peace to China ...to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international 
law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the 
Chinese Empire”. For Roosevelt the US has since McKinley’s declarations has “consistently 
and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East”.643 
Roosevelt here was articulating the continuity of the logics of capital and geopolitics in the 
US approach to China. 
Roosevelt drew on the 1921 Washington Conference as a further example of this concern. He 
stated that “one great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. 
This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the 
Pacific and Far Eastern areas”. The most important aspect for his argument now, was the Nine 
Power Treaty, which “contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle 
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of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all Nations throughout China”.644 What 
is evident here is the qualifying of US concern for Chinese sovereignty, with US interest in 
Chinese markets. Turning to his negotiations with Japan, Roosevelt set out what he saw as 
some basic principles for international relations: 
“In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which 
should govern international relations. These were: The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of all Nations. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The 
principle of equality including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The principle of reliance upon 
international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies”.645 
In many ways these were to become normative staples in US rhetoric regarding international 
politics as Roosevelt formulated the logic of geopolitics as one where states did not have the 
right to intervene in other states while affirming the logic of capital where states had the right 
to the equality of opportunity in commercial treatment and so US intervention to secure this 
notional ‘equality’ would be permissible.646 
In a message to Chiang Kai-Shek on February 7th 1942, Roosevelt celebrated a Congressional 
act to aide China as a testament “to the wholehearted respect and admiration which the 
Government and people of this country have for China”.647 He was here emphasising how it 
was the logic of identity that drew the US and China closer together as he remarked on the 
“earnest desire and determination to be concretely helpful to our partners in the great battle 
for freedom”. In an inversion of the more historical trope of China as uncivilised, Roosevelt 
commented on “the gallant resistance of the Chinese armies against the ruthless invaders of 
your country has called forth the highest praise from the American and all other freedom 
loving peoples”.648 For now, China was located within the world of “freedom loving peoples”, 
a euphemism for the civilised world. He would remark in a fireside chat later that month on 
February 23rd that the US “look at the vast area of China, with its millions of fighting men…it 
is essential that we help China in her magnificent defence and in her inevitable 
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counteroffensive – for that is one important element in the ultimate defeat of Japan”.649 
Alluding to the significant size of China, Roosevelt was making it clear that support for China 
as a matter of democratic solidarity was also coupled with the more practical assessment of 
defeating the Japanese. 
Roosevelt’s observations regarding the constitutive nature of the material and the discursive 
are worth noting here. In describing the Japanese threat he touched on the manner in which 
material circumstances affected discursive constructions of space. He observed that “the 
broad oceans which have been heralded in the past as our protection from attack have become 
endless battlefields on which we are constantly being challenged by our enemies”.650 The 
Pacific has in the past been romantically constituted as a space of inevitable US expansion 
and commercial success where now it was understood as a site of military contestation, a 
source of insecurity rather than security.651  
Roosevelt would also begin to outline one of the longer term US interests in China when he 
reflected on China’s significance in the war and to the US more broadly. In a fireside chat on 
April 28th 1942, he declared, “we remember that the Chinese people were the first to stand up 
and fight against the aggressors in this war; and in the future a still unconquerable China will 
play its proper role in maintaining peace and prosperity, not only in eastern Asia but in the 
whole world”.652 In this sense, Roosevelt envisioned a China that would help maintain the 
international system regionally and globally. China was then to feature in the US’s 
geopolitical imagination as a joint administrator of capitalism and the geopolitical 
configurations that sustained it. China was no longer something to merely exploit through the 
logic of capital, but was becoming constructed as a necessary condition for the reproduction 
of the logic of capital and of the logic of geopolitics. This was also conditioned by the logic of 
identity in US foreign policy as Roosevelt had framed US support for China as standing on 
the foundation of democratic solidarity.  
In a joint press conference with Winston Churchill at Casablanca on January 24th 1943, 
Roosevelt remarked that they had “agreed on giving all possible aid to the heroic struggle of 
China—remembering that China is in her sixth year of the war—with the objective, not only 
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in China but in the whole of the Pacific area, of ending any Japanese attempt in the future to 
dominate the Far East”.653 China was to become the geopolitical foundation of US interest in 
Asia. These concerns were captured during one of Roosevelt’s press conferences with 
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek on February 19th 1943. He remarked that “her visit to us is going 
to be of real help in the days to come, because the people of China well over a century have 
been, in thought and in objective, closer to us Americans than almost any other peoples in the 
world—the same great ideals”.654  It was the logic of identity, reflected in the concern for 
ideals that underpinned Roosevelt’s vision for China. He continued, declaring, “China, in the 
last—less than half a century has become one of the great democracies of the world, 
remembering always that their civilization is thousands of years older than ours. And that is 
why I feel that we in this country have a great deal more to learn about China than China has 
to learn about us”.655 It was democratic kinship in Roosevelt’s words that characterised the 
bond between the US and China. 
This sentiment, and the necessity of war in the Asia Pacific underpinned Roosevelt’s push to 
repeal the Chinese exclusion laws passed around the end of the 19th century. In a message to 
Congress on October 11th 1943, Roosevelt declared, “China is our ally. For many years she 
stood alone in the fight against aggression. Today we fight at her side. She has continued her 
gallant struggle against very great odds… China's resistance does not depend alone on guns 
and planes and on attacks on land, on the sea, and from the air. It is based as much in the spirit 
of her people and her faith in her allies”.656 The construction of affinity between the US and 
China was again performed through the logic of identity. In a rare acknowledgement of a 
mistake for the US, Roosevelt remarked, “nations, like individuals, make mistakes. We must 
be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes of the past and to correct them. By the repeal of 
the Chinese Exclusion Laws, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted 
Japanese propaganda. It would be additional proof that we regard China not only as a partner 
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in waging war but that we shall regard her as a partner in days of peace”.657 Roosevelt 
positioned China as more then a necessary and conditional ally, by setting out his hope for a 
more permanent era of cooperation rendered through the logic of identity. 
In a radio broadcast on December 24th 1943, Roosevelt made clear that “essential to all peace 
and security in the Pacific and in the rest of the world is the permanent elimination of the 
Empire of Japan as a potential force of aggression”.658 This was to be achieved with the help 
of Chiang-Kai- Shek’s China. Roosevelt publically celebrated Chiang describing how he had 
“met in the Generalissimo a man of great vision, great courage, and a remarkably keen 
understanding of the problems of today and tomorrow…I believe I can say that he returned to 
Chungking with the positive assurance of total victory over our common enemy”.659 As a case 
where Chiang was seen to embody all of Roosevelt’s hopes for China, Roosevelt declared 
“today we and the Republic of China are closer together than ever before in deep friendship 
and in unity of purpose”.660 For now, the US and China, imagined through the logic of 
identity, were allies.  
Roosevelt also spoke at length about the broader aspects of US foreign policy. He declared, in 
what is now a common refrain in US foreign policy that “the doctrine that the strong shall 
dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it. But, at the same time, we 
are agreed that if force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be 
applied for as long as it may be necessary”.661 Military force was for Roosevelt an undesirable 
yet justifiable practice for the US when acting to maintain the international system. Roosevelt 
also returned to his thoughts on the US’s understanding of its geographical position was 
changing. He considered that “through [the US’s] early history the Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans were believed to be walls of safety for the United States. Time and distance made it 
physically possible, for example, for us and for the other American Republics to obtain and 
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maintain our independence against infinitely stronger powers”.662 The rise of Japan, so to 
speak, had changed affected the specific configuration of the logic of geopolitics in US 
imaginations of Asia. 
On May 20th 1944 when announcing his Vice-President Wallace’s trip to China, Roosevelt 
declared, “Eastern Asia will play a very important part in the future history of the world. 
Forces are being unleashed there which are of the utmost importance to our future peace and 
prosperity”.663 Roosevelt was covering familiar discursive ground here as he increasingly 
emphasised the importance of Asia to the US’s future. Like arguments presented by 
McKinley and others at the turn of the century, the US’s concern with Asia was rendered 
through the logics of capital and geopolitics and based as much on what China might become 
as its present importance.  
Roosevelt described the geopolitical conditions necessary for the US to defeat Japan and after, 
maintain its interests in Asia. In a radio address on August 12th 1944, he spoke of Hawaii’s 
geopolitical significance to US foreign policy. He remarked, “the Hawaiian Islands are no 
longer a mere outpost. They constitute a major base from which, and from the Pacific coast, 
frontline operations are being conducted twice as far away as the distance between the coast 
and Hawaii itself. The Hawaiian Islands have helped to make possible the victories at 
Guadalcanal and New Guinea and the Marshalls and the Marianas”. Their present significance 
constituted the geopolitical conditions for US war aims in Asia. He continued, “the Islands 
will make possible future operations in China will make possible the recapture and 
independence of the Philippines and make possible the carrying of war into the home islands 
of Japan itself and their capital city of Tokyo”.664 Although he was here focusing on 
immediate war aims, his arguments reveal the geopolitical necessities for US foreign policy 
goals to occur. The US desire for expanding its territory was limited though. As he 
commented elsewhere in the same address, “everybody in Siberia and China knows that we 
have no ambition to acquire land on the Asiatic continent” it is “natural and proper for us to 
think of the economic and the commercial future. It is logical that we should foresee great 
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interchange of commerce between our shores and those of Siberia and China”.665 There was 
essentially a geopolitical threshold to facilitate the conditions for economic exchange to 
occur. In this sense the logic of geopolitics has been complimentary to the logic of capital, if 
not mostly determined by it. 
In a statement on the landing of American troops in the Philippines on October 20th 1944 
Roosevelt declared, “we promised to return, we have returned”.666 The Philippines had proved 
a significant aspect of US imaginations of Asia, in more explicit rendering of the logic of 
identity, Roosevelt state that “the United States promised to help build a new Nation in the 
Pacific, a Nation whose ideals, like our own, were liberty and equality and the democratic 
way of life a Nation which in a very short time would join the friendly family of Nations on 
equal terms”.667 This aim though had immediate geopolitical consequences as he declared “we 
shall strangle the Black Dragon of Japanese militarism forever”.668 The point worth 
mentioning here is that although it is possible to describe US foreign policy to Asia in broad 
terms, there were significant differences with regards to specific countries. China was more 
often than not visualised through the logic of capital and during Roosevelt’s Presidency, the 
logic of identity. The Philippines held geopolitical significance for the US but this 
significance was more emphatically constructed through the logic of identity where the 
Philippines represented an example of altruistic US democracy promotion, despite its obvious 
colonial aspects.669 
In his last State of the Union address on January 6th 1945, Roosevelt touched on the broader 
aspects of his foreign policy. He reflected on how “nations like individuals do not always see 
alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any Nation 
assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. In the future world the misuse of 
power, as implied in the term "power politics," must not be a controlling factor in 
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international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed”.670 
What Roosevelt is indicating here is the notion that there are limits to state power. He 
elaborated on this further with the claim that “we cannot deny that power is a factor in world 
politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics. But in a 
democratic world, as in a democratic Nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and 
obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good”.671 In this 
sense, the logic of capital and the logic of geopolitics were limited by the logic of identity. If 
the logic of capital produced expansionary tendencies that manifested themselves through the 
logic of geopolitics, then they were both condition by the logic of identity. What becomes 
increasingly apparent under Roosevelt is the on going evolution and refinement of the logics 
which I located in the US’s early encounters with China. Essentially, the logics of identity, 
capital and geopolitics converge here to condition how the US imagined China. 
Roosevelt was hopeful here that “the atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and 
determination to find a common ground of common understanding, which surrounded the 
conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, gives us reason to hope that future discussions will 
succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward 
which these preparatory conversations were directed”.672 He was describing the negotiations 
between Allied powers attempting to establish the United Nations out of the existing wartime 
alliance.673 He nevertheless emphasised though that for the US, “we support the greatest 
possible freedom of trade and commerce”.674 In his designs for a world security system, it 
would become evident that China held a prominent position in this vision with regards to the 
management of that system in Asia. This would become towards the end of the 20th century a 
particular important feature of the logic of geopolitics in US imaginations of China. 
In a press conference on route to Yalta on February 23rd 1945, Roosevelt discussed the 
complexities of colonialism in South East Asia. Recalling a conversation with China’s 
Chiang, he remarked,  
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“The first thing I asked Chiang was, ‘Do you want IndoChina?’ He said, ‘It's no help to us. We 
don't want it. They are not Chinese. They would not assimilate into the Chinese people’. I said, 
‘What are you going to advocate? It will take a long time to educate them for self-government’. He 
said they should not go back to the French, that they have been there over a hundred years and have 
done nothing about educating them, that for every dollar they have put in, they have taken out ten, 
and that the situation there is a good deal like the Philippines were in 1898”.675 
As significant as the conversation regarding the future of the colonies in Asia, Roosevelt was 
engaging with China as potential partner in the future of Asia, rather than as a state to be 
organised explicitly by US foreign policy. He continued, “With the Indo-Chinese, there is a 
feeling they ought to be independent but are not ready for it. I suggested at the time, to 
Chiang, that Indo-China be set up under a trusteeship have a Frenchman, one or two Indo-
Chinese, and a Chinese and a Russian because they are on the coast, and maybe a Filipino and 
an American— to educate them for self-government”.676 Evident in these remarks though is 
the colonial trope that the Vietnamese were incapable of self- rule, though importantly for the 
present argument, China was implied to be on the US side of the equation. 
6.3 Truman, Trauma and the ‘Loss of China’ 
Harry Truman’s Presidency covers the most ‘traumatic’ period of US relations with China 
from the US perspective. From the hope of a united democratic China when he became 
President, Truman presided over what critics called the ‘Loss of China’ to Communism.677 
Significantly Truman marks the period when the US publically developed two China policies 
to cope with the defeated Nationalists fleeing to the island of Taiwan. The focus of this 
research is very much on US presidential discourses of China, though I do make reference to 
the US’s Taiwan policy by way of documenting an ever present tension in US China relations. 
In his statement on the 34th anniversary of the Chinese Republic on October 10th 1945, 
Truman commented amicably on China’s contribution to the Allied victory in WWII. He 
made reference to “the tremendous sacrifices which the Chinese people made for so long in 
their stirring and effective resistance to the Japanese invader have finally been rewarded in 
complete victory over the enemy, and the American people take pride in the decisive role 
                                                
675 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy En Route From 
Yalta," February 23, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16589. 
676 Franklin D. Roosevelt: "Excerpts from the Press Conference Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy En Route From 
Yalta," February 23, 1945. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16589. 
677 Purifoy, Harry Truman’s China Policy. 
 157 
played by our gallant ally in this titanic struggle for world freedom”.678 As Roosevelt had 
made clear, China at this time was very much an ally. Truman though was also acutely aware 
of the issues facing China despite the defeat of Japan, he observed that “China now faces the 
urgent problems of reconstruction of her devastated nation a task which will require all of the 
inspired leadership and full cooperation of the Chinese people which have been so evident 
during these years of desperate struggle for survival and without which Japan's savage aims of 
aggression might have succeeded”.679  This was significant as the following comment made 
clear that this reconstruction was going to take the form of a democracy, “on behalf of the 
American people I take pleasure in reaffirming our abiding faith in the ability of the Chinese 
nation to accomplish the democratic objectives established for it by Dr. Sun Yatsen and in 
pledging our assistance and support to the attainment of this end”.680 This continues the 
approach taken by Roosevelt but also draws a historical linage to the establishment of the 
Chinese Republic in 1912. China was understood through a projection of the logic of identity 
as being on a similar democratic trajectory to that of the US. 
In an address on foreign policy in New York City on October 27th 1945, Truman set out his 
broad approach on US foreign policy at the time. He commented that the US has “assured the 
world time and again and I repeat it now that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of 
territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our 
own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power”.681 The significance 
of this qualifying comment should not be undervalued. The US was not interested in the 
territorial empires that dominated the world up until WWII but was explicitly interested in 
securing what is now described as an ‘archipelago of bases’.682 Although seen in the broader 
perspective of US concerns for economic and commercial exchange, Truman made explicit 
reference to the geopolitical aspects of US foreign policy, in full he argued that there were 
four principal tasks motivating the US’s geopolitical thought: 
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“First, our Army, Navy, and Air Force, in collaboration with our allies, must enforce the terms of 
peace imposed upon our defeated enemies. Second, we must fulfil the military obligations which 
we are undertaking as a member of the United Nations Organization to support a lasting peace, by 
force if necessary. Third, we must cooperate with other American nations to preserve the territorial 
integrity and the political independence of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Fourth, in this 
troubled and uncertain world, our military forces must be adequate to discharge the fundamental 
mission laid upon them by the Constitution of the United States to ‘provide for the common 
defence’ of the United States. These four military tasks are directed not toward war not toward 
conquest but toward peace”.683 
These amounted to securing some semblance of geopolitical stability. Truman expanded on 
these by articulating 12 principles of US foreign policy, 4 of which are pertinent to the 
discussion here. The first three consisted of affirmation that the US did not desire any 
territorial expansion, self-determination and that admittance to the international system would 
enable equal access to trade. Truman stated that “we seek no territorial expansion…we 
believe in the eventual return of sovereign rights and self-government to all peoples who have 
been deprived of them…we believe that all states which are accepted in the society of nations 
should have access on equal terms to the trade and the raw materials of the world”.684 One of 
the more fundamental principles was the US belief “that full economic collaboration between 
all nations, great and small, is essential to the improvement of living conditions all over the 
world”.685 Here, the logic of capital begins to contain a globalising imperative that compels 
the US to establish economic access to the world rather than just specific regions.  
In a statement regarding US foreign policy towards China, on December 15th 1945, Truman 
emphasised the US’s main goal where it was “the firm belief of this Government that a 
strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance to the success of this United 
Nations organization and for world peace”.686 The US had important goals for China, and it 
was apparent that these were becoming increasingly important to the US’s broader goals in 
Asia. Truman would accentuate how “a China disorganized and divided either by foreign 
aggression, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by violent internal strife, is an 
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undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and in the future”.687 He made it 
clear that the US desired the unification of China whereby it “and the other United Nations 
have recognized the present National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal 
government in China. It is the proper instrument to achieve the objective of a unified 
China”.688 For Truman, a unified China had to be a democratic China. And this was necessary 
to the reproduction of an international system designed to facilitate international commerce. 
Reflecting the policies of Taft in his desire to use US capital to develop China while 
increasing US economic access Truman declared that the US “would be prepared to give 
favourable consideration to Chinese requests for credits and loans under reasonable conditions 
for projects which would contribute toward the development of a healthy economy throughout 
China and healthy trade relations between China and the United States”.689 Although it 
appeared that Truman was primarily invoking the logics of identity and geopolitics, the logic 
of capital remained fundamental to US interests in China. 
Truman would summarise his policy towards Asia and China specifically in his 1946 State of 
the Union message. He remarked, “our basic policy in the Far East is to encourage the 
development of a strong, independent, united and democratic China. That has been the 
traditional policy of the United States”.690 Truman here is implying that US foreign policy 
towards China is partially legitimised by its longevity, its status as tradition. More broadly 
Truman articulated the significance of the logic of capital in US foreign policy, remarking that 
“the foreign economic policy of the United States is designed to promote our own prosperity, 
and at the same time to aid in the restoration and expansion of world markets and to 
contribute thereby to world peace and world security”.691 There is a slight inversion here as 
Truman indicates that the expansion of markets will produce conditions more favourable to 
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peace despite previous statements that peace and stability would facilitate the expansion of 
international commerce and markets.  
In an address in Chicago on army day on April 6th 1946, Truman celebrated the role of the US 
army while reflecting on the tension between particular foreign policy concerns and more 
general, universal ones. Truman trumped the armies prowess declaring that “our Army has 
written many glorious chapters in the Nation's history, but none so brilliant as the last. Its 
story in this war has been written in every corner of the globe on the continent of Europe; in 
the wastes of the Arctic; over the vast expanse of the Pacific…It is a glorious history of men 
against the forces of nature as well as against the forces of evil”.692 He would also declare “we 
still have to protect and preserve American property all over the world”.693 The logic of 
capital thus, remained fundamental to US foreign policy concerns. 
Truman would articulate the new global arrangement and perspective in US foreign policy. 
He made it clear that the US “must have a policy to guide our relations with every country in 
every part of the world. No country is so remote from us that it may not some day be involved 
in a matter which threatens the peace”.694  The logic of geopolitics now had a fully global 
dimension. Truman justified this by invoking recent historical examples, “remember that the 
First World War began in Serbia; that the peace of Versailles was first broken in Manchuria; 
and that the Second World War began in Poland. Who knows what may happen in the future? 
Our foreign policy must be universal”.695 The US could no longer focus on particular regions 
as it had done so historically. US foreign policy was now effectively organised on a global 
scale of which China policy was a smaller part.  
In Asia, Truman touched on the material conditions of possibility that the US was interested 
in establishing. He declared that “in the Far East our program for peace is designed to combat 
and remedy the conditions that made it possible for Japan to turn upon her neighbours”.696 
Truman was attempting to create the discursive space to affect material conditions in Asia. He 
also maintained a promising outlook on China, describing how the US was “supporting a free 
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and democratic government. Through the wise counsel of General Marshall the Chinese 
leaders are on the road to achieve political unity by peaceful and democratic processes”.697 
Truman had dispatched General George Marshall to attempt to establish peace between the 
Nationalist and Communist forces, a mission that ultimately failed even if it had some short-
term success.698 Truman would make it clear that democracy and peace could be required 
economic stability and expansion. He argued, “the roots of democracy…will not draw much 
nourishment in any nation from a soil of poverty and economic distress. It is a part of our 
strategy of peace, therefore, to assist in the rehabilitation and development of the Far Eastern 
countries. We seek to encourage a quick revival of economic activity and international trade 
in the Far East”.699 The US thus sought to establish the conditions under which the logic of 
capital could function unhindered by geopolitical instability.  
In a statement on US policy towards China made on December 18th, 1946, Truman again 
restated his support for unified and democratic China. He remarked that “a united and 
democratic China is of the utmost importance to world peace, that a broadening of the base of 
the National Government to make it representative of the Chinese people will further China's 
progress toward this goal, and that China has a clear responsibility to the other United Nations 
to eliminate armed conflict within its territory as constituting a threat to world stability and 
peace”.700 Making it clear where the US stood in the reignited civil war, Truman stated, “we 
recognized the National Government of the Republic of China as the legal government”. US 
plans for an interim, coalition government were put under pressure as General Marshall 
“pointed out that these agreements could not be satisfactorily implemented and given 
substance unless China's economic disintegration were checked and particularly unless the 
transportation system could be put in working order. Political unity could not be built on 
economic chaos”.701 This explained the US desire to establish economic stability in China. 
Truman located China’s significance through the logic of geopolitics on a global scale where 
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China was necessary for “world peace”, and China’s economic stability was a necessary 
foundation for this. 
In a case of a rhetorical sleight of hand, Truman declared, “China is a sovereign nation. We 
recognize that fact and we recognize the National Government of China. We continue to hope 
that the Government will find a peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in the 
internal affairs of China”.702 Truman was attempting to position the US as a neutral observer 
with regards to Chinese sovereignty, despite the on-going aid to the Nationalists. As shown 
above, Truman aimed to assist in the establishment of a unified democratic China, as opposed 
to a Communist lead China. His following statement thus appeared to soften the US position 
even as he remarked, “our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in their civil strife, 
we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and 
economic recovery in their country”.703 Missing from this statement was the previous 
emphasis on democratic ideals with a noticeable concern for the logic of capital. 
While describing the Marshall Plan on December 19th 1947, the US’s loan based economic 
recovery plan for Europe, Truman declared that “the United States has taken the lead in 
worldwide efforts to promote industrial and agricultural reconstruction and a revival of world 
commerce”.704 This concern with the logic of capital was based on the premise that “we know 
that enduring peace must be based upon increased production and an expanding flow of goods 
and materials among nations for the benefit of all”.705 Truman was now positioning the US as 
the necessary protagonist in securing the global conditions of possibility for the social and 
political reproduction of the international system. The three logics I describe featured in a 
larger need to secure the conditions for the perpetuation of the international political and 
economic system as Truman saw it.  
Truman made the case to Congress for economic assistance to China on February 18th 1948. 
He invoked a history of amity between the US and China when he spoke of “a genuine 
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friendship has existed between the American people and the people of China over many years. 
This friendship has been accompanied by a long record of commercial and cultural 
association and close cooperation between our two countries. Americans have developed a 
deep respect for the Chinese people and sympathy for the many trials and difficulties which 
they have endured”.706 Identity and capital thus underpinned the US imagination of China as 
an ally. In broader geopolitical terms, Truman would state that the US: 
“has long recognized the importance of a stable Chinese nation to lasting peace in the Pacific and 
the entire world. The vast size and population of China make her an important factor in world 
affairs. China is a land with rich tradition and culture and a large and energetic population. It has 
always been our desire to see a strong progressive China making a full contribution to the strength 
of the family of nations”.707 
As Truman was now making clear, the US understood China as a fundamental feature of the 
future of the international system. This was in jeopardy though as Truman would also depict 
how “the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy is a source of deep concern to the 
United States”.708 US concern for China was in many ways framed through the logic of 
identity through the use of terms like progressive and democratic, but was motivated by the 
logics of capital and geopolitics when it came to describing the necessity of China’s 
involvement in securing the international system.  
Speaking in Wyoming on May 9th 1950, Truman would articulate what I have described as the 
US geopolitical imagination. He began by reflecting on the significance of the Western 
frontier, “the West exerts a strong influence on the imagination of all of us of all Americans, 
in fact. The stirring drama of the opening of the West is a part of our national folklore. And 
there isn't a thing like it in the history of the world anywhere”.709 This opening and the 
invocation of an exceptionalism, featured significantly in the US’s early 20th century desire to 
expand into foreign markets. Reflecting on the manner in which conceptions of space and 
distance informed a sense of isolation Truman continued, “it is a tradition that the West is a 
country of great distances and of isolated communities…That tradition has left a deep 
impression on all Americans…the notion that many of us once held in the United States, that 
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the United States was a vast distance away from foreign neighbours that our Nation was an 
isolated community separated by days of travel from the other communities on the globe”.710 
Now though, as Truman would remonstrate, “you know how the West has shrunk. Distances 
seem to have been wiped out by a network of railroads and highways, and now by the huge 
airliners”.711 Changing material circumstances though, were creating the conditions for a new 
US conception of its place in the world. It is also notable, how Truman made use of a 
domestically focused discourse regarding the West, to explain the basis for a US foreign 
policy of isolationism. 
Truman would from here, begin to elaborate the change in the US’s imagination of itself 
within international politics. He stated that “the first reason I have already mentioned the 
elimination of distances. Where once we could ignore a far off tyranny, there no longer are far 
off places on this earth. Today, everybody on the globe is our neighbour”.712 As observed 
previously, US foreign policy now had an explicitly global orientation. In a juxtaposition of 
Communism to US democratic identity Truman described how “Communism has clearly 
shown its purpose to penetrate free countries, to divide free peoples and confuse them, to 
subvert their institutions, and to weaken their resistance…we cannot compromise our own 
moral or ethical beliefs…Communism denies all that we have come to know as 
democracy”.713 Communism was portrayed as rejection of US democratic beliefs. 
Challenging the historical discourse of isolationism, Truman responded by demanding that 
“we cannot isolate ourselves…We cannot compromise our principles. We cannot withdraw 
from the world”.714 Most importantly, this imperative was articulated through the logic of 
identity, “the free world must demonstrate moral superiority. It must demonstrate material 
superiority”.715 For Truman, rendering US foreign policy through the logic of identity, it was 
the US’s moral superiority that was at stake. 
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It is here that Truman turned to the aftermath of the Chinese Communist’s victory in 1949. 
Observing how “since the Chinese National Government disintegrated and the Chinese 
Communists seized control on the mainland, the plight of hundreds of millions of Chinese has 
been tragic. Their new taskmasters have been heartlessly indifferent to the worst famine 
which has occurred in China in 100 years”.716 The Chinese communists were portrayed as 
“taskmasters” and “heartlessly indifferent” towards their own citizens. These representations 
functioned through the logic of identity where China was the morally vacant ‘other’ to the 
morally superior US. Significant though is the manner in which geopolitical concerns were 
expressed through the logic of identity.  
More broadly, Truman would remark that “in Asia, and in the rest of the world, we are trying 
to do far more than to bring relief to people who are in want…This is of great importance, 
because there can never be political stability and peace unless there is a reasonable degree of 
economic stability and prosperity”.717 For Truman the US’s “world economic policies are 
aimed at breaking down the barriers to world trade. We believe that a high level of trade can 
raise standards of living in our own country and in every other country in the world”.718 As 
such, US “economic policies are also aimed at increasing the international flow of investment 
capital. The industrial growth of underdeveloped areas will mean more production, better 
markets, and a stronger world economy”.719 The logic of capital was to underpin the logic of 
geopolitics in this line of argument. 
In a statement on December 8th 1950 after a discussion with British Prime Minister Clement 
Atlee, the US adopted the basis for what would become its public policy on Taiwan for the 
rest of the century. The US and Britain agreed that  “on the question of Formosa…we agreed 
that the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard the 
interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific, 
and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will contribute to these ends”.720  
                                                
716 Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming.," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478. 
717 Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming.," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478. 
718 Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming.," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478. 
719 Harry S. Truman: "Address in Laramie, Wyoming.," May 9, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13478. 
720 Harry S. Truman: "Joint Statement Following Discussions With the Prime Minister of Great Britain.," 
December 8, 1950. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13681. 
 166 
The logic of geopolitics and the requisite need for geopolitical stability took priority over any 
partisan concern for who should constitute the legitimate ‘one’ China.   
On April 11th 1951, Truman discussed Korea and US Far East policy in a radio report, 
alluding to his clash with General Douglas MacArthur over Korean War policy. He 
considered why the US had not been more aggressive towards to China, “you may ask why 
can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor. Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China 
itself? Why don't we assist the Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of 
China?”.721 These options, proposed by MacArthur were seen as highly dangerous to US 
interests in Asia. Truman clarified his position that “if we were to do these things we would 
be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have 
brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent. If we were to do these things, we 
would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would 
become immeasurably more difficult all over the world”.722 Reflecting on the geopolitical 
tensions of the Cold War, Truman asked rhetorically “what would suit the ambitions of the 
Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full scale war with Red 
China?”.723 The US now had to take into account what the USSR’s interests might have been 
when considering how to act towards China. This reflected how the at times depending on the 
broader regional or global context, the logic of geopolitics became more prominent in US 
discourses of China. 
In a speech entitled “the Underlying Principles of Far Eastern Policy published on November 
19th, 1951, then Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk set out the guiding rationale for US 
foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific. Arguing for the need to elaborate ideas as well as courses 
of action Rusk called for US leadership “in the field of ideas, to explain the meaning of 
American policy, the reality of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the mockery of 
the hollow promises of communist agents, the nature of the threat which communist 
imperialism poses against the newly won freedom and independence of the new nations of 
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Asia”.724 It was up to the US in Rusk’s terms to articulate the integrity of US ideals and 
beliefs in the face of a “hollow” communism in Asia. Rusk remarked that “underlying [US] 
policy to the Far East [was] the persistence of a historical sympathy between the American 
people and their friends across the Pacific”.725 Rusk here is drawing upon the historical 
narratives about the US being a Pacific power, reflecting the logic of identity where it is 
friendship between the US and the countries of Asia that guides US policy. And for Rusk it 
was vital to effectively shape the discourse around US interests in Asia. 
In an address at the Oakland Auditorium October 4th 1952, Truman ruminated over the failed 
US effort to secure a democratic China. He described it as the “the one tragic exception” to 
US aid programs.726 The US had “sent over $2 billion worth of economic and military aid to 
China, but in spite of this, the Chinese Government was unable to marshal its resources or 
lead its people successfully. We helped China, but China proved unable to help herself”.727 
Again, China proved a demonstration of the limits of US foreign policy as Truman remarked 
that “except for China, the free nations, with our aid, have held the line throughout the rest of 
the world”. 728 This was not just the limits of US material capability and discursive authority, 
but the limits of the US imagination in constructing China. There was significant internal 
debate over who the US should ultimately support in the Chinese civil war and it was the anti-
communist influence that proved successful despite much expert analysis that suggested the 
US would be better positioned in Asia by supporting the communists. This debate took place 
during the Roosevelt administration but only now were its consequences becoming 
apparent.729 
The Communist invasion of South Korean and the commencement of the Korean War for 
Truman represented a battle over the nature of the international order. He described it as “the 
great and crucial test…this was the great challenge. If the Communists could get away with 
this, no other international boundary would be safe… We have held the dike of international 
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order at the point where the flood of aggression threatened to burst through”.730 China’s 
support for North Korea during the conflict positioned itself as a direct threat to the 
international system the US wished to defend. This marked the inversion from China as ally 
during WWII to China as an enemy, a conclusion derived form the three logics of capital, 
geopolitics and identity. 
At an address at Naval War College December 19th 1952, Truman effectively demonstrated 
the constitutive relationship between domestic and foreign policy as outlined by Hansen and 
other poststructuralists. Worth quoting extensively here, he stated that: 
 “our national policy is not simply our foreign policy or our military policy or our domestic policy. 
It is a combination of all three. The international domestic policies which a nation follows are the 
foundations of its foreign policy. Unless the domestic policy is sound, you can't have a foreign 
policy; and its military policy also is based on the soundness of the domestic policy. What we can 
do and ought to do abroad depends upon the kind of nation we are at home”.731 
This captures the basis of how the logic of capital and the logic of identity emanate from 
domestic origins and concerns outward into the world. Truman’s reflections on the 
importance of the Western frontier in US history also suggests then, that the logic of 
geopolitics originated in a more local, though not necessarily domestic context, during the US 
colonial expansion across the North American continent. Although this thesis is not primarily 
concerned with the overall origins of these logics or there sources, this is a theme worth 
mentioning here and consider for further research. 
Truman also captured here a sense of anxiety following WWII. He remarked how “at the end 
of World War II, the people of the United States were anxious to return to peaceful concerns. 
We wanted to forget about the problems of national security and national defence. We were, 
indeed, too eager to do this, and, in our hasty demobilization, we impatiently threw away a 
great deal of what we needed”.732 US anxiety about its possible role in the world, or from the 
perspective of the executive, its necessary role in the world, led it to miscalculate immediate 
political developments after the war. Truman drew attention to the then, emerging conflict 
with the USSR, “that nation that former ally set out to expand its own power by taking 
advantage of the weariness and yearning for peace that were prevalent throughout the world 
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in the chaotic aftermath of World War II. This threat was global”.733 He again reflected on 
limits of US power in China where “in this great world struggle there have been some burdens 
we could not undertake because our resources are not unlimited. China was one of those”.734 
The US’s understanding of the Communist success in China was clear. The US’s 
understanding of the emerging conflict with the USSR and China was rendered through the 
logic of geopolitics, even if it was the features of the logic of identity and capital that 
distinguished the opposing sides.  
Truman implored that “no one think that this administration underestimates the effects of the 
Communist victory in China. We know that the capture of the great Chinese people by a 
clique of ruthless Communist fanatics was a tragic loss to the cause of peace and progress in 
Asia and elsewhere. We hope it will not be an irrevocable loss”.735 The Chinese were now in 
the US imagination, “ruthless” “fanatics”, outside the international system whose name the 
US acted in. This rumination on the limits of US geopolitical abilities was explicitly put in 
Truman’s response to his critics, “they forget that our power is not unlimited and that we 
cannot commit ourselves everywhere”.736 The logic of geopolitics in this regard was also 
conditioned by the perception of material capability. 
In his 1953 State of the Union address on January 7th, Truman invoked the historical trope of 
the US’s founding to legitimise its current foreign policy. He recalled how “we in this 
Republic were and are free men, heirs of the American Revolution, dedicated to the truths of 
our Declaration of Independence: ‘... That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights...That to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed’”.737 This 
is, in essence, the fundamental narrative fulcrum of US identity. Truman established the 
contemporary linkage remarking that “our post-war objective has been in keeping with this 
great idea”.  He also wanted to make it clear that the US did not desire an empire; it “did not 
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want satellites but partners”.738 Conversely “the Soviet Union, however, took exactly the 
opposite course”.739 Invoking the logic of identity, Truman remarked, “our whole moral 
position, our leadership in the free world today, is fortified by that fact. Truman lay the blame 
for the Cold War with Soviet expansion, “the world is divided, not through our fault or 
failure, but by Soviet design. They, not we, began the Cold War”.740  He described the USSR 
and China as an economic threat to the US as they constituted a “vast land mass contains an 
enormous store of natural resources sufficient to support an economic development 
comparable to our own”.741 The USSR and China were thus perceived through the 
convergence of the logics of capital and of geopolitics. 
Truman painted the Communist bloc as: 
 “a world of great manmade uniformities, a world that bleeds its population white to build huge 
military forces; a world in which the police are everywhere and their authority unlimited; a world 
where terror and slavery are deliberately administered both as instruments of government and as 
means of production; a world where all effective social power is the state's monopoly yet the state 
itself is the creature of the communist tyrants”.742  
China was categorised with the USSR as being led by tyrants. Truman also invoked the 
uncivilised trope present through more historical discourses of US foreign policy declaring, 
“the Soviet Union, with its satellites, and China are held in the tight grip of communist party 
chieftains”.743 Truman described the Communist threat in vivid terms as “the time when the 
whole world outside their sway will be so torn by strife and contradictions that it will be ripe 
for the communist plucking”. The opportunistic basis of this threat was “the heart of the 
distorted Marxist interpretation of history. This is the glass through which Moscow and 
[Beijing] look out upon the world, the glass through which they see the rest of us. They seem 
really to believe that history is on their side. And they are trying to boost "history" along, at 
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every opportunity, in every way they can”.744 Truman was implying, with no sense of irony, 
that the Communist claim to embodying historical inevitability was preposterous. Here, 
Truman was deploying the logic of identity to locate the Chinese Communists as distinctly 
‘other’ to the US and subsequently the broader ‘Western’ world. 
Truman made it clear that he saw China as a victim of this grand Communist distortion. Not 
dissimilar from China’s victimisation at the end of the 19th century by the now, disintegrating 
colonial empires. He observed how “in the Far East, the tactics of communist imperialism 
have reached heights of violence unmatched elsewhere and the problem of concerted action 
by the free nations has been at once more acute and more difficult. Here, in spite of outside 
aid and support, the free government of China succumbed to the communist assault”.745 
Despite this, Truman demanded that the US “must go on, working with our free associates, 
building an international structure for military defence, and for economic, social, and political 
progress”.746 For Truman, the international structure he had been determined to build, 
following Roosevelt, was to be comprised of democracies and facilitated by capitalist based 
processes of exchange and commerce. Truman had described the need for a universal basis of 
US foreign policy, as a response to US’s perceived pre-eminence. China, he had hoped was to 
a fundamental administrator of that international structure. 
In his reflections on nuclear technology, Truman set out the epistemological basis of the 
rational universalism that reflected US approaches to the world. He claimed that “the 
language of science is universal, the movement of science is always forward into the 
unknown”.747 In this light, US foreign policy was increasingly constituted through 
increasingly universal and expansionist logic of capital and a logic of identity premised on 
universal values, where it became necessary to systematise the world through a logic of 
geopolitics to facilitate the imperatives of the previous two logics. 
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6.4 Eisenhower and Alienation  
In his first State of the Union address on February 2nd 1953, Dwight Eisenhower attempted to 
define a new foreign policy vision for the US. Implicitly distancing himself from the policies 
of his predecessor, he remarked, “we have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely 
remain in a posture of paralyzed tension, leaving forever to the aggressor the choice of time 
and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself. This administration 
has, therefore, begun the definition of a new, positive foreign policy”.748 Remaining though, 
was the global focus of US foreign policy, “the policy we embrace must be a coherent global 
policy”.749 Eisenhower was dedicated to making “the free world secure”.750 He also 
maintained that the US would continue to “recognise the importance of profitable and 
equitable world trade”.751 In what looks like a reformulation of Taft’s dollar diplomacy, 
Eisenhower declared that the US would be “doing whatever Government properly can to 
encourage the flow of private American investment abroad. This involves, as a serious and 
explicit purpose of our foreign policy, the encouragement of a hospitable climate for such 
investment in foreign nations”.752 The logic of capital remained prominent, despite his broad 
statements regarding a new vision. He would touch on this a year later when he claimed, “the 
American economy is one of the wonders of the world. It undergirds our international 
position, our military security, and the standard of living of every citizen”.753 The logic of 
capital then captures the manner in which the domestic US economy was constitutively 
related to US foreign economic policy. 
On the issue of Formosa, or Taiwan as it is now more known, Eisenhower reflected on what 
he saw as the inconsistencies of Truman’s approach to China. He was concerned with how, 
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following the outbreak of the Korean War, the US Seventh Fleet had been “instructed both to 
prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of 
operations against the Chinese Communist mainland. This has meant, in effect, that the 
United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China”.754 
Eisenhower was frustrated by the unwillingness of the China to negotiate a settlement to the 
issue and stated that “consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that 
required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese 
Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers 
and those of our United Nations allies in Korea”.755 The logic Eisenhower was referring to 
was premised on the hope that the China and Taiwan, would be able to come to kind of peace 
settlement. Eisenhower though was ignoring the previous administration’s belief that the US 
needed to prevent the spread of the conflict beyond Korea, though he argued that “the Seventh 
Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. This order implies no aggressive 
intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in 
Korea”.756 
In his 1954 State of the Union message to Congress, Eisenhower declared, “American 
freedom is threatened so long as the world Communist conspiracy exists in its present scope, 
power, and hostility”.757 The Communist threat was existential in other words. In describing a 
security pact with the Republic of Korea he invoked the US “security system for the 
Pacific”.758 This security system was in many ways targeted at China. He described how the 
US “shall also continue military and economic aid to the Nationalist Government of China. In 
South Asia, profound changes are taking place in free nations which are demonstrating their 
ability to progress through democratic methods. They provide an inspiring contrast to the 
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dictatorial methods and backward course of events in Communist China”.759 US foreign 
policy towards Asia, was now very much rendered through the logic of geopolitics and 
orientated around the threat, or potential of what China might become or do.  
In a special message to Congress on March 30th 1954, Eisenhower spoke at length on the 
priorities of US foreign economic policy. He remarked “the national interest in the field of 
foreign economic policy is clear. It is to obtain, in a manner that is consistent with our 
national security and profitable and equitable for all, the highest possible level of trade and 
the most efficient use of capital and resources”.760  This was not significantly different from 
Taft’s priorities. Now though, the benefits would not just accrue to the US but to its allies as 
well as Eisenhower indicated, “that this would also strengthen our military allies adds 
urgency. Their strength is of critical importance to the security of our country”.761 Eisenhower 
would also articulate the need for trade expansion to accommodate US surpluses. He made it 
clear that “he United States stands ready and able to produce and sell more than the rest of the 
world can buy from us. The inability of many foreign countries to buy our goods in the 
volume we would like to sell does not arise from any lack of desire for these goods. Such is 
far from the case. Instead it arises out of an inability of these nations to pay in dollars for the 
volume we have to sell”.762 The logic of capital has since Polk, Grant and Cleveland been 
organised around the search for foreign consumers and investment opportunities but now 
Eisenhower was making an explicit link between the need to secure the reproduction of US 
capital to material security of the US and its allies. 
Eisenhower indicated that to overcome the lack of foreign demand that “dollar grants are no 
lasting solution to this impasse. The solution is a higher level of two-way trade. Thus we can 
sell and receive payment for our exports and have an increasing volume of investment abroad 
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to assist economic development overseas and yield returns to us”.763  The aim of the logic of 
capital then was now to establish the conditions for “greater freedom from restrictions and 
controls and the increased efficiencies which arise from expanding markets and the freer play 
of economic forces are essential to the attainment of this higher trade level”.764 The domestic 
and international were now discursively linked as being symbiotically necessary to each 
others reproduction, indicated by Eisenhower’s remarks that “an increased flow of United 
States investment abroad could contribute significantly to the needed expansion of 
international trade. It also could help maintain a high level of economic activity and 
employment in the United States”.765 This comment embodies the central feature of the logic 
of capital that unites US ‘domestic’ concerns with its ‘foreign’ policy interests. 
Eisenhower captured the essence of the Taft’s dollar diplomacy and the contemporary 
manifestation of the logic of capital when he claimed that “further to encourage the flow of 
private investment abroad, we shall give full diplomatic support, through our activities here 
and through our missions and representatives in the field, to the acceptance and understanding 
by other nations of the prerequisites for the attraction of private foreign investment”.766 
Eisenhower also reflected the continuity in US foreign economic thought when he argued, 
“for our own economic growth we must have continuously expanding world markets; for our 
security we require that our allies become economically strong. Expanding trade is the only 
adequate solution for these two pressing problems confronting our country”.767 The logic of 
capital exhibited how continuous economic growth and the search for foreign markets were 
fundamental to maintaining the conditions for US way of life to continue. 
Eisenhower returned to the issue of the defence of the Taiwan and the island of Formosa on 
January 24th 1955. The US “recognized that it was important that these islands should remain 
in friendly hands. In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate 
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the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic and military forces upon which the 
peace of the Pacific depends”.768 To Eisenhower, the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics 
were vital in maintaining peace in the Asia Pacific. He argued that were Formosa to be 
invaded by China, this “would create a breach in the island chain of the Western Pacific that 
constitutes, for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their 
security structure in that Ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt North South 
communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic 
life of countries friendly to us”.769 This “backbone” and “security structure” amounted to the 
basis of the policy of containment where the US sought to deter the spread of Communism. 
In a speech on US security policy in Asia on April 20th 1955, Eisenhower outlined the major 
features of Asia in the US imagination. He argued that “the immediate threats to world 
security and stability are now centred in Asia…Within the vast arc of free Asia, which 
extends from the Republic of Korea and Japan to the Middle East, 770 million people…most 
of them are citizens of newly independent states. Some have been engaged in recent war 
against the Communists. All are threatened”.770  Eisenhower was outlining what should be 
considered the original China threat thesis. China now constituted the predominant threat to 
US interests and values in Asia. Eisenhower described how that “capital is very scarce…now 
is the time for accelerated development of the nations along the arc. The major responsibility 
must necessarily lie with the countries themselves. At best, foreign capital as well as foreign 
aid can only launch or stimulate the process of creating dynamic economies”.771 The logic of 
capital in US foreign policy then featured the need to use US economic support to facilitate 
the “accelerated development” of countries threatened by the China. The logic of capital was 
thus closely intertwined with the logic of geopolitics as the US felt an obligation to its allies, 
and was also concerned with the need for political stability. 
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To this end “the United States has the capacity, the desire, the concern to take the lead in 
friendly help for free Asia. For example, we can assist in providing and mobilizing capital for 
useful and constructive development. We can encourage our successful private industry to 
join with the people of free Asia in building their private industry and facilitate the way”.772 
In this manner, Eisenhower captured the sense of obligation motivating US foreign policy. 
This was necessary, as he put it, because the US “economy cannot be strong and continue to 
expand without the development of healthy economic conditions in other free nations, and 
without a continuous expansion of international trade”.773 The conditions for this continuous 
expansion of trade required that the US act to contain the potential military expansion of 
China in Asia as they saw it. Again, the logics of geopolitics, and of capital converge. 
Two years later on May 21st 1957, Eisenhower again reflected on the need for mutual security 
in securing peace, declaring that US “safety depends upon recognition of the fact that the 
Communist design for such encirclement must be stopped before it gains momentum before it 
is again too late to save the peace”.774 The communist threat, including the USSR and China, 
was constructed through a discourse of geopolitics. This invoked the logics of geopolitics and 
of identity as Eisenhower warned that “wherever moderate government disappears, 
Communist extremists will extend their brand of despotic imperialism”.775 Eisenhower 
explicitly captured the how the logic of identity functioned in US foreign policy arguing that 
foreign policy “reflects our own national character. We are stirred not only by calculations of 
self-interest but also by decent regard for the needs and the hopes of all our fellowmen. I am 
proud of this fact, as you are. None of us would wish it to be otherwise. This is not mere 
sentimentality. This is the very nature of America realistically understood and applied”.776 
Invoking the logic of identity here, Eisenhower indicated that how the US understood itself 
was fundamental to how it acted. Despite the prominence afforded to the logic of capital and 
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the logic of geopolitics, it was the logic of identity in this case that conditioned the limits to 
their rendering in practice. 
In a speech on June 28th 1957, Secretary of State John Dulles outlined US policy towards 
Communism in China. Touching on the discursive significance of recognition he observed 
how “diplomatic recognition is always a privilege, never a right. Of course, the United States 
recognizes that the Chinese Communist regime exists, we well know that it exists…but 
diplomatic recognition gives the recognized regime valuable rights and privileges”.777  Dulles 
situated China as a state outside of the civilised world stating “internationally the Chinese 
Communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to 
its international obligations; has not been peaceful in the past, and gives no evidence of being 
peaceful in the future”.778 While making clear the US intention to influence the passing of 
Communism in China Dulles also signified the potential of US foreign policy adjusting to the 
international context when he remarked that “our policies are readily adjustable to meet the 
requirements of changing questions”.779 The logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics can in 
this regard be reconfigured depending on changes in material circumstances.  
In a speech at the National Press Club on January 14th 1959, Eisenhower spoke explicitly 
about a China “problem”. In response to a question from the press corps that asked “do you 
consider Red China a potentially greater threat to the free world than Russia?” Eisenhower 
responded by stating he did not “believe in the measurable time, that on this you could make a 
really worthwhile conclusion or prediction. There is no question that the leaders of Red China 
are determined, by methods with which we are all familiar, to become an industrial power, 
which means that behind it, so far as we can see, they want to be a big military power, and 
they are going at that just as hard as they can”.780 Eisenhower encapsulated how the US 
thought of China when he remarked that, “we have indeed got a bleak problem that must be 
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solved”.781 This marks the explicit problematising of China through all three logics of 
identity, capital and geopolitics, as something to be solved in presidential discourses.  
At a speech commemorating the Presidency of Abraham Lincoln, Eisenhower drew a 
comparison between the democratic ideals espoused by Lincoln, and the once future potential 
for a democratic China. He described how “the first President of modern China, Sun Yatsen, 
found his three basic principles of government in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address”. 782 Implicit 
in this, was the lost democratic potential of China, an aspiration that featured prominently in 
Franklins Roosevelt and Truman’s discourses. China had at a time then, and still at present 
been understood through the logic of identity, where it was on the trajectory to become 
increasingly similar to the US.  
In a speech on the “importance of understanding” on April 4th 1959, Eisenhower set out some 
of the broader US concerns in Asia. He elaborated on how “for Vietnam's economic growth, 
the acquisition of capital is vitally necessary”. He used this to position China as a tyrannical 
other to the US considering that the Vietnamese could “create the capital needed for growth 
by stealing from the already meagre rice bowls of its people and regimenting them into work 
battalions. This enslavement is the commune system adopted by the new overlords of Red 
China. It would mean, of course, the loss of freedom within the country without any hostile 
outside action whatsoever”.783  China then, was characterised by its lack of freedom in the US 
sense. This need to assist the Vietnamese was constricted on the basis of the concern 
regarding the expansionist “overlords of Red China”. While discussing the US economic 
relationship with Japan, Eisenhower indicated the need to balance imports and exports in light 
of domestic manufacturing and US security interests in Asia. He stated that “quite naturally 
we must guard against a flooding of our own markets by goods, made in other countries, to 
the point where our own industries would dry up…we too must export in order to buy, and we 
must buy if we are to sell our surpluses abroad. Moreover, unless Japan's exports to us are at 
least maintained at approximately their present levels, we would risk the free world stake in 
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the whole Pacific”.784 Trade with Japan then, was necessary to the security of the countries 
bordering the Pacific. The logic of capital then, also accounted for the domestic consequences 
of international trade. 
At a mass rally in Taipei June 18th 1960, Eisenhower deployed the logic of identity to signify 
solidarity between the US and Taiwan. He declared that “we Americans are in a very real 
sense your close neighbours: we look out with you upon the same ocean the Pacific. This 
largest of oceans has been narrowed by the marvels of modern communication and 
transportation. No longer is it a formidable barrier separating America from the Nations of the 
Far East”.785 The narrowing of geographical space in the US imagination due to technological 
and material developments affected how the logic of geopolitics functioned in in US 
conceptions of the Pacific Ocean. Rather than a barrier, it appeared more as a conduit Asia. 
Eisenhower restated the US’s anti-colonial stance remarking that “though the United States 
provides assistance to the nations of the Pacific Region, many of them recently emerged from 
Colonial status, we have not sought to impose upon them our own way of life or system of 
government. We respect their sovereignty as we do our own”. Invoking the logic of identity 
he declared that “to do otherwise would be a betrayal of America's own traditions. Our 
purpose is to help protect the right of our neighbours of the Pacific to develop in accordance 
with their own National aspirations and their own traditions”.786 In specific reference to the 
China’s claim to the Chinese UN seat Eisenhower outlined how “the United States does not of 
course recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in [Beijing]”.787 
The uncivilised construction of China, as perceived through the logic of identity located 
China outside of the traditional, civilised space of international order governed by US foreign 
policy. 
During a toast in honour of Chiang Kai-Shek during that same day, Eisenhower drew on the 
historical narratives that saw Chiang as embodying the democratic spirit championed by the 
logic of identity. He celebrated how “for a third of a century, president Chiang has played a 
decisive role in the shaping of relations between our two countries. He first won America's 
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admiration and respect as a brilliant young revolutionary leader who unified China in a series 
of masterly campaigns”.788 Chiang was positioned within the same revolutionary tradition the 
US saw itself as embodying. Eisenhower could thus declare that Chiang “set it on the road to 
becoming a modern democratic nation. He further deepened our respect and earned our 
gratitude by his indomitable leadership of our great far Eastern ally in the Second World 
War”.789 In this sense, the logic of identity shaped how the US recalled Chiang’s China before 
the communist victory in 1949 as being one of similar virtuous nature.  
Speaking to the American people about his Far East trip on June 27th 1960, Eisenhower 
reminded the US of how in the early 1950s “China and its half billion people had been lost to 
the free World. The war in Korea, then in condition of stalemate, still dragged on”.790 He 
attempted to disassociate the US from accepting responsibility for this as he argued “we in the 
United States must not fall into the error of blaming ourselves for what the Communists do; 
after all, Communists will act like Communists”.791  Drawing upon the logic of geopolitics he 
outlined how the success of the Communists on mainland China necessitated increased US 
cooperation with the other countries in Asia. Eisenhower described how “since the loss of 
mainland China to the Communists in 1949, the need to link the other nations of the Far East 
with the United States more strongly, in their mutual interest, should be apparent to all”.792 
This need was premised on the geopolitical imperatives of containing China as “the other free 
countries of the Far East, small in relation to the massive area and immense population of Red 
China, can survive in freedom and flourish only in cooperative association with the United 
States and a free Japan”.793 The US sense of obligation to assist other ‘free’ countries in the 
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face of potential Chinese tyranny was coupled with the geopolitical need to contain China 
reflecting the increasingly inseparable logics of geopolitics and identity.  
Eisenhower’s discursive rendering of the China problem in his final State of the Union 
address on January 12th 1961 located China as outside the space of respectable geopolitical 
behaviour. He stated how the US “has continued to withhold recognition of Communist China 
and to oppose vigorously the admission of this belligerent and unrepentant nation in the 
United Nations. Red China has yet to demonstrate that it deserves to be considered a ‘peace-
loving’ nation”.794 China in Eisenhower’s discourse, and the US imagination more broadly, 
had still not met what amounted to the criteria for civilised behaviour.  
In the following section I analyse the Presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson 
together due to similarities in their discourse of China and the manner in which Johnson 
expanded on several tenets of Kennedy’s imaginations of China. 
6.5 Kennedy, Johnson and the Opening for Nixon 
In the second presidential debate, as the democratic candidate, against Richard Nixon on 
October 21st 1960 Kennedy observed the potential benefits for the US of a Sino-Soviet split: 
“Secondly, the relations between Russia and China. They are now engaged in a debate over 
whether war is the means of Communising the world or whether they should use subversion, 
infiltration, economic struggles and all the rest. No one can say what that course of action will 
be, but I think the next president of the United States should watch it carefully”.795 In 
distinction to Eisenhower’s discourses of China, Kennedy did not see China as an inevitable 
ally of the USSR. This understanding was to function as important discursive opening for the 
initial considerations of reconciliation between the US and China, which would culminate, 
poetically, in Nixon’s rapprochement with China. 
In his first State of the Union address on January 30th 1961, Kennedy outlined how “the 
American economy is in trouble. The most resourceful industrialized country on earth ranks 
among the last in the rate of economic growth”.796 The US’s domestic economic conditions 
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were again, a problem.797  As previously recognised by Cleveland and Taft, the logic of 
capital, furnished by imminent economic issues in the US would again influence its foreign 
policy towards China. Turning to Asia, Kennedy described how “the relentless pressures of 
the Chinese Communists menace the security of the entire area from the borders of India and 
South Viet Nam to the jungles of Laos, struggling to protect its newly won independence”.798 
Kennedy would emphasise how the US needed to focus on countries other than the USSR and 
China and to do so, “we must improve our economic tools. Our role is essential and 
unavoidable in the construction of a sound and expanding economy for the entire 
noncommunist world”.799 The US contribution to the world in this light was presented 
through the logic of capital. 
Speaking in Paris on June 2nd 1961, Kennedy commented on the potential for normalisation 
between the US and China. Reflecting on the possibility for the normalisation of relations 
between China and the Kennedy remarked that “we desire peace and we desire to live in 
amity with the Chinese people”.800 Although cautious, Kennedy left open the space for 
normalisation when he reflected on how “the debate which took place last fall between 
Communist parties indicated that the Chinese planned to take an extremely belligerent attitude 
and role towards us and those with whom we are associated”. Despite this frustration he 
claimed, “we hope that policy changes. We want good will. But it takes two to make peace, 
and I am hopeful that the Chinese will be persuaded that a peaceful existence with its 
neighbors represents the best hope for us all. We would welcome it. But I do not see evidence 
of it today”.801 This is not to say that Kennedy was relentlessly naïve in his approach as he 
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made it clear while speaking in New York on December 14th 1962. He recalled how “we have 
been digging our way out of the loss of China for the last 12 years, and my successor in office 
may have to deal with the problem of a China which is carrying out an expansionary policy 
with nuclear weapons and missiles”.802 The ‘problem’ of China remained very much in this 
sense, constructed through the logic of geopolitics.  
In his 1963 State of the Union address Kennedy attempted to position the US as explicitly 
anti-colonial and on the side of freedom in juxtaposition to the USSR and China. He claimed 
that the nonaligned states “were shocked by the Soviets' sudden and secret attempt to 
transform Cuba into a nuclear striking base and by Communist China's arrogant invasion of 
India”.803 Reflecting on the broader global trends, he remarked that “as the older colonialism 
recedes, and the neocolonialism of the Communist powers stands out more starkly than ever, 
they realize more clearly that the issue in the world struggle is not communism versus 
capitalism, but coercion versus free choice”.804 The logic of capital, and its dependency on the 
system of capitalism, was articulated through the logic of identity where the US embodied 
freedom and choice.  
In his comments on the emerging dispute between the USSR and China, Kennedy again tried 
to present the Cold War as a social issue rather than an economic one. He argued that “the 
Soviet Chinese disagreement is over means, not ends” and that “a dispute over how best to 
bury the free world is no grounds for Western rejoicing”.805  Despite this observation, 
Kennedy argued it was “clear that the forces of diversity are at work inside the Communist 
camp, despite all the iron disciplines of regimentation and all the iron dogmatism's of 
ideology”. This discursive piercing of the supposed Sino-Soviet front, constituted Kennedy’s 
championing of the logic of identity as juxtaposing the US to its Cold War adversaries. He 
elaborated on this thought claiming that “Marx is proven wrong once again: for it is the closed 
Communist societies, not the free and open societies which carry within themselves the seeds 
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of internal disintegration”.806  Ultimately for Kennedy “the disarray of the Communist empire 
has been heightened by two other formidable forces”, nationalism and the desire for freedom 
were one. The second force argued by Kennedy, in a statement capturing the linking of the 
logic of capital and the logic of identity in US foreign policy discourses, was “the gross 
inefficiency of their economies. For a closed society is not open to ideas of progress and a 
police state finds that it cannot command the grain to grow”.807 The logic of identity was here 
considered by Kennedy to establish the conditions where the logic of capital could function 
most efficiently.  
In a message to Congress on April 2nd 1963, regarding US international assistance programs, 
Kennedy argued that US military economic assistance to countries in Asia had enabled 
threatened peoples to stay free and independent, when they otherwise would have either been 
overrun by aggressive communist power or fallen victim of utter chaos, poverty and 
despair”.808 Kennedy described how “Free Asia [was] responding resolutely to the political, 
economic and military challenge of Communist China's relentless efforts to dominate the 
continent”.809 This made clear the main US goal in Asia of preventing the expansion and 
influence of China. He would also outline a number of recommendations for US foreign 
policy going forward, “including stricter criteria on aid, reduce the need for US assistance, 
securing more international support for providing aid, defend countries under threat from 
communism and lastly “to increase the role of private investment and other non-Federal 
resources in assisting developing nations”.810 If China constituted a geopolitical threat 
regarding the territorial security of Asian states, Kennedy maintained that the use of US 
capital could be used to facilitate the economic development of other Asian states.  
Kennedy’s assassination would leave the Presidency in the hands of Lyndon Johnson who 
would go on to expand Kennedy’s reasoning towards Asia more broadly, and China 
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specifically. Johnson though would prove to be one of the more forthright presidents in his 
articulation and justification of US foreign policy. For the purpose of this argument, 
Kennedy’s discourses regarding China functioned as creating the immediate conditions in 
which Johnson’s foreign policy towards China emerged from. 
In a speech on foreign affairs in New York City on April 20th 1964, Johnson spoke at length 
on US foreign policy. He argued that “the unity of communism is being eroded by the 
insistent forces of nationalism and diverging interest. A whole new group of societies is 
painfully struggling toward the modern world”.811 With that in mind Johnson’s comments 
would outline almost explicitly how the logics I discuss shape US foreign policy. Johnson 
argued that the US’s  
“basic principles are adequate to this shifting world. But foreign policy is more than just a set of 
general principles. It is the changing application of those principles to specific dangers and to 
specific opportunities. It involves knowledge of strengths and awareness of limitations in each new 
situation”.812 
Johnson here captures the constitutive relationship between the logics I describe, or in his case 
“general principles”, and US foreign policy practices within the material world. The logics 
have evolved through the various Presidencies, but how they are rendered in practice, or in 
response to a particular situation are immanently contextual. How, and why this is the case, 
are issues I consider in what I acknowledge is a relatively superficial manner, but the 
motivation of this thesis is to describe these general principles as they became legible in 
relation to US foreign policy towards China. The three logics I describe through this 
genealogy are not necessarily the only logics at work in US foreign policy generally, but my 
argument is that they are the most dominant in US imaginations of China. Johnson also 
reflects the arguments presented by Chengxin Pan regarding the binary of opportunity and 
threat in US imaginations of China. This binary though, often fails to capture the complete 
spectrum of US foreign policy interests especially in relation to China. The logics I describe, 
at times do not always render the world in terms of danger or opportunity, leaving space for 
thought beyond this binary. 
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Johnson, like some of his predecessors invoked the US’s early encounters with Asia to 
legitimize his policy. He described how “the first American diplomatic mission to the far East 
was instructed to inform all countries ‘we will never make conquests, or ask any nation to let 
us establish ourselves in their countries’. That was our policy in 1832. That is our policy in 
1964…if we have desired no conquest for ourselves, we have also steadfastly opposed it for 
others. The independence of Asian nations is a link in our own freedom”.813 US foreign policy 
was now increasingly being increasingly articulated through the logic of identity. 
Turning to China, Johnson’s position was that “so long as the Communist Chinese pursue 
aggression, so long as the Communist Chinese preach violence, there can be and will be no 
easing of relationships. There are some who prophesy that these policies will change. But 
America must base her acts on present realities and not on future hopes. It is not we who must 
reexamine our view of China. It is the Chinese Communists who must reexamine their view 
of the world”.814 China then, needed to accommodate itself to the US understanding of 
international politics. The logics of US foreign policy then were not so much partial 
approaches to the world, but the for the US captured the fundamental essence of international 
politics which other states needed to adhere to. 
In his statement on the first Chinese nuclear device on October 16th 1964, Johnson implied the 
reckless nature of China, commenting, “scarce economic resources which could have been 
used to improve the wellbeing of the Chinese people have been used to produce a crude 
nuclear device which can only increase the sense of insecurity of the Chinese people”.815 
Johnson would later imply China was an irresponsible state, a comment that would become 
increasingly pertinent in the US understanding of China. To Johnson, China’s “nuclear 
pretensions are both expensive and cruel to its people…It shocks us by its readiness to pollute 
the atmosphere with fallout… Communist China's expensive and demanding effort tempts 
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other states to equal folly”.816 China was subsequently judged via the logic of identity to be a 
reckless and irresponsible state. 
In a speech entitled “Peace Without Conquest” at Johns Hopkins University on April 7th 1965, 
Johnson attempted to justify US policy in the Vietnamese war as being indicative of US 
concern about China. He argued that “over this war and all Asia is another reality: the 
deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by [Beijing]. This 
is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been 
condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the 
forces of violence in almost every continent”.817 US policy towards Vietnam then, was part of 
a broader concern about China in Asia, and the USSR more globally. Johnson argued that 
“the contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes…we are also there to 
strengthen world order. Around the globe”.818 These events signified that “this will be a 
disorderly planet for a long time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the modern world are 
shaking old ways and uprooting ancient civilizations”.819 Johnson here described US foreign 
policy in terms of the logic of geopolitics where “world order” was at stake. Evident here, is 
the slow decline of explicit reference to the logic of capital. US foreign policy was no longer 
imagining the world in terms of outlets for US capital, but in terms of a geopolitical struggle 
over territory and influence, a shift that was articulated most forcefully by Eisenhower. 
Johnson, commenting on US interests in Vietnam, declared, “there is nothing that we want in 
Communist China. There is nothing the American people want from Communist China”.820 
This constituted a direct consequence to Roosevelt’s hopes that China would become a joint 
administrator of the international system. In a speech on US Asia Policy on July 12th 1966, 
Johnson would argue that the primary motivation of US foreign policy towards Asia was “to 
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meet our obligations in Asia as a Pacific power”.821In response to the criticism that the US has 
little economic or, security or social interest in Asia, Johnson declared that these “do not stand 
the test of geography because we are bounded not by one, but by two oceans. And whether by 
aircraft or ship, by satellite or missile, the Pacific is as crossable as the Atlantic. They do not 
stand the test of commonsense”.822 US involvement in Asian affairs then was justified as a 
form of commonsense. Claiming this as commonsense functioned to conceal the contingency, 
history and motivations that underpinned US interests in Asia. This common sense is what I 
try to capture through my argument regarding the three logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics in how the US imagined China.  
In response to critiques of US expansionist folly, Johnson argued that “they do not stand the 
test of reality, either. Asia is no longer sitting outside the door of the 20th century. She is here 
in the same world with all of us to be either our partner or our problem. Americans entered 
this century believing that our own security had no foundation outside our own continent. 
Twice we mistook our sheltered position for safety. Twice we were dead wrong”.823 In 
specific relation to China and its importance to US interests in Asia, “a peaceful mainland 
China is central to a peaceful Asia. A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression. A 
misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward 
policies of peaceful cooperation. For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 
million people of Mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world”.824 To 
Johnson, China was the major determining factor of conditions in Asia and US foreign policy 
towards Asia. It was also not just the US’s understanding of its Pacific identity, but the logic 
of geopolitics compelled the US to secure the international foundations of its security. 
In important remarks regarding US attempts to restart relations with China through people to 
people contacts, Johnson foreshadowed the opening to towards China which was to become 
Nixon’s signature achievement. Johnson described how: 
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 “for many years, now, the United States has attempted in vain to persuade the Chinese 
Communists to agree to an exchange of newsmen as one of the first steps to increased 
understanding between our people. More recently, we have taken steps to permit American 
scholars, experts in medicine and public health, and other specialists to travel to Communist China. 
And only today we, here in the Government, cleared a passport for a leading American 
businessman to exchange knowledge with Chinese mainland leaders in Red China. All of these 
initiatives, except the action today, have been rejected by Communist China”.825 
If the US was attempting to knock at the door it had forced open in the 19th century, in the 
name of security in Asia, China was currently not interested. 
Johnson would return to the theme of the US as a Pacific power and speculating on its future 
significance recalling how “as our great President Theodore Roosevelt once remarked this 
may be the greatest of all human eras the Pacific era. As a Pacific power we must help achieve 
that outcome”.826 Speaking in Hawaii on October 16th 1966, Johnson captured the variety of 
reasons that the West had been interested in Asia: 
“In centuries past, men of the West went to Asia for many reasons. Some made the long ocean trek 
in search of wealth. Others went as the agents of governments that wanted colonial possessions. 
Still others went to teach; to treat the sick; to spread the gospel; to aid the farmer; to help build 
factories; to advise officials; to translate Western works of literature and technology”.827 
This wide recollection of past Western interests reflects the broader variety of logics that 
shaped how Asia and China specifically were imagined in the US. In a rare moment of public 
reflection on Western colonial practices, Johnson reflected on how “through colonialism and 
by other means the West intruded its then superior power into the East. And, of course, there 
was a reaction”.828 This is by no means an inaccurate understanding of how the Chinese 
Communist party has recalled this same history, but more importantly for my concern here, 
reflected the prevailing emphasis on the logic of identity as conditioning presidential 
discourse on China.829 
Johnson posed a series of reflective and critical questions of US foreign policy in Asia during 
his speech in Hawaii, which are worth recalling in full here: 
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“How well have we understood the complex causes of conflict in the Pacific's time of troubles? 
How well have we understood the feelings and the aspirations of Asia's peoples during the century 
of turbulence? How well have we understood the impact of West upon East of Western arms, 
industry, and ideas upon Venerable Asian cultures? How well have we understood the course of 
revolution in Asia? How well have we understood the shocks as well as the benefits that 
modernization can bring to developing societies? How well have we understood the shifting tides 
of nationalism in all its forms? Well, in almost three decades of elective office I have had to answer 
these questions for myself”.830 
Indicating the limitations of his own perspective, Johnson responded that “for two decades I 
answered them as one who conceived America's destiny almost entirely in relation to 
Europe”.831 In a statement pertinent to contemporary US debates over China, Johnson 
observed that “there are still those who cannot understand the Pacific's role in America's 
future…Only by answering these questions with candor can we build solid foundations for 
our future relations with Asia. Only then can we really understand the depth of the desire in 
Asia for independence, for modernization, and for dignity. American policy toward Asia 
today must be the policy of an open mind”.832 In no uncertain terms this was a very public 
display of candor that reflected the limitations of the three logics the US had so far imagined 
China through. It was this discursive openness that created the conditions for Johnson’s 
remarks concerning the issue of reconciliation with China. 
Johnson explained how the US “think[s] sooner or later this new perception will spread as 
well to the closed societies of Communist Asia. Sooner or later the pragmatic and 
compassionate spirit of the Chinese people will prevail over outmoded dogmatism. We in 
America look to that day with hope and with confidence. For our part, we shall do what we 
can to hasten its coming. We shall keep alive the hope for a freer flow of ideas and people 
between mainland China and the United States”.833 Johnson’s rhetoric here marks a return to 
the hope evident Franklin Roosevelt’s discourses regarding China. Johnson continued, stating 
how it was “only through such exchange can isolation be ended and suspicion give way to 
trust. We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must ultimately end in 
reconciliation. We hopefully look to the day when the policies of Mainland China will offer 
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and will permit such a reconciliation”.834 Effectively Johnson was invoking the logics of 
identity and capital when he spoke of “freer flow of ideas and people” but he was also 
alluding to what might be described as a logic of social interaction that falls outside the three 
logics I describe, even if this was motivated by the economic, geopolitical and identity 
narratives I have described up until now. 
In a television interview on December 19th 1967, when discussing the prospects for 
reconciliation with China Johnson described how he has “said to them in several public 
statements that we hope that they can conduct themselves in such a way as will permit them to 
join the family of nations and that we can learn to live in harmony with each other”.835 
Johnson would capture in the next statement, the ambiguity and apparent opaqueness of China 
in the US imagination. He contemplated openly that: 
“We don't know all that we would like to know about what is going on in China. It is a rather 
closed society and we don't have all the information that we would like to have. But we are hopeful 
and we believe that over a period of time, that the opportunity exists for them to gain a better 
understanding of the other peoples of the world and thus be able to live more harmoniously with 
them”.836 
The US under Johnson and primarily through the logic of identity was very much in this case, 
leaving the door open for reconciliation. 
6.6 Conclusion 
What occurs during the period this chapter covers is the more globalised orientation of US 
foreign policy. Roosevelt envisioned a China that would help maintain the international 
system regionally and globally. China was to feature more prominently in the US 
understanding as a potential joint administrator of capitalism and the geopolitical 
configurations that sustained it in Asia. Importantly, both Roosevelt and Truman had 
understood China through the logic of identity, where it was on the trajectory to become a 
democratic state in the mould of the US itself. This aspiration was to essentially disappear 
under Eisenhower in he aftermath of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war. 
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China though, as imagined by Roosevelt and Truman was no longer something to merely 
exploit through the logic of capital, but was becoming constructed as a necessary participant 
to creating the conditions for the interests and reproduction of the logics of capital and 
geopolitics in US foreign policy. This was desire, was to be repressed during the Cold War 
but would ultimately return to US presidential discourse under Bill Clinton, something I will 
describe in chapter 8. The emerging prominence of a logic of geopolitics, that was not only 
concerned with the structuring of international politics to facilitate the imperatives of the logic 
of capital, began to exert its own pressures on US foreign policy as it felt compelled to 
maintain international credibility.  
For Eisenhower China would become rendered through the logic of geopolitics and identity as 
a hostile enemy though the inversion from ally to enemy would begin under Kennedy and 
Johnson, paving the way for Nixon’s overtures to China.  Johnson would also start to 
demonstrate a sense of reflectivity on US foreign policy practices. Although US foreign 
policy would come to be increasingly constituted through the logic of capital that had become 
increasingly universal and expansionist and a logic of identity emphasising universal nature of 
US values, US interests were becoming more predominantly expressed through a logic of 
geopolitics. The consequences of this increasing universalisation and expansion were it 
became necessary to systematise the world through a logic of geopolitics to maintain the 
imperatives within the other two logics. One might speculate and inquire as to this shift in 
discourse to an increasing emphasis and expression of geopolitical concern at the expense of 
the logic of capital which although important in shaping interests, was no longer the dominant 
form of expression with regards to China. 
The space in US presidential discourses, created by Johnson, for reconciliation with China 
contributed to the manner in which the Nixon administration would be able to take along its 
logical trajectory as demonstrated in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7 – 1968-1988: Nixon to Reagan 
7.1 Introduction  
This period is characterised by the major narrative of rapprochement or reconciliation 
between the US and China. This chapter analyses the discourses of Richard Nixon837, Jimmy 
Carter838 and Ronald Reagan. This covers the normalisation of relations between the US and 
China, with official recognition coming under Carter in 1979, and increasing commercial 
times and state visits during the Reagan Presidency.839  Nixon channelled the logic of capital 
in his public statements regarding the need for rapprochement with China. Although he often 
indicated that US attempts to re-establish official relations with China were not about 
geopolitical manoeuvring with the USSR in mind, he would also subtly contradict this claim 
on a regular basis Carter introduced the issue of human rights in to the logic of identity as it 
functioned towards China though as I will demonstrate this always remained secondary to the 
logic of capital. Reagan for one, despite some of his early comments would go on to 
emphasise the logic of capital as the US sought to take advantage of the market orientated 
reforms begun under Deng Xiaoping in China.  
7.2 Nixon and Reconciliation  
In the first 1960 US presidential debate against then Senator Kennedy, Nixon asked “what do 
the Chinese Communists want? They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu; they don't want just 
Formosa; they want the world. And the question is if you surrender or indicate in advance that 
you're not going to defend any part of the free world, and you figure that's going to satisfy 
them, it doesn't satisfy them. It only whets their appetite; and then the question comes, when 
do you stop them?”.840 Although he was unsuccessful in that first Presidential bid, Nixon’s 
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remarks reflected his beliefs and that of the Eisenhower administration that he was Vice-
President of, that China was insatiably expansionist. US discourses of China then during this 
period were rendered through the logic of geopolitics where the US concern about China’s 
intentions, was pressing, immediate and required US opposition. 
Now as President, and speaking at the United Nations on September 18th 1969, Nixon adopted 
amore conciliatory position towards China. In a general sense he attempted to “describe peace 
as a process embodied in a structure”.841 The structure he was considering was the structure 
and relations of international politics, though his more important point was that peace simply 
does not emerge or materialise. This peace was process that could be mediated by actors. In 
this light, he offered an early signal to China of US desire for engagement stating, “whenever 
the leaders of Communist China choose to abandon their self imposed isolation, we are ready 
to talk with them in the same frank and serious spirit”.842 Nixon was reiterating and expanding 
on the offer presented by the Johnson administration. As will be shown below, Nixon justified 
this through the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics.  
In an address to the nation on November 3rd 1969, Nixon set out his understanding of the war 
in Vietnam. One of his major points revealed the constraints limiting the logic of geopolitics. 
He declared, “a nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends”.843 
Nixon outlined what he referred to as the Nixon Doctrine, which was comprised of keeping 
treaty agreements, providing a nuclear shield to allies, providing military and economic 
assistance to other states under threat from communism while also encouraging them to 
defend themselves.844 What was important here, is the notion of greatness that compelled the 
US to remain loyal to its allies, an example of the convergence of the logics of identity and 
geopolitics.. What this indicates is the constitutive nature of identity formation and 
geopolitical practice, to be great, the US had to act in such a way concerning geopolitical 
issues, and those very performances of geopolitics were compelled by identity discourses.  
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During his State of the Union address on January 22nd 1970, Nixon emphasised the global 
changes that had taken place since the end of WWII. He claimed, “we have based our policies 
on an evaluation of the world as it is, not as it was 25 years ago at the conclusion of World 
War II. Many of the policies which were necessary and right then are obsolete today”.845 US 
foreign policy then, had to account for the change, material and discursive, in international 
politics over this time period. This was implicit in his comments regarding the initial attempts 
at US-China dialogue in light f increasing cooperation with Japan. He stated, for instance, that 
it “it [was] with this same spirit that we have resumed discussions with Communist China in 
our talks at Warsaw. Our concern in our relations with both these nations is to avoid a 
catastrophic collision and to build a solid basis for peaceful settlement of our differences”.846  
It was necessary through the logic of geopolitics by following this strand of thought, to 
establish the geopolitical conditions for peace in the Asia-Pacific by engaging with China.  
The Nixon administration was the first to submit an annual report to Congress on US foreign 
policy. These reports offered a detailed discussion for US foreign policy and offer extensive 
insight into the Nixon administration’s interests and reasoning. The first one, in February 
1970, set out Nixon’s vision for US foreign policy in the 1970’s began with the statement this 
it was “this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era 
of international relations”.847 The change Nixon had been referring to in his State of the Union 
address was describing the US’s understanding of a growing fracture between China and the 
USSR. Nixon called that during the 1950s the US was “confronted by a monolithic 
Communist world” and that “today, the nature of that world has changed the power of 
individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been 
shattered”.848  Despite his protestations, discussed below, that his policies towards China were 
not about isolating the USSR through the logic of geopolitics, these prominent opening 
comments imply otherwise. 
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Nixon described the USSR and China as “once a unified bloc, [now] its solidarity has been 
broken by the powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once 
bound by an alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960s….the 
Marxist dream of international Communist unity has disintegrated”.849 Although not stated 
explicitly here, Nixon implied that the US had to respond to this disintegration. This response 
would be characterised, as mentioned above, by the Nixon Doctrine whose “central thesis is 
that the United States will participate in the defence and development of allies and friends, but 
that America cannot and will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all 
the decisions and undertake all the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help 
where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest”.850 Nixon was essentially 
arguing that the US would take a more selective approach to its foreign policy, stimulated by 
the manner in which the Vietnam War had revealed the limitations of US military 
capability.851 The logic of geopolitics was rendered under Nixon as more cautious and 
reserved, at least in his public statements. 
The report located Nixon’s foreign policy within the general approach of US foreign policy 
after WWII. It claimed, despite Nixon’s focus on change that the approach set out as his 
Doctrine could be seen beginning “in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and 
the Marshall Plan, offering American economic and military assistance to countries 
threatened by aggression”.852 Essentially US foreign policy was organised around the belief 
that “democracy and prosperity, buttressed by American military strength and organized in a 
worldwide network of American led alliances, would insure stability and peace”. The logic of 
geopolitics held that democracy and economic prosperity would establish the conditions for 
peace and political stability. Nixon saw the logic of geopolitics in this case as primary and 
facilitated by the logics of capital and identity. For Nixon “this great effort of international 
political and economic reconstruction was a triumph of American leadership and imagination, 
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especially in Europe”.853 This was in short, a positive assessment of how the logic of 
geopolitics had organised US foreign policy since the end of WWII. 
This is not to say Nixon overlooked the logic of capital. He indicated that, “in an ever more 
interdependent world economy, American foreign policy will emphasize the freer flow of 
capital and goods between nations”.854 This growing independence led Nixon to claim that 
“this is also the spirit in which we have resumed formal talks in Warsaw with Communist 
China. No nation need be our permanent enemy”.855 Enmity then, was a contingent state of 
relations, rather than inevitable. In a neat indication of how US foreign policy was 
characterised by the need to solve problems, China being one of them Nixon described how 
“our policymaking must be systematic: our actions must be the products of thorough analysis, 
forward planning, and deliberate decision. We must master problems before they master 
us”.856 The US in this light could be seen a problem solver in the tradition outlined by Cox 
where the US was taking the world “as it is” and responding within existing global 
frameworks.  
For the US “a foreign policy for the 1970's demands imaginative thought. In a world of 
onrushing change, we can no longer rest content with familiar ideas or assume that the future 
will be a projection of the present”. Nixon was returning to the issue of change. Reflecting a 
similar binary understanding of the US’s encounter with the world as Johnson had, the report 
declared that “if we are to meet both the peril and the opportunity of change, we require a 
clear and positive vision of the world we seek and of America's contribution to bringing it 
about”.857 US foreign policy then was also about establishing the conditions necessary for its 
interests to come to fruition. This was to be done by what the Nixon administration described 
as “systematic planning”. What the report goes on to describe is similar to how I see the 
logics I discern functioning in US foreign policy. The reports argues that US 
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 “foreign policy must not be merely the result of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by 
the pressures of events. If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational 
conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and 
deliberate choice. We need a system which forces consideration of problems before they become 
emergencies, which enables us to make our basic determinations of purpose before being pressed 
by events, and to mesh policies”(emphasis added).858 
From this it follows that the logics I describe are what inform US foreign policy and give it its 
overall sense of rationality. They constitute the parameters and criteria for what constitutes 
this rationality. The logics in this light inform what can be considered as legitimate choice but 
they do not determine a particular choice. They function as the discursive spectrum in which 
agency operates.  
Turning to Asia, the report describes how “three times in a single generation, Americans have 
been called upon to cross the Pacific and fight in Asia. No region of the world has more 
engaged our energies in the post-war period”. Referring to the wars with Japan, over Korea 
and over Vietnam, looming is the issue of China. The report continues, “no continent has 
changed more rapidly or with greater complexity since World War II. Nowhere has the failure 
to create peace been more costly or led to greater sacrifice”.859 This emphasis on the 
significance of Asia to US interests is summed up by the following affirmation that “first, we 
remain involved in Asia. We are a Pacific power. We have learned that peace for us is much 
less likely if there is no peace in Asia”. 860 “We are a Pacific power”, returns as an axiomatic 
signifier, at once stating a geographical ‘fact’ while legitimising a certain set of practices. 
This is not to say it functions as an empty signifier with no meaning, but a highly emotive 
signifier that when problematized, as this thesis intends to do, reveals a set of political 
interests at the heart of a seemingly benign factual statement about geographic solidarity. 
The second issue as regards to Asia that the report flags, lends exemplary justification to the 
focus on identity in international politics.861 The report describes how “constructive 
nationalism and economic progress since World War II have strengthened the new nations of 
Asia internally. A growing sense of Asian identity and concrete action toward Asian 
cooperation are creating a new and healthy pattern of international relationships in the 
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region”. This reflects how the US understands the logic of identity to operate in a more 
general sense, as a co-constitutive feature of foreign policy practice.  The report observes, 
facilitated by US policy, that “despite its troubled past, Asia's future is rich in promise. That 
promise has been nurtured in part by America's participation”.862 The third point of reference 
with regards to Asia that the report clarifies is that “while we will maintain our interests in 
Asia and the commitments that flow from them, the changes taking place in that region enable 
us to change the character of our involvement”.863 This sense of change does not imply that 
the logics I describe fundamentally change as they can be emphasised in different ways and 
allow for a variety of practices within certain conditions.  
The report sets out the Nixon administration’s understanding of the logic of capital. It states, 
“peace has an economic dimension. In a world of independent states and interdependent 
economies, failure to collaborate is costly in political as well as economic terms”. To the 
Nixon administration, the logic of capital is embedded within US foreign policy or rather, 
“good U.S. economic policy is good U.S. foreign policy”.  The logic of capital as now 
understood by the US leads the report to the argument that “the preeminent role that we play 
in the world economy gives us a special responsibility”.864 This responsibility was premised 
on improving the conditions for free trade. The report argues that “freer trade among all 
nations provides greater economic benefits for each nation. It minimizes potential political 
frictions as well. These conclusions are truer today than ever before, as the growing 
interdependence of the world economy creates new opportunities for productive exchange. 
But growing interdependence also means greater reliance by each nation on all other 
nations”.865 The logic of capital, now encapsulates more than just the search for foreign 
markets, but the imperatives of maintaining the capitalist economic system as it lead to 
increasing interdependence. Essentially the unilateral tendencies of earlier conceptions of the 
logic of capital in US foreign policy no longer suited the global economic conditions the US 
now inhabited. 
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The report set out the significance of subjective experience in state foreign policy practices. It 
declared that the “we will regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations 
pursuing their own interests as they perceive these interests, just as we follow our own 
interests as we see them”.  Following this the report described “a second principle we shall 
observe in negotiating with the Communist countries relates to how these negotiations should 
be conducted how they should be judged by peoples on both sides anxious for an easing of 
tensions”.866 This was a recognition that the USSR and China acted out of a sense of what 
their interests were, rather than being beholden to an ideology as implied by previous 
Presidential statements regarding the will to global expansion. 
This is most significant here for the specific remarks with regards to China. The report 
admired China declaring, “the Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain 
isolated from the international community”.  Within the logic of geopolitics and the US desire 
for a stable geopolitical order, the report speculated that “in the long run, no stable and 
enduring international order is conceivable without the contribution of this nation of more 
than 700 million people”.867 The international system as perceived by the US, would soon 
come to need China to secure its own reproduction. China, despite it recent pariah status in 
US foreign policy, was not just perceived as necessary to the reproduction of US capital as 
was the case under the likes of McKinley and Taft, but was envisioned as necessary to the 
reproduction of the global economic system. 
Demonstrating a publically more nuanced understanding of China then most previous 
administrations, the report considered how “Chinese foreign policy reflects the complexity of 
China's historical relationships with the outside world. While China has the longest unbroken 
history of self-government in the world, it has had little experience in dealing with other 
nations on a basis of equal sovereignty”. Nixon’s administration was in this way positioning 
US foreign policy as exhibiting what might be considered a logic of understanding or 
reciprocity, similar in nature to some ideas professed by Wilson. This was a formative attempt 
to think about how China might perceive the world and recognition that the US should take 
this into account. A tacit recognition that perspective and subjectivity are important when 
thinking about how states behave in the world. Continuing this historical sensitivity, the 
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report described how China, “predominant in Asia for many centuries, these gifted and 
cultured people saw their society as the centre of the world. Their tradition of self imposed 
cultural isolation ended abruptly in the Nineteenth Century, however, when an internally 
weak China fell prey to exploitation by technologically superior foreign powers”.868 China 
was again a victim of colonial exploitation. This sense of historical sensitivity led to the major 
conclusion that “the history inherited by the Chinese Communists, therefore, was a 
complicated mixture of isolation and incursion, of pride and humiliation. We must recall this 
unique past when we attempt to define a new relationship for the future”.869 China then, was 
granted agency in a manner that the US had refused since the Communist revolution and after. 
Despite the report outlining the potential for reconciliation, it made sure to emphasise how the 
logic of identity underpinned a perception of significant differences between the US and 
China. It argued that the US could not “underestimate the gulf of ideology…or the apparent 
differences in interests and how we interpret world events”. The highlighting of interpretation 
was a key theme of the report as it indicated an awareness that states do not approach the 
world from some objective viewpoint. The report maintained that “while America has historic 
ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict, 
we must recognize the profound gulf of suspicion and ideology”.870 Significantly, the report 
aimed at establishing the discursive potential for reconciliation as it acknowledged that US 
“policy is not likely soon to have much impact on China's behaviour, let alone its ideological 
outlook. But it is certainly in our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and 
the world, that we take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with 
Peking”.871 Rather than compelling China to act, as US foreign policy had done so previously, 
the focus was on creating the conditions of possibility for reconciliation.  
This fostering of reconciliatory conditions did not simply occur discursively as the report 
outlined a number of practical policies the US had implemented to indicate its genuine 
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interest. The report remarked, “we have taken specific steps that did not require Chinese 
agreement but which underlined our willingness to have a more normal and constructive 
relationship”.872 This included easing measures for tourists to purchase Chinese goods and the 
automatic validation of passports for a wider number of groups form journalists to students. 
The report also conveyed a sense of inevitability as it stated how “the resumption of talks with 
the Chinese in Warsaw may indicate that our approach will prove useful. These first steps 
may not lead to major results at once, but sooner or later Communist China will be ready to 
re-enter the international community”.873 This sense of inevitability was tempered by the US 
desire to foster more likely conditions for rapprochement. The report though made a curious 
claim that the US’s “desire for improved relations is not a tactical means of exploiting the 
clash between China and the Soviet Union. We see no benefit to us in the intensification of 
that conflict, and we have no intention of taking sides”.874 This was despite the basis of a new 
approach to US foreign policy being premised on the widening divisions between the USSR 
and China in terms of global communism, and constituted an example of the influence of the 
logic of geopolitics than Nixon had previously tried to distance himself from. 
The following year in a radio address outlining the second annual report on February 25th 
1971, Nixon repeated the intention of re-establishing relations with China. He declared that 
the US “will search for consecutive discussions with Communist China while maintaining our 
defence commitment to Taiwan. When the Government of the People's Republic of China is 
ready to engage in talks, it will find us receptive to agreements that further the legitimate 
national interests of China and its neighbours”.875 The speculative nature of US interest Asia 
was clear as the report indicated that, “In Asia, we can see tomorrow's world in microcosm. 
An economically powerful democratic free nation, Japan, is seeking new markets; a 
potentially powerful Communist nation, China, will one day seek new outlets and new 
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relations”.876 This future speculation was articulated through the logic of capital where it was 
markets and outlets that interested the US. 
The second annual report on US foreign policy presented by the Nixon administration to 
Congress expanded on many of the arguments of the first one. It emphasised the 
disappearance of “the conditions which have determined the assumptions and practice of 
United States foreign policy since 1945”.877 In a statement that contradicted some of the 
administration’s previous remarks about not seeking to exploit a communist schism, the 
report stated how “one of the deepest conflicts in the world today is between Communist 
China and the Soviet Union… Around the globe, East and West, the rigid bipolar world of the 
1940's and 1950's has given way to the fluidity of a new era of multilateral diplomacy”.878 
More precisely the report outlined how “the change in the strategic relationship calls for new 
doctrines. That the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different 
challenges and new opportunities”.879 China then, primarily through the logic of geopolitics 
was imagined as one of these opportunities. 
The report also expanded on the importance of identity to US foreign policy. It asserted, 
“America has always had a belief in a purpose larger than itself. Two centuries ago our 
mission was to be a unique exemplar of free government. Two decades ago it was to take up 
worldwide burdens of securing the common defence, economic recovery, and political 
stability”.880 This sense of purpose is characterised by the logic of identity, where the US is 
determined to act in a way that appears to transcend interests that emerge from the logic of 
capital and of geopolitics. Reflecting on the Nixon Doctrine, the report qualified that it 
“recognised that the Doctrine, like any philosophic attitude, is not a detailed design”.881 In this 
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manner, the Nixon Doctrine was a combination of various logics reflecting an approach rather 
than as the report phrases it, “a detailed design”. Compounding this was the remark that “in 
this case ambiguity is increased since [the Doctrine] is given full meaning through a process 
that involves other countries”.882 The logics then, especially the logic of identity only become 
fully realised through the US encounter with the other. 
The report also echoed previous statements when it affirmed the US axiom that “Asia and the 
Pacific region lie at the heart of the task of creating a stable structure of world peace”.883 Asia, 
the Pacific, and China as previously indicated were constructed as necessary to the 
reproduction and stability of the international order. This significance was indicated by the 
account that “since the Second World War, it is only in this region that developments have 
impelled America to send her sons to war. Asia and the Pacific includes territories of the 
seven most populous and the three wealthiest powers, with all that implies for the vital nature 
of their interests”. The logic of capital, and the promise that Asia held, revealed the 
significance of the region to US foreign policy. Ultimately report described the US as “a 
Pacific power ourselves, our security and economic interests are inextricably involved with 
the future of Asia”.884  The logic of geopolitics, capturing this geographical imagining of US 
disposition, the logic of capital and the sense of identity as a “Pacific power” compelled and 
legitimised US foreign policy towards Asia. 
Signifying a moment of change in international politics, the report declared how “a new Asia 
is emerging”. This sense of change was to be met by the Nixon Doctrine, which according to 
the report was “only the beginning of the adjustment of the American role to an era in which 
the last vestiges of the post-war period will be gone”.885 For the US then, the report stated that 
“it is therefore essential to our national wellbeing that we accept the truth and that our policies 
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reflect the fact that an era has ended in Asia”.886 The reconfiguration of US foreign policy was 
intended to create the space for reconciliation in Asia. The report called for a reassessment of 
how Asia featured in the US imagination. It described how “for several decades, our approach 
to Asia has been rooted in conceptions, once valid, but now increasingly overtaken by 
time”.887 The significance of time in this regard suggests an increasing lag between US 
discourse of Asia and China, and their relation to changing material circumstances. The 
previously valid conceptions were more appropriate to the post WWII world where Asia was 
viewed as generally fragile and unstable. The report makes this clear observing that the 
conceptions “stemmed from our experiences, for World War II and its aftermath served to 
dramatize the fragility of Asia, and nowhere was the menace of the cold war more strongly 
evident”.888 This fragility was related to the parochial recognition of the emergence of Asian 
identities as the report claimed, “Asian nations now generally have a strong and confident 
sense of their own national identity and future”.889 This suggested that the US perceived Asia 
as a place with no meaningful identity to enable action and considerations of the future. It was 
not so much that the logics of US foreign policy towards China needed to be modified but 
their implementation with regards to the material world needed to be reassessed. 
The report outlined how the US envisioned a new structure of international order in Asia. It 
claimed, “in restructuring our own posture, we have set in train the readjustment of the whole 
international order in the Pacific region”. How the geopolitical order of things in Asia was 
understood, was to undergo a US lead rearrangement. Reflecting on this, the report described 
how “in the past twenty years the American people have sacrificed much, both in blood and 
treasure, to help set the stage where such a structure can be created in the Pacific region. It is 
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now in sight”.890 This general outline of US thinking bout Asia through the logic of 
geopolitics turned towards a more specific discussion on how this related to China. 
China was still an unresolved problem, but this problem was no longer the issue of 
threatening Asia or Communist expansion, but one of alienation from the US. This alienation 
was framed around the logic of capital and the potential of China’s large population. The 
report  “Communist China must expose herself to contact with the outside world… The 
twenty two year old hostility between ourselves and the People's Republic of China is another 
unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of the fact that it determines our relationship with 
750 million talented and energetic people”.891 The report stylised this around the “truism that 
an international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it 
and hostile toward it”. Curiously, the international order, could not secure its existence and 
reproduction if it excluded such a state of significant economic potential. The report’s attempt 
to further make the space for rapprochement can be seen in the following declaration that “in 
this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the 
People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and 
particularly with the rest of Asia”.892 This implication of “world community” alluded to the 
logic of identity in US foreign policy with regards to an international order of civility. 
One of the more significant contributions of the report was its historical sensitivity to China’s 
historical experience. In this regard it displayed a recognition akin to more contemporary 
critical analysis on China by William Callahan and his arguments regarding the role that 
humiliation discourses play in guiding China’s foreign policy thinking.893 In full the report 
recognises that: 
“China's long historical experience weighs heavily on contemporary Chinese foreign policy. China 
has had little experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations. For 
centuries China dominated its neighbours, culturally and politically. In the last 150 years it has 
been subjected to massive foreign interventions. Thus, China's attitude toward foreign countries 
retains elements of aloofness, suspicion, and hostility. Under Communism these historically shaped 
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attitudes have been sharpened by doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than 
followed as principles in foreign relations”.894 
Embedded in this recognition though was a trope of immaturity where China had “little 
experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations”, though the 
colonial powers were as responsible for this as China was. This was a clear attempt to 
understand China’s foreign policy actions in a way that respected the subjective constitution 
of interests even if it was patronising in its judgement.  
The report also restated the dubious claim, as remarked above in light of some of Nixon’s 
other statements, that  “We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the hostility between the 
Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any. We will do nothing to sharpen that 
conflict nor to encourage it. It is absurd to believe that we could collude with one of the 
parties against the other”. Again this statement was qualified by the remarks that “at the same 
time, we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR to dictate our policies and 
conduct toward the other”.895 These attempts to underplay the logic of geopolitical thinking of 
the Nixon administration were undermined by the previous statements regarding the on going 
split between China and the USSR with regards to communism as a global movement. This 
became increasingly evident in the following observation that: 
“The Soviet Union wishes to see our influence diminished, and yet fears that diminution as 
enhancing the possibility of expanded Chinese influence. At the same 'time, it has to consider that a 
lesser American influence could contribute to a normalization of relations between ourselves and 
Mainland China, and might permit and encourage a focus of Chinese energies not possible under 
the present realities”.896 
The US was essentially aware of its emerging position to foster discord between the two 
communist states. This kind of reasoning is one of the more conventional ways that the logic 
of geopolitics underpinned US foreign policy in a general sense where it engaged with who 
might be pitted against who for US gain.  
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In one of the report’s more declarative statements, it made clear that for the US, “We are 
prepared to establish a dialogue with [Beijing]”.897 There was also a commendable degree of 
nuance to the US position. With regards to initiating dialogue with China the report clarified 
the limits of US compromise, “we cannot accept its ideological precepts, or the notion that 
Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on 
China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests. The evolution of 
our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own 
commitments”.898 The potential engagement with China then was to occur within the 
international conditions shaped by the US. There was a definitive statement of Nixon’s intent 
as he stated, “I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People's 
Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations”.899 Nixon was determined 
to consider how the US “might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these 
opportunities” and that the US would “hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, 
reciprocity”.900 The report outlined how through the logic of capital the US became interested 
in re-establishing relations with China and that this could potentially be done via the logic of 
geopolitics. 
In an interview on April 16th 1971, Nixon reflected on his desire to open up relations with 
China. He recalled how he “wrote an article for Foreign Affairs…which I pointed out that we 
could not have what will be by the end of the century a billion of the most creative and able 
people in the world isolated from the world and that whoever was President of the United 
States had to develop a policy which would bring the isolation of a billion Chinese from the 
rest of the world to an end”.901 I was not entirely clear if the Chinese were seen as consumers, 
or producers, or other economic agents, but it was apparent that China and its people held 
some kind of speculative importance in US foreign policy. Nixon declared that “the long 
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range goal of this Administration…must be two things: one, a normalization of the relations 
between the Government of the United States and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China, and two, the ending of the isolation of Mainland China from the world community”.902 
China was thus, an increasingly important feature of how the US conceptualised international 
politics. Alluding to the potential shift in international dynamics, Nixon would declare, 
“America and Mainland China, after more than 20 years of hostility and isolation, are 
beginning to move toward a new and more normal relationship”.903 This sense of normality, 
implied a kind of abnormal estrangement between the US and China in the post WWII world. 
Describing the invitation of a future visit China Nixon made the case that “our action in 
seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of 
our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all 
nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's enemy”.904 He 
presented the rationale for doing this in an interview with Dan Rather of CBS on January 2nd 
1972. Nixon recalls how earlier in his Presidency he “said then that the United States, looking 
to the future, had to find a way to open communications with the leaders of 750 million 
people who lived in Mainland China, and so the long process began”.905 Importantly, Nixon 
alluded to a sense of geopolitical inevitability present in US-China relations when he argued 
that “this trip, of course, will have as its major purpose setting up that long dialogue which 
may avert what would otherwise be an inevitable clash”.906 It appeared in this line of 
reasoning that US interest was being determined by the logic of geopolitics despite constant 
references to the larger Chinese population. 
Nixon also maintained a line of reasoning through the logic of identity that there were 
significant philosophical differences between the US and China. Nixon stated that “the 
differences that we have with those great powers, their governments that is, is not because we 
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do not know them or they know us, but because we do know them and they know us. The 
philosophic gulf is enormous. It will continue”.907 If the philosophic gulf were to continue as 
he predicted, his previous statements implied that the logic of identity and its emphasis on 
constitution via processes of differentiation, could be overcome by other concerns. 
In a speech entitled the “Industrial World Ahead” given on February 7th 1972, Nixon made 
clear the continued importance of the logic of capital in US foreign policy. These remarks 
offer a useful light within which to understand his previous statements regarding China’s 
potential importance to the future of Asia. Nixon described how “nations never stand still. 
They go forward or they fall backward. Other nations in the world today are going forward 
some of them rapidly forward. And America has to exert itself, we have to be at our very best, 
if we are to remain competitive in the world”.908 The logic of capital not only exerted an 
expansionary pressure on US foreign policy, but a sense of forward motion on the basis of 
economic prosperity. The logic of capital now also contained the need to “remain 
competitive” in a global context. This sense of capital expansion was by no means limited to 
China. Describing this potential Nixon claimed, “we have the new Europe with Britain in the 
Common Market. We have the Soviet Union...We have Mainland China with all of its 
potential in the future. We have Japan…We have also the future possibilities in Latin 
America, and Asia, the Mideast, and Africa”.909 The world was essentially viewed through the 
logic of capital as constituting a space of potential, and relentless commercial expansion.   
In his address regarding the third annual foreign policy report to congress February 9th 1972, 
Nixon spoke extensively of his China initiative. Outlining the challenge he remarked that 
“when it came to dealing with the People's Republic of China, 25 years of hostility stood in 
the way…We do not expect instant solutions to deep seated differences. But the visit is a 
beginning”.910 Engagement was now going to represent relations rather than exclusion, as 
Nixon observed how “in the relations between our countries, the old exchange of 
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denunciations can be replaced with a constructive exchange of views”.911 This adjustment was 
also to have further geopolitical consequences as Nixon described how “not so long ago, our 
alliances were addressed exclusively to the containment of the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China. But now there has to be more to our alliance. It is fairly simple to unite 
about what you are against. It is a lot more complicated to hold together an alliance on the 
basis of what you are for”.912 These alliances, necessary according to the logic geopolitics, 
had come to have problematic effects on the US economy. In a now prescient concern, Nixon 
argued that “our former dependents have become our competitors…But as the roles change, 
the rules change. The old international monetary and trading system had become unfair to the 
American workers and to American business”.913 The logic of capital, in response to domestic 
economic issues had come to supersede the logic of geopolitics that underpinned US foreign 
policy in the Cold War.914  
The third annual report to Congress from the Nixon administration on US foreign policy 
delivered in 1972 continued on the themes of the previous two. It began by reflecting on “the 
philosophy of a new American foreign policy” which acknowledges “the end of the bipolar 
post-war world” and the “unique opportunity to create a new and last structure of peace”.915 
Its emphasis on the mutability of international politics and the need for US foreign policy to 
take this into account was captured by the following remark, “our enmities are not immutable, 
and we must be prepared realistically to recognize and deal with their cause”.916 It positively 
recorded how with China, the US had “ended a 25 year period of implacable hostility, 
mutually embraced as a central feature of national policy. Fragile as it is, the rapprochement 
between the most populous nation and the most powerful nation of the world could have 
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greater significance for future generations than any other measure…taken this year”.917 China 
then, contained future potential as imagined through the logic of geopolitics and the logic of 
capital. 
The report presented the Nixon administration’s narrative of US-China relations and their 
historical evolution. It recalled how “the earliest Sino-American contacts developed in the 
early 1800'S. At that time the ancient Chinese empire, secure and preeminent, was just 
beginning the painful process of adapting itself to the outside world”.918 This historical 
awareness continued as it referred to how the Chinese “were exploited by technologically 
superior foreign powers”. This was also an attempt by the Nixon administration to positively 
position the US as although “isolationist and bending its energies to national development 
favoured the territorial integrity of China; but our ‘open door’ doctrine of equal treatment for 
all foreigners carried ambiguity in Chinese eyes”.919 In an attempt to signal an awareness of 
China’s historical predicament, the report outlined how “the Communist leaders thus inherited 
a tradition marked by both pride and humiliation; the Chinese experience had not been one of 
dealing with the outside world as equals but one of their Chinese superiority or foreign 
exploitation”.920 In this manner, China’s experience appeared as tangible to the Nixon 
administration, rather than the consequences of some tyrannical ideology. This sensitivity to 
Chinese history was also marked by a new respect in general for China as Nixon recalled how 
in “1970, in a toast to visiting President Ceausescu of Romania, I deliberately used Peking's 
official title, ‘the People's Republic of China’. This was the first time an American President 
had ever done so”.921 
The sense of changing geopolitical considerations also returned as a theme. The US had 
“perceived the Communist countries, including China, as a monolithic bloc with central 
direction. Today, two and a half decades after the war, new realities are reflected in a new 
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American approach to foreign policy”.922 To Nixon this new reality constituted a significant 
restructuring of international politics. He remarked, “in January 1969 I entered office 
convinced that a new policy toward the People's Republic of China was an essential 
component of a new American foreign policy”.923 To put the issue concisely, Nixon declared 
that was “in America's interest, and the world's interest, that the People's Republic of China 
play its appropriate role in shaping international arrangements that affect its concerns”.924 
China was no longer to be excluded form the international system but to contribute to its 
functioning and reproduction.   
The report made reference to the Republic of China and US regret that the Peoples’ Republic 
of China had been awarded China’s seat in the UN.  Despite this, it maintained the US 
position that “the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for 
the United States to decide. A peaceful resolution of this problem by the parties would do 
much to reduce tension in the Far East”.925 Evident here was the manner in which the 
imperatives of the logics of capital and geopolitics regarding the US relationship with 
Mainland China were more important than the logic of identity. 
Setting out the principles of engagement the report made clear how the US was “confident 
that a peaceful and prospering China is in our own national interest” and was “assured that 
peace in Asia and the fullest measure of progress and stability in Asia and in the world require 
China's positive contribution”.926 China then had something to offer the US more generally as 
a prosperous country, and was necessary to a stable geopolitical order in Asia. If China was 
perceived through a geopolitical framing, rapprochement was also rendered significant 
through the logic of capital. 
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In detailing the expanding trade with Communist countries the report alluded to a Taft like 
understanding of the logic of capital.  The emphasis of this logic was very much orientated 
towards the future as the report considers how “although trade with these nations is less than 
one percent of our exports at present, they are an important potential market for our products. 
As relations have improved, trade has grown. As the former continues, so will the latter”.927 
The logic of capital in this regard is seen as part of a positive feedback loop with improving 
relations. To summarise the US position, the report stated, “a continuing and consistent policy 
of this Administration has been to encourage the China to play a constructive role in the 
community of nations”.928 This sense of community and being constructive reflected the logic 
of identity where China should become productive member of the international system.   
During a toast to Zhou En-Lai in Beijing on February 21st 1972, Nixon revealed the 
contingent relevance of the logic of identity in US foreign policy towards China. He reflected 
on US-China relations remarking, “we have at times in the past been enemies. We have great 
differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend 
those differences”.929 Any sense of difference as recognised through the logic of identity 
could be relegated to the imperatives of the logic of capital or of geopolitics. Nixon appeals 
Zhou through a rejection of historical geopolitical violations of China by colonial powers. He 
proclaims that “there is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the 
other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our 
hands and rule the world”.930 Enmity to Nixon is not an inevitable condition between the US 
and China and this reflects the malleability of the three logics I describe. Although they exert 
certain pressures they can also be adapted and reconfigured by particular presidents. 
In a radio address on foreign policy given on November 4th 1972, Nixon speaks of a 
“structure of peace” which for him reflects an “important truth about the nature of peace in 
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today's world. Peace cannot be wished into being”.931 Peace for Nixon, was a process. A 
process that had to be: 
“carefully and painstakingly built in many ways and on many fronts, through networks of alliances, 
through respect for commitments, through patient negotiations, through balancing military forces 
and expanding economic interdependence, through reaching one agreement that opens the way to 
others, through developing patterns of international behaviour that will be accepted by other 
powers”.932  
This reflection on the geopolitical basis for peace was commensurate with Nixon’s initiatives 
to re-evaluate how the US thought about China.  
Nixon would extensive discuss some of the precepts of the logic of geopolitics as it relates to 
the ‘balance of power’. He described how “those who scoff at balance of power diplomacy 
should recognize that the only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power, and 
history shows that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance”.933  
For Nixon it was “precisely the fact that the elements of balance now exist that gives us a rare 
opportunity to create a system of stability that can maintain the peace, not just for a decade 
but for a generation and more”.934 Nixon here is outlining the manner in which the logics of 
geopolitics is aimed at establishing the conditions for either the logics of capital or identity to 
function.  
7.3 Carter and the End of Alienation 
Jimmy Carter’s Presidency marked the restoration of official diplomatic recognition between 
the US and China. This effectively brought to an end the official alienation of China from the 
US. Carter prioritised the logic of capital as championed China’s economic reforms, while 
introducing the discourse of human rights into US concerns about China. The logic of identity 
then was more important for Carter than Nixon, even if it did not significantly affect how the 
US acted towards China. What Carter valued most though, was what the US saw as a 
movement towards modernisation by China, specifically in terms of its economic reforms. 
In a speech welcoming the visit of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Jimmy Carter observed that 
under his and Premier Hua Guofeng’s leadership that China had “begun to move boldly 
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toward modernisation”.935 China had “chosen to broaden your cultural, trade, and diplomatic 
ties with other nations”.936 Modernisation in this regard meant assimilation into the 
international system. This modernisation was also perceived through the logic of identity 
where China was perceived as continually falling short of US expectations. In an address to 
the American people on February 2nd 1977, Carter for instance, emphasised how the US “will 
continue to express our concern about violations of human rights, as we have during this past 
week, without upsetting our efforts toward friendly relationships with other countries”.937 
What is notable is that despite the significance of the logic of identity to Carter, it did not 
supersede the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China. 
Speaking on June 22nd 1977, Carter located the logic of identity as fundamental to US foreign 
policy and conception of itself. He declared, “the human rights issue is one that I consider to 
be of crucial importance. I think it re-establishes our country as kind of a beacon light for 
something that's right and decent and proper and humane and compatible with the basic 
concepts on which our country was founded 200 years ago”.938  The logic of identity was an 
apparent key configuration in Carter’s foreign policy vision, but with regards to China, it 
remained mostly secondary in influence. 
In an address on US-China diplomatic relations on December 15th 1978 concerning a joint 
Communiqué, Carter made stated the basis for the US understanding of the One China policy. 
The statement embodied clarity and ambiguity as the US recognised One China but remained 
discursively ambivalent with regards to the issue of who exactly was sovereign over that One 
China.939  Carter remarked that “the Government of the United States of America 
acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of 
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China”.940 What Carter was more concerned with though was how improved relations with 
China would improve US commercial interests and the geopolitical stability in Asia. He 
described how “normalization—and the expanded commercial and cultural relations that it 
will bring—will contribute to the wellbeing of our own Nation, to our own national interest, 
and it will also enhance the stability of Asia”.941 Again, the logics of capital and geopolitics 
featured prominently. 
In a welcoming ceremony for Deng Xiaoping on January 29th 1979, Carter considered how 
the US and China could foster the conditions for peace in Asia. He declared that   “the United 
States of America has major interests in the Asian and in the Pacific regions. We expect that 
normalisation of relations between our two countries will help to produce an atmosphere in 
the Asian and Pacific area in which the right of all peoples to live in peace will be 
enhanced”.942 Later, Carter would emphasise how “a strong and secure China which 
contributes constructively to world affairs is in our interest, and a globally engaged, confident, 
and strong America is, obviously, in China's interest”.943 This interest in encouraging China to 
become more involved in international politics reflected the concerns of the logics of capital 
and geopolitics in US foreign policy. 
Speaking on June 21st 1979, Carter invoked the logics of capital and of geopolitics again 
stating that US “policy toward East Asia is based on several consistent principles designed to 
maintain stability, further prosperity, and take account of changes occurring in the region”.944 
He also invoked the geographical imagining of the US as a Pacific power as contained within 
the logic of geopolitics as a status he desired to maintain, for Carter this meant that “the basic 
ingredients of that policy are well known to you: American determination to remain actively 
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involved as a Pacific power”.945 The reproduction of the imperatives of the logic of 
geopolitics exerted a significant influence then, on how Carter understood US interests in 
Asia. 
In his State of the Union address on January 23rd 1980, Carter reflected on a sense of 
friendship between the US and China that he had fostered. He presented US efforts to 
improve relations with China as contributing to peace and stability in Asia, but framed these 
efforts through the logic of identity where it was friendship that had been attained. He 
described how for the US “we've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep 
commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with 
much of the Third World”.946 Specifically, the US “decision to normalise relations with the 
People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the 
Western Pacific”.947 The success of normalising relations with China was in this event framed 
through the logic of geopolitics as well. 
Carter would explicitly emphasise China’s importance through the logic of capital in one of 
his last remarks on their relations. At a signing ceremony for various US China maritime 
agreements on September 17th 1980, Carter declared that “for the first time in more than 30 
years, all United States ports will be open to Chinese merchant ships and American ships will 
have access to all Chinese ports of call. This will mean a stronger American maritime 
industry”.948 The significance of geopolitical access was for how it would “mean revenue for 
United States shippers from the growing Chinese market for American goods, and growing 
trade and commerce will benefit the people of both China and the United States”.949 The 
normalisation of US-China relations then was rendered as beneficial for its geopolitical and 
economic potential even if Carter at times emphasised the general importance of human rights 
and the logic of identity in US foreign policy. 
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7.4 Reagan 
Ronald Reagan’s China policy is regularly characterised by his disdainful reference to China 
as “so-called communists” due to the perception of a changing political system and how US 
businesses were beginning to transfer manufacturing to China.950 His attitude to China would 
move from more aggressive to conciliatory through his Presidency. Significantly, his 
Presidency would return to the early 20th century myth of the China market as being a 
potential source of expanding prosperity for the US economy.  
In his address to members of the British Parliament on June 8th 1982, Reagan exhibited the 
logic of identity in juxtaposing the civilised and peaceful identity of the West with the 
imperial recklessness of the Communists. He considered that:  
“historians looking back at our time will note the consistent restraint and peaceful intentions of the 
West. They will note that it was the democracies who refused to use the threat of their nuclear 
monopoly in the forties and early fifties for territorial or imperial gain. Had that nuclear monopoly 
been in the hands of the Communist world, the map of Europe - indeed, the world would look very 
different today”.951 
Exemplifying the logic of identity, the Chinese were implicitly understood as the corollary 
other within the binary that Reagan was celebrating between a virtuous democratic West and 
a reckless Communist world. 
In a joint Communiqué with China on US arms sales to Taiwan August 17th 1982, the US 
made clear that it “recognised the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole 
legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one 
China and Taiwan is part of China”.952  Continuing, the communiqué affirmed that within this 
“context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain 
cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, 
relations between the United States and China were normalised”.953 This constituted the 
lasting formula for the US in thinking about the geopolitical issue of Taiwan’s status in 
regards to China. In a statement of clarifying ambiguity, The US attached “great importance 
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to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursing a 
policy of ‘Two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’”.954 This essentially constituted a deferral 
of the resolution, where traditional conceptions of sovereignty where displaced by a non-
specific answer, displaced in to some indeterminate future. The logic of capital and the logic 
of geopolitics would in this sense, permit the existence this tension in the name of stability 
and economic prosperity. 
In a statement regard arms sales to Taiwan and US-China relations on August 17th 1982, 
Reagan emphasised that “building a strong and lasting relationship with China has been an 
important foreign policy goal of four consecutive American administrations. Such a 
relationship is vital to our long term national security interests and contributes to stability in 
East Asia”.955 The contemporary configuration of US foreign policy towards China then is 
dated back to the Nixon administration even if the organising logics can be traced back much 
further as I throughout this thesis. Emphasising the logic of geopolitics, Reagan declared that 
“it is in the national interest of the United States that this important strategic relationship be 
advanced. This communiqué will make that possible, consistent with our obligations to the 
people of Taiwan”.956 The US was not to maintain an uneasy balance between tis obligations 
to Taiwan, which rested on the need for credibility through the logic of identity and its 
interests with China rendered through the logic of capital and of geopolitics. Reagans here 
would also touch on another source of tension within the logic of capital as he was wary of 
Chinese textile imports flooding the domestic US market but while maintaining the desire to 
secure export benefits for farming surpluses to the China.957 
When welcoming Premier Zhao Ziyang to the US on January 10th 1984, Reagan spoke 
admirably of China’s on-going modernisation. He declared that China had “now embarked on 
an exciting experiment designed to modernize the economy and quadruple the value of its 
national economic output by the year 2000…we welcome the opportunity to walk at China’s 
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side in this endeavour”.958 Signifying the benefits of the US-China relationship through the 
logic of capital Reagan described how in “the last few years, each of our countries has tried to 
help the other build a better life. Our trade has flourished. The United States is now China's 
third largest trading partner. American investment in China exceeds that of all other 
countries”.959 During a toast for Zhao’s visit, Reagan celebrated what he called “the rebirth of 
China’s economy”.960 He announced how the US had “been watching with interest and 
admiration your efforts to modernise by offering incentives to your people in stimulating 
economic competition. We have been pleased to contribute what we could as you expand the 
vistas of economic opportunity for the Chinese people”.961 China was thus, considered as 
engaging with a more general neoliberal rationality concerning primarily though not only, the 
expansion of free markets and reducing government intervention in the market while this 
process was being seen as a success through the logic of capital in US foreign policy.962 
Reagan also commented positively on the US’s involvement in helping China modernise and 
become more attuned to US economic practices.  In regards to two further trade agreements 
he described how “China is now engaged in a vast modernisation program, and this agreement 
will encourage further cooperation between our countries, especially in those industrial 
sectors on which China has placed a top priority”. The logic of capital in US foreign policy 
towards China was reflected in Reagans remark that “American knowhow and investment 
should prove invaluable in these endeavours, and this accord will stimulate participation by 
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our private sector in China”.963 The US would now become economically involved in the 
development of China’s economy. 
While speaking at a meeting of Asian and Pacific-American leaders on February 23rd 1984, 
Reagan drew on the speculative imaginings of a promising future in Asia. He stated, “when 
we look toward that great and grand Pacific Basin, there's a promising future there, as 
well…it's not all foreign policy; America is part of the Pacific. There's Hawaii, American 
Samoa, Guam, the soon to be commonwealth status of the Northern Mariana Islands”.964 
Although US Presidents had previously made the case that the US was a Pacific power, 
Reagan spoke explicitly of US territories when invoking this sentiment. The Pacific was 
again, constructed through the three logics of capital, identity and geopolitics as a potentially 
lucrative space for the US future. 
Reagan was more explicit in an interview with Chinese journalists on trip to China on April 
16th 1984. He commented, “I know it has been my thinking for a long time that the United 
States is truly a nation of the Pacific Basin. And certainly the largest and most important state 
in that Pacific Basin is the People's Republic of China”.965 Reagan’s point was that the US 
and China could cooperate for mutual benefit, he stated, I “believe that the entire Pacific 
Basin is the world's future. It is the fastest growing area. And we can cooperate in some of the 
modernisation that is going on in industry in the People's Republic”.966 This cooperation was 
not just within the immediate framing of the logic of capital and of geopolitics but Reagan 
attempted to frame a continuous of period of “friendship”. He remarked that “we have a long 
history of friendship between our two peoples. It began 200 years ago when an American 
clipper ship visited China and trade began…And I think the future in trade and development 
for both of us holds out a great promise for our people”.967 The logic of identity and the 
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notion of friendship were deployed to accentuate how the logic of capital in US foreign policy 
towards China had been conducted in good spirit. As this thesis has shown, this was not 
necessarily the case according to the discourses of previous Presidents. Signifying the 
importance of the logic of capital with regards to the reproduction of the US as political and 
social entity, Reagan made the remark that “the Pacific Basin is one of the fastest growing 
markets for American goods, services, and investments. To a great extent, our nature's future 
is in the Pacific”.968 The logic of capital then, conditioned how the US understood its potential 
future while remaining essential to that future. 
In a speech to Chinese community leaders in Beijing on April 27th 1984, Reagan reiterated 
many of these themes. He declared that “America's door is open to you, and when you walk 
through, we'll welcome you as our neighbours and our friends… America's interest in China, 
our friendship for your people, and our respect for China's many contributions to the progress 
of civilization date back to the beginning of our own history”.969 This sense of continuous US-
China relations accentuated the US concerns for the logic of capital. This was especially 
evident in Reagan’s recounting of the first encounter as being embedded in the early new US 
republic’s logic of capital. Regan described how “back in 1784, when the first American 
trading ship, the Empress of China, entered your waters, my country was unknown to you. 
We were a new republic, eager to win a place in international commerce”.970 The encounter 
between the US and China occurred through the imperatives of the logic of capital.  
Reagan also drew on Ulysses Grant, discussed in Chapter 4, when signalling the potential for 
China’s future.971 He narrated how “A little over a century ago, Ulysses S. Grant, who was 
then a former President, visited your country and saw China's great potential. ‘I see dawning . 
. .’ Grant wrote, ‘the beginning of a change. When it does come, China will rapidly become a 
powerful and rich nation . . . The population is industrious, frugal, intelligent, and quick to 
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learn’”.972 Grant rendered China’s potential in economic terms, reflecting Reagan’s 
contemporary interest in China. In this sense, Reagan spoke approvingly of Deng’s early 
economic reforms commenting on China’s “commitment to attract capital and scientific 
knowledge to create a high technology base for the future” and how “all this reflects China's 
new role in the international economic community and your determination to modernize your 
economy and raise the standard of living of your people”.973 The logic of capital then very 
much dominated Reagan’s approach to China. 
During a welcoming banquet in Beijing on April 27th, Reagan observed how “as China moves 
forward to modernise and develop its economy, the United States is eager to join in a 
cooperative effort to share the American capabilities that helped turn our country from a vast 
wilderness into an industrial giant”.974 This very much reflected some of Taft’s motivations 
with regards to China, though Reagan was more concerned with assisting the development of  
“a strong China, dedicated to peace” which to Reagans was “clearly…in the best interest of 
international stability and in the best interest of the United States”.975 China was becoming 
increasingly perceived, through the logics of capital and geopolitics, as a necessary ally to US 
regional and global interests. 
The logic of capital, at the heart of Reagan’s China policy, featured again during a speech in 
Beijing April 28th 1984. Recalling Nixon’s diplomatic initiatives, Reagan remarked how “our 
relationship since that time has been a force for peace in the world and will continue to serve 
that end”.976 This geopolitical consideration was perceived as complimentary to the logic of 
capital as Reagan conceived of US-China cooperation as originating when “China and the 
United States recognise[d] that we have many other areas of mutual interest, particularly since 
1978, when Chinese leaders decided to foster the growth of the Chinese economy and open 
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more to the West”.977 The logic of capital for Reagan, then would have a mutually reinforcing 
effect on the US’s geopolitical interests regarding China and international stability.  
Again speaking in Beijing at a dinner with Zhao Ziyang, Reagan touched on the sense of  
“allure” that China had for the US. He described how:  
“the very mention of China holds a sense of allure. It conjures up images of the Yangtze River 
alive with traditional [sailboat] and modern steamers, with the wide deserts of the north, of the 
bamboo forests in the southwest that are home to pandas, golden monkeys, and so many other 
animals native only to China, of the rich, productive fields and farmlands of the east, and of the 
huge cities like Beijing and Shanghai”.978 
This reflected how China featured in the US imagination. This “sense of allure” also 
suggested how despite the emphasis on the logics of capital and of geopolitics, the logic of 
identity constituted a formative component of US foreign policy towards China. That China 
was more than just an economic and geopolitical consideration. Reagan would also emphasis 
the absence of a US desire for territorial expansion. He assured the Chinese that US “aims and 
commitments are fully consistent with the sovereignty, independence, and economic 
development of all nations, including China. [The US] seek[s] no expansion but the expansion 
of good will and opportunity; no victory but the victory of peace”.979 US interest, was very 
much constituted through the logic of capital. 
In a radio address about his trip to China on April 28th 1984, Reagan emphasised the 
economic role that the Pacific would play in the US’s future. He described how his trip 
“demonstrates our awareness of America's responsibility as a Pacific leader in the search for 
regional security and economic wellbeing”.980 Again, identity met capital and geopolitics in 
US imaginations of the Pacific as Reagan also described how “the stability and prosperity of 
this region are of crucial importance to the United States. The nations comprising the Pacific 
Basin represent our fastest growing trading markets. Many say that the 21st century will be 
the century of the Pacific”.981 In one of the few comments regard China’s geopolitical 
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significance with regards to the USSR, Regan explained how “China's efforts to modernize, 
foster the spirit of enterprise, open its doors to the West, and expand areas of mutual 
cooperation while opposing Soviet aggression make it a nation of increasing importance to 
America and to prospects for peace and prosperity in the Pacific”.982 Reagan’s China policies 
were thus motivated by the logics of capital and of geopolitics within the context of the Cold 
War, as well as the US’s other economic and geopolitical concerns. 
Reagan returned to the sense of allure he mentioned previously while speaking at Fudan 
University on April 30th 1984. He stated how “to many Americans, China is still a faraway 
place, unknown, unseen, and fascinating. And we are fascinated”.983 Allure and fascination 
implied a sense of orientalist wonder at China. Reagan also expanded on the differences 
between the US and China, many rendered through the logic of identity. He claimed that 
“there's much that naturally divides us: time and space, different languages and values, 
different cultures and histories, and political systems that are fundamentally different. It 
would be foolish not to acknowledge these differences. There's no point in hiding the truth for 
the sake of a friendship, for a friendship based on fiction will not long withstand the rigors of 
this world”.984 This recognition of divergent concerns reflected the attempts by Johnson and 
Nixon to recognise the China’s sense of agency in international politics.  
Reagan also discussed regional geopolitics as a site where the US and China had aligned 
interests and much in common. He spoke of how “both the United States and China oppose 
the brutal and illegal occupation of Kampuchea. Both the United States and China have stood 
together in condemning the evil and unlawful invasion of Afghanistan. Both the United States 
and China now share a stake in preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula, and we share a 
stake in preserving peace in this area of the world”.985 These similarities extended to more 
general concerns in foreign policy, Regan declared that “neither of us is an expansionist 
power. We do not desire your land, nor you ours. We do not challenge your borders. We do 
not provoke your anxieties. In fact, both the United States and China are forced to arm 
                                                
982 Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on the Trip to China ," April 28, 1984. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39837. 
983 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843. 
984 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843. 
985 Ronald Reagan: "Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, China ," April 30, 1984. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=39843. 
 228 
themselves against those who do”.986 US-China relations then were in this regard, highly 
beneficial with regards to the geopolitics of the region more broadly. 
Speaking on his return from China, Reagan emphasised how he had tried to explain US 
identity as a way of helping the Chinese understand how the US behaves. He remarked, 
“many of the Chinese people still don't understand how our democracy works or what impels 
us as a people. So, I did something unusual. I tried to explain what America is and who we 
are—to explain to them our faith in God and our love, our true love, for freedom. They'll 
never understand us until they understand that”.987 Understanding how US foreign policy was 
predicated on understanding US identity. Even if the logic of identity was not a singular 
motivation in US foreign policy, it was often the register through which US foreign policy 
was rendered and legitimised.  
Responding to written questions from Pacific Magazine on May 4th 1984 Reagan described 
the importance of the Pacific to the US where he:  
“would like to have our administration remembered as one which fully recognized the importance 
of Asia and the Pacific. Focus is shifting increasingly to the Pacific, which is now—as I said 
earlier—the fastest growing economic region of the world… And when we look toward that great 
and grand Pacific Basin, there's a promising future”.988 
He did not use the language of a pivot or rebalance in the manner that the Obama 
administration did, but the discourse was similar. In some ways it might be worthwhile 
considering US foreign policy towards China as one of a perpetual pivoting towards.  
When responding to questions from the Far Eastern Economic Review Reagan again 
reiterated the importance of the Pacific and specifically, China’s approach to foreign capital 
as vital to the US’s future. He repeated how he “happen[ed] to be a believer in the Pacific 
Basin as the place of the future”, but more interestingly he described how “an American once 
said: ‘Go west, young man’. Well, we're still going west”.989 Reagan here is deploying the 
frontier logic exhibited by the US during its 19th century continental expansion. The Pacific 
Ocean and Asia, were portrayed as a natural progression of US expansionary interest even if it 
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was now rendered by more in economic than territorial terms. Reagan was locating US 
geopolitical and economic interests within a logic of geopolitics that finds its origins in the 
origins of the US itself. More specifically Reagan envisioned how “the two biggest nations—
the United States and China—can contribute a great deal to stability in the whole Pacific 
Basin and East Asia”. And that he “was struck by the changes the Chinese are making as part 
of their modernization, including their welcome to outside capital”.990 The ability of China to 
assist in regional geopolitical concerns was premised on its economic stability and 
acquiescence to the US logic of capital.  
In a speech on National Security on February 26th 1986, Reagan reflected on the state of 
anxiety in US politics. He declared the “need to remember where America was 5 years ago. 
We need to recall the atmosphere of that time: the anxiety that events were out of control, that 
the West was in decline, that our enemies were on the march”.991 Anxiety in this sense was 
contingent on the US sense of decline. This was no longer the case according to Reagan and 
he celebrated how the US has “sought to promote prosperity and social progress through a 
free, open, and expanding market-orientated global economy”.992 These initiatives implied 
Regan, reflecting the logic of capital’s imperatives to establish foreign markets had alleviated 
much of US anxiety during the decade. 
In one of his final speeches, at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 
on December 7th 1988, Reagan declared that the US must pursue a “foreign policy based on 
our bedrock principles allows us to offer a practical solution to the suffering peoples of the 
world, a means of achieving prosperity and political stability that all Americans take for 
granted as their birth right”.993 US foreign policy was in this sense grounded in the logic of 
identity and its principles, even if it was shaped and mostly motivated by the logic of capital 
and its subsequent pressures on the logic of geopolitics. He spoke confidently about the 
functioning of the US’s superior political system declaring, “tyranny fails. Freedom works. 
These facts, so little accepted only a decade ago, are now indisputable…The tiny free 
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exchange experiments in the East bloc and the liberalization in the People's Republic of China 
are stunning evidence of the Communist world's desperate efforts to find a way out of the 
economic morass of state socialism”.994 In a succinct statement embodying his general 
approach to foreign policy and politics more broadly Reagan declared that “freedom works, 
and freedom is on the march”.995 Unbeknownst to him, these claims about the world’s politics 
were to be put into question by subsequent events in China that posed a number of issues for 
George H.W. Presidency.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Nixon’s attempts to justify rapprochement with China started to exhibit what could be 
considered a logic of understanding or reciprocity that exists outside of the three major logics 
I have described so far. This was an important formative attempt to take into account how 
China might perceive the world and an acknowledgment that the US should take this into 
account. This was a tacit recognition that perspective and subjectivity are fundamental to 
thinking about how other states act in international politics. This might be something that is 
fairly obvious to the more critically orientated scholars of international politics today, but in 
public statements of US foreign policy towards China, it was a major change to previous 
understandings.  
For the most part, Nixon channelled the logic of capital in his public statements regarding the 
need for rapprochement with China as he often indicated that US attempts to re-establish 
official relations with China were not about geopolitical manoeuvring with regards to the 
USSR. As I have indicated though he would also subtly contradict this claim on a regular 
basis. Carter’s contribution to the genealogy was to introduce the issue of human rights in to 
the logic of identity, a modern incarnation of the civilising discourses of the previous century. 
His discourses on China though would ultimately prioritise the logic of capital. Reagan for 
one, despite some of his initial comments which emphasised the logic of identity as 
distinguishing the US and China would go on to emphasise the logic of capital as the US 
sought to take advantage of the market orientated reforms under way in China. He displayed 
an on-going sense that despite the logic of geopolitics and identity as being increasingly 
significant in US foreign policy towards China, it was the logic of capital that provided the 
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overarching framework for US foreign policy towards China. The lasting effects of these 
reconfigurations of US relations with China and the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics 
are discussed in the following chapter. 
  
 232 
Chapter 8 – 1988-2008: ‘The ‘Rise of China’ 
8.1 Introduction  
As it became clear that the US was going to outlast the disintegrating USSR at the end of the 
Cold War a Soviet political scientist and advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev Georgi Arbatov 
remarked in a speech in California that “Our major secret weapon is to deprive you of an 
enemy”.996  The ‘rise of China’ it would seem would fill the void described by Arbatov. The 
increasing concern in US presidential discourses of what China’s rapidly growing economy 
would mean in relation to the would culminate in Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia and his 
subsequent comparisons of Chinese technological proficiency to the lack of US infrastructure 
development after the 2008 financial crisis.997 The general sentiment of US discourses on 
China described below is captured by Warren Christopher’s comment during his confirmation 
hearings in 1993 when in regards to China he described how US “policy will seek to facilitate 
a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy”.998 The US would deploy the 
three logics of identity, capital and geopolitics to foster and produce a certain kind of China. 
This is similar to a conversation that journalist Ron Suskind recalled having with a senior 
George W. Bush aide. Writing in the New York Times in October 2004,  Suskind outlined a 
conversation where the aide, generally considered to be Karl Rove, captured one of the 
underlying beliefs of the Bush administration, which is applicable to the three logics of 
identity, capital and geopolitics. He recalled: 
“The aide said that guys like me were ‘in what we call the reality-based community’, which he 
defined as people who ‘believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible 
reality’. I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut 
me off. ‘That's not the way the world really works anymore’, he continued. ‘We're an empire now, 
and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, 
as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how 
things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we 
do’.” 999 
Embedded within the logic of geopolitics during the Bush Presidency, was the perception that 
the US created the reality within which it, and everyone else acted and existed in. This 
captures the very manner in which the logics I describe underpin US discourses to the world 
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generally and China specifically. The logics compel the US to behave in a certain way in 
which to ensure their imperatives and the conditions for their reproduction. The US did not 
just participate in international politics, it perceived it self as manufacturing the conditions 
through which international politics takes place. In this light, the logic of identity situated the 
US outside of the regular political world in which other actors were located where it could 
deploy the logics of capital and identity to produce a world as it saw fit. The significance of 
this is that this is what the hope would come to be with regards to US foreign policy towards 
China.  
This chapter will analyse the discourse of the George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush presidencies. 1000 The 20 years this chapter covers were characterised by a number of 
important political events, the end of the Cold War, Chinese political repression in 
Tiananmen, the US War on Terror and the early period of the 2008 financial crisis. What will 
become evident over the course of this chapter is how under Clinton, the US went from just 
wanting to contribute the democratisation of China, but wanted to China to contribute more to 
the administration of the international order.  
8.2 George H.W. Bush and Tiananmen  
Taking questions from Xinhua news agency February on 16th 1989, George H.W. Bush 
outlined how China offered significant opportunities for exercising the logic of capital. He 
announced, “we should also seek to expand our economic relationship. The opportunities for 
trade and investment between our countries are enormous. We have to find ways of taking 
advantage of them”.1001 China became more explicitly an opportunity that the US needed to 
act on. Although Bush mentioned that “to do this will require efforts on both sides”, he place 
the emphasis on China to reform its behaviour with regards to international trade. For instance 
he stated that “continued steps by China to make its trade practices compatible with those of 
its major trading partners and remove barriers to trade and investment are important if China 
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is to expand commerce and attract capital for its modernisation”. 1002 Bush here was invoking 
the logic of capital in an attempt to demonstrate why China needed to adjust its economic 
policy. 
If China wanted to benefit from international trade, it would have to adapt and as Bush put it, 
modernise. Bush recognised though that the US also had to act to facilitate trade with China, 
remarking “the United States, for its part, must keep its markets open to Chinese exports and 
continue to give China access to advanced technology needed for modernization”.1003 Bush 
would also maintain the continuity of geopolitical inertia with regards to Taiwan affirming 
that, “the United States is committed to abide by the three communiqués of 1972, 1979, and 
1982, which provide a firm basis for the further development of our relations”.1004 The logic 
of capital then remained primary when approaching relations with China despite the 
prevailing importance of the logics of identity and geopolitics for presidential discourses on 
China. 
Speaking in Alaska on February 22nd 1989 before a trip to China, Bush outlined his hope to 
“build on the friendly and stable and enduring relationship that now exists”.1005  Significantly, 
Bush described his visit as “something more than symbolism. That relationship is 
fundamental in any foreign policy equation of the United States. We don't want to take our 
friends for granted be they Japan, be they China, be they Korea”.1006 China was now 
considered a friend, and fundamental to US foreign policy thinking. Despite the remark 
regarding symbolism, Bush would repeat the axiom that “we are a Pacific power, and this 
visit will demonstrate that we tend to stay a Pacific power”.1007 Most important was how 
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China was constructed through the logic of identity as a friend, rather a foe or something to 
contain. 
While in China at a welcoming banquet in Beijing on February 25th 1989, Bush declared to 
the Chinese, “your new and farsighted economic program is already improving the lives of 
the people, as it will for generations to come”.1008 From Bush’s perspective, China seemed to 
assimilating appropriately into the international system, he remarked,  “the expansion of your 
international relationships is also creating new possibilities for peace, prosperity, and world 
leadership, and the United States welcomes the enlarged role that China has taken in the 
world”.1009 The issue of Taiwan, an ever-present area of tension, remained subsidiary to US 
relations with China. Bush announced accordingly that as US policy was “based on the 
bedrock principle that there is but one China, we have found ways to address Taiwan 
constructively without rancour. We Americans have a long, historical friendship with Chinese 
people everywhere”.1010 The overall relationship was framed through the logic of identity and 
a discourse of friendship as China was becoming increasingly seen in a positive light through 
the concerns of the logics of capital and of geopolitics. 
In an interview with journalists in Beijing on February 26th 1989, Bush celebrated what he 
saw as “a worldwide movement toward greater freedom: freedom of human creativity and 
freedom of economic opportunity”.1011 In glowing terms, Bush claimed “we've all begun to 
feel the winds of change sweep us toward an exciting and challenging new century”.  Bush 
saw China through this general movement towards freedom arguing that “China was one of 
the first nations to feel this new breeze, and like a tree in a winter wind, you've learned to 
bend and adapt to new ways and new ideas and reform”. This positive assessment of China 
promised benefits for the logic of capital from a US perspective.  He would argue that, 
“together, we must find political solutions to regional conflicts. We must foster global 
growth”.1012 While remaining concerned with creating the conditions for economic growth, 
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Bush acknowledged the political nature of regional issues, like tensions with North Korea, 
indicating that China could play a positive role in their resolution.  The next day on February 
27th 1989, Bush would make clear that his approach to China featured the imperatives of the 
logics of capital, of geopolitics and of identity remarking that despite his positive assessment 
of the US in Asia, “work is yet to be done: opening foreign markets to U.S. competition, 
continuing to encourage the growth of democracy and human rights, and strengthening of our 
alliances”.1013 
In a speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on March 7th 1989, 
Bush would make clear how the US viewed positively China’s on-going economic reforms, 
and the economic opportunity these offered. He observed how “much of what is occurring in 
the world presents us, I think, with remarkable opportunities. I said China is one. China really 
continues to experiment with free market capitalism”.1014 He was describing what he saw as 
the increasing benefits of technological and economic change that were spreading generally 
throughout the world. The positive manner that Bush had viewed China up until this moment, 
was not to last though as it would be fractured by the political repression that took place in 
Tiananmen Square in mid 1989.  
In some of his first comments on events in Tiananmen Square, given on May 21st 1989, Bush 
declared, “we do support freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press; and 
clearly, we support democracy. I don't want to be gratuitous in giving advice, but I would 
encourage restraint. I do not want to see bloodshed”.1015 His approach to these events were 
characterised by their rendering of the logic of identity as he stated, “I would urge the 
Government to be as forthcoming as possible in order to see more democratization and to see 
a peaceful resolution of this matter”.1016 In the political moment, it was the logic of identity in 
US foreign policy that was being challenged. Bush made clear the US position when he 
remarked, “we aspire to see the Chinese people have democracy, but we do not exhort in a 
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way that is going to stir up a military confrontation”.1017 Bush viewed the protest movement 
forming in Tiananmen as “an enormous expression on the part of many people students and 
others for change, toward movement toward democracy”. Bush would also invoke a level of 
personal reflection not usually offered with regards to China. Invoking his time spent as Chief 
US Liaison Officer in 1975, Bush recalled, “I lived there; I saw a society totally different than 
the one that exists in China today. China has moved, in some areas, towards democracy”.1018 
Despite the predominant expression of US interests in terms of geopolitical and international 
trade, the logic of identity remained an important aspect of US foreign policy practices. 
In a statement, on June 3rd 1989, regarding “Chinese government suppression” Bush declared, 
“I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and the consequent 
loss of life. We have been urging and continue to urge nonviolence, restraint, and dialog. 
Tragically, another course has been chosen”.1019 Bush described how “the United States and 
People's Republic of China over the past two decades have built up through great efforts by 
both sides a constructive relationship beneficial to both countries”. Ultimately he expressed a 
hope that “China will rapidly return to the path of political and economic reform and 
conditions of stability so that this relationship, so important to both our peoples, can continue 
its growth”.1020 Distressed by a disturbance to the logic of identity, Bush would draw attention 
to the US concerns regarding China’s political and economic reforms and their benefits to US 
interests.  
Speaking on June 5th 1989, at the annual meeting of the Business Roundtable, Bush alluded to 
the logic of capital as he made clear that he did not want to disturb business or economic 
relations with China. He exclaimed, “I know that many in this room do what we have 
encouraged you to do business with the People's Republic of China. And I don't want to 
disturb that. I don't want to hurt the very business community in China and here that has 
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moved things forward toward democracy”.1021 The logic of capital as expressed by Bush here 
was seen as having contributing to the imperatives within the logic of identity in US 
imaginations of China. There was a return to the trope of an uncivilised China as Bush 
claimed that he hoped “to convince the leaders of the Chinese military to go back to the policy 
of restraint and negotiation and peace, as opposed to this crushing of the human spirit in 
Tiananmen Square”.1022 China at this moment of crisis was very much rendered through the 
logic of identity even if the logic of capital remained fundamental to US interests in China. 
In a news conference later that day, Bush would expand on the notion of a belligerent 
uncivilised China. He described how “during the past few days, elements of the Chinese 
Army have been brutally suppressing popular and peaceful demonstrations in China. There 
has been widespread and continuing violence, many casualties, and many deaths”.1023 In a 
successful act of balancing the immediate concerns of the logic of identity with the longer 
term imperatives of the logic of capital and of geopolitics Bush would make clear that the US 
“cannot condone the violent attacks and cannot ignore the consequences for our relationship 
with China, which has been built on a foundation of broad support by the American people” 
and the US had to present “a reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long 
term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China”.1024 If the acts of the 
Chinese government were brutal and violent, abhorrent within the logic of identity, this was 
not enough to supersede the logic of capital in the long term.  
The US remained motivated to encourage political change in China. Bush recalled how “the 
budding of democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we 
have developed since 1972. And it's important at this time to act in a way that will encourage 
the further development and deepening of the positive elements of that relationship and the 
process of democratisation”.1025 The US then, remained committed to producing a certain 
kind of China, a democratic and liberal one. The success with which Bush had previously 
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described China’s emergence into the international system, meant that in this context “it 
would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull back to its pre-1972 era of isolation and 
repression”.1026 Bush was effectively, intertwining the logics of identity, capital, and 
geopolitics that revealed the historical US concern in transforming Chinese society so it could 
feature more prominently in the international system in a way the US would approve of.  
The inevitability of this process as understood by the US was evident in Bush’s following 
remarks that “the process of democratisation of Communist societies will not be a smooth 
one, and we must react to setbacks in a way which stimulates rather than stifles progress 
toward open and representative systems”.1027 The logic of identity in this sense, had a 
teleological aspect to it that shaped US imaginations of China. Bush again alluded to this 
sense of teleological destiny when he remarked, “I am convinced that the forces of democracy 
are going to overcome these unfortunate events in Tiananmen Square”.1028 The significance in 
the logic of capital in facilitating the imperatives of the logic of identity were made clear in 
Bush’s considerations that “on the commercial side, I don't want to hurt the Chinese people. I 
happen to believe that the commercial contacts have led, in essence, to this quest for more 
freedom. I think as people have commercial incentive, whether it's in China or in other 
totalitarian systems, the move to democracy becomes more inexorable”.1029 Evident here is 
the manner in which the logic of capital and identity appear to be mutually beneficial to one 
another when the US approached China. 
Bush outlined plainly how he did not wish to return to the state of mutual isolation as a 
response to Chinese actions remarking, “I don't want to see a total break in this relationship, 
and I will not encourage a total break in the relationship”.1030 This again reflected how the US 
was in this sense motivated by the logic of identity as Bush explained how  “when you see 
these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United 
States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadership that might 
decide to crackdown further”. Bush wanted to see the US “stay involved and continue to work 
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for restraint and for human rights and for democracy”. Bush would then affirm that the logic 
of identity provided the conditional foundations for the logic of capital and of geopolitics to 
function with regards to China. He stated that “down the road, we have enormous 
commonality of interests with China, but it will not be the same under a brutal and repressive 
regime…and I would like to encourage them to continue their change”.1031 
Bush would also reflect on what he understood as the Chinese perspective in this moment. He 
argued, “China has historically been less than totally interested in what other countries think 
of their performance. You have to just look back to the Middle Kingdom syndrome. And you 
look back in history when outsiders, including the United States, were viewed as 
barbarians”.1032 This acknowledgement was significant as it not only alluded to the limits of 
US capabilities, but also displayed a sensitivity to China’s past. To Bush, “China, with its 
immense pride and its cultural background and its enormous history of conflict internal and 
external has been fairly independent in setting its course” and he “had the feeling that China 
wants to be a more acceptable in the family of nations”.1033 Bush though would also return to 
the sense of teleological inevitability embedded within his rendering of China. He 
pronounced, “I do think this change is inexorable. It may go a couple of steps forward and 
then take a step back, but it is on the move. The genie will not be put back in the bottle”. This 
“inexorable” change then, could be encouraged by US actions and by the US conceit to know 
China. Bush exemplified this when he remarked “I am trying to take steps that will encourage 
a peaceful change, and yet recognize the fact that China does have great pride in its own 
history. And my recommendations are based on my knowledge of Chinese history”.1034 
Underpinning Bush’s use of the logic of identity to affirm the inevitable developmentof 
political order in this regard is the claim to ‘know’ China and its history. 
It was now that Bush also referred to the logic of geopolitics and the US’s geopolitical 
concerns. He stated, “I will not overlook fundamental abuse of the human rights because of a 
strategic concern; but of course, when you look at all your relationships, a President must be 
concerned about the strategic importance of the relationships”. The logic of geopolitics then 
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simply had to be taken into account. With regards to China though, all three logics were 
visible as Bush remarked that “not only is our relationship with China of strategic importance, 
it has this whole cultural and educational and art and hopefully, someday human rights side of 
it”.1035 The events in Tiananmen revealed the extent to which the logic of identity could 
function prominently alongside the logics of capital and geopolitics. 
Defending his handling of the Tiananmen suppression the following year on February 21st 
1990, Bush remarked, “I am not condoning tyranny. I am not doing as the Democratic leader 
said up there today: turning my back on human rights. What I am trying to do is preserve 
enough contact so the United States can have some influence”.1036 Bush though, would also 
invoke the sense of mysticism and allure that occasionally became explicit in US discourse on 
China stating, “I have a feeling that China works in more mysterious ways than other 
countries”.1037 There appeared here, despite his previous remarks, a certain kind of un-know-
ability to China and so the logics of US foreign policy towards China were orientated towards 
creating the conditions for US interest, rather than casual mechanisms of political change.  
In a statement regarding his decision to renew Most Favoured Nation trading status for China 
made on May 24th 1990, the Bush administration “concluded that not to renew MFN would 
harm rather than help U.S. interests and concerns”.1038 Bush was also “determined to help and 
not harm the people of China, who aspire for a better and more open life”.1039 The logic of 
capital then remained predominant to how the US considered its foreign policy towards China 
even if the other logics remained important.  
In another statement, this time on the anniversary of the suppression in Tiananmen made on 
June 4th 1990, Bush reflected on the difficulty of fostering a certain kind of China. He 
described how “transforming China with its 4,000 year old civilization, its own distinct and 
extraordinary traditions, an undeveloped economy, and an historically authoritarian political 
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system is a monumental task”.1040 China remained, through the logics of US foreign policy, a 
problem to be solved, a task to be completed. Bush reflected on how “China made great 
strides from 1978 to 1988 in the face of difficulties, and the dramatic growth in U.S. China 
relations during those 10 years was testimony to that progress”.1041 The continued 
improvement in US-China relations from the US perspective was predicated on the success of 
the logic of identity in US foreign policy. 
In a speech to a joint session of Congress in September 1990, Bush reflected on US foreign 
policy more broadly. He declared that after the Cold War and in response to UN authorized 
intervention in Iraq a new world order was emerging.1042 Later in his 1991 State of the Union 
address, Bush declared, “we are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism. We 
are Americans. We are the Nation that believes in the future. We are the Nation that can shape 
the future”.1043 This articulation of the US as not merely a future orientated state, but the 
future orientated state, invoked how the logic of identity where the US saw it self as the 
exceptional embodiment of a global teleology. US sentiment, that it was a time of great 
possibility, signifies that the US saw itself somewhere between a state of anxiety with regard 
to the boundless potential of having ‘defeated’ the USSR, and potentially more specific ‘fear’ 
as to where the net ‘threat’ might emerge from. Conceiving the idea of an American led new 
world order to shape the world’s future revealed a form of post-Cold War anxiety. This 
anxiety was temporally relieved by the First Gulf War, but would soon find its antidote in an 
(un)familiar other as the US would become increasingly concerned about how it should think 
about China in the 2st century. 
Speaking later in the year about his visions for a new world order and China’s potential role 
in it Bush reflected on the significance of events in Tiananmen. He recalled, “I took on some 
shots for trying to keep relations with China. I was offended as anybody else was by the 
human rights abuses at Tiananmen Square and spoke out on it. But I think it is in the interest 
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of the United States to have continued relations with China”. These relations with China were 
to Bush, “vital to this new world order that that veto holding member of the Security Council 
go along and be with us on these matters of trying to bring peace to troubled corners of the 
world”.1044 With regards to the logic of geopolitics then, China was a “vital” ally in managing 
“the troubled corners of the world”, the periphery of the international system as the US 
viewed it. 
It is worth considering in brief here, before turning to Bill Clinton’s Presidency, the 
arguments of Bush’s Secretary of State, James Baker III who published an article in Foreign 
Affairs outlining the administrations broad approach to Asia.1045 He paid homage to the axiom 
that “America’s destiny lies no less across the Pacific than the Atlantic”.1046 Baker described 
how to “visualize the architecture of US engagement in the region, imagine a fan spread wide, 
with its base in North America and radiating West across the Pacific”.1047 Baker drew an 
analogy between the development of the US frontier in the 19th century and the goal of US 
regional security ties, “one could draw a 21st century Pacific analogy from a nineteenth-
century experience: the development of the American continent”.1048 Explicitly here, was the 
invocation that US perceived expansion across the Pacific as a natural geopolitical process 
that comprised an essential part of the history within the logic of identity. 
Baker captured the historical fluctuations in and orientalist nature of US imaginations of 
China aptly when he described how the US “view of China has oscillated between extremes 
of fascination and confrontation…we have long admired China’s exotic culture and its 
hardworking and long suffering people”.1049  He continued, “when the Chinese seemed to 
adopt our principles- either religious or secular – we enthusiastically welcomed them into the 
fold. But when periodic upheavals led to disappointment and frequently bloodshed, 
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Americans felt the anger of rejection – a conversion that failed”.1050 This reflection made 
explicit what only been implied through the Presidential discourses analysed so far, that the 
US has attempted to convert China into a mirror image of itself. More significantly, how the 
US imagined China and how the logics were expressed was contingent on the US interpreted 
material changes. While stating that “the pendulum of US relations with China must stop its 
sharp swings”, Baker signalled the enduring importance of the logic of identity in US foreign 
policy, remarking that “our ideals and values must be an essential part of our engagement 
with China”.1051 Baker’s arguments serve as additional legitimacy to the analysis presented 
here concerning the multiple logics informing US foreign policy towards China. 
8.3 Bill Clinton and The Rise of the ‘Rise of China’  
Although not the first to make use of China to attack an incumbent President, Bill Clinton’s 
presidential campaign in 1991 released a statement chastising Bush for maintaining friendly 
relations with the “Butcher of Beijing” despite the Chinese state repression in Tiananmen 
Square.1052  As this section will come to illustrate though, this type of language was not to 
feature prominently in Clinton’s discourse regarding China.  
Speaking with reporters on May 3rd 1993, Clinton channelled Bush’s arguments and claimed 
“we obviously hope that we can maintain the maximum good relationship with the Chinese. I 
have no interest in trying to isolate them”.1053 Turning to the intertwining of the logics of 
capital and identity Clinton continued, “I'm encouraged by the successes of their economic 
reforms. And that's got to be in the interest of the whole world if it is accompanied with 
responsible behaviour and respect for human rights and movement toward a more democratic 
society”.1054 Clinton represented a near seamless continuity with the manner in which Bush 
had approached China even if his emphasis on differences envisioned through the logic of 
identity initially prevailed. 
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During a town hall meeting on May 27th 1993, Clinton spent time outlining the details of what 
the Most-Favoured Nation, MFN, status meant in US trade policy with regards to China. 
Clinton described how “China is a huge trading partner of ours, I think now our second 
biggest trading deficit, with China just behind Japan. They've got one of the fastest growing 
economics in the world. They're moving away from communism to market economics very 
quickly”.1055 Despite the positive change in terms of the logic of capital, Clinton outlined 
some issues related to the logic of identity that complicated US imaginations of China; he 
observed, “they still put political prisoners in jail. They still, we think, have used prison 
labour to make products, and we have some other problems with them”.1056 This was the 
premise on which Clinton tried to make trade conditional on political reforms. He outlined 
how “the issue [was] should we revoke that or should we put conditions on it” and he 
“decided to extend most favoured nation status for a year…to support modernization in 
China, and it's a great opportunity for America there. But I want to make it clear to them that 
there has to be some progress on human rights and the use of prison labour”.1057 The logic of 
capital could then be implemented in a way that would reflect the interests of the logic of 
identity, and the US could take advantage of a China opportunity, rather than address an 
explicit China problem. 
In a statement on MFN on May 28th 1993, Clinton declared that China’s “future will do much 
to shape the future of Asia, our security and trade relations in the Pacific, and a host of global 
issues from the environment to weapons proliferation. In short, our relationship with China is 
of very great importance”.1058 China in this sense, was fundamental to the success of the US’s 
more global interests. Commenting on the essential incorporation of China into the 
international system, Clinton outlined how “China's coastal provinces are an engine for 
reform throughout the country” and that “the residents of Shanghai and Guangzhou are far 
more motivated by markets than by Marx or Mao”.1059 China to the US then, was more 
                                                
1055 William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624. 
1056 William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624. 
1057 William J. Clinton: "Remarks in the "CBS This Morning" Town Meeting," May 27, 1993. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46624. 
1058 William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632. 
1059 William J. Clinton: "Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China," May 28, 1993. Online by 
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46632. 
 246 
capitalist than communist, and as such becoming an increasingly important concern regarding 
global issues, rather than just regional ones. 
Clinton would comment further on the conditions attached to the extension of MFN to China. 
To Clinton, the US needed to consider “how best to cultivate these hopeful seeds of change in 
China while expressing our clear disapproval of its repressive policies. The core of this policy 
will be a resolute insistence upon significant progress on human rights in China”.1060 In an 
echo of the standards of civilisation once propagated throughout the 19th century by the 
colonial empires, Clinton stated, “we expect China to meet basic international standards in its 
treatment of its people, its sales of dangerous arms, and its foreign trade”.1061 Significantly, 
Clinton would draw attention to one of the emerging contradictions regarding the logic of 
capital in US foreign policy towards China, the tension between domestic interests regarding 
labour, and international interests regarding the reproduction of capital. Clinton considered 
how “the large and growing U.S.-China trade deficit is unacceptable. The over $40 billion 
trade surplus China has accumulated with the United States since June 1989 has been very 
destructive to American industries, particularly the textile and footwear sectors, resulting in 
the loss of American jobs”.1062 The logic of capital then, was to lead to a rendering of China 
as both opportunity, and potential threat. 
In a speech to the Korean National Assembly on July 10th 1993, Clinton took his turn reciting 
one of the hymns of US Asia policy, “America is, after all, a Pacific nation”.1063 Clinton made 
it clear that his approach to China was somewhat ambiguous. He proclaimed, “we believe 
China cannot be a full partner in the world community until it respects human rights and 
international agreements on trade and weapon sales. But we also are prepared to involve 
China in building this region's new security and economic architectures”.1064  Ultimately 
Clinton would turn to a more contemporary geopolitical mantra, that “we need an involved 
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and engaged China, not an isolated China”.1065 He would though continue the link between 
the logic of capital and the logic of identity stating, “we believe their movement toward 
market reform and decentralization will promote more democracy in China and better 
policies”.1066 
Speaking to the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 27th 1993, Clinton 
outlined his general conception of the forces compelling global economic integration. For 
Clinton, “from beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are 
compelling the world towards integration. These forces are fuelling a welcome explosion of 
entrepreneurship and political liberalization”, those same forces would “also threaten to 
destroy the insularity and independence of national economies, quickening the pace of change 
and making many of our people feel more insecure”.1067 He argued how “in a new era of peril 
and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world's 
community of market-based democracies”. This notion of expansion emerged from the logics 
of capital and identity as Clinton sought to deploy them both to make the world more secure 
and profitable. Specifically, Clinton described how “during the cold war we sought to contain 
a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the circle of nations that 
live under those free institutions”.1068 The premises of the logic of geopolitics and identity 
were here linked to that of the logic of capital.  
Clinton considered how “there are still those who claim that democracy is simply not 
applicable to many cultures, and that its recent expansion is an aberration, an accident in 
history that will soon fade away”.1069 His response, would make explicit, the universalising 
tendencies embedded within the US imagination. He declared, “I agree with President 
Roosevelt, who once said, ‘the democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase of human 
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history. It is human history’”.1070 In this light, the logic of identity situated the US as 
embodying the central tenet of human history, the movement towards democracy. It is 
necessary to stress here, that this thesis is less concerned with whether this statement is true or 
not, but with how it functions in US foreign policy. This belief then condition how the US 
would “work to reduce the threat from regimes that are hostile to democracies and to support 
liberalization of nondemocratic states when they are willing to live in peace with the rest of 
us”.1071 The three logics that organised US foreign policy towards China were thus visible in 
this more general consideration of US foreign policy. 
On November 19th 1993, following a meeting with President Jiang Zemin of China, Clinton 
acknowledged the human rights issues complicating US-China relations while making the 
case “for greater market access and for the protection of intellectual property rights. I think 
our trade relationships alone indicate that the United States has not attempted to isolate China 
but instead has attempted to assist its movement into the global economy”.1072 In a rhetorical 
sleight of hand, Clinton would state, “I do not seek nor would it be proper for the United 
States or for any other nation to tell a great nation like China how to conduct all its internal 
affairs or to treat all its citizens or what laws it should have. That would be wrong”.1073 This 
ran counter to the logic of identity as it had been practised by Clinton himself and his 
predecessor and relied on the distinction between telling China how to conduct itself, and 
conditioning how the international system would approach China based on China conducted 
itself. 
Speaking at the Nixon Centre for a Peace and Freedom Policy Conference on March 1st 1995, 
Clinton captured the sense of triumphalism in the US imagination at the time. He recalled 
how “the implosion of communism and the explosion of the global economy have brought 
new freedoms to countries on every continent. Free markets are on the rise. Democracy is 
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ascendant”.1074 Through the logics of identity and capital, Clinton rendered the US’s approach 
to the world a success. He would though, make clear the limits to US foreign policy. He 
reflected on how: 
“We know now, as President Nixon recognized, that there must also be limits to America's 
involvement in the world's problems, limits imposed by clearheaded evaluation of our fundamental 
interests. We cannot be the world's policemen. We cannot become involved in every problem we 
really care about”.1075 
Taken in combination with his statements on China, the US had perceived China as a problem 
it could address and indeed now saw China as an opportunity. In a sense, this statement made 
clear the limits within each of the logics of capital, geopolitics, and identity. 
In a speech to the Pacific Basin Economic Council on May 20th 1996, Clinton recited how the 
US “must remain an Asia-Pacific power… It is…important to our future prosperity. The Asia-
Pacific region is the largest consumer market in the world, accounting already for more than 
half of our trade and supporting millions of American jobs”.1076 Geography then, was a 
gateway to the logic of capital and Asia, increasingly necessary to the reproduction of 
American life. Clinton would reflect on the US response to China’s 1995-96 naval exercises 
in the Taiwan Straits as an example of how the logic of geopolitics also underpinned US 
policy towards Taiwan in light of China. He recalled how “when China expanded its military 
exercises in the Taiwan Strait, we made clear that any use of force against Taiwan would have 
grave consequences. The two carrier battle groups we sent to the area helped to defuse a 
dangerous situation and demonstrated to our allies our commitment to stability and peace in 
the region”. The link between geopolitics and the imperatives identity was visible in his 
remarks that “in the long run, we also strengthen security by deepening the roots of 
democracy in Asia”.1077 Clinton outlined how the expansion of democracy compelled by the 
logic of identity would also exert an influence on the political stability of the region. 
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Clinton made clear that despite these tensions, US relations with China, now the most 
important globally, would shape the global future.1078 When reflecting on how China would 
choose to define itself he asked, “will it choose the course of openness and integration or veer 
toward isolation and nationalism? Will it be a force for stability or a force for disruption in the 
world?” These concerns captured US uncertainty about what China might become. To that 
end, Clinton claimed US “interests are directly at stake in promoting a secure, stable, open, 
and prosperous China, a China that embraces international non-proliferation, and trade rules, 
cooperates in regional and global security initiatives, and evolves toward greater respect for 
the basic rights of its own citizens”.1079 The logics of US foreign policy towards China then, 
compelled transformative policies. Perhaps, the most acute manner to summarise this was 
Clinton’s remarks regarding how “China has become our fastest growing export market” and 
that revoking MFN status from China “would cede one of the fastest growing markets to our 
competitors”.1080 The logic of capital remained the major conditioning imperative in US 
foreign policy towards China. 
In an interview on July 15th 1996 Clinton reflected on the tension between the US preference 
for expanding democracies and meeting its economic interests, a tension essentially between 
the logics of identity and capital. He claimed that the US believed “over the long run between 
the United States and China, the thing that's most important is democracy, because I think the 
freer the people are the more likely they will be to be responsible partners”.1081 To Clinton the 
implication of that was “we should subordinate our economic goals, or we should withhold 
most-favoured-nation status from them and not treat them like ordinary partners if they're not 
as democratic as we think they should be”. He disagreed with this notion that “imposing some 
sort of economic sanctions will not make China more democratic” and believed that “they're 
more likely to become democratic if they progress economically, if we have regular 
relationships with them…So I believe that economic development and democracy will go 
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hand in hand”.1082 To Clinton then, the tension between the logic of capital and of identity 
could be overcome as viewed them as mutually serving the imperatives of the other. 
In his State of the Union address on February 4th 1997, Clinton set out the importance of 
China to US foreign policy. He announced that the US: 
“must look to the East no less than to the West. Our security demands it. Americans fought three 
wars in Asia in this century. Our prosperity requires it… We must pursue a deeper dialog with 
China for the sake of our interests and our ideals. An isolated China is not good for America; a 
China playing its proper role in the world is”.1083 
China in this line of argument was necessary within the logics of geopolitics and capital. In 
terms of security, Clinton would expand this to include environmental concerns. During a 
speech to the Business Roundtable on June 12th 1997, Clinton recalled a conversation with 
Jiang Zemin worth presenting here at length: 
“I had an interesting conversation with Jiang Zemin in New York about a year ago, when he said, 
‘I don't want you to have a containment policy toward China.’ …I said, ‘I don't want to have a 
containment policy toward China.’ I said, ‘My biggest worry about you is that you'll get rich the 
same way we did. And if you do that, you might burn the air up because you've got 1.2 billion 
people.’ And we need to find an environmentally responsible way for China to grow”.1084 
This strand of reasoning forms the basis for what might be considered a globally orientated 
logic of environmentalism. This logic was very much concerned with the responsibility for 
maintaining and preserving the basic conditions for life and material existence. This is more 
than just a consideration of the environment but encapsulates the broader requirements and 
policies needed to sustain the environmental conditions for human life. This logic might also 
interact more broadly with the other three logics I focus on but it terms of US presidential 
discourses on China remains for the most part subsidiary. 
Speaking on October 24th 1997 to the Asia Society, Clinton restated his preference for a 
“China as a power that is stable, open, and nonaggressive, that embraces free markets, 
political pluralism, and the rule of law, that works with us to build a secure international 
order, that kind of China, rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, is deeply in 
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the interests of the American people”.1085 These remarks again reveal the expression of three 
logics of capital, geopolitics and identity. In a notable elaboration, Clinton described how the 
construction and maintenance of a secure international order “will be much easier if China is a 
part of that process, not only playing by the rules of international behaviour but helping to 
write and enforce them”.1086 China was no longer to merely participate in the reproduction of 
international order, but was being encouraged to shape that international order. This included 
confronting the issue of climate change and its relationship to the logic of capital as Clinton 
remarked that the US “has a profound interest in ensuring that today's progress does not come 
at tomorrow's expense…China is the fastest growing contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, 
and we are the biggest greenhouse gas emitter”.1087 Implicitly then, Clinton saw the US and 
China being fundamental to addressing the climate change.  
During a news conference with Jiang Zemin on October 29th 1997, Clinton exemplified how 
the logic of capital shaped US reasoning. He described how “access to China's market 
remains restricted for many America goods and services…the United States will do 
everything possible to bring China into the World Trade Organization as soon as possible, 
provided China improves access to its market”.1088 Market access remained a priority for the 
US. Clinton would also again repeat his concerns regarding climate change and retelling how 
he “also discussed with President Jiang the special responsibility our nations bear, as the top 
two emitters of greenhouse gases, to lead in finding a global solution to the global problem of 
climate change”.1089 It is now apparent that as his Presidency went on Clinton became more 
concerned with how the US and China could act on climate change, a concern that exists 
independently of the three main logics I articulate here. 
In an interview on June 19th 1998, Clinton reflected on how China considered the issue of 
instability. He argued that to China “instability in the context of their history is something that 
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was just around the corner, only yesterday. And it becomes a significant problem”.1090 He 
would also describe a Chinese “psyche, which is very much seared with past instabilities”.1091 
He would return to these concerns again in an interview with Radio Free Asia on June 24th 
1998, stating, “countries are like people; they have a collective memory”.1092 Displaying what 
has ben a growing US sensitivity to China’s perspective on international politics, Clinton 
stated, “to deal with nations effectively when you have differences with them, it's important to 
understand what their worst nightmare is. Because if we're dominated by our nightmares, we 
make decisions that are not rational in the eyes of other people”.1093 Specifically to China 
Clinton described how “their worst nightmare is disintegration, you know, because they have 
these memories of when China was weakened and vulnerable to foreign attack, vulnerable to 
government by warlords, vulnerable to the opium trade, vulnerable to everything because of 
the disintegration of the central authority”. What this constitutes is an increasing sense of 
reflectivity in US imaginations of China. Similar thoughts were expressed by Johnson and 
Nixon, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively, and thus constitute a growing 
complexity in the logics of US foreign policy towards China. A sense that China is not merely 
to be acted on or towards, but engaged with on terms of equal agency. 
The fundamental point of this critical reflection for Clinton was in the context of China’s 
territorial sovereignty. An issue that permeates US concern for China from McKinley to 
Clinton to varying degrees of priority. Clinton would remark:  
“to an outsider who knows nothing of China's history, the importance to China, which is so large 
and so big, of the "one China" policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, of getting back Hong Kong, of making sure 
that nothing could ever happen and Tibet—to promote any separatism. To us, we see only the 
downsides of those things. To them, a lot of the things they do which to us are unacceptable, they 
do, I believe, because they're too much in the grip of the historic memory of disintegration”.1094 
If this historical reflexivity is to be located anywhere, it is in the logics of identity and 
geopolitics as a consideration of how China conceives of its own geopolitical interests and 
sense of place in the world. 
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When taking questions from students at Beijing University on June 29th 1998, Clinton sought 
to establish a historical narrative regarding US-China relations. He made it clear the US was 
not trying to contain China, “do I really want to contain China? The answer is no”.1095 The 
logic of geopolitics has been undergoing a reconfiguration from Nixon’s Presidency until now 
where the US did not want to contain China, but was more concerned with transforming 
China into a reliable international partner in the administration of the international system. 
Despite how the relationship had “been interrupted from time to time when we have had 
problems…if you go back through the history of our country, there's always been a feeling on 
the part of our people that we ought to be close to the Chinese people”.1096 This 
administration was becoming most apparent with regards to the environment as Clinton, in a 
speech to the people of Guilin in Southern China on July 2nd 1998, would again emphasise. 
Describing common US-China interests in a variety of economic and security issues Clinton 
declared “a big part of that cooperation must rest on our common understanding that we live 
on the same planet, sharing the same oceans and breathing the same air”.1097 
In a major speech on US foreign policy in San Francisco on February 26th 1999, Clinton 
outlined his vision for US foreign policy and declared, “for the first time since before the rise 
of fascism early in this century, there is no overriding threat to our survival or freedom”.1098 
For Clinton, “the world clearly is coming together… the United States has the opportunity 
and, I would argue, the solemn responsibility to shape a more peaceful, prosperous, 
democratic world in the 21st century”.1099 Without a clearly defined other in the form of 
enemy with which to define US identity against, Clinton saw the expansion of democratic 
states as the overarching imperative in US foreign policy. He saw this “coming together”, by 
way of the logic of capital, as reflected in arguments made by McKinley almost a century 
previous. The McKinley passage captured the essence of what Clinton saw as globalisation: 
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“’The world's products are exchanged as never before and with increasing transportation comes 
increasing knowledge and larger trade. We travel greater distances in a shorter space of time and 
with more ease than was ever dreamed of. The same important news is read, though in different 
languages, the same day, in all the world. Isolation is no longer possible. No nation can longer be 
indifferent to any other.’  That was said by President William McKinley100 years ago”. 1100 
As Clinton remarked, “what we now call globalization was well underway even then. We, in 
fact, had more diplomatic posts in the world than we have today, and foreign investment 
actually played a larger role in our own economy then than it does today”.1101 Isolation in an 
economic and geopolitical sense was impossible under Clinton’s reasoning.  
Turning his attention to China he reiterated a long US narrative with regards to managing 
Chinese political developments remarking “I do not believe we can hope to bring change to 
China if we isolate China from the forces of change”.1102  He had made this point earlier in the 
year during his State of the Union address where he argued that “stability can no longer be 
bought at the expense of liberty…It's important not to isolate China. The more we bring China 
into the world, the more the world will bring change and freedom to China”.1103 The 
impossibility of isolation featured in Clinton’s considerations of China. He discussed how 
“the question China faces is how best to assure its stability and progress. Will it choose 
openness and engagement? Or will it choose to limit the aspirations of its people without fully 
embracing the global rules of the road? In my judgment, only the first path can really answer 
the challenges China faces”.1104 This open engagement though would also require the 
transformation of Chinese society as Clinton observed, “we can see in China the kinds of 
problems a society faces when it is moving away from the rule of fear but is not yet rooted in 
the rule of law”. 1105  The logic of capital now perceived what had previously been thought 
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necessary to the reproduction of US capital and its way of life, as part of an increasingly 
inevitable trajectory regarding increasing international interdependence.   
In April 1999, in a speech at U.S. Institute for Peace focused on the US relationship with 
China, Clinton repeated his earlier declaration that “we all know it's an extraordinary moment 
when there is no overriding threat to our security, when no great power need feel that any 
other is a military threat, when freedom is expanding, and open markets and technology are 
raising living standards on every continent, bringing the world closer together in countless 
ways”.1106 Observing that “we all know that perceptions affect policies. And American 
perceptions about China have often changed in this century”, Clinton captured succinctly the 
manner in which US perceptions had shifted over the century: 
“In the early 1900's, most Americans saw China through the eyes of missionaries seeking open 
hearts or traders seeking open markets. During World War II, China was our ally, during the 
Korean War, our adversary. During the cold war, we debated whether China was a solid stone in 
the monolith of world communism or a country with interests and traditions that could make it a 
counterweight to Soviet power”.1107 
If one considers Clinton’s description as an archaeology of US imaginations of China, it is the 
logics I outline that underpin these interpretations of what China meant for the US. Clinton 
outlined how “more recently, many Americans have looked to China to see either the world's 
next great capitalist tiger and an enormous mother lode of economic opportunity for American 
companies and American workers or the world's largest great Communist dragon and next 
great threat to freedom and security”.1108 The debate then was very much between how to 
understand the US in terms of the logics of capital and geopolitics.  
In one of the more reflective and insightful Presidential remarks included in this thesis 
Clinton considered how “for a long time, it seems to me, we have argued about China with 
competing caricatures. Is this a country to be engaged or isolated? Is this a country beyond 
our power to influence or a country that is ours to gain and ours to lose?”.1109 His concern was 
with the confinements these limited binaries produced for US foreign policy. He considered 
how “now we hear that China is a country to be feared” and that “a growing number of people 
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say that it is the next great threat to our security and our wellbeing”.1110 Setting out the 
premise of the argument that China might become an enemy for the US Clinton reflects on 
how “those who say it point out, factually, that if China's economy continues to grow on its 
present trajectory, it will be the world's largest in the next century. They argue, correctly, that 
the Chinese Government often defines its interests in ways sharply divergent from ours. They 
are concerned, rightly, by Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan and at others. From this they 
conclude that China is or will be our enemy”.1111 Clinton argues that proponents of the line of 
thinking that “China could pursue such a course, pouring much more of its wealth into 
military might and into traditional great power geopolitics” are “acting as if that decision has 
already been made”.1112 To Clinton then, the logic of geopolitics need not inevitably lead to 
enmity and conflict.  
Setting out the case for engagement with China, Clinton states he is aware that “this approach 
will clearly put us at odds with those who believe America must always have a great enemy.” 
Clinton considered the question of “how can you be the great force for good in the world and 
justify all the things you do if you don't have a great enemy?” and responded succinctly, “I 
don't believe that”.1113 In one of his most significant contributions to US thought on China, 
Clinton considers the issue of perception in how the US imagines China. What he draws close 
to here is reflecting on how the logics of US foreign policy shape how the US imagines China 
as a knowable object in international politics, and how the logics condition what the 
subsequent policies might be. Clinton argues, 
 “we should not look at China through rose-colored glasses, nor should we look through a glass 
darkly to see an image that distorts China's strength and ignores its complexities. We need to see 
China clearly, its progress and its problems, its system and its strains, its policies and its 
perceptions of us, of itself, of the world”.1114  
The assumption that the US could objectively capture what China is and how it thinks reflects 
Clinton’s previous remarks concerning the need to take into account China’s history and fears 
of instability. What Clinton makes the case for, is that three logics that underpin US foreign 
                                                
1110 William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368. 
1111 William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368. 
1112 William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368. 
1113 William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368. 
1114 William J. Clinton: "Remarks to the United States Institute of Peace," April 7, 1999. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57368. 
 258 
policy towards China can demonstrate a sense of reflexivity that begins to account for China’s 
experience and perspective. 
Clinton warns of the potential geopolitical risks “of a weak China, beset by internal conflicts, 
social dislocation, and criminal activity, becoming a vast zone of instability in Asia”.1115 The 
potential for lies in what Clinton summarises as “in short, we're seeing in China the kinds of 
problems a society can face when it is moving away from the rule of fear but is not yet firmly 
rooted in the rule of law”.1116 The logic of geopolitics then infers that the US desires a 
political stable and ‘strong’ China. What he calls for then is to “continue a policy of 
principled, purposeful engagement with China's leaders and China's people… That is the 
purpose of engagement: not to insulate our relationship from the consequences of Chinese 
actions but to use our relationship to influence China's actions in a way that advances our 
values and our interests”.1117 He also draws on the logic of capital to make the case for China 
joining the World Trade Organization, “if China is willing to play by the global rules of trade, 
it would be an inexplicable mistake for the United States to say no.”.1118 The logic of capital 
under Clinton is now explicitly concern with encouraging China to adopt “the global rules of 
trade”, essentially acquiescing to a US organised regime of trade. Again though the broader 
emphasis is on producing a certain type of China as global actor. 
Clinton also frames what has been generally considered by this thesis as issues related to the 
logic of identity as necessary to the logic of capital and US economic interest in China. 
Clinton described how “encouraging China to respect the human rights of its people and to 
give them a chance to shape the political destiny of their country…cuts to the heart of our 
concerns about China's future”. He continued, emphasising the economic benefits of a 
democratic society,  “because wealth is generated by ideas today, China will be less likely to 
succeed if its people cannot exchange information freely. China also will be less likely to 
succeed if it does not build the legal and political foundation to compete for global capital, 
less likely to succeed if its political system does not gain the legitimacy that comes from 
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democratic choice”.1119 What was the domain of the logic of identity, a concern for spreading 
democracy and rule of law, becomes complimentary to US interest in the conditions for 
circulating and reproducing US capital.  
In a statement reflecting what is sometimes called the unipolar moment1120, Clinton argued 
that the US “is at the height of its power and the peak of its prosperity. Democratic values are 
ascendant throughout much of the world. And while we cannot know where China is heading 
for sure, the forces pulling China toward integration and openness are more powerful today 
than ever before”.1121 As shown above, Clinton had dismissed the idea that “America must 
always have a great enemy”, but what his description of the US-China relationship betrayed, 
was a growing concern with China and its relationship to the US.1122 It was not that China was 
becoming an enemy in conventional terms, but that China is becoming the US’s significant 
other. This speech by Clinton are emblematic of the growing relevance of China in US 
conceptions of itself and its perceived role in the world. What the speech also marks is the 
beginning of a transition from the triumphant delirium of a post-Cold War world with no clear 
enemies to the emerging concern with China’s global role and what this might mean for the 
US, despite the sense if inevitability Clinton ascribes to the forces of integration and 
globalisation. What Clinton also exemplified here, was the manner in which the logics of US 
foreign policy towards China could be modified to consider how China might perceive the 
world. What remains though, is the fundamental way in which concerns about the need for 
circulating US capital, regional geopolitical concerns and the imperatives of US identity 
conditioned US foreign policy towards China. 
In a news conference with Premier Zhu Rongji on April 8th 1999 Clinton outlined the 
geopolitical and economic benefits of close cooperation with China, “, we have lessened the 
tensions on the Korean Peninsula for several years. China has participated with us in any 
number of arms control initiatives…China is a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. And China has worked very hard…to stabilize the Asian economy at a time when it 
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was not only hurting people in Asia but it was beginning to affect the American 
economy”.1123 Clinton would go on to situate these recent benefits in a longer-term narrative: 
 “Since 1784, Chinese and Americans have shared a lively dialog over how to achieve common 
cause in the countless pursuits that animate great nations. Thomas Jefferson took care to promote 
what he called “good dispositions’ between the United States and China. Abraham Lincoln, in his 
first annual message to Congress, predicted our extensive trade with China. And of course, 
Franklin Roosevelt made it America's purpose to join with China in defence of freedom”.1124 
The benefits of contemporary cooperation, the historical linage of US interest and concern for 
China and the potential economic advantages of increased trade with China helped to 
underpin US foreign policy towards China.  In his 2000 State of the Union Address Clinton 
summarised his overarching approach to China and Russia when he declared, “we must 
continue to encourage our former adversaries, Russia and China, to emerge as stable, 
prosperous, democratic nations”.1125 These sentiments reflected the convergence of the logics 
of capital, geopolitics and identity in US foreign policy towards China. In a sense, the US was 
achieving benefits that Clinton suggests had long been projected by past US Presidents.  
In another key speech on US foreign policy at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies on March 8th 2000, Clinton reiterated many of the key themes of his San 
Francisco speech the previous year. He emphasised the logic of capital when he declared that 
the US had “signed the agreement to bring China into the WTO on terms that will open its 
market to American products and investments”.1126 For Clinton this marked the logical 
outcome of the longer term US policy since Nixon to transform China. Clinton argued that the 
China’s entry “represents the most significant opportunity that we have had to create positive 
change in China since the 1970's, when President Nixon first went there, and later in the 
decade when President Carter normalized relations”.1127 Clinton spoke of what he saw as the 
one constant in US imaginations of China. He explained how “we understand that America 
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has a profound stake in what happens in China and how China relates to the rest of the world. 
That's why, for 30 years, every President, without regard to party, has worked for a China that 
contributes to the stability of Asia, that is open to the world, that upholds the rule of law at 
home and abroad”.1128 In effect, Clinton argued here that the logics of capital and geopolitics 
had remained consistently prominent since Nixon’s initiatives to re-establish relations with 
China in the early 1970s. 
Clinton would again reflect on the historical variations in how the US imagined China. He 
considered how “for a long time now, the United States has debated its relationship with 
China, through all the changes, particularly, of the last century. And like all human beings 
everywhere, we see this relationship through the prism of our own experience”. He captured 
here, how the logic of identity often provided the overall framework through which the US 
imagined China, even if its interests were compelled by the other two logics. He expanded on 
the archaeology that he previously offered recounting how:  
“In the early 1900's, most Americans saw China either through the eyes of traders seeking new 
markets or missionaries seeking new converts. During World War II, China was our ally; during 
the Korean war, our adversary. At the dawn of the cold war, when I was a young boy beginning to 
study such things, it was a cudgel in a political battle: Who lost China? Later, it was a 
counterweight to the Soviet Union. And now, in some people's eyes, it's a caricature. Will it be the 
next great capitalist tiger with the biggest market in the world, or the world's last great communist 
dragon and a threat to stability in Asia?”.1129 
What is significant is how Clinton’s formulation of the history of US imaginations of China 
encompasses the three logics of explanation I argue for in this thesis. In Clinton’s era then, the 
question remained whether China should be considered a necessary ally or would become a 
threat to Asian geopolitical stability. This question represented the tension between the logic 
of capital in US foreign policy as China being potentially necessary to the reproduction of US 
capital and capitalism in a more global sense, and some of the tendencies in the logic of 
geopolitics that potential challengers to US geopolitical hegemony needed to be confronted. 
Clinton, like his more immediate predecessors following Nixon, prioritised the logic of capital 
and engagement with China over the isolation of the 1950s. 
To this end, Clinton positioned China adopting the qualities necessary to participate in the 
liberal international order the US was attempting to foster after the Cold War. He remarked 
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how “by joining the WTO, China [was] not simply agreeing to import more of our products; it 
[was] agreeing to import one of democracy's most cherished values, economic freedom”.1130 
Clinton saw the logics of capital and identity as contributing to China’s increasing 
involvement in the liberal order. He also restated the reasoning that “the more China 
liberalises its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people…and when 
individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a 
greater say”.1131 To Clinton, political freedom thus necessary followed economic freedom 
exhibiting the corollary relationship between US interests, with regards to the logics of capital 
and identity. In one of the more colourful metaphors, Clinton inferred to the inevitability of 
political freedom describing how “there's no question China has been trying to crackdown on 
the Internet. Good luck! [Laughter] That's sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall”.1132 
China, despite its efforts could not, according to Clinton, escape from the liberal teleology 
emerging from the logics of capital and identity as expressed towards China where economic 
freedoms inevitably lead to demands for greater political freedoms.  
In a statement on the need for permanent normal trade relations with China, Clinton outlined 
how better market access to China would help to alleviate US anxiety over globalization. He 
described how “people are anxiety ridden about the forces of globalization, or they're 
frustrated over the human rights record of China, or they don't like all the procedures of the 
WTO”.1133 Clinton was attempting to mediate the domestic and international tensions within 
the logic of capital. He tried to explain how what the US was giving is “China membership in 
the WTO in return for greater access to their markets, the right to sell things there without 
having to manufacture things there”.1134 Significantly, Clinton also tied the logic of capital to 
concerns within the logic of geopolitics. He declared that he also thought China’s ascension to 
the WTO as “more important for our national security. Why? Because if we let China in the 
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WTO, they will be inside the world trading system. They will have a strong interest in 
working with other people and cooperating with other people. They will have a strong 
disincentive not to have trouble with Taiwan, even though there's a lot of tension between the 
two of them”.1135 In a plea to Congress to approve the WTO agreement, Clinton argued that 
“if you want to reduce tensions along the Taiwan Strait, if you want a more stable Asia, if you 
want to maximize the chances of avoiding proliferation of dangerous weapons and a new 
arms race, a yes is the right vote”.1136 Engaging with China in an economic sense, would thus 
also address some of the imperatives within the logics of identity and geopolitics. 
Clinton would again emphasise the varying benefits of increased trade with China, including 
the potential to continue shaping China’s international policies. He described how, 
reminiscent of the early 20th century beliefs that, “with more than a billion people, China is 
the largest new market in the world. Our administration has negotiated an agreement which 
will open China's markets to American products made on American soil, everything from 
corn to chemicals to computers”.1137 To Clinton, it was clear that the logic of capital took 
priority in conditioning US foreign policy towards China. Clinton would also note though, 
that what the US has “granted is full membership in the WTO, which brings China into a rule-
based international system”.1138 In terms of the logics of geopolitics and capital, Clinton 
argued that this rule-based system would benefit from China’s increasing participation but 
would also condition China’s politics in a way concordant with the logic of identity in US 
foreign policy. The intertwining of these logics was apparent in the following statement that 
“the more China is involved in the global economy, the global society, the more likely it is to 
change and become more democratic, to become more open, to become more transparent, and 
to become a better partner instead of a competitor with us in the Pacific region”.1139 Clinton 
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here was expressing the possibility that China could be a geopolitical and economic partner 
and ally, rather than an enemy or competitor. 
This partnership, and incorporation of China into the liberal, rules based order represented to 
Clinton the logical outcomes of US policy since Nixon. He reconstructed this linear narrative 
when celebrating granting China Permanent Normal Trade status declaring that: 
“this is a great day for the United States and a hopeful day for the 21st century world. This signing 
ceremony marks the culmination of efforts begun almost 30 years ago by President Nixon, built on 
by President Carter, who normalized our relations with China, pursued firmly by Presidents of both 
parties to normalize ties with China in ways that preserve our interests and advance our values”.1140 
These remarks reflected the self-propelling sense of expansion across the Pacific within the 
logic of geopolitics that the US had expressed towards Asia and China since the 19th century. 
Clinton’s foreign policy towards China then, was characterised by the convergence of the 
three logics of capital, geopolitics and identity within US imaginations of China. 
8.4 The Ambiguity of George W. Bush’s China 
While George W. Bush was still Governor of Texas and campaigning for the Republican 
Presidential nomination he gave a wide-ranging speech outlining what he saw as “a distinctly 
American internationalism” at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on November 19th 
1999. It was an attempt to affirm his foreign policy credentials but would also offer 
significant insight into his foreign policy preferences when President.1141 Most notable, was 
the manner in which US foreign policy was framed through the logic of identity, in a much 
more explicit manner than previously. Bush described how “some have tried to pose a choice 
between American ideals and American interests – between who we are and how we act. But 
the choice is false. America, by definition and destiny, promotes freedom”.1142 He argued that 
the US had a tendency to withdrawal and drift where instead, “foreign policy must be more 
than the management of crisis”.1143 He described his approach as “idealism, without illusions. 
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Confidence, without conceit. Realism, in service of American ideals”.1144 This amounts to 
what is now described as neo-conservatism. A militaristic liberalism in other words.1145 Bush 
wanted US foreign policy to be about more than the administration or management of 
international order and through the logic of identity the US could present a transformative 
foreign policy. 
He described Europe and Asia as “the world’s strategic heartland” and outlined how “China is 
a competitor, not a strategic partner. We must deal with China without ill-will-but without 
illusions”.1146 This was a clear break from Clinton’s rendering of China as a partner. Bush 
would allude to the changing imaginations of China in US discourse over the preceding 
century. Bush remarked how “China, in particular, has taken different shapes in different eyes 
at different times. An empire to be divided. A door to be opened. A model of collective 
conformity. A diplomatic card to be played. One year, it is said to be run by ‘the butchers of 
Beijing’. A few years later, the same administration pronounces it a ‘strategic 
partner’.”1147 He was implying a sense of contradiction in Clinton’s foreign policy and that 
China should be understood more as foe than ally. Deploying a more extensive logic of 
identity Bush would situate the China as implicitly threatening to the US. 
In an early pronouncement of a now common axiom, Bush declared that “China is rising, and 
that is inevitable”. He denounced China as “an enemy of religious freedom” and that “it will 
be unthreatened but not unchecked”.1148 In line with the logic of identity, he declared, “China 
will know that America’s values are always part of America’s agenda”. In similar reasoning 
to Clinton and Reagan, Bush stated that “the case for trade is not just monetary, but moral. 
Economic freedom creates habits of liberty”.1149 Although he continued the policy of 
engaging China economically to foster change, there was a new degree of hostility in his 
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remarks. In reference to criticisms of the US as an empire, Bush claimed US aims were not 
imperial and “America has never been an empire”. He attempted to outline a middle way 
between isolationism and empire calling for the US to “reject the blinders of isolationism, just 
as we refuse the crown of empire”. The significance of identity for Bush was clear when he 
called for “an American foreign policy that reflects American character”.1150 If the US was 
not an empire in the strict territorial sense, Bush outlined his vision for a US that would not so 
much be the policeman of the world, but its architect, engineer and priest. The sense of mutual 
engagement and friendship that Clinton had articulated was increasingly replaced by 
abrasiveness, albeit still situated within the logics of geopolitics and identity.  
Although Bush appeared to chart a more adversarial approach while campaigning he repeated 
many of the traditional mantras now in US imaginations of China. On March 22nd 2001, Bush 
proclaimed that “ China is a great country, Chinas has got vast potential, and we’ve got 
common interests in China”.1151 This “vast potential” reflected the historical interest the US 
had in China with regards to potential economic benefits, but its potential for social and 
political transformation. This included Bush’s comments on the aftermath of a fighter plane 
incident on April 51th 2001, where a US intelligence aircraft collided with a Chinese fighter 
jet off the coast of the Chinese island Hainan resulting in the death of a Chinese pilot. Bush 
made clear, in reference to the US aircrew being held captive that “the message to the Chinese 
is: We should not let this incident destabilize relations. Our relationship with China is very 
important, but they need to realize that it's time for our people to be home”.1152 Despite the 
potential for a more extensive conflict, Bush affirmed the importance of the US-China 
relationship.  
Bush would describe this relationship predominantly through the logic of capital as he 
remarked, “China ought to be a trading partner of ours. I think it's in our economic interests to 
open up the Chinese markets to U.S. products—to U.S. agricultural products”.1153 Bush 
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repeated the close link between the logic of capital and the logic of identity affirming the 
Clinton position when he stated, “I not only believe it's in our economic interest, I believe it's 
in our interest to promote U.S. values. And I believe the marketplace promotes the values. 
When people get a taste of freedom in the marketplace, they tend to demand other freedoms in 
their societies. And so, I'm an advocate of China's entering into the WTO”.1154 The 
imperatives of the logic of capital, spreading democracy and promoting US ‘values’ could be 
achieved through the logic of capital. In a curious and in some ways tragic stumble, Bush 
tried to make clear that his administration saw the relationship with China in more 
antagonistic terms than the Clinton administration. He remarked, “China is a strategic 
partner—I mean, strategic competitor. But that doesn't mean we can't find areas in which we 
can partner, and the economy's a place where we can partner”.1155 The space for cooperation 
remained even if Bush was attempting to indicate a few degrees more suspicion of China. 
On May 29th 2001, in Los Angeles, Bush reiterated his stance on the close relationship 
between the imperatives of the logics of capital and identity. Broadly, he described how “the 
growth of the world economy depends on world trade. The growth of world trade depends on 
American leadership. And America will lead toward freer trade, toward wider and more 
lasting prosperity for ourselves and for the world”.1156 What this meant in terms of China was 
that “open trade is a force for freedom in China, a force for stability in Asia, and a force for 
prosperity in the United States”.1157 The logics of capital, geopolitics and identity were all 
present in the Bush China discourse. Importantly, Bush also reflected on the significance of 
China for the everyday social reproduction of US citizens observing, “Trade is in the interests 
of American consumers, especially those who live from paycheck to paycheck and depend on 
inexpensive goods from China to enhance their quality of life”.1158 This reveals the 
contemporary configuration of the logic of capital in US imaginations of China. If at the end 
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of the 19th century the US was searching for markets to invest surplus capital and sell surplus 
produce, Chinese labour had now become essential to the reproduction of the American way 
of life domestically. This was a tension, between the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity, 
which would expand through the Obama Presidency, discussed in the following chapter, as a 
contradiction without any apparent synthesis or resolution. 
During a meeting with Chinese President Jiang on October 19th 2001, Bush set out the broad 
US interests towards China. He remarked, “China is a great power, and America wants a 
constructive relationship with China. We welcome a China that is a full member of the world 
community, that is at peace with its neighbours”.1159 Bush also made the claim, premised on 
the logics of capital and identity that “in the long run, the advance of Chinese prosperity 
depends on China's full integration into the rules and norms of international institutions. And 
in the long run, economic freedom and political freedom will go hand in hand”.1160 He would 
also later observe while speaking at Tsinghua University in Beijing on February 22nd 2002 
that, “China is on a rising path, and America welcomes the emergence of a strong and 
peaceful and prosperous China”.1161 This sense of China on the rise, prevalent in popular 
commentary on China had yet to be articulated meaningfully in official US discourses. The 
spatial implications of a rising China though, reflected more the temporal premises of 
development, where China was catching up to a certain stage of modern development rather 
reaching a certain plane of the spatial. 
During a commencement address at West Point Military Academy on June 1st 2002, Bush 
traversed the arguments of Fukuyama’s end of history narrative and the triumph of liberal 
democracy and free markets.1162 He described how “the 20th century ended with a single 
surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the 
rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, and private property and free 
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speech and equal justice and religious tolerance”.1163 This was the discursive core of the logic 
of identity in US foreign policy broadly, but also specifically in relation to China. In an 
attempt to dispel accusations of neo-imperialism, Bush conceded that “America cannot 
impose this vision, yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices 
for their own people”.1164 US foreign policy then, was about discursively creating the material 
conditions for certain outcomes to become more likely. From this strand of reasoning, the 
logic of identity was infused with teleological rendering of political order where the only 
possible way to legitimately develop and exist as a political entity was as a liberal, capitalist, 
democracy. 
The dynamics of this teleological rendering in Bush administration are generally more 
commonly associated with the events of September 11th 2001 and its subsequent invasions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan as part of its global War on Terror.1165  Its imagining of China though, 
was also filtered through this dominant narrative as the logic of geopolitics in its specificity 
towards China came to be framed by US interventions in the Middle East. In a news 
conference with Jiang for instance, Bush, in a sense inverting how he had previously deployed 
the logics of identity, capital and geopolitics, described China as an ally against global 
terror.1166 On December 9th 2003, Bush again reiterated the significance of China’s support 
for the war on terror, “we are fighting to defeat a ruthless enemy of order and civilization. We 
are partners in diplomacy working to meet the dangers of the 21st century. We are full 
members of a world trading system that rewards enterprise and lifts nations”.1167 He also 
emphasised US-China cooperation on nuclear issues relating to North Korea and the 
importance of China integrating in to “rules and norms of the international trading and finance 
system” for prosperity to spread through all of China.1168 These were all examples then of 
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China adapting to the liberal world order that US Presidents, as demonstrated, were so 
adamant for China to join. 
Bush’s Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, set out one of the dominant contemporary 
narratives of US imaginations of China on September 21st 2005. In a speech to the National 
Committee on US-China Relations entitled “Whither China: From Membership to 
Responsibility?” Zoellick concluded that “our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the 
dragon has joined the world”.1169 The main thrust of the speech was that now:  
“for the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its 
influence?  To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s 
membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible 
stakeholder in that system.  China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that 
has enabled its success” (emphasis in original).1170 
The descriptor of “responsible stakeholder” became a nodal point in US discourse of China. 
In terms of the logic of geopolitics, China now has a responsibility to help manage the global 
system that it had benefitted from. This responsibility also extended through the logic of 
capital as the international system constitutes not only the geopolitical qualities of the 
international system a perceived by the US, but the economic infrastructure of contemporary 
capitalism as well. As evidence by Zoellick’s remark that “the global economy of the 
21st century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm’s 
length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense”.1171 In this framing, it was 
imperative that the US cooperate with China in an economic sense and not just in terms of 
managing the geopolitical aspects of the international system. 
Zoellick reflected on one of the key concerns in the US about the ‘rise of China’ when he 
observed that “there is a cauldron of anxiety about China”.1172 He described the recent history 
of US policy towards China where “for thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the 
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People’s Republic of China”.1173 He does so to ask “how should we view China at the dawn 
of the 21st Century?  On both sides, there is a gulf in perceptions… many Americans worry 
that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about 
China”.1174  This anxiety reflects a general uncertainty about China’s future. It remains 
anxiety in the sense described by Soren Kierkegaard, as a phenomenon distinct to fear.1175 If 
fear is in relation to something specific, the US was concerned about what China might 
become and what this uncertainty might mean for the US. This also reflects the manner in 
which discourses of a potential China threat are twinned with discourses of opportunity as 
described by Chengxin Pan.1176 By approaching foreign policy in the manner that Campbell 
and other poststructuralists do, as constitutive of identity, the remark by Zoellick that “how 
we deal with China’s rising power is a central question for American foreign policy” captures 
the significance of how the logic of identity condition US foreign policy towards China even 
if concerns were also economic and geopolitical in nature.1177 It is through the logic of 
identity in this regard that the US has drawn China into the liberal international order 
defended by the US.  
The logic of identity becomes clear in Zoellick’s concluding remarks where he states that “as 
a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us 
to sustain the international system that has enabled its success…we can cooperate with the 
emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow”.1178 For 
the US, China’s involvement in administering the international system and its component 
geopolitical and economic aspects has become necessary, while the logic underpinning US 
foreign policy also aims to democratise China while doing so. It becomes increasingly 
apparent then, that China’s cooperation is necessary to the reproduction of the international 
system and thus the US way of life. 
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The notion that China needs to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ revealed a particular 
attitude to what it means to be modern today and how ‘modernity’ functions as a form of 
temporal ordering of the world. To part of the modern world, one had to be responsible. This 
echoed 19th century discourses where one had to be civilised to be an active part of the 
international order.  This reflected how the US utilised a specific linear and progressive 
conception of time to locate other states as less developed but on the same path towards the 
Western capitalist present. As mentioned above, the notion that China is own the rise, is a 
rephrasing of the notion that China is catching up in terms of development. It is currently 
serves then, through implications of its need to catch up or rise up, the constitutive other of 
US capitalist present. This rendering of China as either rising up from below or catching up 
from behind was enabled by David Harvey’s arguments that capital resorts to a “spatial fix” to 
alleviate its recurrent crises by moving between spaces of time.1179 China had been the 
beneficiary of one such fix from Deng’s economic reforms onward, and thus as indicated by 
the previous chapters focus on Carter and Reagan, was seen to be adopting US economic 
norms.1180 
In Kyoto on November 16th 2005, Bush replayed a common theme in US imaginations of East 
Asia, “As a Pacific nation, America is drawn by trade and values and history to be a part of 
the future of this region. The extraordinary economic growth in the Pacific Rim has opened 
new possibilities for progress”.1181 Central to Bush’s rendering of the mantra, was less the 
geographical underpinnings of US interest in Asia, then the logics of capital and identity, 
inflected in his mentioning’s of trade and values. He reflected more on China through the 
logic of capital describing how “access to American markets has played an important role in 
China's economic development” with the point being one of fairness as he argued that “China 
needs to provide a level playing field for American businesses seeking access to China's 
market”.1182 The initial adversarial positioning had given way to the more benign conventions 
of cooperation, “we're important trading partners. We benefit from a system of free and fair 
trade. We'll continue to work with China to open up markets and level the playing field for 
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American goods”.1183 Despite the bravado of earlier Bush discourses, he returned to more 
measured dialect of economic cooperation and the opening of markets. 
In his 2006 State of the Union address Bush captured a growing sense of anxiety in the US 
about its relative position to China and how this affected the US’s sense of itself. What this 
reflected was how the anxiety embedded within the logic of identity as the US needed to 
locate some kind of constitutive other was starting to focus more exclusively, in economic 
terms, on China. He considered how “in a dynamic world economy, we are seeing new 
competitors like China and India, and this creates uncertainty, which makes it easier to feed 
people's fears”.1184 Somewhat confusingly, though perhaps explained by the audience, China 
had again become a competitor. The concern Bush was getting at though, was “seeing some 
old temptations return. Protectionists want to escape competition… Others say that the 
government needs to take a larger role in directing the economy”.1185 Bush was defending the 
neoliberal orthodoxy in this case, though his neglect here, of the authoritative role that the 
Chinese Communist Party played in China becoming a competitor appeared to be beyond 
consideration. Through the logic of capital then, China was becoming more of an economic 
concern. He would though emphasise the on-going liberalisation of the Chinese economy and 
the possibility of new markets in remarks after a meeting with President Hu Jintao on April 
20th 2006. Bush commented, “I appreciate the Government's commitment to that evolution, 
because as there's more consumers and market access, it will mean that U.S. small businesses 
and businesses and farmers will have a chance to be able to find new markets”.1186 Adopting 
the language set out by Zoellick, Bush remarked how “ as stakeholders in the international 
system, our two nations share many strategic interests”.1187 The notion then of a responsible 
stakeholder reflected the a concern with the logic of identity with regard to the notion of a 
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responsible, read civilised, state, and the logics of capital and geopolitics with regards to the 
shared “strategic interests”. 
Bush touched on the issue of economic anxiety again at a speech in Kentucky on American 
Competitiveness on May 19th 2006, where he spoke of the “worried” US workers and who are 
“troubled by competition from places like China and India”. He followed this up outlining 
how a state unwilling to trade freely indicated it had lost its confidence, reflecting on how 
“people’s concerns about imports coming in from China”.1188 If the logic of capital, so 
fundamental to US foreign policy towards China was beginning to foster a sense of anxious 
unease with regards to China, Bush maintained that it was the historic, militaristic aspects of 
the logic of geopolitics that served as the foundations for US foreign policy in Asia. At West 
Point on May 27th 2006 Bush drew upon the logic of geopolitics to reflect on how Truman 
had “ kept US forces in Japan as a counterweight to Communist China” where the “the 
military footprint Truman established on two continents has remained virtually unchanged to 
this day and has served as the foundation for security in Europe and in the Pacific”.1189 
Implications about his audience aside, the logic of geopolitics served as the organising 
principle for US foreign policy in East Asia while the logic of capital compelled certain 
imperatives in the name of reproducing the international system and the US domestic way of 
life. The logics of US foreign policy would ultimately lead Bush to succinctly capture how the 
US imagined China and its global significance. He would make clear this approach in an 
interview with foreign journalists in August 2007, stating, “I view China as an 
opportunity”.1190 
Speaking in Lima on November 22, 2008 Bush would articulate an interpretation of global 
political and economic change which was to motivate much of Obama’s foreign policy 
towards China. Bush described how “we're witnessing a dramatic shift of history, as the 
centre of the world economic stage moves from west to east, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. 
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Some view the rise of Asia-Pacific with suspicion and fear; America doesn't”.1191 As Bush 
had made clear he viewed this as an opportunity, yet the events Bush was describing, the on-
going aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, were to constitute more of an acute anxiety with 
regards to potential US decline and its place in the world specifically in relation to China. If 
Bush appeared slightly ambivalent about this future, Obama, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, was much more concerned.   
8.5 Conclusion 
US presidential discourses have as this and the previous chapters have shown about creating 
the material conditions for certain outcomes to become more likely, especially with regards to 
China. From this strand of reasoning, the logic of identity was infused with teleological 
rendering of political order. This aspect of the logic of identity became increasingly apparent 
after the end of the Cold War and especially effervescent during the George W. Bush 
presidency. China and the discourses of China in US presidential statements were beginning 
to fill the void that Arbatov described would emerge with the dissolution of the USSR. This 
was not in the same sense if enmity, a distinct kind of relationship. Clinton clearly wanted 
China to become a joint administrator of the international system, at least regionally, and 
Zoellick’s comments during the George W. Bush presidency made this explicit.  Despite the 
consistent emphasis of the logic of identity in US presidential discourses of China it was 
regularly superseded by the logic of capital or geopolitics.   
This thesis now moves to the final period of its genealogical analysis, the Obama presidency 
exemplified by his ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific.  
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Chapter 9 – 2008-2016: Obama’s China 
 
“We are in a competition for influence with China; let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, 
do-good side of what we believe in, and let’s just talk straight realpolitik” 
- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 2nd 
20111192 
“US engagement in the Asia-Pacific is in America’s interests…America’s commitment to the 
region – and the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific in particular- is not transient. It is enduring. 
And that’s because the logic of, and the need for, and the value of American engagement in 
the Asia Pacific is irrefutable. And it is proven over decades.” 
-Ash Carter, US Secretary of Defence, Singapore, June 4th, 20161193  
Eric Bates (Interviewer): So why does President Obama think it’s a good idea? 
Bernie Sanders: He sees it as a geopolitical issue. He does not pretend, as previous presidents 
have, that this is going to create all kinds of jobs in America. His argument is that if you 
abandon the TPP, you’re gonna leave Asia open to Chinese influence. 
- Interview in the New Republic October 17th 20161194 
9.1 Introduction 
My aim in this thesis has been to understand how China has been rendered in US presidential 
discourses and offer an analytical framework for why. I present my argument through the 
analytical concepts of the three logics, of identity, capital and geopolitics.  This concluding 
chapter of the genealogy explores how the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics are 
apparent in Obama’s discourses of China.1195 Obama would most prominently invoke the 
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logic of capital in his approach to China even as his signature ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ was 
rendered through the logic of geopolitics. His attempts to pass the multilateral Trans-Pacific 
Partnership constituted the major expression of the logic of capital as the Obama would 
eventually indicate this was designed to pressure China to adopt certain economic reforms. 
The shift in US priorities that is now referred to as the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ took on its initial 
shape in an article by then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published in Foreign Policy in 
October 2011.1196 The declarative by-line, “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not 
Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the centre of the action”, makes the 
Obama administration’s priorities clear. Clinton expressed this sense of the future through the 
logic of capital when she described how “harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central 
to American economic and strategic interests and a ley priority for President Obama”.1197 In a 
tone more congenial than in the above epigraph, Clinton described a more mutually beneficial 
approach to the logic of capital in US discourses of China claim, a “thriving America is good 
for China and a thriving China is good for America”.1198  Clinton’s essay is worth including 
here for the manner in which it sets the scene for Obama’s discourses of China as the first 
statement by a US official publically describing the shift in US priorities. 
9.2 Obama, China and Anxiety in the US Imagination  
During the First Presidential debate of the 2008 US election, taking place at the University of 
Mississippi on September 26th 2008, Obama invoked a sense of anxiety at the US’s relative 
position to China declaring that “we've got to make sure that we're competing in education. 
We've got to invest in science and technology. China had a space launch and a space walk. 
We've got to make sure that our children are keeping pace in math and in science”.1199 The 
underlying premise of competition as a driver of economic development is not necessarily my 
concern here, but contributes to the US perception of relative insecurity in comparison to 
China. The US’s ability to compete economically with China was becoming a concern 
through the logic of capital. The debate was taking place in the midst of the 2008 financial 
crisis, and this was creating conditions where the US sense of itself was being put into 
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question as evident in Obama’s remarks.1200 The logic of capital and its manifestations in 
Obama’s concerns about the US economy stimulated a crisis in the US’s sense of identity.  
These concern about China also spilled into the possibility that it was upstaging the US in 
geopolitical terms. As Obama described how “with China, where we are borrowing billions of 
dollars. They now hold a trillion dollars' worth of our debt. And they are active in countries 
like in regions like Latin America, and Asia, and Africa…the conspicuousness of their 
presence is only matched by our absence, because we've been focused on Iraq”.1201 This was 
an early signal of Obama attempting to distance himself from the major foreign policy 
concerns of the Bush administration in the Middle East. Obama also inferred that geopolitical 
concerns about China were no longer confined to East Asia, but that this filtered into more 
global geopolitical concerns, a predominant feature of US China discussions after 1945. This 
also preconfigured how the logics of capital and geopolitics in US foreign policy towards 
China were becoming increasingly hard to disentangle in a way that has been marginally more 
straightforward over the course of this analysis. 
In July 2009 at the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Obama touched upon many of 
the ambiguities that underpin the US imagination of China. In what has become a modern 
axiom, Obama outlined how “the relationship between the United States and China will shape 
the 21st century…that really must underpin our partnership. That is the responsibility together 
we bear”.1202 Alluding to the substantial trade imbalance between the two states he channelled 
the logic of capital when he remarked, “just as China has benefitted from substantial 
investment and profitable exports, China can also be an enormous market for American 
goods”.1203  Reflecting on the context of US foreign policy in Asia during the Nixon 
Presidency, Obama described how “America had fought three wars in East Asia in just 30 
years, and the Cold War was in a stalemate. China's economy was cut off from the world, and 
a huge percentage of the Chinese people lived in extreme poverty. Back then, our dialogue 
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was guided by a narrow focus on our shared rivalry with the Soviet Union”.1204 Obama was 
attempting to juxtapose how US interest with China had been governed strictly by the logic of 
geopolitics during the Cold War whereas now the emphasis was on the logic of capital and 
China’s economic potential as perceived by the US, a return to themes prevalent in early 20th 
century presidential discourses. 
In a similar vein to Bill Clinton and Nixon, Obama presented a nuanced understanding of the 
Chinese worldview and China’s past contribution to the making of the US. He recalled how 
“China has its own distinct story that shapes its own worldview. And Americans know the 
richness of China's history because it helped to shape the world and it helped to shape 
America”.1205 As has been conceptualised by poststructural scholars and more recently by 
non-Western approaches to IR like Lily Ling’s, the other does not just function for the self to 
establish in opposition to, but there are traces of the other in the self.1206 Obama’s allusion to 
how China has helped shape the US was a significant allusion to this dynamic. Obama would 
make explicit the notion that US cooperation with China and China itself was becoming 
increasingly necessary to reproducing the international order. He observed how: 
“some in China think that America will try to contain China's ambitions; some in America think 
that there is something to fear in a rising China. I take a different view…I believe in a future where 
China is a strong, prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations, a future when 
our nations are partners out of necessity, but also out of opportunity”.1207 
By dispelling the strands of reasoning, described in chapter 2 as the China Threat genre, that 
the US needed to adopt the geopolitically orientated position that China was a threat, Obama 
emphasised the primacy of the logic of capital with regards to the “necessity” of China to the 
international order.  
Speaking in Shanghai on November 16th 2009, Obama also, like Clinton and Nixon, managed 
to situate the contemporary US-China relationship in the romanticised era of expansion and 
trade before the official encounter in 1844. Obama narrated how “in 1784, our Founding 
Father, George Washington, commissioned the Empress of China, a ship that set sail for these 
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shores so that it could pursue trade with the Qing Dynasty. Washington wanted to see the ship 
carry the flag around the globe and to forge new ties with nations like China”.1208 This early 
account reflected the historic basis of the logic of capital in US foreign policy towards China, 
even if in a strict sense Obama was reconstructing this narrative. Obama would make explicit 
one of the guiding imperatives of the logical of capital, stating, “this is a common American 
impulse, the desire to reach for new horizons and to forge new partnerships that are mutually 
beneficial”.1209 The logic of capital in this regard, also had implicit consequences for US 
geopolitical interests, indicating the relationship between the logics of capital and geopolitics. 
Obama would also reflect how despite the oscillations in US discourses of China concerning 
whether it was a threat, opportunity, enemy or ally, there were underlying tenets that informed 
US thinking. Obama indicated this when he observed how “over the two centuries that have 
followed, the currents of history have steered the relationship between our countries in many 
directions. And even in the midst of tumultuous winds, our people had opportunities to forge 
deep and even dramatic ties”.1210 More recently, Obama outlined how the logic of geopolitics 
provided the foundations for US-China reconciliation in the 1970s, despite Nixon’s claim 
otherwise. Obama stated in geopolitical terms how “in 1979, the political cooperation 
between the United States and China was rooted largely in our shared rivalry with the Soviet 
Union”, reflecting an emphasis on the logic of geopolitics.1211 
Turning to the present, Obama rebutted charges of US attempts to contain China through 
reasoning which reflected the imperatives and consequences of the logic of capital. Obama 
outlined his belief that  
“our world is now fundamentally interconnected. The jobs we do, the prosperity we build, the 
environment we protect, the security that we seek, all of these things are shared. And given that 
interconnection, power in the 21st century is no longer a zero-sum game; one country's success need 
not come at the expense of another. And that is why the United States insists we do not seek to 
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contain China's rise. On the contrary, we welcome China as a strong and prosperous and successful 
member of the community of nations”.1212  
Obama would also recognise the limits of the US experience for informing its foreign policy 
remarking, “I think it's very important for the United States not to assume that what is good 
for us is automatically good for somebody else. And we have to have some modesty about our 
attitudes towards other countries”. Despite this recognition of the importance of perspective 
and experience in international politics, Obama maintained the belief  “that there are certain 
fundamental principles that are common to all people, regardless of culture”.1213 Effectively, 
the logic of identity contained the assumption of the necessity and eventually inevitability 
universalisation of US ideals regarding the political structures and institutions of a state. 
Although the US was itself exceptional, Obama here, and US presidents more generally, 
maintained that the political aspects of US exceptionalism were replicable elsewhere. The 
logic of identity in this regard, recognised difference, but also the opportunity for 
homogenisation.  
Approaching the logic of capital in novel language with regards to China, Obama reflected on 
how “there's something about when people think that they can do business and make money 
that makes them think very clearly and not worry as much about ideology”.1214 He was 
alluding here to the manner in which China had adopted economic reforms that shifted away 
from its Communist beliefs and towards a more market based and capitalist orientation.1215 
These remarks reflected the case made by Bush and Clinton that economic openness would 
come with political openness, even if Obama portrayed the relationship in a more coincidental 
manner then strict causal necessity. 
Turning to the issue of security for East Asian as a whole, Obama indicated his desire to have 
a similar relationship with China as with Japan and South Korea.  Specifically, he argued, “it 
is in the United States interests to have a stable and prosperous China that helps to anchor a 
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stable and prosperous Asia in the same way that Japan's stability, South Korea's stability 
creates a more peaceful world and greater commercial ties with the United States. The same is 
true in respect to our policy towards China”.1216 The logic of capital thus guided the logic of 
geopolitics and its imperatives when considering how to foster the conditions for greater 
commercial ties with China. 
In some of his first comments regarding TPP at the APEC summit in Japan on November 13th 
2010, Obama indicated that the US is “looking to expand trade and commerce throughout the 
Asia-Pacific… And that's why we want to pursue the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would 
facilitate trade and open markets throughout the Asia-Pacific’.1217 This was the essence of the 
imperatives within the logic of capital. The US under Obama was approaching Asia as an 
opportunity to expand markets and trade. Obama would also clarify a few months later, that 
there was room for economic cooperation with China in his rendering of the logic of capital. 
At a welcoming ceremony for Chinese President Hu Jintao on January 19th 2011, Obama 
commented on the growing economic interdependence between the US and China. Obama 
explained, “we have an enormous stake in each other's success. In an interconnected world, in 
a global economy, nations including our own will be more prosperous and more secure when 
we work together”, repeating the his position that the US “welcomes China's rise as a strong, 
prosperous, and successful member of the community of nations”.1218 The logic of capital in 
this case functioned to limit the basis for a military conflict to break out between the US and 
China.  
Commenting more extensively on the economic relationship, Obama tried to dispel what he 
saw as unhelpful stereotypes of the relationship. He remarked, “I think our goal here today 
was to make sure that we break out of the old stereotypes that somehow China is simply 
taking manufacturing jobs and taking advantage of low wages; the U.S. is importing cheap 
goods and thereby having cheaper products, but also putting strains on our employment 
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base”.1219 This was an attempt to loosen the existing tensions in the logic of capital and the 
consequences of US foreign policy towards China for domestic labour interests and domestic 
capital interests. Obama responded arguing that “the relationship is much more complex than 
that, and it has much more potential than that. China is one of the top markets for American 
exports”.1220 The significance of the China market would again come to dominate US 
imaginations of China. More broadly though, Obama would also highlight how broader 
geopolitical concerns were fundamental in his approach to China. He reflected how, in 
conversations with Hu, “with regard to regional stability and security in East Asia, I stressed 
that the United States has a fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, 
unimpeded commerce, respect for international law, and the peaceful resolution of 
differences”.1221 Again though, the logic of capital as well as the logic of geopolitics 
continued to condition US policy. 
Obama would also imply that China could be understood as ‘catching up’ in terms of 
development as if all states existed on the same liberal plane of history progressing towards 
liberal democratic nirvana.1222 He described how “China's at a different stage of development 
than we are”, reflecting the pertinence of the liberal teleology I described in Bush’s discourses 
towards China. Although recognising that “China has a different political system than we do” 
and describing how the US and China “come from very different cultures and with very 
different histories”, Obama would recall how told Hu that “we have some core views as 
Americans about the universality of certain rights freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
freedom of assembly that we think are very important and that transcend cultures”.1223 The 
appreciation of cultural experiences and their impact on political perspectives only extended 
so far when understood through the logic of identity.  
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The signature US discourse towards China, historically, but more explicitly since Deng’s 
reforms, and as a result of the dominance of the logic of capital, was evident when Obama 
described to Hu how “China's rise offers enormous economic opportunity”. In a more 
informal setting, during a roundtable with business leaders and Hu, Obama described the 
general economic interest of the US with regards to China when he expressed how “we want 
to sell you all kinds of stuff. We want to sell you planes. We want to sell you cars. We want to 
sell you software”.1224 Making explicit the link between the search for markets abroad, and in 
China specifically, and the subsequent domestic benefits, Obama described how as “President 
Hu and his Government refocuses the economy on expanding domestic demand, that offers 
opportunities for US businesses, which ultimately translates into US jobs”.1225 This reflected 
in short, the logic of capital as evident in Obama’s foreign policy. Obama would nevertheless 
make clear, that he also adhered to the Bush administration’s approach to the benefits of 
China’s increasing involvement with the international order as coming with certain 
conditions. Obama would state, “China's rise is potentially good for the world. To the extent 
that China is functioning as a responsible actor on the world stage”.1226 The logic of capital 
then was complimented by the logics of geopolitics and identity, as was the case under the 
George W. Bush Presidency.  
In his 2011 State of the Union address Obama again drew comparisons to China indicating a 
continuing sense of anxiety at what China’s ‘rise’ might mean for the US. In an attempt to 
justify increased government spending on domestic issues like education and research, Obama 
described how “nations like China and India realized that with some changes of their own, 
they could compete in this new world. And so they started educating their children earlier and 
longer, with greater emphasis on math and science. They're investing in research and new 
technologies”.1227 Again referencing China, he remarked how “just recently, China became 
the home to the world's largest private solar research facility and the world's fastest 
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computer”.1228 This sense of anxiety extended into the domestic materiality of US identity as 
Obama lamented how US “infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped. South 
Korean homes now have greater Internet access than we do. Countries in Europe and Russia 
invest more in their roads and railways than we do. China is building faster trains and newer 
airports”.1229 When it came to green technology Obama warned how “China is making these 
investments. They have already captured a big chunk of the solar market partly because we 
fell down on the job. We weren't moving as fast as we should have. Those are jobs that could 
be created right here that are getting shipped overseas”.1230 This was about the US’s sense of 
itself as being the most developed country in the world, and not only was Obama describing 
issues pertinent to the US being a successful economy, he was invoking a sense of anxiety 
present in the logic of identity.  
Obama’s comparisons to China were invested with these concerns about US identity and 
sense of self specifically with regards to its economy. He argued how “building a world class 
transportation system is part of what made us an economic superpower. And now we're going 
to sit back and watch China build newer airports and faster railroads, at a time when millions 
of unemployed construction workers could build them right here in America?”1231 In Obama’s 
words, more investment was needed to restore the US’s sense of self. In an uncanny 
foreshadowing of rhetoric that would come to dominate the 2016 Presidential election, 
Obama made clear that his comparisons to other countries and call for government investment 
was a concern with “how America can be number one again”.1232 In this regard, the logic of 
capital and the logic of identity were closely intertwined as the US considered itself in relative 
decline in light of China’s ‘rise’. 
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9.3 The ‘Pivot’ and the Primacy of the Logic of Capital 
Speaking at the November 2011 APEC summit in Hawaii, Obama returned to the logic of 
geopolitics when he took his turn to invoke the geopolitical mantra that “the United States is a 
Pacific power, and we are here to stay… whether it's on security architecture, whether it's on 
trade, whether it's on commerce, we are going to continue to prioritise this region”.1233 
Significant though, was his emphasis on prioritising the Pacific. Obama would also invoke the 
logic of capital when he argued that “we should be rooting for China to grow, because not 
only does that then present an enormous marketplace for American businesses and American 
exports, but to see so many millions of people, hundreds of millions of people, lifted out of 
poverty is a remarkable achievement… those are potential customers for us in the future”.1234 
In this light, Obama described his visit to Australia in November 2011 as “making it clear that 
the US is stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific”.1235 This commitment also 
contained a defence of the liberal, rule based order that Clinton and Bush defended. Obama 
remarked how in the US: 
“we welcome a rising, peaceful China… with their rise comes increased responsibilities. It's 
important for them to play by the rules of the road and in fact help underwrite the rules that have 
allowed so much remarkable economic progress to be made over the last several decades. And 
that's going to be true on a whole host of issues. So where China is playing by those rules, 
recognizing its new role, I think this is a win-win situation”.1236 
Aside from repeating the responsibilities that China’s ‘rise’ earned for it, Obama also indicted 
the desire for China to not just adhere to international rules and norms, but help “underwrite” 
them.1237 This served to rebut the charge that the US feared China as he remarked, “I think the 
notion that we fear China is mistaken. The notion that we are looking to exclude China is 
mistaken”.1238 Important here, is the distinction between fear and anxiety, if anxiety is a more 
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general uncertainty about the meaning of something, then fear is a specific sensation to 
something certain. This exemplifies how the logics of capital, geopolitics, and identity then do 
not determine specific policies or thoughts, but do frame, organise and limit the parameters of 
US foreign policy towards China. 
In his hallmark address regarding US foreign policy in Asia, Obama spoke to the Australian 
Parliament in Canberra on November 17th 2011. The major content of the speech was 
describing what would come to be known as the ‘pivot’ to Asia, first articulated by Hillary 
Clinton as Secretary of State in her October Foreign Policy article. Obama argued that this 
prioritising of the Asia-Pacific, “for the United States, this reflects a broader shift. After a 
decade in which we fought two wars that cost us dearly in blood and treasure, the United 
States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region”.1239 What 
Obama wanted to indicate though by emphasising the logic of identity was that this was a 
matter of priority as “the United States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation”.1240 The 
US’s sense of itself as a Pacific state implied certain geopolitical entitlements to acting in 
Asia. The potential Obama described was rendered through the logic of capital as he remarked 
how in the Asia-Pacific “we see the future. As the world's fastest growing region, and home to 
more than half the global economy, the Asia-Pacific is critical to achieving my highest 
priority, and that's creating jobs and opportunity for the American people”.1241 US foreign 
policy the reflected domestic economic concerns that I describe as operating through the logic 
of capital. 
The ‘pivot’, being conditioned by the logic of capital, was consequentially organised through 
the logic of geopolitics and the US’s network of regional allies. Obama stated, “I have 
therefore made a deliberate and strategic decision: As a Pacific nation, the United States will 
play a larger and long term role in shaping this region and its future by upholding core 
principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends”.1242 In terms of the logic of 
geopolitics this meant, as Obama put it, that the US would “preserve our unique ability to 
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project power and deter threats to peace”.1243 The projection of power in this sense was to 
occur spatially as well as discursively as the US attempted to order East Asian relations. 
Turning to China in an attempt to argue that the ‘pivot’ was not about containing China, 
Obama stated, “the United States will continue our effort to build a cooperative relationship 
with China. All of our nations have a profound interest in the rise of a peaceful and 
prosperous China. That's why the United States welcomes it”. Geopolitically for the US, 
Obama described how “we've seen that China can be a partner, from reducing tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula to preventing proliferation”.1244 Obama would also repeat the US axiom 
regarding the link between economic and political freedom. He described how “history 
teaches us, the greatest force the world has ever known for creating wealth and opportunity is 
free markets. So we seek economies that are open and transparent. We seek trade that is free 
and fair. And we seek an open international economic system, where rules are clear and every 
nation plays by them”.1245 This statement briefly encapsulates the contemporary articulation 
of the logic of capital as understood in US presidential discourses regarding China and foreign 
policy more generally. 
Fundamentally, Obama would make clear how these interests and imperatives, embedded in 
the logics of capital and geopolitics, were conditioned by the logic of identity.  In the passage, 
which served as the initial provocation this thesis began with, Obama declared: 
“This is the future we seek in the Asia-Pacific: security, prosperity, and dignity for all. That's what 
we stand for. That's who we are. That's the future we will pursue in partnership with allies and 
friends and with every element of American power. So let there be no doubt: In the Asia-Pacific in 
the 21st century, the United States of America is all in”.1246 
Obama makes explicit the constitutive link between how the US conceptualises its identity 
and how it acts. This is the definitive imperative in the logic of identity where the US’s 
imagining of its own identity compels specific foreign policy practices, exemplified by how it 
conceives of itself as a Pacific power, which obliges and entitles engagement in the region. 
This is not to say that the logic of identity is the primary influence in US foreign policy 
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towards China, but that it shapes and limits how the logics of capital and geopolitics can be 
rendered in practice.   
Prior to a meeting with then Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping in February 2012, Obama 
recalled how the US had “tried to emphasise that because of China's extraordinarily—
extraordinary development over the last two decades, that with expanding power and 
prosperity also comes increased responsibilities”.1247 His concern here was presented through 
the logic of capital as he outlined how his administration “want to work with China to make 
sure that everybody is working by the same rules of the road when it comes to the world 
economic system”.1248 China, in Obama’s terms, now that it was becoming increasingly 
economically developed and consequentially had to meet certain standards if it wanted to 
fully participate in the international order. 
During the 2012 Presidential debate in Florida where Republican nominee Mitt Romney 
regularly raised the issue of China, Obama conceded stated that “China is both an adversary 
but also a potential partner in the international community if it's following the rules”.1249 How 
the US conceptualised China then, was contingent on how rigorously China adhered to the 
standards of international behaviour as understood by the US. The debate was also significant, 
as Obama would make explicit the geopolitical role of TPP. He declared that “we believe 
China can be a partner, but we're also sending a very clear signal that America is a Pacific 
power, that we are going to have a presence there…And we're organising trade relations with 
countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic 
international standards”.1250 Obama was essentially deploying a contemporary form of Taft’s 
dollar diplomacy where US economic power could be deployed to shape the behaviour and 
nature of other states, not just for economic gain in its own right but for more explicit and 
broader geopolitical interests.  
US economic power was becoming orientated towards making China behave in a specific 
manner and conduct particular reforms regarding the liberalisation of its economy, with the 
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aim of the US accruing certain economic benefits from this. US foreign policy was not so 
much about containing China, as had been the case during the 1950s, but about fostering the 
conditions to produce a certain kind of China. This reflected the convergence of the logics of 
capital, geopolitics and identity as the US desired a China who while helping to underwrite 
the rules of the international order essentially functioning as a joint administrator of that 
order. The issue with the greatest need for cooperation in terms of the international order was 
climate change as Obama made clear arguing that “neither country by itself can deal with the 
challenge of climate change. That's an issue that we'll have to deal with together”.1251 Again, 
China had a necessary role to play.  
In an interview on CBS in June 2013, Obama reflected on how China’s recent, rapid pace of 
economic development was affecting how it perceived its role in the world. He repeated the 
need for China to take on increased responsibility in the international order remarking, “we've 
got to get this relationship right and China does need to be a stakeholder”.1252 Obama also 
considered from the Chinese perspective, “they recognize…they have achieved such rapid 
growth and they have grown so fast almost on steroids that there's a part of them that still 
thinks of themselves as this poor country that's got all these problems”.1253 The consequences 
of this were in Obama’s words:  
“I think what you're seeing inside of Chinese leadership is the desire to maybe continue not to be 
responsible, not to be a full stakeholder, work the international system on something like trade or 
intellectual property rights; get as much as they can and be free riders and let the United States 
worry about the big hassles and the big problems”.1254  
What these thoughts reveal, is the manner in which the US no longer had the desire, and 
potentially the capacity to address global issues on its own. In terms of the logic of identity, 
the Obama exemplified how the US considered that occupying a certain economic status 
globally, came with certain responsibilities of being a modern state. More precisely Obama 
described how “what we're saying to them is you can't pick and choose. You know, you can't 
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have all the rights of a major world power, but none of the responsibilities”.1255 Following this 
line of argument, the logics of capital, geopolitics and identity were inseparable in Obama’s 
discourse. Each limited and shaped how the others could be rendered discursively and the 
subsequent actions they compelled. 
In his 2014 commencement speech at West Point military academy Obama considered the 
major decision facing the US was “not whether America will lead, but how we will lead, not 
just to secure our peace and prosperity, but also extend peace and prosperity around the 
globe”.1256 He would try to position his foreign policy somewhere between adopting some 
form isolation and extensive intervention in global crises. Definitively, Obama declared, 
“America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. The military…is 
and always will be the backbone of that leadership.1257 This leadership was framed within the 
need to secure the perpetuation and extension of the conditions for the imperatives of the 
logics of capital and geopolitics. 
On November 14th 2014, Obama commented on the Chinese plans to set up what would 
become the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. He remarked how US concerns “on 
something like a infrastructure bank in this region [was] making sure that there's transparency 
and accountability, and that if it's in fact a multilateral institution, that there are rules that all 
countries are abiding by in the operations of the institution”.1258 Obama made it clear that as 
long as China acted within existing international rules then the US did was not especially 
concerned. Conceding the limitations to the logic identity when it came to China Obama 
remarked, “we don't expect China to follow an American model in every instance, but we're 
going to continue to have concerns about human rights”.1259 
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At an APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Obama reiterated a common theme within 
in US discourses on China’s ‘rise’. He described how “we welcome the rise of a prosperous, 
peaceful, and stable China”.1260 Elaborating on this theme, Obama recounted how “over 
recent decades the United States has worked to help integrate China into the global economy, 
not only because it's in China's best interests, but because it's in America's best interests and 
the world's best interests. We want China to do well”.1261 This integration into the global 
economy and international order extended to cooperation over climate change, as Obama 
announced an agreement between the US and China in with regards to reducing their carbon 
emissions. Obama invoked the sense of responsibility both states had when he argued, “as the 
world's two largest economies, energy consumers, and emitters of greenhouse gases, we have 
a special responsibility to lead the global effort against climate change”.1262 The issue of 
climate change appeared in this light to transcend the logics of capital, geopolitics and 
identity, as it cannot be confined to any particular one even if responses to it could be seen 
within one or more of them.  
Without exploring this notion in great detail here it is worth considering that the potential 
consequences of climate change have started to induce a more specific logic, present in some 
of the remarks made by Clinton that I discuss on page 247, about to comprehend and respond 
to it. A logic that is more attuned to the existential and transnational implications of the more 
extreme scenarios.1263 To return to the focus here, Obama would outline the importance of the 
agreement in the following manner, “That's why today I am proud that we can announce a 
historic agreement. I commend President Xi, his team, and the Chinese Government for the 
commitment they are making to slow, peak, and then reverse the course of China's carbon 
emissions”.1264 This raises the potential for climate change, as the definitive transnational or 
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global issue, as collapsing the relationship between the three logics I describe in US 
presidential discourses of China. 
Returning to the logic of geopolitics, Obama outlined how “for decades, America's 
engagement in the Asia-Pacific, including our alliances and our stabilizing presence, have 
been a foundation for the region's progress, including contributing to China's remarkable 
economic growth”.1265 In this strand of reasoning, it was the due to the consequences of US 
policy in the region that had guaranteed the requisite geopolitical stability necessary for the 
conditions of economic development. The logic of geopolitics, as deployed by the US 
concerning its presence in the Asia-Pacific, operated in lieu of the imperatives of the logic of 
capital. The US, had in Obama’s reasoning, been historically engaged in Asia in order to 
create the conditions where it too could benefit economically. This revealed the US’s primary 
concern with geopolitical stability, where the imperatives of the logic of identity as the 
requirement to foster democracies, were secondary unless they contributed to the concerns 
within the logic of capital. This explains why the US can take the following position on the 
territorial disputes over various islands between China and other Asian countries. Obama 
stated the US in the following terms where: 
“While the United States does not take a position on competing claims in the East and South China 
Seas, I made it clear that we do have a fundamental interest in freedom of navigation and that 
territorial disputes in the region should be resolved peacefully, in accordance with international 
law”.1266 
Publically then, the US prioritised the logic of capital where it was concerned with limiting 
the effects of these disputes on trade and other economic activities. 
Speaking in December 2014, Obama recognised the domestic tensions contributing to China’s 
foreign policy. Obama observed how Xi “has consolidated power faster and more 
comprehensively than probably anybody since, I think, Deng Xiaoping”, significantly Obama 
recognised the “dangers in that: on issues of human rights, on issues of clamping down on 
dissent. He taps into a nationalism that worries his neighbours and that we've seen manifest in 
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these maritime disputes in the South China Sea and as well as on the Senkaku Islands”.1267 
Obama was more concerned with acting on the imperatives of the logic of capital. He 
described how “one of the ancillary benefits of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is to create high 
standards in the region that then China has to adapt to, as opposed to a race to the bottom 
where there's no IP protection, for example, and China is really setting the terms for how trade 
and investment should operate”.1268 It was becoming more explicit that TPP was about 
constraining China rather than containing China. The Trade agreement was an attempt to 
regulate and Chinese behaviour to produce a certain kind of China rather than limit its 
behaviour outright. 
During a question and answer session with the Business Roundtable in December 2014, 
Obama reflected on his anxiety over China’s economic impact on the US. He responded to a 
question on China, in an answer worth recollecting in full: 
“I do not take potential competition from China lightly, but I am absolutely confident we've got 
better cars than China does. And I'd much rather have our problems than China's problems. That 
I'm confident about. On the other hand, the one thing I will say is that if they need to build some 
stuff, they can build it. And over time, that wears away our advantage competitively. It's 
embarrassing: You drive down their roads, and you look at what they're able to do”.1269 
Implicit in this answer was that although Obama still felt the US more developed than China, 
in manufacturing and economic terms there appeared a sense of envy at China’s economic 
capacity. Whether this was due to Republican obstruction in Congress or merely China’s 
perceived capable economic ability, is for my purposes besides the point, what the remarks do 
reflect though, is further evidence of the logic of capital was giving rise to a sense of US 
anxiety and uncertainty about what China’s ‘rise’ means for itself.  
During his 2015 State of the Union address Obama would again allude to the sense of anxiety 
in US foreign policy about China’s ‘rise’ and its consequences.  He argued, “China wants to 
write the rules for the world's fastest growing region. That would put our workers and our 
businesses at a disadvantage. Why would we let that happen? We should write those 
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rules”.1270 This line of reasoning reflected primarily the logic of capital but also expressed 
geopolitical concerns about the Asia-Pacific and the sense that the US was the worlds arbiter 
of economic rules. Although Obama regularly emphasised US cooperation with China, 
compelled by the logic of capital he did maintain that this did not allay US geopolitical 
concerns about China’s increasingly forthright behaviour in Asia. Obama stated how “the 
scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented, even as we remain alert to China's 
military modernization and reject any role for intimidation in resolving territorial 
disputes”.1271 The logic of geopolitics and with it, the US’s concerns for its allies in Asia, did 
retain a certain degree of autonomy from the logic of capital, whereby the US understood its 
interests as not purely economic. In this regard, the logic of geopolitics compelled the US to 
behave in a certain way concerning what to do about an increasingly powerful state in a 
region where it had maintained relative hegemony for a sustained period of time. 
Speaking at the Nike headquarters in Oregon on May 8th 2015, Obama outlined the potential 
benefits to the Chinese if Congress did not approve TPP. He argued: 
 “we have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy. And we should do it 
today, while our economy is in the position of global strength. Because if we don't write the rules 
for trade around the world, guess what? China will. And they'll write those rules in a way that 
gives Chinese workers and Chinese businesses the upper hand and locks American made goods 
out”.1272  
As mentioned above it was becoming increasingly clear how TPP exemplified the logic of 
capital and was about responding to China’s ‘rise’ in a way that would benefit the US while 
pressuring China to adopt particular economic reforms and practices. 
During another Business Roundtable question and answer session in September 2015 Obama 
reflected on the comparisons being drawn between US anxiety about Japan in the 1980s and 
China in the 2010s. He argued that the US should “not fall into the same trap that we fell into 
around Japan in the 1980s, which is, somehow, China is taking over just like Japan was taking 
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over, and we're in inevitable decline”.1273 In a minor sense, Obama was contradicting some of 
his earlier statements comparing US unfavourably to China but here he maintained that “this 
whole argument…that somehow we're getting outcompeted, out-dealt, out-this, out-that, we're 
losing, we're in—nobody outside the United States understands what we're talking about”.1274 
What he was defending though, was US engagement with China in the face of calls for a more 
confrontational strategy.  
In a joint news conference with Xi on September 23rd 2015, Obama outlined how the US 
understanding of China influenced how it acted towards China. He described how “given 
China's size, we recognize there's still a lot of development to be done and a lot of poverty 
inside of China”.1275 Despite this recognition, Obama maintained that the US “can't treat 
China as if it's still a very poor, developing country, as it might have been 50 years ago. It is 
now a powerhouse. And that means it's got responsibilities and expectations in terms of 
helping to uphold international rules that might not have existed before”.1276 China’s 
economic development had lead the US to view it in a more equal manner, which essentially 
meant a new set of expectations regarding international responsibility and an adjustment in 
the framing of the logic of identity.  
In outlining his concern over not completing TPP and the benefits this failure would offer 
China, Obama again argued that “if we fail to get the Trans-Pacific Partnership done, if we do 
not create the architecture for high standards trade and commerce in this region, then that void 
will be filled by China, it will be filled by our economic competitors. They will make the 
rules, and those rules will not be to our advantage”.1277 This anxiety about not being able to 
determine the terms of international trade in Asia exemplified the sense of anxiety that Obama 
acknowledged permeated US domestic politics after the 2008 financial crisis. He speculated 
that “the reason that a lot of Americans feel anxious—is that the economy has been changing 
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in profound ways, changes that started long before the great recession hit, changes that have 
not let up”.1278 The financial crisis of 2008 then created the conditions for US anxiety both 
domestically amongst its population, but also internationally regarding its relationship to 
China. 
In a statement directed at China during his visit to Vietnam in May 2016, Obama outlined 
how the US would act to preserve geopolitical norms that facilitate economic trade. Obama 
again restated how “in the South China Sea, the United States is not a claimant in current 
disputes. But we will stand with partners in upholding core principles, like freedom of 
navigation and over-flight and lawful commerce that is not impeded and the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, through legal means, in accordance with international law”.1279 
Describing the geopolitical performances available to the US Obama described how “the 
United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and we 
will support the right of all countries to do the same”.1280 The logic of geopolitics in this case, 
was prioritised by Obama as unquestionable US foreign policy in the region. 
The significance of passing TPP to counter China and its attempts to reduce US influence in 
Asia were prominent in some of Obama’s final comments on international politics in 
September 2016. He released a statement describing how “as our global economy evolves, we 
have to ensure America plays a leading role in setting the highest standards for the rest of the 
world to follow. That's what the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, is all about: putting 
American workers, farmers, and businesses first”.1281 Obama summarised the need for TPP 
warning that “China is negotiating a trade deal of its own, one that would carve up the 
growing Asia-Pacific markets at our expense, risking American jobs, businesses, and goods. 
Unless we act now to set our own high standards, the fast growing Asia-Pacific will be forced 
to play by lower standard rules that we didn't set”.1282 The major issues at stake in Asia then 
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were rendered through the logic of capital where the US stood to lose out economically to the 
benefit of China. 
9.4 Conclusion 
In April 2016, The Atlantic magazine published an extensive article based on a number of 
interviews with Obama conducted by Jeffrey Goldberg. 1283 Although not Obama’s final 
statement on foreign policy, the article tried to capture what the ‘Obama Doctrine’ consisted 
of and offers useful insight into the Obama’s foreign policy motivations. These merit 
consideration here before I offer some concluding thoughts overall for the manner in which 
the further illuminate Obama’s foreign policy thinking. Obama reflected how “in terms of 
traditional great-state relations, I do believe that the relationship between the United States 
and China is going to be the most critical”.1284 More precisely, Obama considered, through the 
logics of capital and geopolitics what the possibilities of China’s successful ‘rise’ or collapse 
might mean for the US. He outlined how if “China continues on a peaceful rise, then we have 
a partner that is growing in capability and sharing with us the burdens and responsibilities of 
maintaining an international order”.1285 What this reveals, as mentioned above is the manner 
in which Obama acknowledged the limits of US capability within international politics as 
rendered through the logics of identity, capital, and geopolitics. 
Conversely, Obama considered the challenges facing China where “if [it] fails; if it is not able 
to maintain a trajectory that satisfies its population and has to resort to nationalism as an 
organising principle; if it feels so overwhelmed that it never takes on the responsibilities of a 
country its size in maintaining the international order; if it views the world only in terms of 
regional spheres of influence—then not only do we see the potential for conflict with China, 
but we will find ourselves having more difficulty dealing with these other challenges that are 
going to come”.1286 Succinctly Obama affirmed that he had “been very explicit in saying that 
we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China”.1287 
What this signifies is Obama’s understanding that to see China as a threat or opportunity as is 
the traditional way for debating China’s rise, misses out the significance of China’s apparent 
necessity to US interests, regionally, globally and economic as well as political. In 
geopolitical terms, Obama was more expressive regarding US pushback to some of China’s 
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actions in the region. He argued, “I think we have to be firm where China’s actions are 
undermining international interests, and if you look at how we’ve operated in the South China 
Sea, we have been able to mobilise most of Asia to isolate China in ways that have surprised 
China, frankly, and have very much served our interest in strengthening our alliances”.1288  
In this line of reasoning, the US requires China to participate in the international order in a 
manner concordant with US ideals to help preserve and reproduce that very order. There was 
nothing inherently threatening about China’s ‘rise’, but the US was concerned, as it has been 
since Franklin Roosevelt’s hopes for a democratic China, in producing a China that behaved 
in a way beneficial to the US and the preservation of the international order. Describing 
Obama’s foreign policy towards China as either containment or attempting to constrain China 
essentially misses the major point that US foreign policy towards China has been about 
producing a China that would assist in the administration of the international order, as the US 
understood it. What this revealed was a sense of anxiety present in US discourses about China 
with regards to the US’s relative position and domestic way of life, but less overtly, a sense of 
anxiety about international politics more broadly. This is best exhibited by the admittedly few 
remarks on climate change I have engaged with in this chapter and the previous one. What 
climate change appears to do based on the difficulty with locating it in any of the three logics 
I have described and analysed, is collapse their distinctions and imperatives. Climate change 
might in this regard induce its own logic within US political discourses that conditions not 
just US discourse of China, but US discourses of politics more generally. Whether this is the 
case, and what this might mean though are matters for another day. 
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Chapter 10 - Beginnings 
 
10.1 Beginnings  
This thesis has demonstrated that three logics, of identity, capital, and geopolitics, emerge 
over time and are predominant in US presidential discourses of China. These were not pre-
existing assumptions derived as analytical concepts from the genealogy I have presented. 
These logics function to frame, organise and limit what is politically possible and 
subsequently perceived as necessary, in US foreign policy towards China. The logic of capital 
addresses the need for US capital to reproduce itself by expanding internationally. The logic 
of geopolitics predominantly functions as the organising principles for the logic of capital and 
US foreign relations specifically in relation to China, though it as times invoked 
independently of the other two. The logic of identity functions as a conditioning limit on the 
logics of capital and geopolitics. By this I mean that the logic of identity both enables and 
limits certain understandings and application of the other two logics. The logics of US foreign 
policy towards China within US presidential discourses operate in a nexus of converging and 
diverging tension. This is not the same as some kind of dialectical synthesis, but to describe 
US foreign policy as conditioned through only one of the logic of identity, capital or 
geopolitics would ignore the evidence presented here. 
In the 19th century US presidential discourses of China, exemplified by Polk, Grant and 
Cleveland predominantly invoked the logic of capital where China was a potential economic 
‘solution’ to domestic economic crises. It was not until the Presidency of William McKinley 
that the other two logics of geopolitics and identity became visibly more significant. Taft 
established a lasting legacy through his rendering of the logic of capital towards China as a 
means to transform China. Franklin Roosevelt became the first to gradually combine the 
logics in a way that did not overly prioritise one or the other. Under Truman there was a clear 
increase in China’s significance.  He was also significant for being the first to articulate a 
preference for China to assist in the management of the international system, at least locally in 
Asia. Eisenhower rendered China explicitly as “a bleak problem that must be solved”.1289 
Johnson and Nixon acknowledged that allowing space for understanding China’s perspective 
on the world would benefit US policy and both invoked the logic of capital to varying degrees 
when justifying reconciliation. Although Clinton regularly invoked all three logics, he more 
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regularly imagined China through the logic of capital. Significantly, Obama not only 
recognised an uncertainty about what China’s economic development meant for the US but he 
started to reflect the limits of those logics in regards to China when it came to addressing the 
issue of climate change. 
From this genealogy it becomes possible to reflect on how the problem of China emerged 
historically as a perceived solution to the economic problems of the US before it became 
rendered as a geopolitical problem outright during Eisenhower’s presidency. Increasingly 
apparent though, especially under Clinton, Bush and Obama is the US intention that China 
become, at the least, a regional custodian of the international order, if not a more ‘responsible’ 
member more globally. Under Obama, China was now perceived as necessary actor in the 
maintenance of the global economy and political system not just an opportunity or a threat. 
What I can establish more generally from this analysis is that US anxiety over the ‘rise of 
China’ is a manifestation of historic US conceptions of its identity as a ‘Pacific power’, its 
geopolitical imagining of the Asia-Pacific, and the perceived imperatives of contemporary 
capitalism in the US. Fundamentally the logics I articulate not only capture how the US thinks 
about and how its foreign policy is conditioned towards China, but they function to produce 
China as the very problem they attempt to resolve. And it is in this manner that I expand on 
Foucault’s comments on critique as setting out the assumptions of a particular practice with 
the impetuous of critical theory as outlined by Cox to imply that it is on the terrain of these 
logics that US foreign policy should be challenged if one has in mind reducing the 
geopolitical and economic tension between the US and China today. 
As Chapter 2 indicated, there is an extensive body of literature on US foreign policy towards 
China though none of which provide a genealogical analysis of US presidential discourse over 
this time frame. My argument should hopefully speak to and contribute to the conclusions 
drawn by Pan, Barr, Turner and Ling, regarding the significance and limitations of how China 
has featured in the US imagination. Following Koopman’s framing of Foucault’s genealogy I 
have been able to derive three analytical concepts which will hopefully be useful to further 
analysis of either US foreign policy towards China in more detail, or at least potentially a 
starting point for engaging with US foreign policy more broadly. I remained mindful though 
of Angharad Stephens’ observation that many critical responses to the prevailing US 
imaginative geographies “tend to keep them firmly in place and entrench them further”, 
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though I would contend that this should not preclude the analysis here.1290 There must also be 
some acceptance that even if we produce certain ideas we wish to disrupt, this should be 
considered the price of critique and analysis. 
In many ways, this research has produced more questions than it has answer. This is perhaps 
always the case, but remains a strange sensation. There are a number of potential areas of 
further research that exist latently in the manner in which I have selected the source material 
and focus that I use. Time and practicality necessarily lead to certain methodological choices 
that always imply certain a set of limitation to one’s argument.  For instance, in light of the 
genealogy it would seem to make sense to structure the argument thematically through the 
logics of identity, capital and geopolitics, although a chronological structure was necessary to 
demonstrate how I derived the logics even if a thematic structure lends itself to a more overt 
analytical position.  
My focus on presidential sources alone, with a few complimentary additions from 
government officials raises the question of whether these logics feature in other sources of 
discourses. One might consider how the US public consider the importance of relations with 
China, especially in the current moment defined by Donald Trump’s presidency, more on this 
below. One issue that became apparent is the absence of an explicitly racial discourse in the 
sources I analysed. What I noticed early in my research is that although Cleveland and 
McKinley made explicit references to race in their statements about the Chinese, racial 
discourses were much more overt and explicit in other sources, especially during the 19th 
century in congressional and everyday discourses. For instance, one popular pamphlet 
circulating in the early 19th century during debates over Chinese exclusion was entitled ‘Meat 
Vs. Rice. American Manhood Against Asiatic Coolieism. Which Shall Survive?’ and Chinese 
were racially inferior due to their diet of rice.1291 Worth considering as well might be the 
relationship between popular, congressional and presidential discourses of China.  
It might also be analytical fruitful to engage with the broader set of foreign policy documents 
contained in the published Foreign Relations of the United States collections to see whether 
the logics discernable in presidential discourses are present in the more private spaces of 
                                                
1290 Angharad Stephens, ‘Beyond imaginative geographies? Critique, co-optation, and imagination in the 
aftermath of the war on terror?’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space (2011): 254. 
1291 American Federation of Labor, ‘Some Reasons for Chinese Exclusion. Meat Vs. Rice. American Manhood 
Against Asiatic Coolieism. Which Shall Survive?’,  Internet Archive 
(https://archive.org/details/somereasonsforc00labogoog 20 October 2014). 
 303 
foreign policy decision making.1292  This might also help with exploring the relatively under 
researched period of US-China relations during the 1920s.1293 Or it would be worth examining 
the relationship between the broader milieu of geopolitical ideas and US foreign policy with 
regards to China. This could be done for instance, bearing in mind the close relations ship 
between Alfred Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, by examining the relationship between the 
arguments of Mahan’s the Problem of Asia and Brooks Adams’ The New Empire and 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy.1294 One could do this through a more contemporary focus and 
consider whether and how these logics are circulated in modern media discourses, 
contemporary secondary literature on US foreign policy or in academic.  
I also do not engage at all with how the Chinese responded to these discourses or indeed 
through what logics they understand the US. It might also have been beneficial to consider US 
discourses of China and Japan over the period as much of their concern about one was to do 
with how they understood the other, apparent in the discourses of Theodore Roosevelt, 
Franklin Roosevelt or Obama. There were also significant periods of debate in the US about 
how exactly they should understand China, most notable were during WWII up until the 
success of the Communist revolution in China.1295 This would reflect more the more 
‘traditional’ concerns of a genealogy as needing to focus on debates and subjugated 
knowledge, rather than say, presidential discourses. In a broader sense, it would be worth 
investigating the consequences of the US imagining of China for the rest of Asia or more 
specifically South-East Asia, especially during the second half of the 20th century.  
There is a necessary question that follows from this genealogy, either a continuation of the 
genealogy if you will or what other analysis can now be done with the conceptual frameworks 
developed form the genealogy. One might address why a particular logic was more dominant 
at a particular time, or indeed bhow the different logics relate to eachother. An inquiry of this 
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kind would necessitate the application of a different set of theoretical and methodological 
tools, but nonetheless requires an initial genealogy as I present here, to be meaningful. A 
number of questions arise concerning where and how does change occur in US foreign 
policy? Why at some times does one logic appear more evident than the other two? What are 
the specific conditions that affect this? A more theoretical analysis of how the logics relate to 
each other would also be worthwhile. I remained essentially ambivalent about US political 
party structures but it would be worth considering the function of these logics in the broader 
political context of US politics concerning class antagonisms and other personal interests of 
political actors involved in the foreign policy process. This concern has been noted astutely 
explored by Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton when looking at the competing class interests 
in US foreign policy in relation to Iraq during the run up to the 2003 US invasion. While I 
have refrained from explicit engagement with their ideas, the issues they raised have haunted 
this thesis for a substantial period of time.1296 
Where possible I have referred to the domestic and broader socio-political factors that might 
have influenced US foreign policy towards China though this was never intended to be a 
major focus of this thesis.  For instance, it was apparent that domestic financial problems in 
the US often spurred an increased interest in China, either in the 1890s, the 1930s or post 
2008. I was more concerned with articulating the logics which condition how the US came to 
think and acts towards China. Further research might benefit from a historical sociological 
approach along the lines of the extraordinary work done by Alexander Anievas and others 
who make use of theories of uneven and combined development.1297 This would go some way 
to deepening our understanding of the logics I have described and their functioning within 
various domestic and transnational social relations. This would also reflect a more concerted 
attempt to account for capitalism in US foreign policy and policy towards China more 
broadly. The logic of capital I describe, mildly reflects this concern but for the most part only 
recognises that empirically, it is vital to understanding how the US thinks about and acts 
towards China. A more specific analysis of the role of private corporations and individuals in 
this light would also add to our understanding and analysis. 
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The final two chapters of this thesis also reflect the growing concern with climate change in 
US presidential discourses regarding China. The significance was noted by Obama’s 
Secretary of State John Kerry reflecting on the failed 2009 Copenhagen when he described 
how the US’s relationship with China “changed the paradigm of what happened in 
Copenhagen…It was a sea change”.1298 More specific research might focus on how the issue 
of climate change and related security effects was affecting how the US understood its 
relationship to China and how it should orientate its foreign policy.1299 What can be drawn 
from my brief analysis of Obama’s comments, centred on a secretly negotiated deal with 
China, is how the existential nature of climate change does not fit into any of the logics I 
describe.1300 
This though, brings into focus the Donald Trump presidency. 
10.2 2016 and Beyond: The Trump Future. 
The 2016 election of Donald Trump raises, amongst other things, a number of important 
questions that the research I have presented here might be able to address. I present a few 
brief suggestions on how my research would approach his presidency through the three logics 
of identity, capital and geopolitics I have outlined in this thesis. 
The ascension to the US Presidency of Donald Trump has provoked a heightening of tensions 
between the US and China as he has adopted a more aggressive stance towards China 
throughout his presidential campaign. Although criticism of China during US elections is a 
now common theme1301, Trump has advocated a contemporary form of unilateral 
mercantilism towards China on the perception that China has actively undermined the US 
economy. This is best, but unfortunately, exhibited by his declaration that “we can't continue 
to allow China to rape our country”.1302 Trump’s rhetoric can be understood as exhibiting a 
more bellicose rendering of the three logics I have developed in this thesis, and a particular 
understanding of the logic of capital and identity.  This is despite the fact that Xi Jinping’s 
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January 2017 speech in Davos1303 appeared to represent a position that US foreign policy had 
been pressuring China to adopt since at least Clinton’s era, that of a “responsible stakeholder” 
and cooperative administrator of regional and global capitalism. 
In his brief time as president, Trump has already reduced his statements on China to more 
palatable variations on the US having lost jobs since China’s entry into the WTO. On 
February 23rd 2017 Trump would set out his position on US foreign economic policy, 
revealing the intimate relationship between ‘domestic’ and  ‘foreign’ concerns when he stated, 
“my administration's policies and regulatory reform, tax reform, trade policies will return 
significant manufacturing jobs to our country”.1304  
In an address to Congress on February 28th contextualised that claim when he remarked, 
“we've lost more than one-fourth of our manufacturing jobs since NAFTA was approved, and 
we've lost 60,000 factories since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001”.1305 A 
few weeks later at a ‘Make America Great Again’ rally in Kentucky on March 20th Trump 
would remark, “since China joined -- and it's another beauty -- the World Trade Organization 
in 2001, the United States has lost many more than 60,000 factories. We sacrificed our own 
middle class to finance the growth of foreign countries”.1306 It is comparatively early days but 
what is clear from these remarks is the manner in which Trump is approaching China through 
the logic of capital. 
Trump did make some reference to China during his February 10th meeting with Japanese 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In relation to Japan he stated, “working together, our two 
countries have the ability to bring greater harmony, stability, and prosperity to the Pacific 
region and beyond, improving countless lives in the process”.1307 His comments reveal a 
distinct difference in tone from his campaign rhetoric as evidence by the relatively oblique 
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statement, “we have conversations with various representatives of China. I believe that that 
will all work out very well for everybody: China, Japan, the United States, and everybody in 
the region”.1308 This statement makes some inference to a Trumpian logic of geopolitics 
though in repudiation of the Obama administration’s discourse his Assistant Secretary of State 
Susan Thornton has declared that: 
“On the issue of pivot, rebalance, et cetera, that was a word that was used to describe the Asia 
policy in the last administration. I think you can probably expect that this administration will have 
its own formulation and it hasn’t actually, we haven’t seen in detail what the formulation will be or 
if there even will be a formulation”.1309 
Now it seems apparent that the Trump administration will not be a continuation of Obama era 
policies towards China, but the logics of capital and geopolitics remain key features in 
Trump’s discourse of China so far. 
Examining the Trump presidency’s foreign policy towards China would benefit from 
combining the three logics presented here with an approach outlined by Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff. They study “corporate elite networks”, using social network 
analysis and detailed biographical data, to explore the social sources of grand strategy making 
to see how public state power relates to social private power.1310 They elaborate on a nexus 
that exists between individuals based in transnational capital and the US government to 
demonstrate the close relationship between corporate and state interests in US foreign 
policy.1311 What this might entail is examining the thought of one of Trump’s economic 
advisor Peter Navarro who has published numerous tracts on US-China relations including 
Death by China and The Coming Wars, and the marginally more refined Crouching Tiger: 
What China’s Militarism means for the World.1312 Evident in Navarro’s work is an inversion 
of the principal US understanding of the logic of capital where the incorporation of China into 
                                                
1308 Donald J. Trump: "The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan," February 
10, 2017. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123196. 
1309 Ankit Panda, ‘Straight From the US State Department: The 'Pivot' to Asia Is Over’, The Diplomat 
(http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/straight-from-the-us-state-department-the-pivot-to-asia-is-over/, 20 March 
2017). 
1310 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff, American Grand Strategy and Corporate Elite Networks (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2016). 
1311 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn and Nana de Graff, ‘The Limits of Open Door Imperialism and the US State-Capital 
Nexus’, Globalization 9 (2012): 593-608. 
1312 Adam Davidson, ‘Trump’s Muse on U.S. Trade with China, October 12 2016’, The New Yorker 
(http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/trumps-muse-on-u-s-trade-with-china, 15 December 2016); Peter 
Navarro and Greg Autry, Death by China Confronting the Dragon- A Global Call to Action (New Jersey: 
Pearson Publication, 2011); Peter Navarro, The Coming China Wars (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2008); 
Peter Navarro, Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World (New York: Prometheus Books, 
2015). 
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the global economic system beginning in the 1980s has undermined the US manufacturing 
sector. This is in stark contrast to Obama’s argument that China is now fundamental to the 
maintenance of the global economic system.  
The most important part of this research though, is how it should ideally serve as the 
beginning of a broader engagement with US foreign policy and China and not some kind of 
absolute conclusion that captures the entirety complexity of the relationship. Whatever might 
occur during the Trump presidency, it is unlikely that the US-China relationship will become 
of any lesser importance in the near future and so maintaining a critical attitude to US 
discourses of China in the present by way of engaging with the history invoked by those 
contemporary discourses will remain a necessary exercise. 
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